Heidegger

[Nile577]

1(a... (a leaf falls on loneliness)

1(a

le
af
fa
ll

s)
one
l

iness

- e.e. cummings

somewhere i have never travelled, glady beyond

somewhere i have never travelled,gladly beyond
any experience,your eyes have their silence:
in your most frail gesture are things which enclose me,
or which i cannot touch because they are too near

your slightest look will easily unclose me
though i have closed myself as fingers,
you open always petal by petal myself as Spring opens
(touching skilfully,mysteriously)her first rose

or if your wish be to close me, i and
my life will shut very beautifully, suddenly,
as when the heart of this flower imagines
the snow carefully everywhere descending;
nothing which we are to perceive in this world equals
the power of your intense fragility:whose texture
compels me with the color of its countries,
rendering death and forever with each breathing

(i do not know what it is about you that closes
and opens;only something in me understands
the voice of your eyes is deeper than all roses)
nobody,not even the rain,has such small hands

- e e cummings

 

[Nile577]

Pirate and Osbie Feel are learning on their roof-ledge, a magnificent sunset across and up the winding river, the imperial serpent, crowds of factories, flats, parks, smoky spires and gables, incandescent sky casting downward across the miles of deep streets and roofs cluttering and sinuous river Thames a drastic strain of burnt orange to remind a visitor of his mortal transience here, to seal or empty all the doors and windows in sight to his eyes that look only for a bit of company, a word or two in the street before he goes up to the soap-heavy smell of the rented room and the squares of coral sunset on the floorboards - an antique light, self-absorbed, fuel consumed in the metered winter holocaust, the more distant shapes among the threads of or sheets of smoke now perfect ash ruins of themselves, nearer windows, struck a moment by the sun, not reflecting at all but containing the same destroying light, this intense fading in which there is no promise of return, light that rusts the government cars at the curbsides, varnishes the last faces hurrying past the shops in the cold as if a vast siren had finally sounded, light that makes chilled untraveled canals of many streets, and that fills with the starlings of London, converging by millions to hazy stone pedestals, to emptying squares and a great collective sleep. They flow in rings, concentric rings, on the radar screens. The operators call them "angels"

- Thomas Pynchon. Gravity's Rainbow.

 

[Nile577]

The sun had not yet risen. The sea was indistinguishable from the sky, except that the sea was slightly creased as if a cloth had wrinkles in it. Gradually as the sky whitened a dark line lay on the horizon dividing the sea from the sky and the grey cloth became barred with thick strokes moving, one after another, beneath the surface, following each other, pursuing each other, perpetually.

As they neared the shore each bar rose, heaped itself, broke and swept a thin veil of white water across the sand. The wave paused, and then drew out again, sighing like a sleeper whose breath comes and goes unconsciously. Gradually the dark bar on the horizon became clear as if the sediment in an old wine-bottle had sunk and left the glass green. Behind it, too, the sky cleared as if the white sediment there had sunk, or as if the arm of a woman couched beneath the horizon had raised a lamp and flat bars of white, green and yellow spread across the sky like the blades of a fan. Then she raised her lamp higher and the air seemed to become fibrous and to tear away from the green surface flickering and flaming in red and yellow fibres like the smoky fire that roars from a bonfire. Gradually the fibres of the burning bonfire were fused into one haze, one incandescence which lifted the weight of the woollen grey sky on top of it and turned it to a million atoms of soft blue. The surface of the sea slowly became transparent and lay rippling and sparkling until the dark stripes were almost rubbed out. Slowly the arm that held the lamp raised it higher and then higher until a broad flame became visible; an arc of fire burnt on the rim of the horizon, and all round it the sea blazed gold.

The light struck upon the trees in the garden, making one leaf transparent and then another. One bird chirped high up; there was a pause; another chirped lower down. The sun sharpened the walls of the house, and rested like the tip of a fan upon a white blind and made a blue finger-print of shadow under the leaf by the bedroom window. The blind stirred slightly, but all within was dim and unsubstantial. The birds sang their blank melody outside.

- Virginia Woolf, The Waves.

 

[Nile577]

How I loathe the servitude people try to hold up to me as being so valuable. I pity the man who is condemned to it, who cannot generally escape it, but it is not the burden of his labour that disposes me in his favour, it is - it can only be - the vigour of his protest against it. I know that at a factory furnace, or in front of one of those inexorable machines which all day long, at a few seconds' interval, impose the repetition of the same gesture, or anywhere else, under the least acceptable orders, in a cell or before a firing squad, one can still feel free: but it is not the martyrdom one undergoes which creates this freedom. It is, I mean, a perpetual unfettering: yet for this unfettering to be possible, constantly possible, the fetters must not crush us as they do many of those you mention. But it is also, and perhaps in human terms, much more, the relatively long but marvellous series of steps which man may make unfettered. Do you suppose these people capable of taking such steps? Have they even the time for them. Have they the heart?...

We are in front of a fountain, whose jet she seems to be watching. "Those are your thoughts and mine. Look where they all start from. How high they reach, and then how it's still prettier when they fall back. And they dissolve immediately, driven back up with the same strength, then there's that broken spurt again, that fall... and so on indefinitely."

- Andre Breton, Nadja

 

[Nile577]

riverrun, past Eve and Adam's, from swerve of shore to bend of bay, brings us by a commodius vicus of recirculation back to Howth Castle and Environs.

Sir Tristram, violer d'amores, fr'over the short sea, had passen- core rearrived from North Armorica on this side the scraggy isthmus of Europe Minor to wielderfight his penisolate war: nor had topsawyer's rocks by the stream Oconee exaggerated themselse to Laurens County's gorgios while they went doublin their mumper all the time: nor avoice from afire bellowsed mishe mishe to tauftauf thuartpeatrick: not yet, though venissoon after, had a kidscad buttended a bland old isaac: not yet, though all's fair in vanessy, were sosie sesthers wroth with twone nathandjoe. Rot a peck of pa's malt had Jhem or Shen brewed by arclight and rory end to the regginbrow was to be seen ringsome on the aquaface.

The fall
(bababadalgharaghtakamminarronnkonnbronntonnerronntuonnthunntrovarrhounawnskawntoohoohoordenenthurnuk!) of a once wallstrait oldparr is retaled early in bed and later on life down through all christian minstrelsy. The great fall of the offwall entailed at such short notice the pftjschute of Finnegan, erse solid man, that the humptyhillhead of humself prumptly sends an unquiring one well to the west in quest of his tumptytumtoes: and their upturnpikepointandplace is at the knock out in the park where oranges have been laid to rust upon the green since devlinsfirst loved livvy.

- James Joyce. Finnegans Wake. Full Online Version

 

[Nile577]

This is perhaps, a more direct way to put it. And Im glad you did Cythraul. The mainstream criticism of Heidegger of course, is that his ideas are actually quite simple, and because of this, he purposely clouded and obsfucated his ideas to make them acceptable to academics and other intellectuals.

But, this is my problem, that I tried to explain with a little sarcasm (and failed): what's so wrong with these simple but profound ideas? And why do his followers, and academics in the Heideggerian tradition, go to such lengths to keep others from understanding? Ive read Poe's Purloined Letter a few times, but I havent the slightest clue what Justin S was talking about. It seemed a very well-written and reasoned paper, but it presupposed a high level of Heideggerian knowledge. Its almost like a Heideggerian Masonic lodge or something. And one is not allowed in unless one wishes to spend a great deal of time digesting this stuff.

Again, Im sorry, and Im not a philosopher but a crazy American dilletante.

Genuinely, I found Justin's paper on Derrida extremely interesting, thought provoking and quite possible to understand. I honestly don't mean that to be some kind of badge of 'pretence.' I also think his first post here says everything I would say.

How to gain a window in Heidegger's achievement when to describe - with a view to didacticism - is so very un-Heideggerian? He challenges the scientific understanding of man. His friend, the theologian Rudolf Bultmann, proposed that science offered an incorrect ‘begrifflichkeit’ (that is: way of asking) for understanding consciousness and human being. (Even today, consciousness is often considered the ‘last frontier’ of science. Can I, for example, ever directly experience exactly what it is to be, Cythraul?) The thrust of Heidegger’s thought is to propose a new Begrifflichkeit with which to enquire into what he calls ontological Being.

Heidegger considers the entirety of Western thought to have engaged in subtle dogma around the question of Being. So fundamental, so everyday, so utterly familiar is our notion of what we mean when we say something 'is' that it is often taken for granted by science and philosophy, yet common sense engages with the question continuously. Do you not see that in discovering an absurd yet crucial dogma in the history of human thought, neologisms will be needed to articulate it? The very structure of language and 'meaning' is cast anew. Philosophy is no longer a detached ‘system’ of ideas to apply to ‘common sense’ – the question of being is transcendental. In engaging with the question afresh, Heidegger is able to ‘understand’ the Being of Dasein, of human, of life (some of which must forever remain unintelligible).

Heidegger chooses his neologisms with meticulous care. Understand that he pushes 'philosophy' into difficult new areas. In many ways, he might be thought to offer an alternative path of thinking to that chosen by Socrates against the background of his presocratic forefathers. Is it any surprise that, if Western thought has had a mediocre concept of Being for thousands of years, the paradigm of its language will be utterly insufficient to convey a fundamentally different way of thinking? This is nothing less that what Heidegger attempted.

The return to the very origins of thought rightfully requires neologisms.

Let's consider one such example: 'Ab-grund.' In German the word 'ab-grund' means 'abyss.' It is intended to articulate that ground which ultimately prevails, despite hesitating acceptance. The 'ab' prefix - 'from' - gives the sense of 'abstaining' or 'removing' - 'far from here.' In English, translating 'ab-grund' as 'abyss' totally misses the implications of what Heidegger meant by the term. It is better rendered as 'ab-ground' That is: That which is reluctantly grounded. Do you see how the hyphen, far from being obfuscatory, reveals the word in an entirely new etymology? 'das Abhafte des Grundes' is 'what in the ground is of the nature of 'ab' - that is, the nature of staying away.

Heidegger exposes our notions of dogma as to the fixity of common words (be-ing, ek-sist, be-cause) by displaying cracks in our mediocre understanding of them.

 

[Nile577]

Hehe. I dont like Newton either. And whats the big deal about gravity anyway? But you really do take Heidegger pretty seriously, dont you?

Sorry folks anyway. I've just grown tired of reading Heideggerian responses, and my own responses.

Ach, my friend, my comments were supposed to be satirical/somewhat in jest. My post was not Ojeblikketian.

 

[Nile577]

Here is a special video that Speed, Cythraul and OldScratch may enjoy nearly as much as it irks me http://youtube.com/watch?v=UtwFchwL8ME

 

[Nile577]

Anyhow, a few years ago Hubert Dreyfus put a whole year of his Heidegger lectures online in mp3 format - 35 hours dealing section by section with Being and Time for his undergraduate course. It was only available very briefly and I think has long since vanished from the internet. I managed to save a copy from bittorrent - alas it took two months to download, so slow was the speed. I am currently uploading it to megaupload and will post the link here later today. Hopefully it should be more than enough to satisfy any who seek to explore Heidegger's thought further.

 

[derbeder]

It would be really great if you posted the link here, Nile557. Thanks.

A thread on Heidegger may be most fruitful if we have all read some of his important writings (Being and Time at least) and also have some background in at least Husserl (Logical Investigations, Ideas, maybe even The Crisis of the European Sciences). Heidegger is indeed difficult to understand, but his thought in the 20s is not impenetrable and is indeed full of insights. Some of these insights have slowly been gaining recognition in the English speaking philosophy community (and even among researchers in artificial intelligence) through the interpretive work of Hubert Dreyfus. Yet even Dreyfus' interpretation is at best incomplete, since he does not take sufficient note of some of the themes in Heidegger's early thought. Being and Time is an unfinished work and some of the lectures in the late 20s present ideas that were supposed to find their way into Divison 3, which remained unwritten. It is also important to know Heidegger's discussion of Kant's First Critique (in Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics and a course lecture leading to this book). Some of his outlandish statements about logic seem to make sense as polemics against neo-Kantians in the 20s and it is easy to miss this when one does not know of these writings. Also the writings that Dreyfus does not note make the sections of Division 1 that he does interpret stand in a different light.

 

[speed]

Ach, my friend, my comments were supposed to be satirical/somewhat in jest. My post was not Ojeblikketian.

My post was satirical as well.

But I think we've made some real headway on Heidegger here. I know Im pleased when I read most of the posts, even the harsh ones.

 

[speed]

It would be really great if you posted the link to the link here, Nile557. Thanks.

A thread on Heidegger may be most fruitful if we have all read some of his important writings (Being and Time at least) and also have some background in at least Husserl (Logical Investigations, Ideas, maybe even The Crisis of the European Sciences). Heidegger is indeed difficult to understand, but his thought in the 20s is not impenetrable and is indeed full of insights. Some of these insights have slowly been gaining recognition in the English speaking philosophy community (and even among researchers in artificial intelligence) through the interpretive work of Hubert Dreyfus. Yet even Dreyfus' interpretation is at best incomplete, since he does not take sufficient note of some of the themes in Heidegger's early thought. Being and Time is an unfinished work and some of the lectures in the late 20s present ideas that were supposed to find their way into Divison 3, which remained unwritten. It is also important to know Heidegger's discussion of Kant's First Critique (in Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics and a course lecture leading to this book). Some of his outlandish statements about logic seem to make sense as polemics against neo-Kantians in the 20s and it is easy to miss this when one does not know of these writings. Also the writings that Dreyfus does not note make the sections of Division 1 that he does interpret stand in a different light.

Well that is very interesting.

 

[OldScratch]

Stangely(or perhaps not really)enough I find the whole thread altogether useful and instructive - both the critical posts and the thoughtfully illustrative poetry, general observations, etc.(Justin S. your post is not a waste of time at all!) It all collectively provides a range of perspectives on Herr Heidegger(verbose bullshit artist or brilliant philosopher - whichever)that even a pedestrian simpleton such as I can readily digest and comprehend. I appreciate the whole discussion.

*Nile577 - My dinosaur dial-up system will not abide the video-link apparently! Though title alone intrigues me!!

 

[JColtrane]

Well, Heidegger certainly accomplished his goal with his writings. Reading them, one realizes he or she is a being-unto-death so quickly one can barely say "Dasein".

 

[Scourge of God]

Genuinely, I found Justin's paper on Derrida extremely interesting, thought provoking and quite possible to understand. I honestly don't mean that to be some kind of badge of 'pretence.' I also think his first post here says everything I would say.

How to gain a window in Heidegger's achievement when to describe - with a view to didacticism - is so very un-Heideggerian? He challenges the scientific understanding of man. His friend, the theologian Rudolf Bultmann, proposed that science offered an incorrect ‘begrifflichkeit’ (that is: way of asking) for understanding consciousness and human being. (Even today, consciousness is often considered the ‘last frontier’ of science. Can I, for example, ever directly experience exactly what it is to be, Cythraul?) The thrust of Heidegger’s thought is to propose a new Begrifflichkeit with which to enquire into what he calls ontological Being.

Heidegger considers the entirety of Western thought to have engaged in subtle dogma around the question of Being. So fundamental, so everyday, so utterly familiar is our notion of what we mean when we say something 'is' that it is often taken for granted by science and philosophy, yet common sense engages with the question continuously. Do you not see that in discovering an absurd yet crucial dogma in the history of human thought, neologisms will be needed to articulate it? The very structure of language and 'meaning' is cast anew. Philosophy is no longer a detached ‘system’ of ideas to apply to ‘common sense’ – the question of being is transcendental. In engaging with the question afresh, Heidegger is able to ‘understand’ the Being of Dasein, of human, of life (some of which must forever remain unintelligible).

Heidegger chooses his neologisms with meticulous care. Understand that he pushes 'philosophy' into difficult new areas. In many ways, he might be thought to offer an alternative path of thinking to that chosen by Socrates against the background of his presocratic forefathers. Is it any surprise that, if Western thought has had a mediocre concept of Being for thousands of years, the paradigm of its language will be utterly insufficient to convey a fundamentally different way of thinking? This is nothing less that what Heidegger attempted.

The return to the very origins of thought rightfully requires neologisms.

Let's consider one such example: 'Ab-grund.' In German the word 'ab-grund' means 'abyss.' It is intended to articulate that ground which ultimately prevails, despite hesitating acceptance. The 'ab' prefix - 'from' - gives the sense of 'abstaining' or 'removing' - 'far from here.' In English, translating 'ab-grund' as 'abyss' totally misses the implications of what Heidegger meant by the term. It is better rendered as 'ab-ground' That is: That which is reluctantly grounded. Do you see how the hyphen, far from being obfuscatory, reveals the word in an entirely new etymology? 'das Abhafte des Grundes' is 'what in the ground is of the nature of 'ab' - that is, the nature of staying away.

Heidegger exposes our notions of dogma as to the fixity of common words (be-ing, ek-sist, be-cause) by displaying cracks in our mediocre understanding of them.

I recognize the necessity of much of Heidegger's habitual neologizing, but I still maintain that the difficulty of rendering many of these intelligibly into English has significantly inhibited the penetration of Heidegger in particular and Continental philosophy in general in the English speaking world, and it does tend to make Heidegger and people writing about Heidegger linguistically awkward for an English speaker.