The thread is losing focus as rapidly as logic. In my reply, I'll attempt to put things into an argumentative perspective rather than a battle between claims to factual information. Since liberalism has been miscontrued and misrepresented quite frequently, it has been outlined as a means to settle the issue mentioned below, and it is hoped that the length of the post be forgiven on grounds of its relevance.
The resolution of the argument lies in the resolution of one central issue, one that deals with how the granting of certain individual liberties on grounds of both principle and pragmatism is imperative and thus the restriction of the extent to which the exercise of power is justifiable, followed by a comparison of totalitarian and liberal societies.
I'll deal with the justification or otherwise, in principle, of government interference in individual acts first, followed by the utility of the proposed non-interference.
Acts are broadly divided into two categories: those that concern the interests of no one but the individual perpetuating them (self-regarding acts), and those that concern the interests of people other than the performing individual (social acts). In the case of the former, the government is in principle unjustified in interference; in the case of the latter, it is completely justified. The basis for the principles just mentioned are perhaps the core of the contention.
The basis, outlined repeatedly in liberal literature, is that mature individuals are in a position to judge their own benefit better than any external party, owing to their being aware of the circumstances and consequences and their consequent reactions to them better than any such party (usually the government). Misapplication of generalized doctrines to individuals are probable, owing to the differences inherent in the circumstances and dispositions of people.
To deprive these individuals of the means to judge for themselves is to assume that the intervening party will necessarily be a better judge. In barbaric nations, the assumption may always hold true, which is why 'there is nothing for them but implicit obedience to an Akbar or a Charlemagne, if they are so fortunate as to find one' (J.S. Mill). Further, nations facing obstacles so great that overcoming them may be a goal unattainable except without the single-handed guidance of a capable leader are justified in adopting totalitarian regimes, and for the same reason, modern dictators claiming to prepare countries for democratic rule are tolerated.
It is fair to restrict the debate to nations which are closest to ideal liberalism, since it is on these that the charges were levied by the author. All such nations are neither barbarians nor faced with any obstacles that cannot be handled by the present mode of government. There is, therefore, no justification in principle for the exercise of power in issues relating to purely self-regarding actions as far as these nations are concerned.
In classical liberal policy, the government may employ education, disuassion and discouragement as means of warning individuals against what they consider a decision for their own good, but no more. While it is not contested that certain individuals will make illogical and harmful decisions, it is argued 'that all errors committed against persuasion and discouragement are far outweighed by the evil of constraining one to what others think is good.'
The argument against restrain beyond a certain point is strengthened upon further consideration. On issues of social conduct and morality, public opinion or that of someone representing the public interests (in totalitarian regimes) is more probable than not to be right since such issues involve directly the interests of the deciding member(s) of society. However, on issues of personal self-regarding conduct, the legislation of external parties is at best an imposition on the individual of what others believe to be correct or utilitarian, and at worst bringing into conformity with oneself the acts of others. This last example is exhibited well in history. The calls for a nation-drive against Mormonism, which embraced polygamy, in late 19th century England is perhaps the most cited in favour of liberalism. While tolerating Muslims, Hindus and the Chinese, the British set out on campaigns to hunt down self-exiled Mormons. As long as the proposed institution of marriage is voluntary in nature and as long as the Mormon community allows for the discharge of those who disagree, there is no case against them and their existence should continue unhampered by society, though the persistence of disapproval is justified.
The granting of liberties finds an even more solid footing on utilitarian grounds.
To subject individuals to either popularly decided customs or modes of action deduced from the dictation of totalitarian regimes as the only possible methods to be employed is damaging: firstly, recorded experience may be too narrow or improperly interpreted, and using it to enforce upon individuals infringements of liberty as a means for their betterment is likely to be flawed. Secondly, such policies may be tailored for customary circumstances and dispositions, and a person may differ from the custom. Further, the strengthening of the mental faculties of man lies in making responsible decisions, and the decision of the state to disallow the same merely weakens the faculty of reason in man, in addition to treating him in a manner identical with the manner in which children or mentally incapable people are treated.
The maintenance of genius and originality requires such freedom. Conformity, therefore, halts progress, and conformity is a necessary consequence of the proposed methods of control, if not a purpose. It also guards effectively against mediocrity in totalitarian regimes, a possibility proponents of any form of totalitarianism conveniently ignore.
Pertinent examples, perhaps, of nations in slump owing to mass conformity are many Islamic States. While rich in culture and historically parallel in development to much of the west, these have been dulled by conformity owing to the repressive penetration of ideologies designed to induce conformity. While it is not claimed that the parity between the East and West is a consequence of this one circumstance, the contribution of it to the existing state of affairs is definitely maintained.
In general, liberalism would argue and I would agree that in matters concerning purely personal acts which do not involve the interests of others, individual liberty is not only essential in principle, it is also yeilds the most utility.
I believe the very first objection raised, that of it being essential to society that 'selfish impulses' be restrained, has been satisfactorily answered by demonstrating that granting these selfish impulses is a method that favours both principle and utility.
Prior to any argument concerning social theory, I believe it is imperative the goal of the proposed measures be outlined. Taking the lead from you, I have assumed the goal to be the continued existence of society in a state where the benefits of all individuals are increased to a maximum. The goal, however, for many people is on a completely parallel footing: people would argue for and against power systems purely on the basis of the legal justification of either. The introduction of the social contract into the argument was an attempt to defend liberalism on such grounds.
While it is undoubtedly arguable whether the social contract precedes Enlightenment thought or not, it is highly irrelevant to the subject at hand to argue the historical standing of the contract. What is relevant is the fact that the basis for modern society in the cases under consideration, the American and French revolutions and the consequent adoption of liberalism as an irreplacable ideology, took into account the social contract as detailed by Rousseau. Owing to difficulties in the enforcement of the contract as a legal proceeding (such as the absence of any alternatives to individuals if they wish not to abide by it or the inability of an individual to enter into an agreement prior to maturity and the consequent responsibility thrust onto society for his support in those years), the only manner in which it can be best realised is by its inclusion into revolutionary thought that framed modern society. The American and French constitutions drafted after the revolutions included in them a great sense of this responsibility of society towards individuals in exchange for letting go of certain liberties, and thus to argue that the social contract is the basis for modern society is most certainly far removed from being 'ignorance of the basest sort'. Perhaps what can justifiably be deemed outrageous, as is admitted, is the claim that it forms the basis for all society that has existed, and the claim is withdrawn.
The argument, therefore, that the exercise of power is not justified beyond what the social contract would permit, stands tall. It is emphasized, however, that this argument is neither central nor necessary to touch upon further, since the issue has been handled on grounds closer to those upon which the refutations were based.
It is also my intent to clarify that modern liberal society is by no means an ideal representation of liberal society. Modern society undoubtedly stifles freedom more than it ought to as per the arguments detailed, and in as much as it does so, it is unjustified. However, it is assumed understood that the deficiences of governments in the implementations of liberal policy are not equivalent to deficiences within liberalism itself.
It was claimed that liberal society is an end unto itself, that it will self-destruct. I'll reserve my comments on a claim as foolish as this till it is substantiated, for the case has been otherwise. Also, egalitarianism, multiculturalism and consumerism were cited as occurrences in a liberal society that are inevitable and mutable only through a change in political ideology. As far as egalitarianism is concerned, I would like it to be elaborated how it is a development harmful to society. Multiculturalism, while arguable in its impact as being for the betterment or otherwise of society, is hardly a development interlinked necessarily to liberalism. Britian pursues official monoculturalism, and the United States pursues a 'melting pot' doctrine - it allows for the amalgamation of cultures without state intervention. Infact, Diane Ravitch has argued in Illiberal Education how the doctrine of multiculturalism and liberalism stand on opposite poles. Lastly, consumerism is, I must admit, a consequence of liberalism much abhorred universally. However, my argument is still a long way from being weakened by such an allowance: firstly, even if consumerism were incurable, it would an abuse of a freedom that others may use equally purposefully, and the analogy is of a knife which can chop both vegetables and human beings, but disallowing it on the basis of the latter is ridiculous. Secondly, the curative mechanism usually proposed by liberalism is that of social disapproval and discouragement, perhaps even government sponsored disuassion, but nothing beyond it. It is arguable and remains to be seen whether the mechanism is effective is this case or not, but it certainly is a tool one would much prefer to outright infringements on liberty.
Also, your claims that the radicalization of liberal democracy are bound to end in disaster are also highly speculative and based on little fact. I would like an elaborate elucidation of the claim and the its workings towards disaster before I busy myself with the subject.
In addition, I would like to comment on your suggestions to improve the current state of affairs for the better. You propose a shift away from tradition. I continue to contend that tradition typically favours a form of government that you propose, one that dictates to it citizens affairs that lie in the domain of the individual. The feudalism rampant in Europe throughout the middle ages, the formation of nation-states characterized by the conflicts between the 'monarchy, aristrocratic fuedal lords and the church' (all three forms of individual subjugation), the dynasties in China, the Valley Civilizations of the sub-continent, Russia prior to the Decembrist Revolt in 1825 with its autocratic power distribution (specially under Catherine) and other innumerable examples stand unchallenged against your nit-picked examples from history where liberal policies were adopted as an exception and consequence of greater civilization (at least such was the case in Vedic India and Republican Rome). Your mechanism for reform, therefore, is achieving about as much as your digressions on Roman history and Socrates: nothing.
With regard to economic policy and the linkage of capitalism with liberalism: Since trade is an act that affects all participating members of society and thus a social rather than self-regarding act, its regulation by the imposition of a restraint for the general betterment of people is a justifiable regulation. While economics would show that free markets with no government intervention function best, the granting of liberty is just a corollary privilege of a policy that works best, and it is essential only on grounds of such a policy being economically beneficial rather than it being an obligation of a liberal society.
To sum up my argument, I'd choose an issue that popped up somewhere and was ridiculously handled before it disappeared into the realm of forum messages. Someone argued that just because one's desire to eat a pie is dictated by one's biological composition (genes, I believe, was the term used), it cannot be taken away. The reply thundered that if it harms society, it most certainly should. Both standpoints are entirely correct, they can be reconciled with one another and are both the two maxims that are central to liberalism.
The individual is granted the freedom to follow the selfish impulse of eating a pie, irrespective of whether it is dictated by genes, circumstance or mature mental decisions taking into account both. Infact, the origins of one's desire are of no concern to this argument, and by referring to 'will', one is referring to what one desires irrespective of why one desires it - doing so, as has perhaps been done, is stepping out of sociology and into biology.
Returning to the example: the individual is granted the freedom to follow this selfish desire of his, as long as it does not infringe upon the interests of others. If his eating a pie harms society, it is most definitely justified for the government to interfere.
You act like this issue has actually been settled already.