Critique of Pure Reason

[Justin S.]

My posts in this thread will be a mish-mash of notes, papers/responses revised for the forum, and new material. My rough plan is simply to cover areas of interest starting with the Preface. I am neither psychotic enough, nor so presumptuous to attempt a comprehensive "summary", but will be sure to touch on many "core" issues, however briefly and unsatisfactorily. Basically, just go read it. Also, I won't attempt to "situate" the Critique historically, or discuss its relation to empiricism and rationalism. If one were interested in quickly reading key texts from both of those movements, I highly recommend Descartes' Meditations and David Hume's An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, which are both much shorter than the Critique. In the mean time, I think it appropriate to try and engage the work of such a thinker as Kant, if only to balance all the rabid scientism and "Nietzscheanism" around here.

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First post: Formal Overview of the Preface

"For in [metaphysics] reason continuously gets stuck...we have to retrace our path countless times, because we find that it does not lead where we want to go, and it is so far from reaching unanimity in the assertions of its adherents that it is rather a battlefield, and indeed one that appears to be especially determined for testing one's powers in mock combat; on this battlefield no combatant has ever gained the least bit of ground, nor has any been able to base any lasting possession on his victory. Hence there is no doubt that up to now the procedure of metaphysics has been a mere groping, and what is the worst, a groping among mere concepts." B xv, Cambridge edition. (bold emphasis added)

Kant begins his 1787 Preface to the Critique of Pure Reason by comparing the fruitful progress of the sciences with the deadlock of metaphysics. Since the objects and areas of investigation of the sciences are fundamentally distinct from metaphysics (the latter being "a wholly isolated speculative cognition of reason that elevates itself entirely above all instruction from experience..."), Kant's comparison concerns the methodology of the sciences and what metaphysics can potentially learn from it.

In particular, Kant calls our attention to the work of Copernicus, whose advances in astronomy were made possible by uprooting and reorienting the fundamental assumptions of the field. Copernicus' progress came not by assuming, as was customary, a static observer around which the heavens revolve, but rather in interrogating the observer to see if, in fact, it was he that was in motion. It is in this sense, of a focal inversion from observed "objects" to the observing "subjects," that Kant's Critique initiates a "Copernican revolution" within philosophy.

The first steps in this transformation of the procedure of metaphysics consist in an examination of the traditional assumptions regarding the role of the observer/inquirer- specifically, the intuition of sensible objects (what is given in perception) and the nature of concept formation. Kant claims that until the Critique it was assumed that our cognition conforms to the objects of sensation [the Cambridge edition translates "erkenntnis" as "cognition", and so I also use it on occasion. However, it can also be translated as "knowing" or knowledge, which I usually find preferable to the very general and technical "cognition"; contemporary readers might interpret the latter as simply "thought" or some minimal mental event or process, which is not what Kant means]. Under this assumption, the faculty of intuition plays only a "passive" role in the representation of objects, thereby ruling out the possibility of knowing anything about them (the objects) prior to experience. This assumption opens the door to skepticism, as all knowledge of objects is held to be a posteriori (through experience of them) and therefore contingent (cf. Hume).

However, if, as Kant argues, the objects of sensation must conform to our active cognition (to "the constitution of our faculty of intuition"), then a priori, and thereby necessary, knowledge becomes possible through an analysis of this faculty and its forms.
Kant treats the status of concepts in a similar fashion. If, like intuition, concepts are assumed to conform to objects then we are once again barred from any a priori knowledge and skepticism looms. However, if objects conform to our concepts (which are generated in the interplay of the understanding and the "raw material" given in intuition) then a priori knowledge is possible through an analysis of the faculty and forms of intuition and understanding.

This Copernican reversal is not merely hypothetical as Kant attempts to demonstrate its merit apodictically in the Transcendental Aesthetic and Logic, respectively [see table of contents above]. In the Transcendental Aesthetic, sensibility is "isolated" [faculty of intuition] and two discoveries are made:

Firstly, that space and time cannot be merely empirical concepts derived from experience. For in order for the impressions of the senses to be distinguished from the subject as "outer" (as "objects" distinct from the "subject") or in any "relation" to enable a conceptual deduction of space, the representation of space must already be present in us and constitute the a priori ground of spatial determinations as such. Likewise, simultaneity and succession could not be perceived if "the representation of time did not ground them a priori."

Secondly, that the a priority of spatial and temporal representation, as forms of intuition, demonstrates that both space and time are necessary conditions for human experience and therefore are not, Kant claims, things existing independently of the constitution of our faculty of intuition. In this sense, space and time are empirically real; they are forms of the mind which hold sway in, and enable, all experience and empirical knowledge. They are therefore also transcendentally ideal; meaning, space and time are merely ideal (non-real) beyond the faculties of the mind.

continued below...

 

[Justin S.]

first post continued...


In the lengthy Transcendental Logic, which will only be touched upon here, it is the faculty of the understanding ("spontaneity of thought") that is isolated and interrogated with respect to its operation. Kant finds that the understanding is governed by what he calls the categories of the understanding. It is the categories that, through synthesis, make ready the manifold of intuition and make possible the formation of concepts and judgments. Thus, what Kant calls "theoretical knowledge" (knowledge of the empirical world) is a result of the interplay of both the faculties of intuition and the understanding.

Additionally, this analysis of the two kinds of a priori faculties and their forms yields what might be considered the bedrock of Kant's entire project—the distinction between appearances and things-in-themselves. With the realization of what we, the "observers," contribute or bring to experience, it becomes clear that our representations cannot be thought of as simply mirroring objects as they are in themselves; the mind plays an active role in making perception and experience possible by imposing forms on the "data" of the senses. Thus, what we can experience, and possess knowledge of, is what is given through the forms of intuition (space and time) as well as "taken up" and worked on by the categories of the understanding. Consequently, objects conform to our forms of cognition and understanding, and our conditioned representations are to be regarded as just what they are, appearances (in the broadest sense) and not things-in-themselves.

However, Kant stresses that the critique has an essentially positive function that is made possible by a prior negative utility. In the same way that many astronomical discrepancies could be traced back to the faulty assumption of a passive or inert observer, the dialectical deadlock of metaphysics results from a failure to undertake a preparatory critique of the capacity and contribution of the mind, and therein an assessment of the limits and proper conduct of metaphysics. In limiting "speculative reason" [potentially confusing terminology; speculative knowledge for Kant is empirical knowledge. What he calls "practical knowldge" is non-empirical knowing, which we would currently call speculation] and knowledge-claims to the boundaries of experience, the pretensions of metaphysics are reined in and speculative reason is prevented from extending beyond its capacity. At the same time, in this restriction of speculative reason, a space is opened for the exercise of practical reason—of the ability to think, rather than know, things as they are in themselves. Kant asserts that once we carry out an analysis of the faculties of the mind and secure the division of appearances and things-in-themselves, the battlefield of "mock combat" is disbanded.

However, any peace is only momentary. Not simply because the combatants fear the loss of their imagined spoils, but due to the very nature of human reason. According to Kant, there is an "unavoidable dialectic of pure reason"; it is part of reason's nature to continually fall into a "logic of illusion" despite potentially having full awareness of the snare. For this kind of illusion, what Kant calls transcendental, is fundamentally different from other forms. It cannot simply be brought to attention and remedied like empirical and logical illusions; "[Transcendental] illusion...cannot be avoided at all...just as little as the astronomer can prevent the rising moon from appearing larger to him, even when he is not deceived by this illusion." These transcendental illusions occur when reason, as is natural to it, demands completeness, totality, and the unconditioned condition absent from appearances, and thereby oversteps the empirical bounds of knowledge and "holds out to us the semblance of extending the pure understanding."

This transgression is an illegitimate extension of the understanding; things-in-themselves are mistaken as appearances and are incorrectly thought to be subject to the conditions of human cognition and experience. In other words, the forms of intuition are taken as objects outside this faculty, and the categories of the understanding (which only pertain to appearances) are applied to things-in-themselves.

The unavoidability of falling into transcendental illusions necessitates the recapitulation of an immanent critique of the capacity of reason, less the violence of metaphysics become too pitched, and its front lines too entrenched. For its combatants, whether skeptical or rigidly aligned, are both forms of dogmatisim, which Kant defines as "the dogmatic procedure of pure reason, without an antecedent critique of its own capacity." For Kant, transcendental philosophy, equipped with a robust analysis of the faculty of reason and the crucial distinction between appearances and things-in-themselves, is the only way around the deadlock of the conflict of reason that perpetually blocks metaphysical progress. However, transcendental philosophy is not capable of "resolving" the dispute by taking sides anymore than previous attempts; Kant cautions us not to think of the fundamental conflict of reason as any arbitrary one that can be shed through further insight; its dialectical nature stems from reason being capable of justifiably arguing for both a thesis and its antithesis simultaneously:

"If in using the principles of the understanding we apply our reason not merely to objects of experience, for the use of principles of the understanding, but instead venture also to extend these principles beyond the boundaries of experience, then there arise sophistical theorems, which may neither hope for confirmation in experience nor fear refutation by it; and each of them is not only without contradiction in itself but even meets with conditions of its necessity in the nature of reason itself, only unfortunately the opposite has on its side equally valid and necessary grounds for its assertion."

Kant calls this unavoidable dialectic the antinomy of pure reason. By turning attention to the nature of dialectical conflict, he identifies four fundamental sources (antinomies) of transcendental illusion. They are: the infinity/finitude of the world, the divisibility/indivisibility of the world, the freedom/determination of the world, and finally, the existence/non-existence of a supreme being and cause of the world.

Thus, transcendental philosophy, the product of Kant's "Copernican revolution," removes the obstacles inhibiting metaphysic's progress, not by resolving the unavoidable illusions of the antinomies, but in revealing them as illusion, through a preparatory critique of the faculty of reason and the conditions of human knowledge and experience. It is only through this critique that the root of the antinomies, the conflation of
appearances and things-in-themselves, can be show to be unjustified, and the mind prepared for, and in some limited sense secured against, the "momentary aberrations" of transcendental illusion. By reminding us of the limits of what can be known, Kant turns to the expanse of what can be thought and opens the possibility for faith. Through transcendental philosophy, metaphysics is "saved" from dogmatism and skepticism, and practical reason is restored to its proper station.

 

[kmik]

Great post. The distinction between practical and speculative reason is still unclear to me, and so is the abstract idea of "thinking the things-in-themselves".

It's also unclear who are the "combatants" in this mock combat. I mean, is the problem that they pass judgments on the thing-in-itself to which experience makes no sense (The thing-in-itself cannot be blue, because "blue" is within the boundaries of experience), or that they have different representations of things even though the sensual data is identical (the same input through different programs yields a different output)? Because you mention skepticism, and it might be worth expanding upon.

Lastly: can anything be known about the thing-in-itself? If the rock does not conform to our representation, but our representation conforms to the rock, perhaps we can learn about its nature by studying our own forms of understanding (a bad analogy is a computer again: we have the output [representation] and we can guess the input [thing-in-itself] by studying the mind [the program])

 

[The_Walrus]

nice post but...

we had this before I remember reading it here see, idealism is self-refuting. unless things in themself are intelligible no statement about them would apply including kant's statement that things-in-themselves are not intellgibile, right? you cant differentiate between appearance and reality without knowing both. also you can't say 'something is' without that being a statement about 'what' it is. really im sorry to say but those simple arguments make kants project a big failure. whenever u hear people say things are forever unknowable or inexpressable or unreachable they are just refuting themselves.

 

[Justin S.]

Great post. The distinction between practical and speculative reason is still unclear to me, and so is the abstract idea of "thinking the things-in-themselves".

This distinction is counter-intuitive to our time; to make matters worse, the Germans have different words and "ways" of what me might translate as "knowledge." For Kant, theoretical (or speculative) reason and theoretical (speculative) knowledge are concerned only with what is given in perception (appearances). This means empirical knowledge, and judgments concerning empirical matters.

In contrast, what he calls practical reason and practical knowledge is radically non-empirical thought and knowing. This is difficult for contemporary readers because for many people knowledge just means the possession of "facts", which are determined empirically (aside from mathematics and logic, which I'll leave aside except in saying that Kant thinks these truths are matters of a priori yet ampliative [intuitive] knowledge, i.e, synthetic a priori).

Kant is saying there are different domains of thought and knowledge; science and empiricism are only one such domain, and a limited one at that. In modern parlance, we might call practical reason "speculative thought", which is telling of our current relationship to science and technology.

It's also unclear who are the "combatants" in this mock combat. I mean, is the problem that they pass judgments on the thing-in-itself to which experience makes no sense (The thing-in-itself cannot be blue, because "blue" is within the boundaries of experience), or that they have different representations of things even though the sensual data is identical (the same input through different programs yields a different output)? Because you mention skepticism, and it might be worth expanding upon.

The combatants are us! In terms of historical context, Kant was deeply engaged with empiricism and rationalism, so they are often explicit targets. However, he is concerned with the metaphysical enterprise as such.

It is absolutely essential not to think of "appearances" as having anything to do with "illusion" or being not fully real. Appearances are real in the strictest sense, and there is no other ultimate "reality" behind it consisting of "things-in-themselves." Furthermore "appearances" should not be confused with the experience of any given subject, for this is infinitely variable. They are not to be confused as secondary properties, or merely optical. Both primary and secondary properties are appearances. What is given in perception as such constitute appearances. The domain of appearances, or receptivity in the broadest sense, is what Kant simply calls nature. Thus, the objects, strictly speaking, of nature are not epistemologically dependent (i.e., bacteria existed prior to optical magnification, and so on). In this sense, Kant is a strict empiricist; however, he is an idealist in the sense that the appearances are not transcendentally real, but only empirically.

Speaking about things-in-themselves is difficult. Firstly, they are not "objects", and not found in nature. Kant clearly distinguishes objects from thing. An object is already a determination of the synthesis of the understanding (i.e., we apprehend something as something, as an object). To a large degree, the same holds for "thing" (as a determination), but it is vague, less determined, and doesn't necessarily refer to anything empirical at all. It would be totally incorrect to say there is a "house" as it appears to me as "appearance", and the house as a thing-in-itself outside human perception. No! Space, time, extension, substance, duration, object, position, number, etc., are all conditions of intuition and understanding and do not pertain to "things-in-themselves", what may lie beyond our perception and categories. Thus, when we clearly distinguish appearances from things-in-themselves, we forgo the temptation to make empirical knowledge-claims on the latter (transcendental illusion), and are free to think about them, in the broadest and richest sense of the word. It might also be beneficial to bear in mind writing under erasure.

 

[The_Walrus]

No! Space, time, extension, substance, duration, object, position, number, etc., are all conditions of intuition and understanding and do not pertain to "things-in-themselves", what may lie beyond our perception and categories. Thus, when we clearly distinguish appearances from things-in-themselves, we forgo the temptation to make empirical knowledge-claims on the latter

i think its awesome that you are doing this thread here. you know your stuff and i learn a lot from you. but still "we must forgo making empirical knowledge claims about things-in-themself" is itself a knowledge claim about things in themselves. hence even tho your writing style and knowlege are impressive unfortunately kant is just as self-refuting as ever, don't you think?

 

[Nile577]

i think its awesome that you are doing this thread here. you know your stuff and i learn a lot from you. but still "we must forgo making empirical knowledge claims about things-in-themself" is itself a knowledge claim about things in themselves. hence even tho your writing style and knowlege are impressive unfortunately kant is just as self-refuting as ever, don't you think?

""we must forgo making empirical knowledge claims..."

 

[The_Walrus]

""we must forgo making empirical knowledge claims..."

That is STILL an empirical knowledge claim in itself and is just completely self-defeating. if we know that we cannot know empirically, that is a knowledgeable statement about the potential for empirical knowledge of the thing in itself. we must have some understanding of the possibility for empirical knowledge to make that statement.

 

[Justin S.]

The_Walrus,

Exercising greater care and restraint with our words and conclusions would help us avoid unnecessary conflicts.

Concerning "types" of knowledge, there is not only the object of knowledge, but the method and way of justification. Empirical knowledge, as we are using it here in this thread, is not simply those claims with empirical phenomena as their object, but claims that appeal to empirical phenomena for justification. This is the crucial point here. Furthermore, as discussed above, not all "objects" and "things" are empirical. An easy example of Kant's would be God, or freedom. They certainly are "thought objects" or "things" in some sense, but are not to be found in nature (i.e., non-empirical).

if we know that we cannot know empirically, that is a knowledgeable statement about the potential for empirical knowledge of the thing in itself. we must have some understanding of the possibility for empirical knowledge to make that statement.

Yes. But, the knowing of the limits of the empirical need not (and cannot) itself be empirical. The transcendental critique proceeds by way of demonstrating a priori, hence non-empirical, knowledge.

"But although all our knowledge commences with experience, yet it does not on that account all arise from experience. For it could well be that even our experiential knowledge is a composite of that which we receive through impressions and that which our own cognitive faculty (merely prompted by sensible impressions) provides out of itself..." Introduction, B1

 

[kmik]

Regarding the combatants: I think there needed to be a distinction there I did not explicitly state. It could be:

"Combatant" 1: Space is infinitely dividable
"Combatant" 2: No! It's the other way around

So there are two errors here and I'm not sure what Kant says (perhaps it's both): first, that concepts such as divisible/indivisible is not something that can be applied to a thing-in-itself as it is something that is experienced already, OR that both "combatants" are right from their own point of view, even though they have the same sensual data - i.e maybe apples taste like shit for aliens even though the "taste" of the apple is the same. I think there could be a misunderstanding here I myself almost fell into: one could say "okay, so what see as red I see as green", but in fact the mind is the creator of the very concept of color.

If quantity does not apply to the things-in-themselves, how do we know there is not one huge thing-in-itself (God?), or actually distinguish between them? And maybe the distinction between "this exists" and "this does not exist" is something that only holds for appearances?

I still do not understand what you say about thinking. I suppose you can't give examples or explain the "how-to's" because this already kills the concept, but it's still problematic...

Oh and really, your posts are excellent. Keep them coming!

 

[Demiurge]

i think its awesome that you are doing this thread here. you know your stuff and i learn a lot from you. but still "we must forgo making empirical knowledge claims about things-in-themself" is itself a knowledge claim about things in themselves. hence even tho your writing style and knowlege are impressive unfortunately kant is just as self-refuting as ever, don't you think?

It is not a claim about things in themselves. Rather, it is a claim about knowledge claims. Something like 'the set of warranted knowledge claims about ... is the null set.' Similarly, 'nothing can be known about things in themselves' can be translated to 'the set of known statements about ... is empty.' It cannot be 'it is known that nothing can be known' as that is clearly self-refuting. In other words, you want to say not that you know that which is unknowable, but that there is no such knowledge.

 

[The_Walrus]

It is not a claim about things in themselves. Rather, it is a claim about knowledge claims. Something like 'the set of warranted knowledge claims about ... is the null set.' Similarly, 'nothing can be known about things in themselves' can be translated to 'the set of known statements about ... is empty.' It cannot be 'it is known that nothing can be known' as that is clearly self-refuting. In other words, you want to say not that you know that which is unknowable, but that there is no such knowledge.

yeah i want to believe you but isn't kant saying that not only are the set of warranted knowledge claims 'empty' but they must always remain empty as they are outside our perceptions? i guess justin's answer that there is non-empirical/sensual knowledge is the answer.

the self-refuting attack on kant (and wittgenstein and hume and heidegger and nietzsche) comes from the evangelicals. if you draw limits to thinking or speaking you self-refute yourself by referring to the other side of those limits as ineffable or unthinkable. hate the arguments but they seem sound. i want to believe your refutation though. i don't know.

here is a quote from an evangelical book.

To get a handle on this, look for a second out the window at a tree. Kant is saying that the tree you think you are looking at appears the way it does because your mind is forming the sense data you’re getting from the tree. You really don’t know the tree in itself; you only know the phenomena your mind categorizes about the tree. In short, you “kant” know the real tree in itself, only the tree as it appears to you.

Thankfully, there’s a simple answer to all of this–the Road Runner tactic. Kant commits the same error as Hume–he violates the Law of Noncontradiction. He contradicts his own premise by saying that no one can know the real world while he claims to know something about it, namely that the real world is unknowable! In effect, Kant says the truth about the real world is that there are no truths about the real world.

In a philosophy class that I [Norm] was teaching, I pointed out the flaws in Kant’s philosophy this way. I said, “First, if Kant claims that he can’t know anything about the real world (the thing in itself) then how does he know the real world is there? And second, his view is self-defeating because he claims that you can’t know anything about the real world while asserting that he knows that the real world is unknowable!”

One student blurted out, “No! It can’t be that easy, Dr. Geisler. You can’t destroy the central tenet of the last hundred-plus years of philosophical thought in just a couple of simple sentences!”

Quoting my favorite source–The Reader’s Digest–I responded, “That’s what happens when a beautiful theory meets a brutal gang of facts.”

Book: I Don’t Have Enough FAITH to Be an ATHEIST, by Geisler and Turek, chapter 2

 

[Justin S.]

The Geisler quote is a complete misreading of Kant, which is clear even from my rough overview.

Edit: I'm pretty sure quoting a guy who name-drops The Reader's Digest (!?) is grounds for a ban.

 

[JColtrane]

Just interested--do you guys buy Kant's distinction between pure and practical reason?