“If God does not exist, then everything is permitted”

speed

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“If God does not exist, then everything is permitted”—Dostoevsky


Morality and God—the two go hand-in-hand, don’t they? God, speaking through a prophet, earthly son, angel, occultist or science fiction writer (in the curious case of Mr. L.Ron), lays down a set of earthly rules for his followers to follow if they aim to please their father, supreme creator and arbiter of the afterlife. This code of ethics, this morality is to some religions and Christian sects, as important as faith itself. Dostoevsky stated, “If God does not exist, then everything is permitted,” furthering the bond between God and morality.

What if God does not exist? Does this lay morality and ethics on its head? Who is the new arbiter of right and wrong? What actions will be deemed good or evil? And without God and his tempting reward of heaven, and not so tempting punishment of eternal damnation, is there any actual meaning in ethics and morality? Or, as Voltaire stated: (and probably the inspiration for old Fyodor’s aphorism) “If God did not exist, it would be necessary to invent him.” Can man accept a morality and ethics based not on some supernatural creation and basis for judgment in the afterlife, but merely for his own temporal earthly benefit? Or is this too impossible? Does man perhaps mistrust his fellow man too much: does jealously, pity, domination, wealth, etc, make such an ethics impossible? Is this why Voltaire made his aphorism?
 
Morality and God—the two go hand-in-hand, don’t they?

no. To me, the first issue is to refute both God and Intrinsic Value, for otherwise there may be 'absolute' or 'objective' morality. then you have to address relativism, secular morality. Even the likes of Buddhism has 'morality' without making an appeal all the way up to 'God' to justify it. there is a strong relation where the further from an absolute god a religion is the less moral commandment it gives, but it isn't a prerequisite for morality in my view.

I take the view Peter Kreeft articulates, that ethics is dependent on metaphysics and anthropology---'what is good depends on what is.' and 'what is good for man depends on what man is.'
 
Can 'God' not be replaced with nature / physics / the universe / reality? As complex structures of matter evolved from simple - is it not reasonable for us to act in accordance with that complexity, to strive for the continued existence and evolution of it? This requires the belief of 'I matter', but then it's not as if the deity based moral system doesn't.

I guess I fail to see what the concept of a god does for us. Given the existance of God - in order to have a 'moral' system where God is relevant, we are faced with the required beliefs of 'I should act in accordance with God's wishes / designs' and 'I matter'. I can think of no reasons for the former belief other than God's supposed ability to grant everlasting pleasure / pain - and the relevance of that hinges on the latter. It would seem more elegant overall to reduce it to just the latter belief.

I realise there may be some potentially 'bold leaps' in there... it's basically the nucleus of a thought that has been playing on my mind of late - it's about time it was picked to pieces :)
 
Presuming as I do that man, in fact, invented "God(s)" it should follow that man can survive without this "God" as he must have before inventing him. That notwithstanding, even as a non-believer, I must confess the questions raised are entirely valid with regard to morality, ethics and human behavior.
God and morality only go hand in hand insofar as the given God and the prescribed morality jibe. Or the old Good is what we like, Evil is what we don't like theory. God or Gods have stood as symbolic arbiters of man's behavior, but hasn't man hisotrically acted in spite of his God as much as in concert therewith? We crow a great deal about morality through the ages, yet we often conduct ourselves otherwise. We speak of God...we may worship our God...but we generally do what we must - or occasionally what we indeed should not.
It would seem as enlightened and intelligent beings we should be able to live by an agreed upon code of conduct, laws or what have you, and need not look to mystical beings to keep us "in line." Still, we don't necessarily know on a mass scale what this might look like. I may have answered too quickly...need to think on this more:guh:
 
no. To me, the first issue is to refute both God and Intrinsic Value, for otherwise there may be 'absolute' or 'objective' morality. then you have to address relativism, secular morality. Even the likes of Buddhism has 'morality' without making an appeal all the way up to 'God' to justify it. there is a strong relation where the further from an absolute god a religion is the less moral commandment it gives, but it isn't a prerequisite for morality in my view.

I take the view Peter Kreeft articulates, that ethics is dependent on metaphysics and anthropology---'what is good depends on what is.' and 'what is good for man depends on what man is.'

Interesting comment on this point that ethics is dependent on metaphysics and anthropology. However, anthroplogy has drastically changed since the Iron age (and before that) when most of our present day religions were founded. Our culture, has also drastically changed. Thus, do perhaps these old moral and ethical precepts that were perhaps conditioned by necessity (with our technology that can alter environments, panopoly of goods and food, different family structures etc) and then given metaphysical force, no longer have any relevance in either necessity or obviously metaphysics (with the death of God and all)?

I was going to bring Buddhism and Eastern religions up in general as my example of morality and ethics occurring without god. Confucianism, developed a set of ethics and morals still used today, which only has the respect of ones ancestors as its metaphysical force. But lets just take the Judeo-Christian example, since all of the Western worlds ethics and laws were first brought down the mountain by a bearded exile, or whispered into the ear of a wily merchant by an angel. From this tradition, churches, imans, etc. justify any resulting changes in ethics and morality as being sanctioned by God, who spoke through the enraptured prophet or enlightened church bureacracy, of the divinity of said moral and ethical changes.
 
In Euthyphro, Plato raised the following question about piety - Which of the following two incompatible claims is correct:

It is because certain acts are pious that they are loved by the gods

and

It is because they are loved by the gods that certain acts are pious.

In the dialogue, Socrates accepts the first claim and rejects the second. He takes it that gods have an infallible ability to track piety. The gods are omniscient when it comes to questions about which acts are pious. Euthyphro, by contrast, chooses the second claim and rejects the second. He repudiates the idea that piety has sufficient constitutive independence from the opinions of the best judges (gods). On his view, the conceptual ground of an act's being pious is that it is judged so by the gods. Socrates opposes that piety has such a conceptual ground.

The same sort of question can be raised about the moral worth of our acts. Thinking that if God does not exist, then no acts have moral worth corresponds to accepting the analogue of Euthyphro's position. One then thinks if there are any moral truths, they are grounded in God's will. (These moral principles are the true ones, since they are the ones chosen by God). The analogue of Socrates' position will involve the rejection of this grounding. Moral truths are independently grounded (or are ungrounded and hence basic), and God does not have any choice about what the true moral principles are.

Resolving disputes of this kind is no easy matter. Considerations about what some religions (Christianity, Buddhism etc.) say about the grounding of moral truth help little in a philosophical dispute of this sort.
 
Our culture, has also drastically changed. Thus, do perhaps these old moral and ethical precepts that were perhaps conditioned by necessity (with our technology that can alter environments, panopoly of goods and food, different family structures etc) and then given metaphysical force, no longer have any relevance in either necessity or obviously metaphysics (with the death of God and all)?

that seems to be the case to me.
I'm not one for that Platonist ideal that there are perfect unchanging things. So long as people change in social and biological ways, I think our morals have to change also, that they aren't some fixed thing to find which will always apply even when the rich get memory chip implants becomming vastly intellectually superior and there are 20billion people on earth and we need to consider limiting the freedom of reproduction and on and on, changes seem to necessitate moral changes, and if we were to build a machine that reads the thoughts of coral reefs then we may then have a moral change about deep trawl fishing, our advancements just force these things (and were society as we know it to collapse we'd have a moral change supporting a steal to survive way of life which was now necessary for a while for the majority, if morality is fixed at all it seems like a fixed relation where we chase our reflection, rather than some end which is always applicable). ( of course, in my personal philosophy I attack morality altogether, but so far as we talk about morality as applied today, I think this is the case).


But lets just take the Judeo-Christian example, since all of the Western worlds ethics and laws were first brought down the mountain by a bearded exile, or whispered into the ear of a wily merchant by an angel. From this tradition, churches, imans, etc. justify any resulting changes in ethics and morality as being sanctioned by God, who spoke through the enraptured prophet or enlightened church bureacracy, of the divinity of said moral and ethical changes.

one of the nice failsafes eh, like 'you prayed for rain and it rained---prayer works. you prayed for rain and it didn't rain, you prayed wrong/aren't worthy/it wasn't in Gods will to answer your prayer.' and the tradition escapes unharmed.
 
In Euthyphro, Plato raised the following question about piety - Which of the following two incompatible claims is correct:

It is because certain acts are pious that they are loved by the gods
and
It is because they are loved by the gods that certain acts are pious.

In the dialogue, Socrates accepts the first claim and rejects the second.

weird. you'd think if someone worshipped a crucifix or santa figure, some 'idol' to symbolize God, that would be pious---reverance for God---but it is expressly forbidden to do so (For the Christians)

if someone thought 'loving' (having sex with) children was reverence to God, that doesn't mean God would go 'aww shucks, it's the thought that counts' and not give him eternal hellfire does it?

it seems that what is pious is wholly determined by the Gods.


The same sort of question can be raised about the moral worth of our acts. Thinking that if God does not exist, then no acts have moral worth corresponds to accepting the analogue of Euthyphro's position..

I dunno about that. Piety refers to God as judge, does morality not refer to man as judge? for what is pious is pious to god, but what is moral is moral to man, so analogously is man not the ultimate judge of morality (where there is no God at least)?


The analogue of Socrates' position will involve the rejection of this grounding. Moral truths are independently grounded (or are ungrounded and hence basic), and God does not have any choice about what the true moral principles are.

this seems to undercut the omnipotent expectation we have of a God figure. If he hasn't the power to create a wholly opposite moral universe if he so chooses, then he isn't all powerful, and thus we suggest he isn't fit for the title God, and perhaps whatever it was above him which determined morality even it must adhere to is more fit for the title, and he is no more Godly in telling us about that morality than our parents were.
 
1. The notion of piety at work in Euthyphro is one according to which an act which is believed to be done out of reverence to the gods may not always count as pious. What Socrates there means is rather close to an act's being right or wrong in matters about the gods and may be considered a moral conception of piety.


2. I assume that in the second paragraph you are arguing against the contention that if God does not exist, then no acts have moral worth actually follows from Euthyphro-style position about morals on the assumption of the non-existence of God.
Now, the analogue of Euthyphro's position with respect to morality is that it is because God wills certain things that certain moral principles are true. This seems to be a sort of causal explanation and as with other causal explanations we may take it as entailing that if God had not existed and willed these things, then no moral principles would be true. Suppose now that God does not exist. The following inference schema appears valid:

If it were the case that P, then it would be the case that Q

and

P

entail

Q.
(The relevant instance is
If it were the case that God does not exist, there would be no moral truths.
God does not exist. Hence there are no moral truths.)
Hence, if one rejects that there is a God and still holds the Euthyphro-style position, one will accept that there are no true moral principles. If there are no true moral principles, it seems that acts cannot be morally good or bad and hence do not have moral worth.


3. It is arguable nothing has any choice about the existence of necessarily existing objects (eg. numbers, properties, propositions) or the truth of necessary truths (eg. logical and mathematical truths on the most natural conception of these). If certain things must be the case, then they will be the case no matter what anyone or anything actually does (whatever choice God makes). Similarly, if some things can't be the case, again God has no say about it. Even God can't make a necessary falsehood, such as a contradiction, true.
If we suppose that moral truths are not contingent but necessary (for instance, if it must be the case that slavery is morally unacceptable), then their truth is decided by God's will. Anyone who thinks that moral truths are necessary (as I believe Socrates does) will have to reject that God could have created a world with different moral norms in play. But does he need to reject that God is omnipotent? Not necessarily - if one understands by an omnipotent being, a being that can choose to make any possible world actual, then there can be an omnipotent being even if there are necessary truths. There are some questions here that touch on issues about modality and counterfactuals as well as issues about how one should understand omnipotence. One may take a look at this acticle in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, which gives a brief introduction to these issues.
 
“The greatest tragedy in mankind's entire history may be
the hijacking of morality by religion.”
Arthur C Clarke

(Arthur C Clarke invented the Scientology religion, about which I know very little.) He said something very sensible in that quote, however.

Plato:
Good people do not need laws to tell them to act responsibly, while bad people will find a way around the laws

Indeed good people don't need laws and they don't need the fear of God or the threat of Hell , nor any promises of rewards or punishments to act responsibly. They do so for their own dignity and because they are happiest when living a responsible and virtuous life.

There is a class of people who, it could be argued, do require the fear of God (the idea that someone in authority is watching them and reading their minds and will judge them on their behaviour).

If such, otherwise immoral, people can be made to believe in God, then it makes life a lot easier for the rulers. God has his uses when it comes to enforcing morality.

And yet, even with an avowed belief in God, plenty of people still behave very immorally - in terms of criminal activity for example - and they have consciously sinned. There is no indication that believers in God, en masse, behave more morally than those who do not. Nor is there evidence that religion prevents crime - although it could be that the kind of people who are religous would have behaved much worse if they didn't have their religion.

In the Saturday Times newspaper this week there were some pie charts showing the link between religion and crime. Most crimes were committed by people who were of one relgion or another rather than the non-religious. The article particularly pointed out that sex abusers were more likely to be religious than not, although there was evidence that many became Christians after the crime because of the forgiveness and understanding offered by priests. (Note: they reoffended even after their decision to become religious.)
 
Arthur C Clarke

(Arthur C Clarke invented the Scientology religion, about which I know very little.) He said something very sensible in that quote, however.

Actually it was L. Ron Hubbard who invented Scientology; although, they proposed similar views on the origin of the species through alien contact. Of course, Clarke's views are actually plausible and more importantly, fictional; whereas L. Ron made his fictional and implausible claims into a "religion".
 
Actually it was L. Ron Hubbard who invented Scientology; although, they proposed similar views on the origin of the species through alien contact. Of course, Clarke's views are actually plausible and more importantly, fictional; whereas L. Ron made his fictional and implausible claims into a "religion".

So it was! Silly mistake:oops:
 
And yet, even with an avowed belief in God, plenty of people still behave very immorally - in terms of criminal activity for example - and they have consciously sinned. There is no indication that believers in God, en masse, behave more morally than those who do not. Nor is there evidence that religion prevents crime - although it could be that the kind of people who are religous would have behaved much worse if they didn't have their religion.

In the Saturday Times newspaper this week there were some pie charts showing the link between religion and crime. Most crimes were committed by people who were of one relgion or another rather than the non-religious. The article particularly pointed out that sex abusers were more likely to be religious than not, although there was evidence that many became Christians after the crime because of the forgiveness and understanding offered by priests. (Note: they reoffended even after their decision to become religious.)

I was considering this as well. It seems the greatest argument by the religious in this sphere, is that if there is a God and his moral/ethical order is to be believed divine, then this is the greatest counterweight society has towards those lower class criminals etc, who are more likely to believe in God (lower the income, direct correlation with believing in God), and thus the less likely they will be to commit crimes. But, it seems, this doesnt hold true, as these criminals dont seem to mind going against God's order; and in fact, perhaps this spurning of God is part of the attractiveness or total rock-bottom sinfulness these persons seek to feel alive.

So perhaps it really is the otherway around: If God did exist, everything is permitted. Really, lets face it, most violent criminals are poorer, and not the types to question the logic and validity of God, religion and morality. Whereas those who dont believe in God, are generally smarter, higher class, and less likely to commit at least a violent crime. Perhaps there is a direct correlation between intelligence and economics with crime and religion is a minor factor; or perhaps those who are non-religious place more emphasis and seriousness on their temporal lives, and are less likely to risk crime for fear of losing what little time they have in the bowels of the justice system.
 
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I was considering this as well. It seems the greatest argument by the religious in this sphere, is that if there is a God and his moral/ethical order is to be believed divine, then this is the greatest counterweight society has towards those lower class criminals etc, who are more likely to believe in God (lower the income, direct correlation with believing in God), and thus the less likely they will be to commit crimes. But, it seems, this doesnt hold true, as these criminals dont seem to mind going against God's order; and in fact, perhaps this spurning of God is part of the attractiveness or total rock-bottom sinfulness these persons seek to feel alive.

So perhaps it really is the otherway around: If God did exist, everything is permitted. Really, lets face it, most violent criminals are poorer, and not the types to question the logic and validity of God, religion and morality. Whereas those who dont believe in God, are generally smarter, higher class, and less likely to commit at least a violent crime. Perhaps there is a direct correlation between intelligence and economics with crime and religion is a minor factor; or perhaps those who are non-religious place more emphasis and seriousness on their temporal lives, and are less likely to risk crime for fear of losing what little time they have in the bowels of the justice system.

That sounds a reasonable assessment Speed.
A funny thing with Catholicism is the way that Catholics are encouraged to confess sins at the Confessional. There seems to be some pressure to confess, such that if they cannot think of anything to confess to is is shameful and they must be refusing to come clean about it. So there is a feeling that they really should take any opportunity to sin so that they can better please the priest with their confession. I am not sure if this is a fair observation.

Certainly the Bible does say that God loves a sinner who repents more than a man who has never sinned.

And then consider eccentrics like Rasputin

In 1904, he joined a radical religious sect (the Khlysty) that preached that the only route to salvation was sin followed by repentance! Rasputin’s own favorite bits of religious guidance included, “Sin in order that you may obtain forgiveness.” He practiced what he preached, partaking in sexual orgies and a generally libertine life style interspersed with prayers of repentance. He developed a Charles Manson-like or David Koresh-like mystique and megalomania, claiming the “Only through me you can hope to be saved; and the manner of your salvation is this: you must be united with me in soul and body.” Given this philosophical foundation for his teachings, the wild orgies in which he participated merely enhanced his reputation as a holy man!

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That sounds a reasonable assessment Speed.
A funny thing with Catholicism is the way that Catholics are encouraged to confess sins at the Confessional. There seems to be some pressure to confess, such that if they cannot think of anything to confess to is is shameful and they must be refusing to come clean about it. So there is a feeling that they really should take any opportunity to sin so that they can better please the priest with their confession. I am not sure if this is a fair observation.

Certainly the Bible does say that God loves a sinner who repents more than a man who has never sinned.

And then consider eccentrics like Rasputin



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As a somehow baptised but non-practicing or believing catholic--who never ever went to church or confessional except when forced to at Jesuit high school-- I dont think confession in anyway compels parishioners to sin (although, there may be a few interesting characters out there who do). Honestly, the confessional is one of the few things I really like about Catholicism. And frankly, one can always think of very little sins to speak about.
 
no. To me, the first issue is to refute both God and Intrinsic Value, for otherwise there may be 'absolute' or 'objective' morality. then you have to address relativism, secular morality. Even the likes of Buddhism has 'morality' without making an appeal all the way up to 'God' to justify it. there is a strong relation where the further from an absolute god a religion is the less moral commandment it gives, but it isn't a prerequisite for morality in my view.

I take the view Peter Kreeft articulates, that ethics is dependent on metaphysics and anthropology---'what is good depends on what is.' and 'what is good for man depends on what man is.'

Morality presupposes design and an actual ground and order for moral choices. It has to do with how moral agents act or relate to others, whether being is being corrupted, deprived, or has an unjust lack, or if being is being treated as it should be.

While we could have an idea of what morality could be, without a theistic personal God to ground moral behavior, by which there is an actual measure for behavior, morality is meaningless.

So while it is grounded in metaphysics and athropology, both physics and anthropology imply a ground for their existence that is not they themselves..nothing can cause its own existence...without which there is no reason for why they exist vs not exist, and without which there would be no standard for how some should act vs should not act, and no order being violated. What is wrong is when ones order is violated, but without order, there can be nothing to violate.

So if morality is not grounded in the actual character of a personal theistic God, it is meaningless and or contradictory. While one can state morality exists, without a theistic God one cannot meaningfully affirm it or see how it can be grounded or justified.


To anyone who believes that morality or truth is relative what is true for you isnt true for me, I have to ask if that if that principle is true for everybody or not?
 
What meaning does God give to morality? Why is 'God finds this good', more meaningful than 'I find this good' or 'society finds this good'??
 
so - God has an infallible, objective view of morals. Sure, by the very nature of the concept 'god' we see that. But what does an infallible, objective view of morals do for anything? Does morality serve a purpose on it's own? We still get stuck trying to invent a purpose to the whole thing.
 
While we could have an idea of what morality could be, without a theistic personal God to ground moral behavior, by which there is an actual measure for behavior, morality is meaningless. .

I couldn't disagree more.

Indeed 'God' could have an idea of what morality could be, but without itself having a blahblahinfinite regression... it's a self-refuting point.