One highly interesting but obscure school of ancient philosophy that I believe is relevant today is that of the Cyrenaics. The Cyrenaics were one of the two main schools (the Cynics being the immediate other) that evolved out of the Socratic tradition, under the direction of Aristippus, one of the close confidants of Socrates. And in all of history, I know of no group, school, or philosophy that ever matched the Cyrenaics in hedonism and pure pleasure. And yet, as much as I dislike many of their ideas, I find I almost entirely agree with them (not to mention someone extremely close to me is a unknowing practicing Cyrenaic--thus this thread). I contend, that surely the philosophy of modern society is closer to the Cyrenaics in thought than any other.
Note: Most of this is pasted from the Stanford Internet Encyclopedia of PhilosophyIm too lazy and too tired and stressed to re-write or paraphrase all this stuff! And I am curious to read everyones reactions to this philosophy.
Empiricism and Epistemology
They were empiricists, and believed that all we could know was our own experiences. They distinguished sharply between the experiences that one has--e.g., that I am now seeing gray--and the objects that cause one to have these experiences--e.g., the computer screen. We can have infallible knowledge of our own experiences, since we have immediate access to them, but we do not have access to objects and qualities in the external world. As the Cyrenaics put it, "The experience which takes place in us reveals to us nothing more than itself." The Cyrenaics reinforce this point by saying that, strictly speaking, we should not say, "I am seeing something yellow," for instance, but "I am being yellowed," or "I am being moved by something yellowly," since the latter statements make it clear that we are reporting only our immediate perceptual state. (In this respect, the Cyrenaics bear a striking resemblance to some modern epistemologists, who resort to locutions like "I am being appeared to redly now" as describing accurately what is immediately given to us in experience.)
The Cyrenaics note that the same object can cause different perceivers to experience different sensible qualities, depending on the bodily condition of the perceivers. For instance, honey will taste sweet to most people, but bitter to somebody with an illness, and the same wall that appears white to one person will look yellow to somebody with jaundice. And if a person presses his eye, he sees double. From the fact that the wall appears white to me and yellow to you, the Cyrenaics think we should infer that we cannot know which quality the wall itself has on the basis of our experience of it, presumably because we have no criterion outside of our experiences to use to adjudicate which one (if either) of our experiences is correct.
Even if all people were to agree on the perceptual quality that some object has--for instance, that a wall appears white--the Cyrenaics still think that we could not confidently say that we are having the same experience. This is because each of us has access only to our own experiences, not to those of other people, and so the mere fact that each of us calls the wall 'white' does not show us that we are all having the same experience that I am having when I use the word 'white.' This argument of the Cyrenaics anticipates the 'problem of other minds'--that is, how can I know that other people have a mind like I do, since I only observe their behavior (if even that), not the mental states that might or might not cause that behavior?
Ethics
The Cyrenaics start from the Greek ethical commonplace that the highest good is what we all seek for its own sake, and not for the sake of anything else. This they identify as pleasure, because we instinctively seek pleasure for its own sake, and when we achieve pleasure, we want nothing more. Similarly, pain is bad because we shun it.
When the Cyrenaics say that 'pleasure' is the highest good, they do not mean that pleasure in general in good, so that we should seek to maximize the overall amount of pleasure in the world, as utilitarians say. Instead, they mean that, for each of us, our own pleasure is what is valuable to us, because that is what each of us seeks. Also, each of us can only experience our own pleasures, and not the pleasures of other people. Thus, the Cyrenaic view is a form of egoistic hedonism.
Pleasure
Another striking feature of the Cyrenaic theory is its lack of future-concern. The Cyrenaics advocate going after whatever will bring one pleasure now, enjoying the pleasure while one is experiencing it, and not worrying too much about what the future will bring. Although the Cyrenaics say that prudence is valuable for attaining pleasure, they do not seem much concerned with exercising self-control in pursuing pleasure, or with deferring present pleasures (or undergoing present pains) for the sake of experiencing greater pleasure (or avoiding greater pains) in the future.
The first reason that the Cyrenaics might have for rejecting long-term planning about one's pursuits is that they are skeptical about personal identity across time. If all I have access to are momentary, fluctuating experiences, what reason do I have to think that the 'self' that exists today will be the same 'self' as the person who will bear my name 30 years hence? After all, in most respects, a person at 30 years old is almost completely different from that 'same' person at 10, and the 'same' person at 50 will also be much changed. So, if what I desire is pleasure for myself, what reason do I have to sacrifice my pleasures for the sake of the pleasures of that 'other' person down the temporal stream from myself? Nursing a hangover, or deep in debt, that future self might curse the past self for his intemperance, but what concern is that of mine?
The Cyrenaics may also think that planning for the future, and trying to assure happiness by foregoing present pleasures for the sake of the future, is self-defeating. If this is right, then it is not the case that the Cyrenaics think that future pleasures and pains are unimportant, it is simply that they believe that worrying about the future is futile. One gains happiness, and maximizes the pleasure in one's life, not by anxiously planning one's future out, and toiling on behalf of the future, but simply by enjoying whatever pleasures are immediately at hand, without worrying about the long-term consequences.
The Cyrenaics think that "to pile up the pleasures which produce happiness is most unpleasant," because one will need to be choosing things which are painful for the sake of future pleasures. The Cyrenaics instead aim at enjoying the pleasures that are present, without letting themselves be troubled at what is not present, i.e., the past and future. Epicurus thinks that the memory of past pleasures, and the expectation of future pleasures, are themselves most pleasant, and hence he emphasizes the importance of careful planning in arranging what one will experience in the future. The Cyrenaics, however, deny this, saying that pleasures are pleasant only when actually being experienced.
Finally, the Cyrenaics lack of future-concern may result from radically relativizing the good to one's present preferences. It's reported that Aristippus "discerned the good by the single present time alone," and later Cyrenaics assert that there is no telos--goal or good--to life asa whole; instead, particular actions and desires each aim at some particular pleasure. So the notion of some overall goal or good for one's entire life is rejected and is replaced by a succession of short-terms goals. As one's desires change over time, what is good for you at that time likewise changes, and at each moment, it makes sense to try to satisfy the desires that one has at that time, without regard to the desires one may happen to have in the future.
If the Cyrenaics thought that to choose rationally is to endeavor to maximize the fulfillment of one's present preferences, their position would be analogous to the model of economic rationality put forward by current philosophers like David Gauthier.
Morality
In ancient times, the Cyrenaics were among the most dismissive of traditional Greek morality. They say that nothing is just or base by nature: what is just or base is set entirely by the customs and conventions of particular societies. So, for instance, there is nothing in the world or in human nature that makes incest, or stealing, or parricide wrong in themselves. However, these things become base in a particular society because the laws and customs of that society designate those practices as base. You should normally refrain from wrong-doing, not because wrong-doing is bad in itself, but because of the punishments that you will suffer if you are caught.
Many of the stories surrounding Aristippus stress his willingness to do things that were considered demeaning or shocking, like putting on a woman's robes when the king commands it, or exposing his child to die with no remorse when it was an inconvenience. Although most of these stories are malicious and probably untrue, they do seem to have a basis in the Cyrenaics' disregard of conventions of propriety when they think they can get away with it. All pleasures are good, they say, even ones that result from unseemly behavior.
The Cyrenaic attitude toward friendship also is consistent with their egoistic hedonism and well outside the traditional attitudes toward friendship. Friendship, according to the Cyrenaics, is entered into for self-interested motives. That is, we obtain friends simply because we believe that by doing so we will be in a better position to obtain pleasure for ourselves, not because we think that the friendship is valuable for its own sake, or because we love our friend for his own sake.
Note: Most of this is pasted from the Stanford Internet Encyclopedia of PhilosophyIm too lazy and too tired and stressed to re-write or paraphrase all this stuff! And I am curious to read everyones reactions to this philosophy.
Empiricism and Epistemology
They were empiricists, and believed that all we could know was our own experiences. They distinguished sharply between the experiences that one has--e.g., that I am now seeing gray--and the objects that cause one to have these experiences--e.g., the computer screen. We can have infallible knowledge of our own experiences, since we have immediate access to them, but we do not have access to objects and qualities in the external world. As the Cyrenaics put it, "The experience which takes place in us reveals to us nothing more than itself." The Cyrenaics reinforce this point by saying that, strictly speaking, we should not say, "I am seeing something yellow," for instance, but "I am being yellowed," or "I am being moved by something yellowly," since the latter statements make it clear that we are reporting only our immediate perceptual state. (In this respect, the Cyrenaics bear a striking resemblance to some modern epistemologists, who resort to locutions like "I am being appeared to redly now" as describing accurately what is immediately given to us in experience.)
The Cyrenaics note that the same object can cause different perceivers to experience different sensible qualities, depending on the bodily condition of the perceivers. For instance, honey will taste sweet to most people, but bitter to somebody with an illness, and the same wall that appears white to one person will look yellow to somebody with jaundice. And if a person presses his eye, he sees double. From the fact that the wall appears white to me and yellow to you, the Cyrenaics think we should infer that we cannot know which quality the wall itself has on the basis of our experience of it, presumably because we have no criterion outside of our experiences to use to adjudicate which one (if either) of our experiences is correct.
Even if all people were to agree on the perceptual quality that some object has--for instance, that a wall appears white--the Cyrenaics still think that we could not confidently say that we are having the same experience. This is because each of us has access only to our own experiences, not to those of other people, and so the mere fact that each of us calls the wall 'white' does not show us that we are all having the same experience that I am having when I use the word 'white.' This argument of the Cyrenaics anticipates the 'problem of other minds'--that is, how can I know that other people have a mind like I do, since I only observe their behavior (if even that), not the mental states that might or might not cause that behavior?
Ethics
The Cyrenaics start from the Greek ethical commonplace that the highest good is what we all seek for its own sake, and not for the sake of anything else. This they identify as pleasure, because we instinctively seek pleasure for its own sake, and when we achieve pleasure, we want nothing more. Similarly, pain is bad because we shun it.
When the Cyrenaics say that 'pleasure' is the highest good, they do not mean that pleasure in general in good, so that we should seek to maximize the overall amount of pleasure in the world, as utilitarians say. Instead, they mean that, for each of us, our own pleasure is what is valuable to us, because that is what each of us seeks. Also, each of us can only experience our own pleasures, and not the pleasures of other people. Thus, the Cyrenaic view is a form of egoistic hedonism.
Pleasure
Another striking feature of the Cyrenaic theory is its lack of future-concern. The Cyrenaics advocate going after whatever will bring one pleasure now, enjoying the pleasure while one is experiencing it, and not worrying too much about what the future will bring. Although the Cyrenaics say that prudence is valuable for attaining pleasure, they do not seem much concerned with exercising self-control in pursuing pleasure, or with deferring present pleasures (or undergoing present pains) for the sake of experiencing greater pleasure (or avoiding greater pains) in the future.
The first reason that the Cyrenaics might have for rejecting long-term planning about one's pursuits is that they are skeptical about personal identity across time. If all I have access to are momentary, fluctuating experiences, what reason do I have to think that the 'self' that exists today will be the same 'self' as the person who will bear my name 30 years hence? After all, in most respects, a person at 30 years old is almost completely different from that 'same' person at 10, and the 'same' person at 50 will also be much changed. So, if what I desire is pleasure for myself, what reason do I have to sacrifice my pleasures for the sake of the pleasures of that 'other' person down the temporal stream from myself? Nursing a hangover, or deep in debt, that future self might curse the past self for his intemperance, but what concern is that of mine?
The Cyrenaics may also think that planning for the future, and trying to assure happiness by foregoing present pleasures for the sake of the future, is self-defeating. If this is right, then it is not the case that the Cyrenaics think that future pleasures and pains are unimportant, it is simply that they believe that worrying about the future is futile. One gains happiness, and maximizes the pleasure in one's life, not by anxiously planning one's future out, and toiling on behalf of the future, but simply by enjoying whatever pleasures are immediately at hand, without worrying about the long-term consequences.
The Cyrenaics think that "to pile up the pleasures which produce happiness is most unpleasant," because one will need to be choosing things which are painful for the sake of future pleasures. The Cyrenaics instead aim at enjoying the pleasures that are present, without letting themselves be troubled at what is not present, i.e., the past and future. Epicurus thinks that the memory of past pleasures, and the expectation of future pleasures, are themselves most pleasant, and hence he emphasizes the importance of careful planning in arranging what one will experience in the future. The Cyrenaics, however, deny this, saying that pleasures are pleasant only when actually being experienced.
Finally, the Cyrenaics lack of future-concern may result from radically relativizing the good to one's present preferences. It's reported that Aristippus "discerned the good by the single present time alone," and later Cyrenaics assert that there is no telos--goal or good--to life asa whole; instead, particular actions and desires each aim at some particular pleasure. So the notion of some overall goal or good for one's entire life is rejected and is replaced by a succession of short-terms goals. As one's desires change over time, what is good for you at that time likewise changes, and at each moment, it makes sense to try to satisfy the desires that one has at that time, without regard to the desires one may happen to have in the future.
If the Cyrenaics thought that to choose rationally is to endeavor to maximize the fulfillment of one's present preferences, their position would be analogous to the model of economic rationality put forward by current philosophers like David Gauthier.
Morality
In ancient times, the Cyrenaics were among the most dismissive of traditional Greek morality. They say that nothing is just or base by nature: what is just or base is set entirely by the customs and conventions of particular societies. So, for instance, there is nothing in the world or in human nature that makes incest, or stealing, or parricide wrong in themselves. However, these things become base in a particular society because the laws and customs of that society designate those practices as base. You should normally refrain from wrong-doing, not because wrong-doing is bad in itself, but because of the punishments that you will suffer if you are caught.
Many of the stories surrounding Aristippus stress his willingness to do things that were considered demeaning or shocking, like putting on a woman's robes when the king commands it, or exposing his child to die with no remorse when it was an inconvenience. Although most of these stories are malicious and probably untrue, they do seem to have a basis in the Cyrenaics' disregard of conventions of propriety when they think they can get away with it. All pleasures are good, they say, even ones that result from unseemly behavior.
The Cyrenaic attitude toward friendship also is consistent with their egoistic hedonism and well outside the traditional attitudes toward friendship. Friendship, according to the Cyrenaics, is entered into for self-interested motives. That is, we obtain friends simply because we believe that by doing so we will be in a better position to obtain pleasure for ourselves, not because we think that the friendship is valuable for its own sake, or because we love our friend for his own sake.
