The Cyrenaics

Jesus, then define transcendent. Is anything transcendent? Is transcendence perhaps a personal thing (as the Cyrenaics postulate with pleasure, morals, etc)? Some may find transcendence in sex, some in drugs, some in art, some in math, etc.

Fuzzy term, rather abstract meaning. But it does not mean overwhelming or warping of senses... If it did, than it is hollow. To associate transcendence with pleasure removes any real meaning the term had.
 
Έρεβος;6202618 said:
Fuzzy term, rather abstract meaning. But it does not mean overwhelming or warping of senses... If it did, than it is hollow. To associate transcendence with pleasure removes any real meaning the term had.

Well then you have no argument. If you cant define transcendence, (and I will refrain from other barbs in respect of Scourge), then how can you argue something is not transcendent?

And worse, you're starting to remind me of some young Ignatius Reilly.
 
Έρεβος;6202618 said:
Fuzzy term, rather abstract meaning. But it does not mean overwhelming or warping of senses... If it did, than it is hollow. To associate transcendence with pleasure removes any real meaning the term had.


Psychedelic drugs do not merely 'warp the senses.' It appears that you have very little knowledge of their subjective effects.
 
Έρεβος' skepticism here is well-founded; "transcendence" is relational, something X trans-scends (going "across, over, or beyond" in an "upward movement") limit(s) Y. It remains obscure (as Demiurge and Έρεβος have stated) what limit, event, or horizon is transcended, and how or why this transcendence occurs and functions.

I don't find the argument that sex "transcends the physical" very helpful, as it is mistaken (like any strict dualism) to think that sex could ever be "purely physical" and that one is doing something special ("transcendent") by acknowledging the psychical/"spiritual" aspects. I don't think speed is really arguing for such a division as he states, "[t]he mind and the body truly are one." The issue remains obscure.

However, Demiurge offered the following:

Sex is 'transcendent' in the sense that it eradicates individuality. When one is in the thralls of pleasure, a certain conceptual vacuity takes hold. One becomes lost to the world of things and abstract ideas with which he is normally concerned. The thoughts that one usually uses to individuate himself are ephemerally lost, then when it is over, he sinks back into his persona. Perhaps, another way of saying it is that orgasm cuts away the pretensions with which we shroud ourselves.

I agree that "conceptualization" is peripheral when in the midst of the "thralls of pleasure";but, this is only one aspect of consciousness and identity. Other modes of thinking (including intuition) are not "dormant" at all. Far more is apprehended than can be comprehended; in other words, we think and intuit a great deal more than can be brought to conceptualization.

Thus, I disagree that through sex there is a possibility for transcending "individuality"; partly because I think the matter of "identity" ("persona") and "individuality" are highly complex (they remain mysterious) and cannot be defined and "leaped over" so easily, and, similarly, I don't equate "the individual" with "the conceptual apparatus" (Dasein is certainly not "transcended" during sex).
 
Έρεβος' skepticism here is well-founded; "transcendence" is relational, something X trans-scends (going "across, over, or beyond" in an "upward movement") limit(s) Y. It remains obscure (as Demiurge and Έρεβος have stated) what limit, event, or horizon is transcended, and how or why this transcendence occurs and functions.

I don't find the argument that sex "transcends the physical" very helpful, as it is mistaken (like any strict dualism) to think that sex could ever be "purely physical" and that one is doing something special ("transcendent") by acknowledging the psychical/"spiritual" aspects. I don't think speed is really arguing for such a division as he states, "[t]he mind and the body truly are one." The issue remains obscure.

However, Demiurge offered the following:



I agree that "conceptualization" is peripheral when in the midst of the "thralls of pleasure";but, this is only one aspect of consciousness and identity. Other modes of thinking (including intuition) are not "dormant" at all. Far more is apprehended than can be comprehended; in other words, we think and intuit a great deal more than can be brought to conceptualization.

Thus, I disagree that through sex there is a possibility for transcending "individuality"; partly because I think the matter of "identity" ("persona") and "individuality" are highly complex (they remain mysterious) and cannot be defined and "leaped over" so easily, and, similarly, I don't equate "the individual" with "the conceptual apparatus" (Dasein is certainly not "transcended" during sex).

I admit, I havent really thought about it in philosophical vein. Its such a primal and basic drive, that brings such pleasure--and almost always (well, for me) transcendent pleasure, I clearly inferred (thinking clearly that everyone would agree, even those youngins or puritans who havent had sex, and should have masturbated, would have to agree sex is almost an out of body transcendent experience Demiurge best described). This is why I think--especially for the common or even inferior man--that sex is probably the most common transcedent feeling we all experience. However, of course, many never acheive orgasm (apparently according to research, its purely for psychological not physical reasons) or this transcendent love.

I also am concerned with you Justin S, going back to Heidegger for every single idea you have. Really, I dont get it. Surely you have some ideas of your own on this? Even Heidegger had a variety of different and distinct philosophical influences.
 
Anyway, I think Plato through Aristophanes, best descibed this love or transcendent feeling one gets with sex and love in this excerpt from the Symposium:




In the first place, let me treat of the nature of man and what has happened to it; for the original human nature was not like the present, but different. The sexes were not two as they are now, but originally three in number; there was man, woman, and the union of the two, having a name corresponding to this double nature, which had once a real existence, but is now lost, and the word "Androgynous" is only preserved as a term of reproach. In the second place, the primeval man was round, his back and sides forming a circle; and he had four hands and four feet, one head with two faces, looking opposite ways, set on a round neck and precisely alike; also four ears, two privy members, and the remainder to correspond. He could walk upright as men now do, backwards or forwards as he pleased, and he could also roll over and over at a great pace, turning on his four hands and four feet, eight in all, like tumblers going over and over with their legs in the air; this was when he wanted to run fast. Now the sexes were three, and such as I have described them; because the sun, moon, and earth are three;-and the man was originally the child of the sun, the woman of the earth, and the man-woman of the moon, which is made up of sun and earth, and they were all round and moved round and round: like their parents. Terrible was their might and strength, and the thoughts of their hearts were great, and they made an attack upon the gods; of them is told the tale of Otys and Ephialtes who, as Homer says, dared to scale heaven, and would have laid hands upon the gods. Doubt reigned in the celestial councils. Should they kill them and annihilate the race with thunderbolts, as they had done the giants, then there would be an end of the sacrifices and worship which men offered to them; but, on the other hand, the gods could not suffer their insolence to be unrestrained.

At last, after a good deal of reflection, Zeus discovered a way. He said: "Methinks I have a plan which will humble their pride and improve their manners; men shall continue to exist, but I will cut them in two and then they will be diminished in strength and increased in numbers; this will have the advantage of making them more profitable to us. They shall walk upright on two legs, and if they continue insolent and will not be quiet, I will split them again and they shall hop about on a single leg." He spoke and cut men in two, like a sorb-apple which is halved for pickling, or as you might divide an egg with a hair; and as he cut them one after another, he bade Apollo give the face and the half of the neck a turn in order that the man might contemplate the section of himself: he would thus learn a lesson of humility. Apollo was also bidden to heal their wounds and compose their forms. So he gave a turn to the face and pulled the skin from the sides all over that which in our language is called the belly, like the purses which draw in, and he made one mouth at the centre, which he fastened in a knot (the same which is called the navel); he also moulded the breast and took out most of the wrinkles, much as a shoemaker might smooth leather upon a last; he left a few, however, in the region of the belly and navel, as a memorial of the primeval state. After the division the two parts of man, each desiring his other half, came together, and throwing their arms about one another, entwined in mutual embraces, longing to grow into one, they were on the point of dying from hunger and self-neglect, because they did not like to do anything apart; and when one of the halves died and the other survived, the survivor sought another mate, man or woman as we call them, being the sections of entire men or women, and clung to that. They were being destroyed, when Zeus in pity of them invented a new plan: he turned the parts of generation round to the front, for this had not been always their position and they sowed the seed no longer as hitherto like grasshoppers in the ground, but in one another; and after the transposition the male generated in the female in order that by the mutual embraces of man and woman they might breed, and the race might continue; or if man came to man they might be satisfied, and rest, and go their ways to the business of life: so ancient is the desire of one another which is implanted in us, reuniting our original nature, making one of two, and healing the state of man.

Each of us when separated, having one side only, like a flat fish, is but the indenture of a man, and he is always looking for his other half. Men who are a section of that double nature which was once called Androgynous are lovers of women; adulterers are generally of this breed, and also adulterous women who lust after men: the women who are a section of the woman do not care for men, but have female attachments; the female companions are of this sort. But they who are a section of the male follow the male, and while they are young, being slices of the original man, they hang about men and embrace them, and they are themselves the best of boys and youths, because they have the most manly nature. Some indeed assert that they are shameless, but this is not true; for they do not act thus from any want of shame, but because they are valiant and manly, and have a manly countenance, and they embrace that which is like them. And these when they grow up become our statesmen, and these only, which is a great proof of the truth of what I am saving. When they reach manhood they are loves of youth, and are not naturally inclined to marry or beget children,-if at all, they do so only in obedience to the law; but they are satisfied if they may be allowed to live with one another unwedded; and such a nature is prone to love and ready to return love, always embracing that which is akin to him. And when one of them meets with his other half, the actual half of himself, whether he be a lover of youth or a lover of another sort, the pair are lost in an amazement of love and friendship and intimacy, and would not be out of the other's sight, as I may say, even for a moment: these are the people who pass their whole lives together; yet they could not explain what they desire of one another. For the intense yearning which each of them has towards the other does not appear to be the desire of lover's intercourse, but of something else which the soul of either evidently desires and cannot tell, and of which she has only a dark and doubtful presentiment. Suppose Hephaestus, with his instruments, to come to the pair who are lying side, by side and to say to them, "What do you people want of one another?" they would be unable to explain. And suppose further, that when he saw their perplexity he said: "Do you desire to be wholly one; always day and night to be in one another's company? for if this is what you desire, I am ready to melt you into one and let you grow together, so that being two you shall become one, and while you live a common life as if you were a single man, and after your death in the world below still be one departed soul instead of two-I ask whether this is what you lovingly desire, and whether you are satisfied to attain this?"-there is not a man of them who when he heard the proposal would deny or would not acknowledge that this meeting and melting into one another, this becoming one instead of two, was the very expression of his ancient need. And the reason is that human nature was originally one and we were a whole, and the desire and pursuit of the whole is called love. There was a time, I say, when we were one, but now because of the wickedness of mankind God has dispersed us, as the Arcadians were dispersed into villages by the Lacedaemonians. And if we are not obedient to the gods, there is a danger that we shall be split up again and go about in basso-relievo, like the profile figures having only half a nose which are sculptured on monuments, and that we shall be like tallies.
 
I admit, I havent really thought about it in philosophical vein. Its such a primal and basic drive, that brings such pleasure--and almost always (well, for me) transcendent pleasure, I clearly inferred (thinking clearly that everyone would agree, even those youngins or puritans who havent had sex, and should have masturbated, would have to agree sex is almost an out of body transcendent experience Demiurge best described). This is why I think--especially for the common or even inferior man--that sex is probably the most common transcedent feeling we all experience. However, of course, many never acheive orgasm (apparently according to research, its purely for psychological not physical reasons) or this transcendent love.

The gratification and satisfaction one can gain from pleasurable sex (and its "primal nature") is not being disputed here. The issue is the claim that these experiences/responses are "transcendent" while leaving unexplained how or why this is the case, or even what is meant by "transcendence". Appealing to assumptions, "self-evidency", and the "psychological" deficiencies of those who question this claim adds nothing to your "argument".

I also am concerned with you Justin S, going back to Heidegger for every single idea you have. Really, I dont get it. Surely you have some ideas of your own on this? Even Heidegger had a variety of different and distinct philosophical influences.

I don't know how you can expect me to interpret this in any way but as insulting. Not only are your statements of "concern" unfair, but entirely inaccurate. Other than the explicit mention of Dasein in the last sentence, the post is much more informed by Kant (the issues of concept and intuition) and the problems of the Cartesian tradition. Dasein is referenced here because of how Heidegger's analytic challenges the notions of subjectivity that the arguments (for sexual transcendency) draw from in this thread. I reference it generally because most on this board do not show concern for such an important "framework" that renders many "problems" and arguments null. As long as it goes ignored, I will continue to offer it in argument. Furthermore, my current studies are entwined with Heidegger's work, so it is rather easy to see why that would have an influence on my thinking, as your reading of the Ancients conditions yours.
 
I also am concerned with you Justin S, going back to Heidegger for every single idea you have. Really, I dont get it. Surely you have some ideas of your own on this?

I find the concept of philosophical 'ideas' quite distasteful. In my view philosophy is not a toolbox to apply to a pre-existing 'life' that is in itself clear, self-evident and defined by common sense. Philosophy is ALL thought. It would really be a severe betrayal of Heidegger's work to use it as an 'idea' to fit into the standard analytic hegemony, or as a variety of pick and mix philosophical candy amongst many others. His thinking is antithetical to these means of appropriation.

In my view there was no need for Justin to be defensive here in explaining (correctly) how his post engages with different thinkers. With respect, and calmy my friend, if you are concerned about 'going back to Heidegger,' perhaps I am concerned with the framework of 'ideas' that you seem to stretch great thinkers out upon. Without wishing to speak for Justin, I suspect it is this crucial difference - how 'philosophy' is to be understood and interpreted - that causes your exasperation.

Finally, I do not see any value in 'unique' or novel 'ideas' simply for their own sake. I believe Heidegger did not 'invent' Dasein, but discovered it. In questioning being, he questioned the great elephant in the room of philosophy. His concerns in raising this question resound through continental thought since. For me, it would be impossible and supremely distasteful to intentionally refrain from engaging with this supremely important question with the aim of appearing 'novel' when repsonding to this thread, or to 'pick another' 'philosopher' for the misguided purpose of 'diversity' on an UltimateMetal philosophy board.

Justin: Clearly your thought is engaging and gives a sober and considered foundation to the discussion here. I applaud your stance.
 
I think an important consideration here is the role of the ‘other’ in sex. When having loving sex, one partner attempts to posses the freedoms of the other. That is, the being of the other is for-me, but paradoxically it is for-me in its freedom to be for-itself. Each lover wishes to be an ontological root of their partner’s Being-in-the-World, to be the foundation of their partner’s freedom. For example, I might choose to arrange the world in its distance from my partner, my time in accordance to her activities. She would possess my freedom.

Because both loving partners attempt this ‘possession’ at the same time, there is an irresolvable tension in sex where each partner is both the object and subject of their mutual disclosures. One partner attempts to reveal the other in her flesh through his caresses, but his task is futile; the partner never fully submits as an object of flesh, and continues to reveal the partner doing the touching, either in his touching or through her own. In the wake of this conflict, - a constant slipping between object and subject - whatever is meant by ‘transcendence’ seems unlikely to occur.

When one has non-loving sex, one often either engages in sadism, in which the other is merely an object for possession, or in masochism, in which the other is he that reveals self's ontology. Just as god reveals the being of man as sinful or virtuous, kind or wicked, the sadist tries to reveal the being of the other as for-himself. The other’s flesh becomes a canvas upon which to exert his will, as a God. The masochist, on the contrary, desires the passivity of theism – that is, to be revealed. Of course, these revelations last only until orgasm, and are still, at core, inauthentic roleplay. The masochist's being is still for-itself in its willed comportment as an object for his partner; the sadist is not divine, but is for-his-partner as he-that-reveals-as-an-object. In neither case can I detect anything that might be called 'transcendent.'

In light of the tremendous parallels between sado-masochism and monotheism, I would like to advance the proposal that true sado-masochism can only be carried out in an atheistic bent. One must not be ‘for-god’ if he is to attempt, in sex, - forever without success - to wholly be ‘for-himself’ or ‘for another.’
 
I'm not going to talk about sex, but about this hedonistic idea as proposed by the Cyrenaics.

Perhaps it is the case that people do act according to what gives them immediate pleasure - but what if someone has the feeling that they should bear in mind the future consequences to themselves of their activities, and this thought entirely prevents them from enjoying the kind of pleasures that others can indulge in on the spur of the moment? Perhaps a feeling that what they are doing is "wrong" comes over that person and would spoil the pleasure unless they rectify this by doing what feels "right". And only by so doing can they ever feel pleasure.

Anyone with such an instinct is lucky - because they have a chance of having long-term pleasure rather than wrecking future pleasure by a short-sightedness that is foolish. Behaviour in this respect corresponds to the developement of the frontal cortex of the brain. This is where the brain processes thoughts to do with foresight.

Although skull shape does not always match the inherited brain form, a high-browed individual will have greater capacity for foresight than someone low-browed.

Just think of the term "high brow" and the kind of character that it implies compared to "low brow". The "low brow" people are more animalistic and much more into immediate gratification than are the "high brow" people. There is truth in this apparant cliche.

Some of us actually get the most pleasure from acting in what we feel is a responsible manner, and anything else is neurotic behaviour and the product of confused thinking. That is not to say that such a person is not tempted to wonder if indeed there is greater pleasure to be had in behaving irresponsibly - since so many others seem to be experiencing this. But really the pleasure would be elusive for someone of this character and they would only achieve pleasure by considering that the consequences of their actions were going to be positive.

Nietzche's ubermench are supposed to derive great pleasure from eternal struggle/challenge. How starkly does that contrast to those who see struggle as something to avoid at all costs and prefer a mental state of easy indulgence?

Perhaps we are all motivated by pleasure, but our ideas of pleasure are not all the same. Some people who seem to be keen on avoiding hedonistic pleasure may really be deriving pleasure from what they do.

I have to go and excercise now and don't have time to check if what I just wrote (after drinking half a bottle of wine) is stupid or not.
 
what if someone has the feeling that they should bear in mind the future consequences to themselves of their activities, and this thought entirely prevents them from enjoying the kind of pleasures that others can indulge in on the spur of the moment?

Then they're not a Cyrenaic, because they value life or future happiness or quantity of pleasure you might say over the immediate quality of actualized pleasure as the highest good, to which any other possible goods are indeed inferior and worth sacrificing.

I'm not sure how close Epicurianism is to this theory, but I think it fits well what Epicurus said, "There is nothing dreadful in life for the man who has truly comprehended that there is nothing terrible in not living." Only those who really feel living today to the fullest at the expense of a thousand tomorrows is something terrible will feel the 'right and wrong' you're talking about there. If they accept Epicurus' claim about the meaninglessness of life, truly embrace it, they indeed have no reason to sacrifice the real for the potential, the now for the future. (as much as I love this quote, I haven't truly let go of emotion attachments to the contrary, and thus I think indeed most of us would not behave as a Cyrenaic, perhaps only those who know death is on it's way, and thus actually know they have no future, no experience beyond that of today, and thus live today in hedonistic full flight.)
 
clealy I like the word 'thus'
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A population of Cyrenaics would look with envy at any civilisation run by those who plan ahead and behave in a socially responsible manner. They would be angry that these other people had more wealth than they had and would feel that it was not fair.

Perhaps they would be helped by attempts to lift them out of their poverty by kind hearted benefactors from this other civilisation. (The Cyrenaics couldn't actually maintain any civilisation at all). These benefactors may believe that it is misfortune that put the Cyrenaics into their dire position, and not that this was caused instead by their inability to behave responsibly and forgo immediate pleasures for the sake of longer term stability. The Cyrenaics for their part would show no gratitude and would tend to view their benefactors with a mixture of envy and bemusement (seeing them as suckers to be exploited).
 
I think an important consideration here is the role of the ‘other’ in sex. When having loving sex, one partner attempts to posses the freedoms of the other. That is, the being of the other is for-me, but paradoxically it is for-me in its freedom to be for-itself. Each lover wishes to be an ontological root of their partner’s Being-in-the-World, to be the foundation of their partner’s freedom. For example, I might choose to arrange the world in its distance from my partner, my time in accordance to her activities. She would possess my freedom.

Because both loving partners attempt this ‘possession’ at the same time, there is an irresolvable tension in sex where each partner is both the object and subject of their mutual disclosures. One partner attempts to reveal the other in her flesh through his caresses, but his task is futile; the partner never fully submits as an object of flesh, and continues to reveal the partner doing the touching, either in his touching or through her own. In the wake of this conflict, - a constant slipping between object and subject - whatever is meant by ‘transcendence’ seems unlikely to occur.

When one has non-loving sex, one often either engages in sadism, in which the other is merely an object for possession, or in masochism, in which the other is he that reveals self's ontology. Just as god reveals the being of man as sinful or virtuous, kind or wicked, the sadist tries to reveal the being of the other as for-himself. The other’s flesh becomes a canvas upon which to exert his will, as a God. The masochist, on the contrary, desires the passivity of theism – that is, to be revealed. Of course, these revelations last only until orgasm, and are still, at core, inauthentic roleplay. The masochist's being is still for-itself in its willed comportment as an object for his partner; the sadist is not divine, but is for-his-partner as he-that-reveals-as-an-object. In neither case can I detect anything that might be called 'transcendent.'

In light of the tremendous parallels between sado-masochism and monotheism, I would like to advance the proposal that true sado-masochism can only be carried out in an atheistic bent. One must not be ‘for-god’ if he is to attempt, in sex, - forever without success - to wholly be ‘for-himself’ or ‘for another.’

Excellent comments--a continuation of our discussion in the Sartre's ideas of Love thread.
 
The gratification and satisfaction one can gain from pleasurable sex (and its "primal nature") is not being disputed here. The issue is the claim that these experiences/responses are "transcendent" while leaving unexplained how or why this is the case, or even what is meant by "transcendence". Appealing to assumptions, "self-evidency", and the "psychological" deficiencies of those who question this claim adds nothing to your "argument".



I don't know how you can expect me to interpret this in any way but as insulting. Not only are your statements of "concern" unfair, but entirely inaccurate. Other than the explicit mention of Dasein in the last sentence, the post is much more informed by Kant (the issues of concept and intuition) and the problems of the Cartesian tradition. Dasein is referenced here because of how Heidegger's analytic challenges the notions of subjectivity that the arguments (for sexual transcendency) draw from in this thread. I reference it generally because most on this board do not show concern for such an important "framework" that renders many "problems" and arguments null. As long as it goes ignored, I will continue to offer it in argument. Furthermore, my current studies are entwined with Heidegger's work, so it is rather easy to see why that would have an influence on my thinking, as your reading of the Ancients conditions yours.

Well, can we even have a dicussion of whether something is transcendent, if no one will agree on what transcendence is? And yes, my argument wasnt me at my best. I perhaps inferred too much of why someone would not agree sex is a transcendent pleasure, and started bringing up the muck.

And whoa, I think I offended without the intention to offend. Poor word choice around philosophers is never a good idea. I merely get tired of reading about Heidegger is all--much like you get tired of reading my classical ravings.
 
A population of Cyrenaics would look with envy at any civilisation run by those who plan ahead and behave in a socially responsible manner. They would be angry that these other people had more wealth than they had and would feel that it was not fair.

Perhaps they would be helped by attempts to lift them out of their poverty by kind hearted benefactors from this other civilisation. (The Cyrenaics couldn't actually maintain any civilisation at all). These benefactors may believe that it is misfortune that put the Cyrenaics into their dire position, and not that this was caused instead by their inability to behave responsibly and forgo immediate pleasures for the sake of longer term stability. The Cyrenaics for their part would show no gratitude and would tend to view their benefactors with a mixture of envy and bemusement (seeing them as suckers to be exploited).

If this is not the living definition of the modern underclasses of the western world and their compulsively "compassionate" bourgeois benefactors, I don't know what would be.
 
A population of Cyrenaics would look with envy at any civilisation run by those who plan ahead and behave in a socially responsible manner.
A population of non-Cyrenaics in a society run by Cyrenaics would. The Cyrenaics though, should feel no reason not to carpe deim and rob the nice wealthy people and party it up for a day.

Perhaps they would be helped by attempts to lift them out of their poverty by kind hearted benefactors from this other civilisation. (The Cyrenaics couldn't actually maintain any civilisation at all).
I agree. It's a way of life, a philosophy for individuals, not a way of nation, a philosophy to unite a people toward some distant and impersonal good of others.
 
A population of non-Cyrenaics in a society run by Cyrenaics would. The Cyrenaics though, should feel no reason not to carpe deim and rob the nice wealthy people and party it up for a day.

So the Cyrenaics are prone to criminality, and this has nothing to do with not being given chances, or because of their poverty, or supposed discrimination from non-Cyrenaics, but simply because they will not behave in a responsible manner. But those crafty Cyrenaics would rather like to induce guilt in the non-Cyrenaics by claiming to be oppressed. (And the Cyrenaics probably even convince themselves that this is true).
 
So the Cyrenaics are prone to criminality, and this has nothing to do with not being given chances, or because of their poverty, or supposed discrimination from non-Cyrenaics, but simply because they will not behave in a responsible manner. But those crafty Cyrenaics would rather like to induce guilt in the non-Cyrenaics by claiming to be oppressed. (And the Cyrenaics probably even convince themselves that this is true).

sounds good.
 
However, Demiurge offered the following:



I agree that "conceptualization" is peripheral when in the midst of the "thralls of pleasure";but, this is only one aspect of consciousness and identity. Other modes of thinking (including intuition) are not "dormant" at all. Far more is apprehended than can be comprehended; in other words, we think and intuit a great deal more than can be brought to conceptualization.

Thus, I disagree that through sex there is a possibility for transcending "individuality"; partly because I think the matter of "identity" ("persona") and "individuality" are highly complex (they remain mysterious) and cannot be defined and "leaped over" so easily, and, similarly, I don't equate "the individual" with "the conceptual apparatus" (Dasein is certainly not "transcended" during sex).

I was using spirited language for that post and I sacrificed rigor in the process. It is easily dissected, but it was not really my intention to proffer an argument. Anyway, yes, there is more to identity than is lost in orgasm. I agree. Perhaps, we might amend the post to 'one transcends conceptual thought during sexual orgasm.'

One point that can be clarified is that I did not mean 'identity' by 'persona.' I meant the outward appearance of one's identity that one projects for others, which might, but I expect often does not, correspond exactly to one's 'inner' sense of identity.