The Mysticism Thread

[Einherjar86]

Well, I don't want to derail the Mysticism thread, since my musings are of largely non-mystic nature. Honestly, I've taken to Dakryn's Batshit thread as the undeclared philosophy thread in the social forum.

As i posted above, i'm beginning to lean toward the idea that "true philosophical rigor" must involve addressing our lack of understanding about our brains. The influence of language and culture on our philosophy was indeed an important realization for humanity, and i think the next logical step is to explore the influence of the inner workings of the brain.

I agree, and I think it already is in effect; hence the recent informational leaps in neurobiology, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of language.

Uhm... ok, i seem to agree with Badiou on many of his criticisms of past philosophers, but all this jargon about "truth as a void" and "a situation of truth" is suspiciously confusing. Regarding the different kinds of "truth procedures" though, i'd really like to know if Badiou sees these as working independently of each other or necessarily integrating with each other. If it's the former, then i think Badiou is as confused about the nature of truth as many of the people he critiques. If it's the latter, then i'd say he's probably rather scientifically naive if he's mentioning things like "art" and "love" in the same context.

I didn't really expect you to address that whole thing quite so seriously, since I don't even know where I stand with regard to it. But I'm glad you did.

The whole business about the space of Truth as a void is certainly confusing. I'll arrive there in a moment.

Philosophy is not a "situation of Truth" in the same way the Kantian categorical imperative isn't a universal maxim. The categorical imperative is a test to see if a maxim can be deemed universal (and, hence, "truthful"). Likewise, Badiou's idea of philosophy is procedural, or operational; it is an apparatus within which we can test our various Truth procedures to see if they're worthy of the name. Philosophy is not a site of Truth in and of itself; but it allows us to seize the Truth through various means.

When philosophy attempts to become a site of Truth, it often falls victim to dogmatism. It perceives the Truth as something that it must create, and thus turns to images of authority designed to guarantee that creation (e.g. philosopher-kings, Absolute Spirit, etc.). Later philosophical methods such as pragmatism or deconstruction also see Truth as something created, but acknowledge a plurality of truths, which thus undermines the very concept of Truth itself, consigning it to the dustbin of relative meaning and value.

The void of Truth, as I see it, makes the very pursuit of Truth possible; and it is philosophy's responsibility to preserve this void as the site/situation of Truth. But philosophy itself can never fill this void (or is misdirected if it tries to do so) since to do so would be to nullify its own action. It succumbs to paradox. Instead, philosophy preserves the void of Truth and thus makes way for the collective of individuals (the masses, the voluntary order) to engage in the procedures listed above. Badiou refers to such an engagement as an "event."

I also think he plays a slight trick on his audience. He undermines conceptual relativity and language games, but I don't think this necessarily precludes the possibility of multiple truths. Rather, what I think Badiou intends to say is that at any given historical moment, the voluntary order is capable of arriving at a Truth that can be effectively known in the Real at that moment in time. The Truth itself is not universal, and does not exist eternally (this is the mistake that philosophy makes when it tries to fill the void of Truth), but can exist for that people at that moment. What is eternal is the role of philosophy as an operational apparatus that can guarantee the voluntary collective access to the Truth of their time.

As far as different Truth procedures go, I don't see any problem in including science and love alongside one another; Badiou is merely claiming that different procedures might be taken up and used effectively for a particular historical moment. These procedures and moments themselves are not predetermined, but entirely contingent.

 

[Dak]

I disagree on the neuroscience end. To say that we can identify the mechanical processes happening during an experience is not to say we can understand the experience. This would be similar to saying we can fully understand what it is like to drive a car by looking at a complete layout/diagnostic/spec sheet. Just because you know that when combustion occurs it moves the wheels doesn't mean you know what it's like to drive 100mph.

 

[Einherjar86]

Maybe he's playing a trick on himself as well -- in science we typically refer to "truths" that are subject to change as theories.

Point taken, although I'm inclined to think that Badiou is talking about Truth differently; not as a scientific discovery/theory, but as a unifying trend around which a collective of individuals can enact a truly positive existence. These trends might change depending on the historical moment, but not because of scientific inaccuracy or ignorance. Instead, they change due to the cultural needs of a particular collective.

For Badiou, science is second to philosophy, so scientific truths need not necessarily be constant or universal. They can remain theories, absolutely. What needs to remain constant (ahistorical, eternal, etc.) is the philosophical apparatus that makes the scientific pursuit of Truth possible.

The problem with love is that its nature has generally been much better explained by psychology and neuroscience than by people who attempt to understand it primarily through the experience. This problem comes up in art, religion, mysticism, psychedelics, etc. Sure, the experience itself confirms that there's *something* going on that eludes science, but that doesn't mean we'll understand the experiences any better by abandoning science.

The fact that millions of highly intelligent thinkers in all of those areas of experience have throughout history found themselves incapable of articulating those experiences to the world any better than to say "you just have to experience it to understand" is a huge indicator that those people are missing something important in their understanding. Neuroscience has given us plenty of evidence that experiences are not as "sacred" as we like to think they are.

I completely understand the comments on neuroscience, but I don't think love needs to be "sacred" in order for it to operate on the level of science. Every day we're witnessing more evidence that our emotions are nothing more than the result of particular combinations of synapses and neurons firing off, and specific balances of bodily hormones. Furthermore, we're discovering that we have far less control over our own minds than we like to think. The brain is very much like a machine, and it operates on its own, regardless of what the conscious mind recognizes.

That aside, deconstructing the notion of love doesn't change the fact that people still experience the emotional response. As time goes (centuries from now) perhaps human beings will look at love in an entirely different way, or it may even (conceivably) disappear entirely; but for now, in this historical period, love can still function as a legitimate Truth procedure because of the collective experience it can foster.