The Mysticism Thread

[Jimmy... Dead.]

I never liked the idea or jargon of truth in the spirit/self.

Our version of the world is limited by observations of a vast universe and my experience of this universe is just a minuscule part of what Schophenhauer calls ‘universal will.’ My version of the world does not include things I have not perceived nor the “will” I have not yet experienced. We take the limits of our own field of knowledge for the limits of the universe.

 

[zabu of nΩd]

What I'm getting at here is that seeking this truth through purely objective/scientific means is giving you only one interpretation, i.e. a cosmos in which subject and object interact as causes and effects. But in truth they only seem separated by the illusion of grammar, which divides reality into subject and object. We are only particles colliding in space, individuals pitted against one another.

I disagree that the features of our language have that kind of influence on our perception of reality. I think language and our minds have evolved in *response* to reality, not vice versa. Just because we are aware of the gaps in our conceptual framework does not mean we created that framework out of thin air.

To annihilate the ego, to dispel this illusory distinction between subject and object, is the key to truth, for it awakens you to identity with not only the totality of Being, but also the infinity of infinities within it. The ability to tap into that well of infinite possibilities is liberation, the freedom of Spirit (or Mind - Hegel and Nietzsche would say "Geist" which means sort of both).

Your claim here really sounds more speculative than anything else to me. Based on my above comments, i see reality as *suggesting* to us the subject-object distinction. It's clear to both of us that there are problems with that apparent distinction, but to suggest that the opposite situation must be true is to me an argument from ignorance. We simply cannot know what to make of the gaps in our understanding.

 

[KafkaX]

We simply cannot know what to make of the gaps in our understanding.

So were fucked?

 

[zabu of nΩd]

I'd say we're "fucked" in the sense that we probably aren't going to discover shit about ourselves and the universe until we see some advances in neuroscience or particle physics.

I just came across this video last night which makes a pretty good case for how much room for discovery there is in brain theory: http://www.ted.com/talks/jeff_hawkins_on_how_brain_science_will_change_computing.html

It makes far more sense to me to focus our society's philosophical efforts in that area, as opposed to speculating on the nature of "reality" or "truth" when we don't even understand the part of our bodies that gives us the notions of "reality" and "truth" in the first place.

 

[zabu of nΩd]

Cody, i hope you don't mind me moving Pat's post from the whining thread over here, i didn't want to continue diverting that thread off-topic.

I've been thinking more about this lately, and while I still believe that in the ultimate course of history, different paradigms, epistemes, etc. will have different conceptions of reality or "being-in-the-world", I think that individuals living within those periods will be hardpressed to see their relation to the world as being conditioned or mediated by things like language and culture. We see this all the time today.

That said, it doesn't mean that people should just ignore the effects of our limited apperception of the world; however, if a sizable group, taking these limitations into account, were to somehow participate in an event of true philosophical rigor, I believe the common understanding drawn from its conclusion might suffice as a kind of "grand conclusion about the nature of reality."

As i posted above, i'm beginning to lean toward the idea that "true philosophical rigor" must involve addressing our lack of understanding about our brains. The influence of language and culture on our philosophy was indeed an important realization for humanity, and i think the next logical step is to explore the influence of the inner workings of the brain.

This attitude could be said to fit within a branch of 20th-century analytic philosophy known as pragmatism. Pragmatism draws a lot of influence from Nietzsche, Wittgenstein, even occasionally Foucault, and puts extraordinary emphasis on conceptual relativity, empiricism, and the idea that all discourses/arguments/discussions essentially boil down to language games. Our best practical approach, therefore, is to try and understand the language games, the instruments we use, the concepts, so as to better understand and facilitate our communicative faculties.

Coincidentally, I just read an essay by Alain Badiou that challenges this approach. Badiou accuses it of sophistry and claims that the current situation of analytic (and even much of continental) philosophy relies too much on the historical conditioning of philosophy up unto this point in time. He writes:

"For Nietzsche, as for Heidegger, all thought that claims to be philosophical must first of all be evaluated in a historical assemblage (montage); the mainspring of this historical assemblage is to be found with the Greeks; and the game is played, the consignment is sent, in what happens between the Presocratics and Plato."

Badiou calls for a radical breaking of philosophy from what he calls "historicism." This is difficult for me to accept, since I see history (or at least the contingency of historical moments) as the primary conditioner of any cultural milieu. However, I also see where Badiou is coming from: he wants to salvage philosophy as a genuine and legitimate search for the Absolute, for Truth, and his theoretical system is an attempt to provide the method for doing that.

On the surface, this might seem like a pseudo-totalitarian attempt at securing Truth based on whatever fallacious appeal might be at hand; but Badiou really does a job in this essay to distance himself from previous philosophies of the Absolute. Philosophy, Badiou claims, has often fallen into error where it attempts to posit itself as a legitimate truth procedure, and in this way becomes like an art, or science, or politics, etc; but philosophy is none of these things. Rather, philosophy is the supra-procedural apparatus by which we should carry out truth procedures in art, science, politics, etc. Philosophy's primary goal, Badiou seems to suggest, is to fix the place of Truth as a void. This void is not ontological, however (i.e. not a void of being); it is operational. Badiou claims that wherever philosophy has tried to address this void as ontological, it has hence posited itself as a truth procedure, and has thus fallen into error, or disaster:

"Nietzsche's poet-philosopher; Husserl's vow to make philosophy a rigorous science; Pascal and Kierkegaard's wish to see philosophy as intense existence; and Plato's naming of the philosopher-king: all are as many intra-philosophical schemes of the permanent possibility of disaster. These schemas are all governed by the filling-in of the void that sustains the exercise of the pincers of Truth.

"A disaster, in philosophical thought, is in the making whenever philosophy presents itself as being not a seizing of truths but a situation of truth."

So, to get back to Grant's comment: Badiou would disregard such an approach because it hinges on the possibility of a multiplicity of truths, and all of them negative truths at that, i.e. meanings/values generated differentially through the play of language games. Philosophy does have the power, Badiou claims, to penetrate "beyond" language and meaning, to arrive at a logically sound Truth about the Real. It errs when it posits itself as a situation of this Truth, which he charges most philosophy of the past several centuries as having done. What philosophy should strive to do instead is create an operational apparatus (in Badiou's whole complex theory this can be achieved through mathematics) by which truth procedures such as art, science, politics, and even love can be effective.

tl;dr Badiou disagrees with Grant, and I don't know where I stand. As usual.

Uhm... ok, i seem to agree with Badiou on many of his criticisms of past philosophers, but all this jargon about "truth as a void" and "a situation of truth" is suspiciously confusing. Regarding the different kinds of "truth procedures" though, i'd really like to know if Badiou sees these as working independently of each other or necessarily integrating with each other. If it's the former, then i think Badiou is as confused about the nature of truth as many of the people he critiques. If it's the latter, then i'd say he's probably rather scientifically naive if he's mentioning things like "art" and "love" in the same context.

 

[Einherjar86]

Well, I don't want to derail the Mysticism thread, since my musings are of largely non-mystic nature. Honestly, I've taken to Dakryn's Batshit thread as the undeclared philosophy thread in the social forum.

As i posted above, i'm beginning to lean toward the idea that "true philosophical rigor" must involve addressing our lack of understanding about our brains. The influence of language and culture on our philosophy was indeed an important realization for humanity, and i think the next logical step is to explore the influence of the inner workings of the brain.

I agree, and I think it already is in effect; hence the recent informational leaps in neurobiology, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of language.

Uhm... ok, i seem to agree with Badiou on many of his criticisms of past philosophers, but all this jargon about "truth as a void" and "a situation of truth" is suspiciously confusing. Regarding the different kinds of "truth procedures" though, i'd really like to know if Badiou sees these as working independently of each other or necessarily integrating with each other. If it's the former, then i think Badiou is as confused about the nature of truth as many of the people he critiques. If it's the latter, then i'd say he's probably rather scientifically naive if he's mentioning things like "art" and "love" in the same context.

I didn't really expect you to address that whole thing quite so seriously, since I don't even know where I stand with regard to it. But I'm glad you did.

The whole business about the space of Truth as a void is certainly confusing. I'll arrive there in a moment.

Philosophy is not a "situation of Truth" in the same way the Kantian categorical imperative isn't a universal maxim. The categorical imperative is a test to see if a maxim can be deemed universal (and, hence, "truthful"). Likewise, Badiou's idea of philosophy is procedural, or operational; it is an apparatus within which we can test our various Truth procedures to see if they're worthy of the name. Philosophy is not a site of Truth in and of itself; but it allows us to seize the Truth through various means.

When philosophy attempts to become a site of Truth, it often falls victim to dogmatism. It perceives the Truth as something that it must create, and thus turns to images of authority designed to guarantee that creation (e.g. philosopher-kings, Absolute Spirit, etc.). Later philosophical methods such as pragmatism or deconstruction also see Truth as something created, but acknowledge a plurality of truths, which thus undermines the very concept of Truth itself, consigning it to the dustbin of relative meaning and value.

The void of Truth, as I see it, makes the very pursuit of Truth possible; and it is philosophy's responsibility to preserve this void as the site/situation of Truth. But philosophy itself can never fill this void (or is misdirected if it tries to do so) since to do so would be to nullify its own action. It succumbs to paradox. Instead, philosophy preserves the void of Truth and thus makes way for the collective of individuals (the masses, the voluntary order) to engage in the procedures listed above. Badiou refers to such an engagement as an "event."

I also think he plays a slight trick on his audience. He undermines conceptual relativity and language games, but I don't think this necessarily precludes the possibility of multiple truths. Rather, what I think Badiou intends to say is that at any given historical moment, the voluntary order is capable of arriving at a Truth that can be effectively known in the Real at that moment in time. The Truth itself is not universal, and does not exist eternally (this is the mistake that philosophy makes when it tries to fill the void of Truth), but can exist for that people at that moment. What is eternal is the role of philosophy as an operational apparatus that can guarantee the voluntary collective access to the Truth of their time.

As far as different Truth procedures go, I don't see any problem in including science and love alongside one another; Badiou is merely claiming that different procedures might be taken up and used effectively for a particular historical moment. These procedures and moments themselves are not predetermined, but entirely contingent.

 

[zabu of nΩd]

Philosophy is not a "situation of Truth" in the same way the Kantian categorical imperative isn't a universal maxim. The categorical imperative is a test to see if a maxim can be deemed universal (and, hence, "truthful"). Likewise, Badiou's idea of philosophy is procedural, or operational; it is an apparatus within which we can test our various Truth procedures to see if they're worthy of the name. Philosophy is not a site of Truth in and of itself; but it allows us to seize the Truth through various means.

When philosophy attempts to become a site of Truth, it often falls victim to dogmatism. It perceives the Truth as something that it must create, and thus turns to images of authority designed to guarantee that creation (e.g. philosopher-kings, Absolute Spirit, etc.). Later philosophical methods such as pragmatism or deconstruction also see Truth as something created, but acknowledge a plurality of truths, which thus undermines the very concept of Truth itself, consigning it to the dustbin of relative meaning and value.

The void of Truth, as I see it, makes the very pursuit of Truth possible; and it is philosophy's responsibility to preserve this void as the site/situation of Truth. But philosophy itself can never fill this void (or is misdirected if it tries to do so) since to do so would be to nullify its own action. It succumbs to paradox. Instead, philosophy preserves the void of Truth and thus makes way for the collective of individuals (the masses, the voluntary order) to engage in the procedures listed above. Badiou refers to such an engagement as an "event."

Got it.

I also think he plays a slight trick on his audience. He undermines conceptual relativity and language games, but I don't think this necessarily precludes the possibility of multiple truths. Rather, what I think Badiou intends to say is that at any given historical moment, the voluntary order is capable of arriving at a Truth that can be effectively known in the Real at that moment in time. The Truth itself is not universal, and does not exist eternally (this is the mistake that philosophy makes when it tries to fill the void of Truth), but can exist for that people at that moment. What is eternal is the role of philosophy as an operational apparatus that can guarantee the voluntary collective access to the Truth of their time.

Maybe he's playing a trick on himself as well -- in science we typically refer to "truths" that are subject to change as theories.

As far as different Truth procedures go, I don't see any problem in including science and love alongside one another; Badiou is merely claiming that different procedures might be taken up and used effectively for a particular historical moment. These procedures and moments themselves are not predetermined, but entirely contingent.

The problem with love is that its nature has generally been much better explained by psychology and neuroscience than by people who attempt to understand it primarily through the experience. This problem comes up in art, religion, mysticism, psychedelics, etc. Sure, the experience itself confirms that there's *something* going on that eludes science, but that doesn't mean we'll understand the experiences any better by abandoning science.

The fact that millions of highly intelligent thinkers in all of those areas of experience have throughout history found themselves incapable of articulating those experiences to the world any better than to say "you just have to experience it to understand" is a huge indicator that those people are missing something important in their understanding. Neuroscience has given us plenty of evidence that experiences are not as "sacred" as we like to think they are.

 

[Dak]

I disagree on the neuroscience end. To say that we can identify the mechanical processes happening during an experience is not to say we can understand the experience. This would be similar to saying we can fully understand what it is like to drive a car by looking at a complete layout/diagnostic/spec sheet. Just because you know that when combustion occurs it moves the wheels doesn't mean you know what it's like to drive 100mph.

 

[zabu of nΩd]

I'm not trying to say the experiences teach us nothing -- i'm saying they typically only show us the tip of the iceberg, and science is much better suited for digging deeper toward the fundamentals.

 

[Einherjar86]

Maybe he's playing a trick on himself as well -- in science we typically refer to "truths" that are subject to change as theories.

Point taken, although I'm inclined to think that Badiou is talking about Truth differently; not as a scientific discovery/theory, but as a unifying trend around which a collective of individuals can enact a truly positive existence. These trends might change depending on the historical moment, but not because of scientific inaccuracy or ignorance. Instead, they change due to the cultural needs of a particular collective.

For Badiou, science is second to philosophy, so scientific truths need not necessarily be constant or universal. They can remain theories, absolutely. What needs to remain constant (ahistorical, eternal, etc.) is the philosophical apparatus that makes the scientific pursuit of Truth possible.

The problem with love is that its nature has generally been much better explained by psychology and neuroscience than by people who attempt to understand it primarily through the experience. This problem comes up in art, religion, mysticism, psychedelics, etc. Sure, the experience itself confirms that there's *something* going on that eludes science, but that doesn't mean we'll understand the experiences any better by abandoning science.

The fact that millions of highly intelligent thinkers in all of those areas of experience have throughout history found themselves incapable of articulating those experiences to the world any better than to say "you just have to experience it to understand" is a huge indicator that those people are missing something important in their understanding. Neuroscience has given us plenty of evidence that experiences are not as "sacred" as we like to think they are.

I completely understand the comments on neuroscience, but I don't think love needs to be "sacred" in order for it to operate on the level of science. Every day we're witnessing more evidence that our emotions are nothing more than the result of particular combinations of synapses and neurons firing off, and specific balances of bodily hormones. Furthermore, we're discovering that we have far less control over our own minds than we like to think. The brain is very much like a machine, and it operates on its own, regardless of what the conscious mind recognizes.

That aside, deconstructing the notion of love doesn't change the fact that people still experience the emotional response. As time goes (centuries from now) perhaps human beings will look at love in an entirely different way, or it may even (conceivably) disappear entirely; but for now, in this historical period, love can still function as a legitimate Truth procedure because of the collective experience it can foster.