A broader discussion of "freedom" was requested after a recent tangent of mine touched upon it. A circumspect discussion of the word-concept "freedom" might prevent many of the tangled and irresolvable arguments that occur when using it (such as the free will thread) without cautious reflection upon what it means, entails, or presupposes, and after such thoughts, if it retains a palatable sense at all.
I previously wrote, "For one to suppose that the categorical concept "freedom" is meaningful or an actual condition is to ignore states of being."
And later,
I would like to emphasize some of the above. Free-dom (remember I am discussing this categorically, such as "Land of the Free" or "freewill"), the state of being free, presupposes the concept "free", that "free" is an actual relationship (or rather a state with no relationships). This, to me, is the heart of the problem, and precisely what I meant by "ignores states of being".
Freedom denies being.
A robust ontology acknowledges simultaneous and parallel relationships (states of being). A metaphysics of categorical freedom is quite extreme, and dispenses with the complexity of existence in one stroke. Ontology says, "being is a burdening"; freedom arises in response to this, motivated primarily by denial, and announces, "there is nothing outside unmitigated will."
Both "deconstruction" and psychoanalysis reveal more of the framework and impetus for freedom. First, as deconstructionist texts (all texts) show so brilliantly (and Im generalizing greatly here), "categories" undermine themselves during formulation. This is a grievous blow to both "free" and "free-dom". Furthermore, the motivation for positing "free" owes much to compensation recoiling from assailed existence.
I hope this sheds light on why I find discussions that make use of "freedom" as something viable uninteresting and distasteful (what amounts to common denial), and wish to shift our focus to "free play" or the space for negotiation within ontology (and thereby, actual and potent will).
I previously wrote, "For one to suppose that the categorical concept "freedom" is meaningful or an actual condition is to ignore states of being."
And later,
"Free-dom, the state of "free", the absence of restraint and necessity, the availability and exercise of choice and independence, freedom from controlling force, freedom to exercise will. This concept is pure fantasy when understood categorically (I would argue that this is now entrenched in the very construction of the word).
It thinks not of "thrown-ness", the condition of existence we in each case find ourselves. It disregards our being-in-the-world, that we are assailed by presence, and do not choose how something can come to exist (the enabling condition of being), it is oblivious to historicity, that we are a lineage of genetics and acculturation, we are born into a family, community, society, hierarchy, with endless restrictions, rules, and policies that condition our existence, languages that structure and set limits to conceptualization and expression. Freedom clings to linear causality, a reductionist method that seeks to tear states of affairs from their context to "simplify matters" and affirm the fleeting power of human will. This, and so much more that I cannot list, is what the category "freedom" passes over and obliterates once set as a foundation for metaphysical systems.
A much more rigorous idea is that of our "free play", the room for our engagement (negotiation) within the conditions of our existence."
I would like to emphasize some of the above. Free-dom (remember I am discussing this categorically, such as "Land of the Free" or "freewill"), the state of being free, presupposes the concept "free", that "free" is an actual relationship (or rather a state with no relationships). This, to me, is the heart of the problem, and precisely what I meant by "ignores states of being".
Freedom denies being.
A robust ontology acknowledges simultaneous and parallel relationships (states of being). A metaphysics of categorical freedom is quite extreme, and dispenses with the complexity of existence in one stroke. Ontology says, "being is a burdening"; freedom arises in response to this, motivated primarily by denial, and announces, "there is nothing outside unmitigated will."
Both "deconstruction" and psychoanalysis reveal more of the framework and impetus for freedom. First, as deconstructionist texts (all texts) show so brilliantly (and Im generalizing greatly here), "categories" undermine themselves during formulation. This is a grievous blow to both "free" and "free-dom". Furthermore, the motivation for positing "free" owes much to compensation recoiling from assailed existence.
I hope this sheds light on why I find discussions that make use of "freedom" as something viable uninteresting and distasteful (what amounts to common denial), and wish to shift our focus to "free play" or the space for negotiation within ontology (and thereby, actual and potent will).