Science, Logical Positivism, and Metaphysics

[Justin S.]

For my Philosophy of Science course, I wrote a paper concerned with these broad themes. I thought its general attitute and findings might be interesting to you all:

On Logical Positivism's Relationship to Metaphysics

(Here is the yousendit link for those that cant download it above) Alternate link

Please keep in mind that this paper is far from exhaustive, and examines "in depth" only two authors' positions. Also, I am currently studying under a rigidly analytic department, and I have to be careful with what I write- this paper is certainly at the limit (even though it strikes me as somewhat obvious). Nevertheless, its broader themes are still very important questions that are too often ignored and dismissed by those that do not like what they find therein.

I know we have other philosophy students on the board, from both "traditions", and I am eager to hear what you think of it. Also, I am highly curious as to how it reads to those who dont explicitly "study" philosophy. So I look forward to general thoughts from all who frequent here.

Also, feel free to riff on this in any direction which leads to interesting discussions (I want my paper to be a catalyst, not the focus).

So, what do you think of the metaphysical foundations of anti-metaphysics (and science/logic in general)?

 

[Cythraul]

I've always wondered what a Justin S. paper would be like. I'll read and perhaps post some thoughts later.

 

[speed]

I've always wondered what a Justin S. paper would be like. I'll read and perhaps post some thoughts later.

Ive got my red pencil sharpened and ready to go. Even have a backup as I know its Justin. hehe. Obviously kidding if one cannot figure it out.

Frankly, Im surprised more students, or persons taking philosophy classes dont show up and post topics they're either studying or have papers on. Perhaps they do, I dont know. But I think this is the first academic philosophy paper Ive seen here in awhile.

 

[Cythraul]

Interesting paper, Justin. I don't quite understand how value-oriented bias in terms of orientation towards a subject of inquiry is supposed to color the results of inquiry or undermine the objectivity of inquiry. You do put 'objectivity' in shudder quotes and that suggests to me that you would want to reject some philosophically loaded notion of objectivity. I am interested in what you would take that notion to be and if some kind of ordinary, everyday notion of objectivity is left over in its absence.

Hilary Putnam frequently discusses how values color all forms of inquiry, but I don't think he takes that to undermine the objectivity of inquiry. Rather, he seems to take it to undermine the notion of values as subjective or non-factual. He disagrees with the view that there is some sort of dichotomy between factual discourse and value discourse. I'm inclined to agree with him. I also don't know if I want to accept some sort of strong realism or correspondence view of truth, and I think that puts me into some sort of pragmatist camp.

 

[Cythraul]

Frankly, Im surprised more students, or persons taking philosophy classes dont show up and post topics they're either studying or have papers on.

I would but I am extremely insecure and don't like to show my work to other people. Also, I just don't think anybody would care, nor do I think anyone would understand what I'm talking about unless I provided lengthy explanations in order to facilitate understanding of what I write about...and I am just too lazy to do anything like that.

 

[Horus]

Downloading it now.. I'm pretty excited about reading this.

 

[derbeder]

I also don't know if I want to accept some sort of strong realism or correspondence view of truth, and I think that puts me into some sort of pragmatist camp.

There are many positions one can hold concerning truth which involve rejecting a correspondence view of truth.

Deflationists about truth think that instances the schema

'P' is true if and only if P

exhaust all there is to say about truth. Deflationism involves rejection of a correspondence view of truth - if the correspondence theory is to be understood as going beyond mere platitudes (eg. if all there is to say about correspondence and truth is something like " 'P' is true if and only if 'P' corresponds to the facts") and as giving a substantial theory of what the relation of correspondence is and of what facts are.
According to deflationism, we have a use for the expression "true" because it serves some expressive needs. For instance, suppose Michael asserts A, B, C... and I have only heard some of A, B, C... and there are sentences that he has asserted that I have no idea about. How can I say something that is equivalent to the conjunction of A, B, C...?
I can express my agreement with Michael by saying

Everything Michael says is true

and since Michael has said A, B, C..., what I have just said is equivalent to A, B, C...
Another use of the truth-predicate is in allowing us to express certain generalizations without using infinitely many sentences - eg. it allows us to say something equivalent to the conjunction of infinitely many instances of the schema 'P or not-P' - that is "every instance of 'P or not-P' is true".
There are many problems that a deflationist view of truth has to face, one of which is to show that it does not lead to contradiction by the reasoning of the liar paradox. There are some solutions to the paradox which don't preserve the equivalence of "P" and " 'P' is true" and if there are reasons to prefer some such solution to those which preserve the equivalence, then deflationism is incorrect. But these issues turn on details about the solutions offered to the paradox, and can get rather involved. I should however say that there is an solution to the paradox which keeps the equivalence and is rather attractive.
Other problems about deflationism turn on the relation between meaning and truth. It is arguable that if we are to hold a deflationist line about truth, than the meaning of a sentence cannot be explained in terms of the conditions under which it is true. But it is independently plausible that the meaning of a sentence can be explained - at least in part - by the conditions under which it is true. I will not go into more detail about how to actually develop and evaluate this line of argument here.

A pragmatist theory of truth is one according to which whether a sentence is true depends on our goals, interests etc. Such a view may be inconsistent with a correspondence theory whch explains what a fact is without invoking our interest etc. (which is what standard correspondence theories have done). It is also inconsistent with deflationism, since a pragmatist theory says something more about truth than the equivalence of 'P' and 'P is true' and deflationism takes the equivalence to be the whole story about truth.

There are yet other views about truth which are distinct from the three views mentioned so far. On an epistemic theory of truth, truth is somehow defined (non-circularly) from conditions of warrented assertion - there are more than a few attempts at doing this. There is also what is called a coherence theory of truth, but it is rather difficult to actually articulate such a theory without really making it collapse into one of the other theories. But there have been attempts at doing that as well. It is also possible to hold that there is more to say about truth than deflationism allows and still take each of the theories above (correspondence, pragmatist, coherence etc.) to be attempting something which cannot be done. Each of these theories tries to define the concept of truth from other concepts and we may reject any attempt at such a definiton by taking truth to be a primitive concept which cannot be defined in a non-circular manner.

All in all, rejection of a correspondence theory of truth does not lead to the acceptance of a pragmatist view. There are many players on the field.


BTW: The link didn't work for me, so I couldn't read Justin's paper.

 

[Cythraul]

All in all, rejection of a correspondence theory of truth does not lead to the acceptance of a pragmatist view. There are many players on the field.

I guess I was wrong to say it would commit me to some sort of pragmatist view of truth, but some of the views I hold I think are usually characterized as pragmatist, although I am not entirely clear on what pragmatism is.

 

[Seditious]

"All download slots assigned to your country (New Zealand) are currently in use. Please try again in a few hours"

any chance of you uploading it to yousendit.com?

 

[Justin S.]

I uploaded it to yousendit (which I should have done first anyway). Sorry about that.

 

[Justin S.]

I would but I am extremely insecure and don't like to show my work to other people. Also, I just don't think anybody would care, nor do I think anyone would understand what I'm talking about unless I provided lengthy explanations in order to facilitate understanding of what I write about...and I am just too lazy to do anything like that.

I can be insecure as well, but thats all the more reason to work on something and present it (when others hold your feet to the fire).

Plus, there are some who would understand the terminology/concepts and be interested to see what youre working on (*cough*).

 

[Justin S.]

Interesting paper, Justin. I don't quite understand how value-oriented bias in terms of orientation towards a subject of inquiry is supposed to color the results of inquiry or undermine the objectivity of inquiry. You do put 'objectivity' in shudder quotes and that suggests to me that you would want to reject some philosophically loaded notion of objectivity. I am interested in what you would take that notion to be and if some kind of ordinary, everyday notion of objectivity is left over in its absence.

Thanks for reading it. Your questions are rather involved, but Ill try to answer them concisely.

I put "objectivity" in scare quotes, not only because I'm weary of it, but because I don't even know what it is supposed to signify- every proposed meaning I have encountered seems very flawed. I reject the subjective/objective dichotomy that is so prevalent in our culture, and highly qualified notions, such as Putnam's, water it down to the point that I'm left wondering why they want to retain it. Also, I'm a stickler for "meaning seepage" (if you'll excuse a silly term, I have been drinking tonight to mark the end of this semester)- even if "objectivity" is heavily qualified to mean something "acceptable" its former auras still linger in its usage, imparting notions that I find problematic. The question should be, not why I don't like it, but why others insist on holding on to it? (I think the lingering effect of historical meanings plays a large role here)- Why is this distinction necessary, what notion does it capture? (of course, I see no reason for it, in that I lean phenomenologically).

About value-oriented bias: As I mentioned in the paper, there is this assumption that, once oriented to an object of inquiry, bias "ends" and that "results" of the inquiry are empirically objective. How does this work? How is the inquirer able to "access" the phenomena (via perception/measurement) in such a way that is "objective", or that one can make claims on phenomena as objective? The information that they select as "result" is a matter of salience, as well as the tools of saliency that aid in this process such as logic and whatever scientific methodology they use. Furthermore, "objectivity" seems to cling to determinism, or realism, or both- I am opposed to these notions.

 

[Horus]

Just finished reading it. Now I know what my future writings need; Big words . Seriously though, Justin, that was really good. I still have yet to fully tackle Metaphysicss, so I was lost at some parts, but I kinda caught on as I kept reading, which is why I think I found it a good read.

 

[Justin S.]

Ptah, Im glad you read it and got something out of it- I know its somewhat formal, but the themes within are anything but "formal" concerns.

 

[Έρεβος]

Frankly, Im surprised more students, or persons taking philosophy classes dont show up and post topics they're either studying or have papers on. Perhaps they do, I dont know. But I think this is the first academic philosophy paper Ive seen here in awhile.

Maybe most are just boringly bland and somewhat obvious topics. I don't know what a college level philosophy course is like [yet], though the [highschool level] coures I've heard of/read of seem to cover things that most truly philosophically minded individuals master at the age of 10. I'm guessing most college coures would either cover things too - I don't know - academic, to be discussed in this kind of setting; or that the things studied are not-all-that-mind-numbing. I'll be taking a couple freshman courses in philosophy at a local university as part of an early study program, and I highly doubt I'll learn anything new to post here or really much new at all; though I do look forward to showing a bunch of college students up at philosophy. I'm guessing the only really interesting topics would be in the high-end courses, or rare courses with great teachers that study the less-mainstream topics.

As for the paper, my mind is a bit too dreary to comprehend it at the moment. I shall read it tommorow and post on it then.

 

[Έρεβος]

Just finished reading it. Now I know what my future writings need; Big words . Seriously though, Justin, that was really good. I still have yet to fully tackle Metaphysicss, so I was lost at some parts, but I kinda caught on as I kept reading, which is why I think I found it a good read.

Big words, haha. Well, they can help condense things sometimes, but - even though I tend to use them quite a bit - I usually consider use of too many overly large words to be [usually] nothing more than an "ego boost" or trying to come off as being "so" sophisticated unneededly. Not saying Justin did this [too badly] (as I'm quickly browsing through his paper), plus college professors I know like to grade papers largely by the amount of big words in them .

 

[Horus]

Or "Fluff" as you so profoundly put it in the Kamelot forum.

As for High School level Philosophy courses, they're really a joke compared to a real study of Philosophy and its related branches. Aside from music, my only other true passion is figuring out how the human brain works on all levels of thought, and the courses I'm taking don't really help me at all.

 

[Seditious]

I usually consider use of too many overly large words to be [usually] nothing more than an "ego boost" or trying to come off as being "so" sophisticated.

yea.

I honestly didn't see any word you wouldn't expect at a college level used in that essay, but it was definitely much more professionally written than many essays I've seen, which is nothing to do with the size or obscurity of words individually.

 

[Έρεβος]

I honestly didn't see any word you wouldn't expect at a college level used in that essay, but it was definitely much more professionally written than many essays I've seen, which is nothing to do with the size or obscurity of words individually.

Yeah.

 

[Korona]

Thanks for posting that Justin, it was a good read.

Your first point is very relevant to me, the fact/value dychotomy is a topic I am writing an essay on in a few weeks.
I think Hillary Putnam beat you to it though in his essays "The Empiricist Background" and "The Entanglement of Fact and Value" (especialy in the section called "Epistemic Values Are Values Too").

judgements of "coherence", "plausibility", "reasonableness", "simplicity", and of what Dirac famously called the beauty of a hypothesis, are all normative judgements in Charles Peirce's sense, judgements of "what ought to be" in the case of reasonaing

I would suggest that you have been overly wordy, and take a long time to make the fairly straightforward point that Positivists make value judgements when establishing their method, and thus cannot claim to have a value-less system of inquirey.

You might want to condense the wording down and add in Hume's famous "you can't derive fact's from values" as a motivation for the positivists taking up the dychotomy, and frame their project in terms of a response to Kant's notion of the synthetic a-prioiri (which included mathamatics, and was thus abhorent to the positivists).

I would very much reccomend you dig up those Putnam essays though, because they are highly relevant and should help streamline the essay and make it more in-depth.


As for your other conclusion - I don't think that it is right to say that objectivity is undermined. What you have shown is rather that objectivity isn't an inherant good, or possesing intrinsic value, which is certainly an assumption positivists make, and a good thing to address!
However that doesn't undermine the objective/subjective distintion itself, which you seem to be taking as synonymous with unbiased/biased.
Most people would take objective to mean "possesing mind-independant reality"... a fairly innocuous point unless you are some kind of Berkelian Idealist!
Hopefully you didn't mean to give this impression, but the lanaguge could do with tightening up so as to avoid confusion. I suspect that it collapses into the first point - that the inherant good of objectivity is just one example of a metaphysical assumption made in the positivist programme. Therefore setting the conclusion up as multi-parted is probably a mistake as it leads one to make the assumption that you are attacking objectivity itself, rather than the presuppositions around it.

Having said this, I do think your conclusion is correct, positivism is based on non-empirical value judgements.