Moreover, if it were demonstrated that free will is nonexistent, then there would be no sense in claiming that one can freely choose to "fully embrace" some idea.
That you can "make a choice" to embrace some view of the world is not inconsistent with the idea that there is no free will.
What makes human experience relevant if we *do* have 'free will' then?
What reason would that be?
Would the knowledge that you were some pawn in a hyperdimensional entities chess game provide your existence with reason and meaning? Personally I don't find the knowledge of what others intend for me at all reassuring or meaning-giving - whether or not some divine entity has a purpose for me is irrelevant to any decision on 'meaning' I make for my existence.
If we have free will, so do subatomic particles, mathematicians claim to prove.
Human free will might seem like the squishiest of philosophical subjects, way beyond the realm of mathematical demonstration. But two highly regarded Princeton mathematicians, John Conway and Simon Kochen, claim to have proven that if humans have even the tiniest amount of free will, then atoms themselves must also behave unpredictably.
The finding won’t give many physicists a moment’s worry, because traditional interpretations of quantum mechanics embrace unpredictability already. The best anyone can hope to do, quantum theory says, is predict the probability that a particle will behave in a certain way.
But physicists all the way back to Einstein have been unhappy with this idea. Einstein famously grumped, “God does not play dice.” And indeed, ever since the birth of quantum mechanics, some physicists have offered alternate interpretations of its equations that aim to get rid of this indeterminism. The most famous alternative is attributed to the physicist David Bohm, who argued in the 1950s that the behavior of subatomic particles is entirely determined by “hidden variables” that cannot be observed.
But Gerard ’t Hooft of the University of Utrecht in the Netherlands, who won the Nobel Prize in physics in 1999, says the pair’s conclusions are legitimate — but he chooses determinism over free will. “As a determined determinist I would say that yes, you bet, an experimenter's choice what to measure was fixed from the dawn of time, and so were the properties of the thing he decided to call a photon,” ’t Hooft says. “If you believe in determinism, you have to believe it all the way. No escape possible. Conway and Kochen have shown here in a beautiful way that a half-hearted belief in pseudo-determinism is impossible to sustain.”