This attitude could be said to fit within a branch of 20th-century analytic philosophy known as pragmatism. Pragmatism draws a lot of influence from Nietzsche, Wittgenstein, even occasionally Foucault, and puts extraordinary emphasis on conceptual relativity, empiricism, and the idea that all discourses/arguments/discussions essentially boil down to language games. Our best practical approach, therefore, is to try and understand the language games, the instruments we use, the concepts, so as to better understand and facilitate our communicative faculties.
Coincidentally, I just read an essay by Alain Badiou that challenges this approach. Badiou accuses it of sophistry and claims that the current situation of analytic (and even much of continental) philosophy relies too much on the historical conditioning of philosophy up unto this point in time. He writes:
"For Nietzsche, as for Heidegger, all thought that claims to be philosophical must first of all be evaluated in a historical assemblage (montage); the mainspring of this historical assemblage is to be found with the Greeks; and the game is played, the consignment is sent, in what happens between the Presocratics and Plato."
Badiou calls for a radical breaking of philosophy from what he calls "historicism." This is difficult for me to accept, since I see history (or at least the contingency of historical moments) as the primary conditioner of any cultural milieu. However, I also see where Badiou is coming from: he wants to salvage philosophy as a genuine and legitimate search for the Absolute, for Truth, and his theoretical system is an attempt to provide the method for doing that.
On the surface, this might seem like a pseudo-totalitarian attempt at securing Truth based on whatever fallacious appeal might be at hand; but Badiou really does a job in this essay to distance himself from previous philosophies of the Absolute. Philosophy, Badiou claims, has often fallen into error where it attempts to posit itself as a legitimate truth procedure, and in this way becomes like an art, or science, or politics, etc; but philosophy is none of these things. Rather, philosophy is the supra-procedural apparatus by which we should carry out truth procedures in art, science, politics, etc. Philosophy's primary goal, Badiou seems to suggest, is to fix the place of Truth as a void. This void is not ontological, however (i.e. not a void of being); it is operational. Badiou claims that wherever philosophy has tried to address this void as ontological, it has hence posited itself as a truth procedure, and has thus fallen into error, or disaster:
"Nietzsche's poet-philosopher; Husserl's vow to make philosophy a rigorous science; Pascal and Kierkegaard's wish to see philosophy as intense existence; and Plato's naming of the philosopher-king: all are as many intra-philosophical schemes of the permanent possibility of disaster. These schemas are all governed by the filling-in of the void that sustains the exercise of the pincers of Truth.
"A disaster, in philosophical thought, is in the making whenever philosophy presents itself as being not a seizing of truths but a situation of truth."
So, to get back to Grant's comment: Badiou would disregard such an approach because it hinges on the possibility of a multiplicity of truths, and all of them negative truths at that, i.e. meanings/values generated differentially through the play of language games. Philosophy does have the power, Badiou claims, to penetrate "beyond" language and meaning, to arrive at a logically sound Truth about the Real. It errs when it posits itself as a situation of this Truth, which he charges most philosophy of the past several centuries as having done. What philosophy should strive to do instead is create an operational apparatus (in Badiou's whole complex theory this can be achieved through mathematics) by which truth procedures such as art, science, politics, and even love can be effective.
tl;dr Badiou disagrees with Grant, and I don't know where I stand. As usual.