Dasein

speed

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Can someone please explain to me, the Heideggerian concept of Dasein and Angst?

My understanding of this concept I believe is clouded with my knowledge and love of Kierkegaard and his god-centric angst and existentialism (not that I am a cowering repressed and believing Protestant or anything), as well as my own assumption, and/or wish, to believe Dasein is nothing more than Heidegger's attempt to show us the absurdity of everything. I presume, this absurdity is not the interpretation Heidegger was aiming for.

Thus, will some hearty altruistic soul, please clarify my understanding?
 
I would like to elaborate on those concepts and their significance at some point. However, this is a busy week, so I wont be posting anything substantial for a few days.
 
I'm sure you will already know a great deal of what's below, Speed, but I will try to explain these concepts in a more general sense so as perhaps to be of use to others reading here also. I am equally sure that Justin will disagree or object to some of what of I say. I am far from an expert but here is my understanding of Dasein (and angst). I have tried to keep the tone as conversational as possible. I've included lots of examples and have added some sneaky drawings I did to attempt to help explain things.

To understand the concept of Dasein, one must first understand the question that led to its formulation.

Heidegger is concerned with Being. Being is the fundamental question of his work. He distinguishes between two kinds of being: ontic and ontological. One of the problems of Being and Time is that, as well as introducing a startling array of new terminology, it uses pre-existing terms without defining them, assuming an accumulated specialized knowledge in the reader. One such term is 'ontic' being. I cursed not knowing what it meant when I first read the text. It's absolutely crucial to have a crystal-clear understanding of each of these terms before progressing to the concept of Dasein.

Ontic Being: Ontic being describes the physical properties of something's existence. It describes its factual being. Imagine you are back at High School and, sitting in class, the teacher asks you to describe carefully the contents of a test-tube. The description you would provide would correspond to an ontic analysis of the contents of the tube. An ontic description of a book might be: it has a red cover, a black spine and is quite heavy.

Ontological Being Ontological being describes the nature of what something IS. It dispenses with an analysis of appearance or physical description to understand the WHAT of a thing’s Being. A comb is ontically blue, with thirty teeth, light and made of plastic. A comb is ontologically FOR parting hair. Tidying hair is one facet of a combs' ontological being. The ontical being of a saucepan is a black, hollowed-out object with a wooden handle; one facet of its ontological being is cookery. 'Purpose' is perhaps too tendentious a term, but ontological Being certainly attempts to understand the primal 'nature' of a thing's Being, whereas ontical being understands its appearance.

The different types of being are differentiated in text in several ways. Some translators italicize ontological being; I use a capital letter. (‘being’ = ontic being) (‘Being’ = ontological being). I hope the above is clear. If not, please say so and perhaps I or someone else can explain further.

Now, Heidegger argues that the entire history of Western thought - reason, science, philosophy etc - concerns itself ONLY with ontic being. That is, with physical description. In arguably the most iconoclastic reconstitution of thought in the history of philosophy, he dismisses the entire body science and philosophy as wholly failing to engage with the concept of ontological Being. When science asks what an object IS, he argues, it only describes its appearance and properties.

Having thus distinguished the concepts of being and Being, Heidegger sees a monumental task before him. He wishes to understand the MEANING of ontological Being.

He makes some opening observations. Most existing objects, he realizes, are unable to understand their own ontological being. He calls such items ‘ontic items.’ A pencil, a can of soda, a hammer, a Slayer cd and a keyboard are all examples of ontic items. Man, however, is capable not only of understanding his existence (the ontic human body) in an ontological sense (through his awareness of himself in consciousness) but is also capable of understanding the Being of other humans and the Being of ontic items. Man is self-aware. This special distinction of ontological being and ontological awareness in humanity, Heidegger terms ‘Dasein.’ Dasein is the ontological being of man.

It is crucial to understand that Dasein is not a subject but a collective window of potential Being. Within the human World, a comb is most often ontologically ‘brushing-hair.’ Dasein is ALL the different potential Beings of humanity. In Being and Time Heidegger attempts to analyze the Being of Dasein.

(He states that he will cover the Being of ontic items later. Some argue that this remains the unfulfilled promise of his philosophy, others propose that he came to understand that Dasein was the vector through which ALL ontological Being comes into the world.)

I will now attempt to give an explanation of the constitution of Dasein.

The constitution of Dasein:

Descartes proposes that man can understand his being through the cogito. That is, ‘I think, therefore I am.’ Heidegger argues, in the tradition of Husserl, that the cogito is superficial because it makes no definition of the ‘AM’ in ‘I am.’ That is, Descartes’ maxim makes no account of ontological Being.

One of the most beautiful parts of this thought is a recognition that because Being precedes cognition, it is impossible to reach the root of our existence through thought alone. In order to think, one must have something with which to think. Dasein is always ahead of itself. One cannot think without already presupposing a mind, so to use thought as a scaffold of Being is dishonest.

Heidegger argues that we are FALLEN into being. That is, we awake already existing. We do not ask to exist before we find ourselves waking up; we simply awake already in the world. It is from this position that all philosophy should begin. I am biased here but for me this is a most brilliant and beautiful recognition.

It follows then, that the first and most essential aspect of Daseinic ontology (the ontological Being of Dasein) is that it is Being-in-the-world. What is the nature of Dasein’s being-in-the-world? It is more precisely understood, argues Heidegger, if we realize that Dasein exists ALONGSIDE the world into which he awakes. He interacts with the world through the process of what is called CARE.

donaldin4.jpg


Here is Donald the Dasein. Dasein is not really a subject but for our purposes we will depict him as a human (or my woeful attempt at drawing one). Dasein is really better depicted as a kind of cloud of Being existing around a human, extending into time.

Dasein has FALLEN away from the root of his being and is unable to reach it by thought.

therootyl9.jpg


In his falleness, Dasein exists alongside the world. He interacts with it through care.

carefi6.jpg


Care is a relationship of interaction between Dasein and objects in the world. Heidegger gives a special meaning to interactions that reveal the ontological Being of objects. He terms them ‘disclosure.’ For example, Dasein discloses an aspect of human ontology when its Being is Being-towards-wanting-to-brush-its-hair. That is, the state of its ontological Being IS ‘towards-wanting-to-brush-its-hair.’ In doing so, Dasein also discloses an aspect of the ontological being of a comb – which we have outlined above. Through care (the need to brush hair) Dasein discloses the Being of a ‘comb’.

Dasein is that which instills the meaning of Being.

Now, care can form different categories depending on Daseinic need. ‘Handiness’ is one such category. The ‘equipmental’ ontology of a hammer is disclosed when Dasein is ‘Being-towards-wanting-to-drive-a-nail.’ The ‘hammer’ may be disclosed differently as a ‘weapon’ if Dasein is ‘Being-towards-wanting-to-smash-someone’s-face.’ Dasein discloses the ontological Being of ontic items and in so doing discloses its own ontological Being. The least significant category is ‘Being-towards-merely-contemplating’ things objectively present.

Care fashions matter into meaning. The same matter may alternately become a hammer, a weapon, a prop, an opener, a weight, a wedge etc. Dasein shepherds Being.

I find this idea fascinating. Everything you see is ontologically disclosed through care. That is, at your computer desk now you are ontologically disclosing the face of the monitor in your ‘Being-towards-wanting-to-understand.’ You are disclosing the metal object that perhaps sits adjacent as ‘merely-being-present,’ however, if you grow thirsty you will disclose your Being as ‘towards-wanting-to-drink’ and its Being will become ‘A can of coke carrying liquid to relieve thirst.’

So, Dasein is FALLEN into the world and its states of being derive from Being-in-the-world. The structure of its consciousness is of particular interest.

The construction of Daseinic Consciousness:

We spoke earlier of Dasein’s unreachable ontological root. That is, the root of its Being. It cannot be reached by thought. Dasein’s thought is always ahead of itself because it is ahead of its being.

Dasein attempts to gaze back at its primal Being, its root, but is unable to reach it. Fallen Dasein is a projection from this root. Dasein is THROWN into Being as a projection FROM this primal, unreachable foundation of Being. In what, for me, is the most breathtaking analysis of Being ever proposed, Heidegger notes that this phenomenon results in ANGST.

Angst arises in Dasein because it awakens to Being in a state of bewilderment. Angst is Dasein’s concern over its continuation. Dasein exists in time. Time is the horizon of its Being. Each and every behaviour Dasein exhibits is ultimately ‘Being-Towards-Death.’ THIS is angst; this concern over our projected THROWNNESS. Angst is a recognition of death; a recognition of Dasein’s own finitude.

Dasein’s Fallen-self attempts to desperately turn back into itself and search for its primal Being, trying to avoid the angst of Being-in-the-world. Such a process echoes in the cries of mankind – WHY AM I HERE? WHAT IS THE MEANING OF LIFE? It is amazingly profound to me that Heidegger ANSWERED these questions by realizing that they arise not as objectively meaningful queries (we have already discussed how all philosophy must begin with man already ‘in-the-world’) but as the defining tenet of human ontology in themselves. That is, simply, beautifully and magnificently: the question of ‘why am I here?’ is precisely, in itself, in its asking, the answer to ‘what is the meaning of human Being?’ These doubts, these questions fundamentally ARE human. They are what defines human consciousness. Once this is realized, the errors of depression and despair are seen as collateral occurrences to Dasein’s inability to comprehend its own ontological root.

I like to see Dasein’s unreachable primal self and Dasein’s Fallen self as two strands forming a kind of double-helix structure. The fallen self turns in on itself and attempt to reach the primal self - which it cannot - and is in turn thrown back out through projection into the world. The Helix continues on into time, continually projecting against itself and being thrown back into the world, ending abruptly at death.

helixdw4.jpg


Dasein also interacts with what Heidegger terms the ‘They-self.’ The they-self again is not a subject. It exists in consciousness as a protocol of ontological Being. The Being of They-self corresponds to what other people think. One must not Be ‘walking down the street naked’ because ‘They-self’ disagrees with it. One must not Be ‘rocking the boat’ because ‘They-self’ would not approve. One must Be ‘fearing the word of the media’ because it voices the collective ‘They-self.’

Heidegger proposes notions of authenticity and inauthenticity in Dasein’s Being. Inauthentic Being arises when Dasein wallows in its falleness so that its being exists solely in either They-self or in ‘merely-being-contemplated’ observations of ontic items. Inauthenticity is an attempt to escape a recognition of death (see the hordes of people buying cartoon dvd collections? They are, for Heidegger, ‘inauthentic’)

Capability exists, however, for Dasein to become ‘resolute.’ Dasein must become accepting of its own death as a necessary part of its ontological beauty. Through ‘guilt,’ Dasein is called away from its submergence in inauthentic Being and rises to awareness of itself as shepherd of Being, disclosing it ontologically in time. Dasein is a vector through which meaning is instilled in the world. Dasein ek-sists. That is, it (ek) stands out from existence.

Heidegger defines ‘The Earth’ as a realm that Dasein has not disclosed the being of – it is slightly similar to the unknowable noumena (thing in itself). The World is the realm of Dasein. Dasein discloses things from Earth to World in a beautiful, gentle and wondrous array of varieties. Dasein’s gaze frames the Earth as World. Heidegger would later go on to argue that works of Art – particularly poetry, which sees things ontologically and metaphorically - can disclose Being in themselves.

The meaning of life is to disclose Being. The Heideggerian Superman is a warrior poet! So to answer your questions: Dasein is human ontology; angst a recognition of its ‘being-towards-death.’
 
I wasn't all that impressed. I'm curious to see what others think.

You did a good job though..
 
judas69 said:
I was refering to Heidegger's arguement.

Ah, pardon my statement then. I thought you were deriding the herculean efforts of nile.

It (Dasein, and all of Heidegger's works) has been mocked as being overly simplistic, couched in needlessly obscure language.
 
Great post, just to clear one thing up: Heidegger talks about 3 types (but there might exist more, maybe works of art) of ontological Being: present-at-hand (selfsufficient substances), ready-to-hand (tools - things whose Being is dependent on a network of other things: a hammer doesn't make sense without spikes and someone that uses the hammer) and Dasein. I guess you have mentioned them all, but to me it seemed like you placed the first one (present-at-hand) outside of ontological Being.

And then I have a question to you: is the question of "why am I here?" really that central to Heideggers understanding of Dasein? I have gotten the impression (part due to Hubert Deyfus, whom I noticed that you said you disagreed with) that immersion and sort of forgetting the reflecting side of the human being is of more importance. But I might be mixing things up since I haven't studied Heidegger at any serious depth (or even completed Being and Time :/).
 
AIDS said:
Great post, just to clear one thing up: Heidegger talks about 3 types (but there might exist more, maybe works of art) of ontological Being: present-at-hand (selfsufficient substances), ready-to-hand (tools - things whose Being is dependent on a network of other things: a hammer doesn't make sense without spikes and someone that uses the hammer) and Dasein. I guess you have mentioned them all, but to me it seemed like you placed the first one (present-at-hand) outside of ontological Being.

There are several types of ontological Being. I have an idea that in the instance you cite I was specifically talking about Merely-Being-towards-contemplating. This, I think, is definitely the 'lowest' form of these types. It is ontological Being and Dasein is disclosing objects as Being merely contemplated, but here 'care' is at its most apathetic and uninvolved. It was my mistake to write 'merely-being-present' instead of 'merely-being-present-towards-contemplating' and I have edited the article accordingly.

Also: good point about the 'dependent network.'

AIDS said:
And then I have a question to you: is the question of "why am I here?" really that central to Heideggers understanding of Dasein? I have gotten the impression (part due to Hubert Deyfus, whom I noticed that you said you disagreed with) that immersion and sort of forgetting the reflecting side of the human being is of more importance. But I might be mixing things up since I haven't studied Heidegger at any serious depth (or even completed Being and Time :/).

I perhaps would have done better to write 'How am I here?' You are right, it isn't a much discussed aspect of his thought. Personally, I think it clearly follows from Dasein's deduction that it has awoken into the world and is the question that fuels the angst over its continuance. Dasein suddenly finds that it exists and the finitude of this existence is death. That is, all Being is ultimately 'Being-towards-death.' The 'Why/How am I here?' marks a failed attempt by Dasein to recover and understand the foundation of its being. Its lack of answer fuels the nearly sublime ‘angst’ which percolates every facet of our existence. Fear is a direct response to an object; angst is a deeper concern in regards to the over-arching ‘Being-towards-death’ of Dasein. This Being lurks behind all of our other disclosures and behaviors, defining them by adding their temporal dimension. I read the question of WHY/HOW? as voicing the initial self-recoil of Dasein back into its (root/primordial) self, from which it is thrown forth into the world.

More widely discussed is the idea that Dasein has fallen away from itself into a state of authentic being. This argument is stressed far more directly in Being and Time. When Dasein is called into consciousness through 'guilt,' it becomes aware of its independent nature as an ontological vector and gives up its immersion in in-authentic They-self. It recovers its authentic being.

To say I disagree with Dreyfus was a little too forward of me (not to mention suggesting a somewhat immodest parity, considering he is the leading expert in the world, with decades of experience including meeting Heidegger in person, and I am a 23 year old pseud). I should have said: I sometimes disagree with him and other times agree. Or, more readily: I am confused with him.

In his commentary on Being and Time, I sometimes think he is far too ready to propose that Heidegger's Dasein should EMBRACE the They-self and its immersion in in-authentic being. Surely passages of BAT really drive home how Heidegger detested such Being? I think there is an 'elitist' abhorrence of collective thought that drives the text and serves as its fundamental moral compass. Perhaps I feel Dreyfus 'nicefies' Heidegger a little. However, I grant that there is a very strange passage in the first division of the work in which Heidegger argues that there is no hierarchy between They-self and My-self and They-self is not something we should attempt to throw off.

I find myself confused over this seeming antilogy: how can They-self be a negative thing in the wake of such statements? I need to look more into this: perhaps They-self CAN exist authentically and is not always in-authentic? If you or anyone else are able to shed light here, please do so.
 
(Side point: I really appreciate you reading my post and the response you give. If I may make a small suggestion, I think it might be better not to quote a huge amount of text in one unbroken lump, as it makes the thread a little annoying to scroll through.)
 
^Agreed! Nile's post was very illuminating. I've only just begun to explore Heidegger, and reading it sometimes leaves me in an ambivalent state. Is this truly profound, or needlessly cryptic, obscure in language,(as Speed noted) etc? I am quite certain it is my lack of comprehension though that is the problem, not Heidegger's lack of substance. Either way, the explanation is very usefull. I shall consider this in my further reading.
 
Nile577 said:
I perhaps would have done better to write 'How am I here?' You are right, it isn't a much discussed aspect of his thought. Personally, I think it clearly follows from Dasein's deduction that it has awoken into the world and is the question that fuels the angst over its continuance. Dasein suddenly finds that it exists and the finitude of this existence is death. That is, all Being is ultimately 'Being-towards-death.' The 'Why/How am I here?' marks a failed attempt by Dasein to recover and understand the foundation of its being. Its lack of answer fuels the nearly sublime ‘angst’ which percolates every facet of our existence. Fear is a direct response to an object; angst is a deeper concern in regards to the over-arching ‘Being-towards-death’ of Dasein. This Being lurks behind all of our other disclosures and behaviors, defining them by adding their temporal dimension. I read the question of WHY/HOW? as voicing the initial self-recoil of Dasein back into its (root/primordial) self, from which it is thrown forth into the world.

More widely discussed is the idea that Dasein has fallen away from itself into a state of authentic being. This argument is stressed far more directly in Being and Time. When Dasein is called into consciousness through 'guilt,' it becomes aware of its independent nature as an ontological vector and gives up its immersion in in-authentic They-self. It recovers its authentic being.

I'd say that Heidegger borrows a lot from Kierkegaard in his view on anxiety. Anxiety come into existence by way of realizing that nothing has intrinsic meaning, that there are no guidelines that you can follow. Well, you can follow guides, and there certanly exists a lot of them for any given situation, but then you havent embraced the absurdity of life and are in now way near the authentic life.
 
Nile577 said:
In his commentary on Being and Time, I sometimes think he is far too ready to propose that many Heidegger's Dasein should EMBRACE the They-self and its immersion in in-authentic being. Surely passages of BAT really drive home how Heidegger detested such Being? I think there is an 'elitist' abhorrence of collective thought that drives the text and serves as its fundamental moral compass. Perhaps I feel Dreyfus 'nicefies' Heidegger a little. However, I grant that there is a very strange passage in the first division of the work in which Heidegger argues that there is no hierarchy between They-self and My-self and They-self is not something we should attempt to throw off.

I think that you may very well be right. After reading som interviews with Dreyfus one can clearly see why he is such a proponent of immersion: it stems from his own experiences of teaching, during which he immerse himself in the task so much that the idea of a self is oblivirated. What he have realized is then incorporated into his books and lectures about Heidegger. But I really do honor him for it, I utterly despise boring academes who only recite their subjects view and fail to bring anything new to the table.
 
Nile577,

Your outline of basic concepts certainly follows the structural framework of Being and Time, and I admire your efforts in communication (truly). However, I do have concerns about your presentation, and what, in turn, it will communicate to the reader who has not grappled with the work.

Part of this is the crude nature of summary, and how it lends itself to reductionist deduction (such as "boiling away" the nuance and purpose of the world of language housing a conclusion that gives it meaning- such is the result of those who ask, "what is the point?", and do not wish to discover "it", but to have a tidy list of propositions handed to them).

Of greatest concern to me is how, through the common mode of summary and description, Heidegger's ontological work is rendered as something merely ontic! One "describes" what the properties are of the text, its logical structure, its "key claims" from a supposed distanced and theoretical/scientific attitude. The irony of the modern reader who can only perceive ontically, trying to grasp the ontological (and thereby demanding the "meaning" to be fit into ontic language and conceptualization) is almost too much to bear. Speed's frustration and demands on language are evidence of this problem.

Also, I find the diagrams unhelpful and even somewhat problematic (even if motivated by good intentions, and a remarkably honest desire to communicate with this board). To schematize is necessarily to present a rough sketch. It would be similar to saying Starry Night depicts a utterly common event of stars in a night sky as they appear over a settlement. Although factually true with respect to the objects represented in the work, this comprehension is oblivious to the significance and actual meaning of the art (again, stuck ontically in the subject/object attitude, incapable of grasping ontological significance). The humor inherent to rough diagrams, unfortunately, also strips away the sober resolve appropriate for this matter. Which leads me to my final point for now:

The blunting and concealment of the radical force of Heidegger's thought. Avoiding this requires one not to engage in the artificially distanced theoretical attitude which the work seeks to de-strukt. In a sense, commentary or summary descriptions of Heidegger must be "passed over", and instead its meaning displayed. Heidegger's thinking must be disclosed by those who grasp its essence- the essence that becomes totally concealed when framed in accordance with the scientific/ontic attitude.

If time and energy permit, I may, this weekend, attempt to present an interpretation that seeks to preserve both Heidegger's conscientious rigor and ek-static spirit.
 
Fair enough. Mostly valid concerns. I particularly agree that summary explanations are no substitute for reading the text. I think, within the context of a 'philosophy' section on UltimateMetal (a can of worms in itself - philosophy is different from ‘normal’ thinking?), however, my description at least provides a means of stimulating interest in Being and Time. If it does so, it fulfills its intent.

Your issues seem not to be with its content but with its form.

Justin S. said:
Of greatest concern to me is how, through the common mode of summary and description, Heidegger's ontological work is rendered as something merely ontic! One "describes" what the properties are of the text, its logical structure, its "key claims" from a supposed distanced and theoretical/scientific attitude.

Yes: For Heidegger, thinking 'is' and words should disclose rather than dispose. He argues that Western language 'disposes' as it is confined by the rigid fixity of the ontic gestalt. Because we are ‘held hostage’ by ontic words, Heidegger opens dialogue with the Pre-Socratics, who disclosed language before the Socratic instigation of dialectics. He offers idiosyncratic re-translations of ancient terms (e.g 'techne') to employ them ontologically.

However: his description of the process is ONTIC.

Heidegger's writing itself is ontic. That it is frequently neologistic does not change this. Being and Time is sectionalized in accordance to a descriptive conveyance of its thesis; it is didactic, not disclosive. It itself occupies the detached theoretical/scientific attitude you castigate. Heidegger's work describes the perceived problem of Western thought (that it is too focused on describing). Unless one were to philosophize with poety, or make prose become poetry, one is limited to ontic description. The linguistic irony you speak of is present in Heidegger himself.

Heidegger did not invent 'Heideggerian' thought but discovered it. His subsequent communication of this thought outlines, ontically, a paradigm of ontological existence. Subsequent experience results in the reader gaining greater understanding, at which point he realizes the crudeness of the ontic description which facilitated his understanding and cuts it away, like a rotten rung at the base of a ladder. The ontic description Heidegger gives awakens the brain to ontological thought. You have evidently reached this point but I do not think you began your exploration of Heidegger at it. I propose Heideggerian scholarship to be a progressive journey towards abandoning the ontic paradigm.

Therefore, while your criticisms are well-meaning they are also a little pedantic. The ontic description is self-iconoclastic as it points towards an ontological Being which reveals the limiting encasement of its form. In reading Heidegger, one discloses the descriptive text as ontologically Being-towards-understanding-the-notion-of-Dasein.

(Side point: The showing/describing language argument brings to mind Wittgenstein).

Interestingly, Heidegger’s pupil Hannah Arendt notes in her introduction to Walter Benjamin’s Illuminations that, whereas Heidegger thought poetically; Benjamin Thought poetically, often structuring surrealist pastiches of quotes ripped from their context, into essays entirely in themselves, with no descriptive supporting text.

Finally, I like the diagrams and find them appropriate for the context in which they are employed here (a very basic introduction to some of the themes covered in B.A.T.). I will disagree that they are not sober enough. I think humor is essential – I am reminded of Norsemaiden’s signature quote. I'm afraid that your argument here sounds very stuffy to me.

I will look forward to reading your interpretation, which i am sure, should you get to complete it, will be excellent and I thank you for providing a challenging and valid argument.
 
Nile577,

I experienced a funny feeling while reading your last response, as I agree very much with most it (it is not in "opposition" to my criticism, nor mine to yours), and feel that we are often talking past each other, even overlapping, and the inherent difficulties of communication (greatly exacerbated by this medium) are in full effect. This is also why I would like to abandon as much as possible the ever-narrowing (and frankly, often disingenuously and strategically employed) technical convolution in argument (this mirrors my thinking on the course of "philosophy" as well) in favor of a more "poetic" way that is open and more perceptive of intent- which is as central to me as statement.

I plan on a more detailed response to your last post, as well as still posting my own interpretation.