- Jun 26, 2003
- 376
- 2
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Paragraph 8
When we try to approach the question of being through the being of beings, it is crucial to note that we find that the being of beings is already given. That is, in order to interrogate a specific being, that being must already be the thing that it is in advance of our examination. An apple must be an apple, for example, before we can enquire after it as an apple. "The question of being demands that the right access to beings be gained and secured in advance with regards to what it interrogates." We are not trying to describe the material qualities of a specific thing; we are asking how beings are disclosed as the things they are.
"Everything we talk about, mean, and are related to is in being." That is everyTHING whatsoever is. Our preontological understanding of being allows us to understand things as the things they are*. Being determines them as those things.
If being is that which determines things as they are (remember: not in a causal sense), and everything is in being, which being shall have priority for our enquiry into the meaning of being? That is, from where is our enquiry to begin? From which being shall we try to disclose the meaning of being in general? Will it be the being of the question as a mode of the questioner?
* = This understanding does not suggest some kind of factual omniscience. A foreign object we do not understand has a kind of being (probably: present-to-hand). If we learn (get a sense) that this object is a kind of tool, we understand its being as ready-to-hand. Hammers, saws, screwdrivers etc have the same kind of being regardless of their different material properties. The notions of "present-to-hand" and "ready-to-hand" will be encountered in much greater depth later.
Paragraph 9
To formulate the question of being, then, requires us to enquire how we gain access to what is to be interrogated (being), and also requires us to discover the being from which our enquiry is to unfold. "Regarding, understanding and grasping, choosing, and gaining access to, are constitutive attitudes of inquiry and are thus themselves modes of a particular being." That is, the task of questioning, and the methods of enquiry used to formulate a question, are themselves modes of a certain being: human being, or Da-sein. "Thus to work out the question of being means to make a being - one who questions - transparent in its being."
Paragraph 10
Is this not just circular reasoning? The question of being is asked as a mode of a being (Da-sein); we must already understand beings as the things they are to have a foundation for the asking of the question. "In working out the question do we not presuppose something that only the answer can provide?"
This is quite a rare concession by Heidegger to the protocols of analytic debate and formal logic, and even here is he is deprecatory: "Formal objections such as the argument of circular reasoning... are always sterile. They do not offer anything to the understanding of the issue and they hinder penetration into the field of investigation."
Paragraph 11
In any case, there is no circular reasoning. We can already understand beings as the things they are without an explicit concept of the meaning of being. That is, we understand beings preontologically (before a worked-out system of ontology). In all prior ontology (as a discipline of philosophy), and indeed in all prior western thinking, being is "presupposed," or taken for granted. Philosophical and ideological theories apply to beings as they are already given and already understood preontologically by Da-sein. Theoretical thinking seeks to describe, order and categorise beings that already given. We are after an understanding of being in general as that which allows entities to be the things that they are in advance of any theories.
"A 'circle of reasoning' cannot possibly lie in the formulation of the question of the meaning of being, because in answering this question it is not a matter of grounding by deduction but rather of laying bare and exhibiting the ground." That is, we are not enquiring into an entity and trying to deduce its nature - entities (beings) are already understood in their being (which determines the entities they are) by Da-sein's preontological understanding -, we are laying bare the ground of all beings whatsoever, and in so doing disclosing the meaning of beings itself.
We must be careful here. When Heidegger writes of "laying bare the ground" of the meaning of being he does not mean to suggest that being is a materially present "ground" upon which beings show up. Likewise, being is not something that lurks behind beings. By "laying bare the ground" of the question of being we are not seeking to ground it by deduction; we are trying to understand how it shows up as the question that it is. The "ground" is that by which things are determined to be the things they are. In that sense, the ground of beings is being. We are not after the meaning of beings; we are after the meaning of that which determines beings to be the beings they are - namely, being.
The question itself does not exist outside of being. We cannot be satisfied merely by "answering" it as we would any other question - by looking at the already given qualities of a specific being - we are seeking to understand the meaning of being itself, which, if you will forgive the repetition, is a non-entity that determines beings as the beings they are.
Paragraph 12
Confused? We probably should be. Heidegger writes that "the way what is questioned essentially engages our questioning belongs to the innermost meaning of the question of being." The question, as a mode of a questioner, arises in being and seeks to enquire after the meaning of being. Heidegger notices that something like a "relatedness backward or forward" emerges. This is the first mention of the hermeneutic approach that will be adopted in Being and Time. In this context, "hermeneutic" means careful interpretation. In pursuing our enquiry we must allow for the fact that the enquiry itself arises from within the (non)object of its interrogation. That is, the question of the meaning of being arises within being and is understood preontologically in its being. We must perpetually relate the question to its own arising.
As the question arises as a mode of Da-sein, "something like a priority of Da-sein has announced itself." That is, Da-sein will be the being from which our enquiry will unfold.
When we try to approach the question of being through the being of beings, it is crucial to note that we find that the being of beings is already given. That is, in order to interrogate a specific being, that being must already be the thing that it is in advance of our examination. An apple must be an apple, for example, before we can enquire after it as an apple. "The question of being demands that the right access to beings be gained and secured in advance with regards to what it interrogates." We are not trying to describe the material qualities of a specific thing; we are asking how beings are disclosed as the things they are.
"Everything we talk about, mean, and are related to is in being." That is everyTHING whatsoever is. Our preontological understanding of being allows us to understand things as the things they are*. Being determines them as those things.
If being is that which determines things as they are (remember: not in a causal sense), and everything is in being, which being shall have priority for our enquiry into the meaning of being? That is, from where is our enquiry to begin? From which being shall we try to disclose the meaning of being in general? Will it be the being of the question as a mode of the questioner?
* = This understanding does not suggest some kind of factual omniscience. A foreign object we do not understand has a kind of being (probably: present-to-hand). If we learn (get a sense) that this object is a kind of tool, we understand its being as ready-to-hand. Hammers, saws, screwdrivers etc have the same kind of being regardless of their different material properties. The notions of "present-to-hand" and "ready-to-hand" will be encountered in much greater depth later.
Paragraph 9
To formulate the question of being, then, requires us to enquire how we gain access to what is to be interrogated (being), and also requires us to discover the being from which our enquiry is to unfold. "Regarding, understanding and grasping, choosing, and gaining access to, are constitutive attitudes of inquiry and are thus themselves modes of a particular being." That is, the task of questioning, and the methods of enquiry used to formulate a question, are themselves modes of a certain being: human being, or Da-sein. "Thus to work out the question of being means to make a being - one who questions - transparent in its being."
Paragraph 10
Is this not just circular reasoning? The question of being is asked as a mode of a being (Da-sein); we must already understand beings as the things they are to have a foundation for the asking of the question. "In working out the question do we not presuppose something that only the answer can provide?"
This is quite a rare concession by Heidegger to the protocols of analytic debate and formal logic, and even here is he is deprecatory: "Formal objections such as the argument of circular reasoning... are always sterile. They do not offer anything to the understanding of the issue and they hinder penetration into the field of investigation."
Paragraph 11
In any case, there is no circular reasoning. We can already understand beings as the things they are without an explicit concept of the meaning of being. That is, we understand beings preontologically (before a worked-out system of ontology). In all prior ontology (as a discipline of philosophy), and indeed in all prior western thinking, being is "presupposed," or taken for granted. Philosophical and ideological theories apply to beings as they are already given and already understood preontologically by Da-sein. Theoretical thinking seeks to describe, order and categorise beings that already given. We are after an understanding of being in general as that which allows entities to be the things that they are in advance of any theories.
"A 'circle of reasoning' cannot possibly lie in the formulation of the question of the meaning of being, because in answering this question it is not a matter of grounding by deduction but rather of laying bare and exhibiting the ground." That is, we are not enquiring into an entity and trying to deduce its nature - entities (beings) are already understood in their being (which determines the entities they are) by Da-sein's preontological understanding -, we are laying bare the ground of all beings whatsoever, and in so doing disclosing the meaning of beings itself.
We must be careful here. When Heidegger writes of "laying bare the ground" of the meaning of being he does not mean to suggest that being is a materially present "ground" upon which beings show up. Likewise, being is not something that lurks behind beings. By "laying bare the ground" of the question of being we are not seeking to ground it by deduction; we are trying to understand how it shows up as the question that it is. The "ground" is that by which things are determined to be the things they are. In that sense, the ground of beings is being. We are not after the meaning of beings; we are after the meaning of that which determines beings to be the beings they are - namely, being.
The question itself does not exist outside of being. We cannot be satisfied merely by "answering" it as we would any other question - by looking at the already given qualities of a specific being - we are seeking to understand the meaning of being itself, which, if you will forgive the repetition, is a non-entity that determines beings as the beings they are.
Paragraph 12
Confused? We probably should be. Heidegger writes that "the way what is questioned essentially engages our questioning belongs to the innermost meaning of the question of being." The question, as a mode of a questioner, arises in being and seeks to enquire after the meaning of being. Heidegger notices that something like a "relatedness backward or forward" emerges. This is the first mention of the hermeneutic approach that will be adopted in Being and Time. In this context, "hermeneutic" means careful interpretation. In pursuing our enquiry we must allow for the fact that the enquiry itself arises from within the (non)object of its interrogation. That is, the question of the meaning of being arises within being and is understood preontologically in its being. We must perpetually relate the question to its own arising.
As the question arises as a mode of Da-sein, "something like a priority of Da-sein has announced itself." That is, Da-sein will be the being from which our enquiry will unfold.
