free will and optimism

[kmik]

Basically my point is this: usually we consider the fact free will doesn't exist and we are actually biological automats as sad or fatalistic in nature, and that morality is not justified because everything that happens is bound to happen. But I argue that in fact the contrary is true - for if our actions are not determined by past events then they'd be completely arbitary. So basically we cannot praise people for good things they've done according to that, or punish them: since then again everything is arbitary.

Also, the same applies for the 'genetics vs environment' controversy: in reality our personality is shaped by both. However, at least personally I'd rather personality is completely hereditary; you could argue that 'you are your bloodline', but you have no physical correlation at all with the enviornment. So basically the two seemingly pessimistic assertions that you are your forefathers and that free will does not exist are actually better than the alternative.

 

[speed]

I've decided to re-open this thread. Kmik messaged a new, more understandable thread which i have posted, and he informed me English is not his native tongue.

Sorry for the delay Kmik.

 

[Cythraul]

But I argue that in fact the contrary is true - for if our actions are not determined by past events then they'd be completely arbitary.

That's absolutely correct. However, I think it's better to cast the idea of free will in terms of autonomy. Autonomy is neither deterministic nor completely random, and it's a formal requirement for rational action. People normally experience a gap between antecedent desires (or any antecedent condition for that matter) and the actual undertaking of an action. That is, my antecedent desire to eat a sandwich is not sufficient to cause me to eat a sandwich; I have to actually get up and go make a sandwich of my own volition. This experiential gap is a fact of our psychology. Now the question is: Is the psychological gap matched by a neurobiological correlate? It would seem strange to me if it wasn't, because that would render any apparently rational action irrelevant. That seems wildly counterintuitive. Why would we have evolved a merely psychological, epiphenomenal sense of free will and rational action when rational action clearly seems to be so beneficial to our species, and would be beneficial to any species for that matter? It looks like that psychological gap has to be relevant in some way.