The News Thread

You're arguing that to enact the penalty of breaking a law is to deny agency. So if we punish anyone for breaking any law we deny agency. So those poor murderers. Poor poor murderers. Oh won't someone think of the murderers. Or the rapists. Won't someone think of those poor souls. Etc.
 
Yes, you're right. We are denying agency to murderers and rapists. I never said there weren't cases in which we should deny people agency.

See how much quicker we could have gotten to that point?
 
  • Like
Reactions: CiG
Yes, you're right. We are denying agency to murderers and rapists. I never said there weren't cases in which we should deny people agency.

See how much quicker we could have gotten to that point?

After we apply punishment, not before they commit the crime. They committed those crimes with agency. We don't deny agency to those who illegally immigrate as they do so, or as they live here.
 
We deny criminals the agency to exist in their criminality, with that identity as tolerated by the social milieu. And maybe there are cases in which we should deny them that agency, that identity; perhaps their are cases of serial rapists, or violent individuals whose agency is best curtailed. My argument was never, never that there aren't socially unacceptable modes of agency.

But all of this is beside the point anyway, because all I was trying to say is that you cannot accuse me of denying agency to, for example, a black man who shot back at a police officer because I make a comment about the social conditions that may have contributed to this situation. My argument is not denying that subject his agency just because it attempts to account for a systemic explanation of his behavior. From my perspective, systemic conditions can also be seen as contributing to restrictions on his agency, since he might prefer to act otherwise but feels that he can't. However, that still doesn't mean that I don't think he should be imprisoned for his violent behavior; and imprisoning him will definitely deny him the agency to act in a violent manner in the future (in a public scenario, at least).
 
We deny criminals the agency to exist in their criminality, with that identity as tolerated by the social milieu. And maybe there are cases in which we should deny them that agency, that identity; perhaps their are cases of serial rapists, or violent individuals whose agency is best curtailed. My argument was never, never that there aren't socially unacceptable modes of agency.

But all of this is beside the point anyway, because all I was trying to say is that you cannot accuse me of denying agency to, for example, a black man who shot back at a police officer because I make a comment about the social conditions that may have contributed to this situation. My argument is not denying that subject his agency just because it attempts to account for a systemic explanation of his behavior. From my perspective, systemic conditions can also be seen as contributing to restrictions on his agency, since he might prefer to act otherwise but feels that he can't. However, that still doesn't mean that I don't think he should be imprisoned for his violent behavior; and imprisoning him will definitely deny him the agency to act in a violent manner in the future (in a public scenario, at least).

Passing laws against X does not deny the agency to commit X. It recognizes the agency and punishes/incentivizes against X. It's nearly impossible to find a median of incentivizing for or agaisnt. CF very clearly believes illegal immigrants should not face "the"(there's only one, so I can't say "any") penalty for illegally immigrating. That's what I rebutted.

If one believes that X law against any socially related modes of agency (and how many modes of agency aren't socially related?) is wrong, then one should argue against the law, not argue against the punishment, or supporters, etc. I have never seen CF offer decent argument (Unlike what I have seen you offer). He's like the liberal tea party republican as it were.
 
I'm not going to argue about the definition of agency. Judicial discipline acknowledges prior action by denying it in the future, so you cannot make the argument that it denies or at least restricts agency. It most certainly does. I won't debate that point. We can debate over whether certain restrictions are warranted, however.

Additionally, you've still done nothing to prove that not punishing a subject for committing a crime is somehow a denial of agency. From what I can tell, this stems from a very strict and sterile definition of "agency" on your part.
 
I'm not going to argue about the definition of agency. Judicial discipline acknowledges prior action by denying it in the future, so you cannot make the argument that it denies or at least restricts agency. It most certainly does.

So agency is acknowledged. To take action is to display agency unless such action was completely or majorly forced by external forces.Even if i was, this in itself does not even grant any legal leniency. You haven't sufficiently argued that illegal immigration is either majorly or otherwise motivated.

Additionally, you've still done nothing to prove that not punishing a subject for committing a crime is somehow a denial of agency. From what I can tell, this stems from a very strict and sterile definition of "agency" on your part.

To display agency is to take action, unless majorly forced by external factors or actors. Force must be clear, not merely conjecture. To contrast illegal immigration: Illegal immigration by Jews from the 3rd Reich ~1940 would be clear. Illegal immigration from Mexico? Also clear. Clearly different.
 
So agency is acknowledged. To take action is to display agency unless such action was completely or majorly forced by external forces.Even if i was, this in itself does not even grant any legal leniency. You haven't sufficiently argued that illegal immigration is either majorly or otherwise motivated.

To display agency is to take action, unless majorly forced by external factors or actors. Force must be clear, not merely conjecture. To contrast illegal immigration: Illegal immigration by Jews from the 3rd Reich ~1940 would be clear. Illegal immigration from Mexico? Also clear. Clearly different.

Clearly different. Also clearly motivated by external factors, just different external factors (although not entirely different; plenty of poorer Mexicans suffer the threat of violence from organized crime). It's tantamount to blissful ignorance to claim otherwise. To suggest that the motivation to emigrate to another country emerges entirely from within a subject, regardless of external conditions, falls back on a metaphysics of the subject that even you've questioned in the past.

But once again, none of this really pertains to my specific claim, which has to do with your accusation that by simply addressing systemic conditions I am somehow denying subjects their agency. It has nothing to do with the actual treatment of the subjects themselves by the judicial system or any social system - take your pick. I'm focusing specifically on your accusation that the argument itself is a denial of agency. This is what you've said: when you make an argument regarding the impact of social conditions, you deny/restrict agency. How am I restricting agency? How am I not trying to identify forces that restrict agency?

Denying agency is the very definition of judicial punishment/imprisonment is it not?

Yes, absolutely. It seems as though Dak is trying to say that imprisoning people admits and enhances their agency.
 
Clearly different. Also clearly motivated by external factors, just different external factors (although not entirely different; plenty of poorer Mexicans suffer the threat of violence from organized crime). It's tantamount to blissful ignorance to claim otherwise. To suggest that the motivation to emigrate to another country emerges entirely from within a subject, regardless of external conditions, falls back on a metaphysics of the subject that even you've questioned in the past.

We can't say that anything emerges entirely from within the subject. That's setting the bar too high.

But once again, none of this really pertains to my specific claim, which has to do with your accusation that by simply addressing systemic conditions I am somehow denying subjects their agency. It has nothing to do with the actual treatment of the subjects themselves by the judicial system or any social system - take your pick. I'm focusing specifically on your accusation that the argument itself is a denial of agency. This is what you've said: when you make an argument regarding the impact of social conditions, you deny/restrict agency. How am I restricting agency? How am I not trying to identify forces that restrict agency?

Yes, absolutely. It seems as though Dak is trying to say that imprisoning people admits and enhances their agency.

The topic was illegal immigration and deportation. cf was making a typical type of bleeding heart argument against carrying out the legal consequences/repercussions of actions because those consequences are unpleasant. To shelter people from the consequences of their actions requires some basis, usually some denial of their capability for agency (mentally ill, mentally handicapped, under external control, etc). cf and people like him like to treat everyone who does something wrong that isn't rich and/or white as falling within one of those categories, therefore denying them the capability of agency or maybe rather refusing to recognize it. Punishment recognizes agency in some cases by restricting it.
 
  • Like
Reactions: CiG
We can't say that anything emerges entirely from within the subject. That's setting the bar too high.

Well, there you go.

The topic was illegal immigration and deportation. cf was making a typical type of bleeding heart argument against carrying out the legal consequences/repercussions of actions because those consequences are unpleasant. To shelter people from the consequences of their actions requires some basis, usually some denial of their capability for agency (mentally ill, mentally handicapped, under external control, etc). cf and people like him like to treat everyone who does something wrong that isn't rich and/or white as falling within one of those categories, therefore denying them the capability of agency or maybe rather refusing to recognize it. Punishment recognizes agency in some cases by restricting it.

I'd ask that you read my entire response before replying.

As I've already stated, I'm fine with the discussion being whether or not we should punish subjects for certain behaviors. I'm asking you to acknowledge that an argument addressing the conditions external to a subject as factors in that subject's behavior is not denying that subject any agency.

Your purported logic bomb that you dropped on me a few posts back completely distracted everyone from the point I was making, which is that in the case of homosexuality we would not claim that imprisonment was somehow granting homosexual subjects their agency. If anything it was depriving them of it - to freely engage in sexual practices according to their own choices. You warped this comment into an admission that imprisoning murderers deprives them of agency too, which it does - as I said, denying certain subjects agency may very be a necessary condition of social operations.

Obviously the law recognizes an individual choice at one particular moment: the moment of the criminal act. An objection might be that this choice was not individual at all, but in fact dictated by external conditions. In the case of immigration, this is probably the case to a significant degree (that's a premise of my position that I consider mostly accurate). Now, an argument that attempts to recognize these external factors is not denying criminals their agency, but is in fact acknowledging that said criminals may possess agency that they would otherwise use differently if the given external conditions were different. Agency need not be restricted to only the actual actions of an individual, but exists in the potential actions that a subject may make within the dynamics of social relations and conditions. This is not reducing it to an individual's capabilities, but to the range of acceptable possibilities that exist virtually in any given social context.

Now, set aside for a moment the argument over whether immigrants should be imprisoned. Let's say, in fact, for the sake of argument, that they should be. There is no need for the judicial system to appeal to individual agency in order to make this decision. That's simply how our current systems of discipline and punish choose to color the issue. We can make decisions of punishment based on assessments of social factors without appealing ultimately to a subject's agential power in committing a criminal act.
 
Poverty is not the same level of external factor as having someone point a gun to my head and tell me to kill someone else.

Illegal immigration is long thought out, premeditated, intentional breakage of law and usually not completely urgent or necessary. There is food in Mexico; they just need to find it, settle for it, make do with it, have only the number of kids they can support. "Wanting a better life", a house, car, tv, etc is no excuse
 
  • Like
Reactions: CiG and Dak
As I've already stated, I'm fine with the discussion being whether or not we should punish subjects for certain behaviors. I'm asking you to acknowledge that an argument addressing the conditions external to a subject as factors in that subject's behavior is not denying that subject any agency.

There's a difference between addressing them and going "but that would be unpleasant!" every time consequences are suggested. Which is what I see a lot of out of cf et al.

Obviously the law recognizes an individual choice at one particular moment: the moment of the criminal act. An objection might be that this choice was not individual at all, but in fact dictated by external conditions. In the case of immigration, this is probably the case to a significant degree (that's a premise of my position that I consider mostly accurate). Now, an argument that attempts to recognize these external factors is not denying criminals their agency, but is in fact acknowledging that said criminals may possess agency that they would otherwise use differently if the given external conditions were different. Agency need not be restricted to only the actual actions of an individual, but exists in the potential actions that a subject may make within the dynamics of social relations and conditions. This is not reducing it to an individual's capabilities, but to the range of acceptable possibilities that exist virtually in any given social context.

That's a premise that is contingently accurate, and pretty inaccurate as it refers specifically to Mexican immigration. I contrasted two different scenarios, one in which it is accurate and one in which it isn't. Mexico is 11th in the world in PPP. Canada is 16th but you don't see waves of Canucks rushing the even more lightly guarded northern border. In short, Mexicans aren't immigrating from Rwanda, or even anywhere close to it. That a particular Mexican might have an "easier" go in the US than in Mexico is simply no excuse whatsoever.

Criminals sometimes are not controlling their actions as it were (I gave a list of cases: mentally ill/handicapped, etc). I would not limit agency to only "acceptable possibilities", since one can obviously make unacceptable choices.


Now, set aside for a moment the argument over whether immigrants should be imprisoned. Let's say, in fact, for the sake of argument, that they should be. There is no need for the judicial system to appeal to individual agency in order to make this decision. That's simply how our current systems of discipline and punish choose to color the issue. We can make decisions of punishment based on assessments of social factors without appealing ultimately to a subject's agential power in committing a criminal act.

I'm certainly not talking about imprisonment. cf was concerned about holding areas while waiting to be deported. I don't consider deportation a punishment. When you get thrown out of a bar you snuck into, it isn't a punishment. Now, apparently we do imprison some illegal immigrants for doing so already. Unless they are otherwise dangerous, I think this is a dumb policy - if the border were more controlled. I was just reading that most deported illegals come right back over.
 
For what it's worth, Canada has a far better infrastructure for taking care of those... less fortunate, let's say, than Mexico does.

My claim, pure and simple, is that Crimson hasn't denied anyone agency, and his comments don't deny anyone agency, and even the judicial choice to not prosecute immigrants doesn't deny them their agency. They're already exercising agency, as you've said; and it's generating a social response, whether the judicial system acts or not. Agency is being acknowledged, even if there are no legal consequences.

This is entirely tangential to the argument of whether immigrants should or shouldn't be punished, or suffer consequences. I just don't like your characterization of agency because it strikes me as an attempt to turn racial accusations back on the accusers, and I don't think it works.
 
For what it's worth, Canada has a far better infrastructure for taking care of those... less fortunate, let's say, than Mexico does.

And with a poorer economy by some measures. Maybe it's because Mexicans have been a little more traditional in regards to family taking care of family. Family is often listed as a reason to immigrate, and one of the complaints about Mexican immigrants, of both legal and illegal varieties, is how much money is sent to Mexico. But it doesn't really matter. Mexicans are the responsibility of Mexicans and the Mexican government. Not every bleeding heart in the US. If US bleeding hearts want to make a difference for Mexicans, no one is stopping them from hopping the border the other way. Of course the Mexican government is much less lenient than the US government is about that sort of thing.

My claim, pure and simple, is that Crimson hasn't denied anyone agency, and his comments don't deny anyone agency, and even the judicial choice to not prosecute immigrants doesn't deny them their agency. They're already exercising agency, as you've said; and it's generating a social response, whether the judicial system acts or not. Agency is being acknowledged, even if there are no legal consequences.

You haven't responded to my explanation. When someone breaks the law and is brought before the court, there are a variety of defense tactics to either avoid a conviction or lessen the punishment. One of them is to deny or suggest a limit in any way in the agency of the accused - that they didn't possess the capacity to do otherwise. This is the frame that I use as a reference for the sort of defense that cf offers. I haven't seen anything that you have said that invalidates this frame or offers a better one, and cf hasn't provided any other justification.

This is entirely tangential to the argument of whether immigrants should or shouldn't be punished, or suffer consequences. I just don't like your characterization of agency because it strikes me as an attempt to turn racial accusations back on the accusers, and I don't think it works.

It's not tangential because cf claimed they shouldn't suffer any unpleasant consequences of their actions. The frame I listed previously provides the only tactic I see that he has in terms of justification. You're absolutely right on the characterization of agency, but I think you're protesting because it is true/it works. American liberals with their neo-white man's burden are *at least* as racist as any Grand Wizard. It just takes a different form.