Einherjar86
Active Member
Trace out the logic on that one.
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No homosexuality is a law you can't argue socioeconomics against.
Dak, stop being a fucking pedant and make an argument. You're annoying me.
Trace out the logic on that one.
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No homosexuality is a law you can't argue socioeconomics against.
Yes, you're right. We are denying agency to murderers and rapists. I never said there weren't cases in which we should deny people agency.
See how much quicker we could have gotten to that point?
We deny criminals the agency to exist in their criminality, with that identity as tolerated by the social milieu. And maybe there are cases in which we should deny them that agency, that identity; perhaps their are cases of serial rapists, or violent individuals whose agency is best curtailed. My argument was never, never that there aren't socially unacceptable modes of agency.
But all of this is beside the point anyway, because all I was trying to say is that you cannot accuse me of denying agency to, for example, a black man who shot back at a police officer because I make a comment about the social conditions that may have contributed to this situation. My argument is not denying that subject his agency just because it attempts to account for a systemic explanation of his behavior. From my perspective, systemic conditions can also be seen as contributing to restrictions on his agency, since he might prefer to act otherwise but feels that he can't. However, that still doesn't mean that I don't think he should be imprisoned for his violent behavior; and imprisoning him will definitely deny him the agency to act in a violent manner in the future (in a public scenario, at least).
I'm not going to argue about the definition of agency. Judicial discipline acknowledges prior action by denying it in the future, so you cannot make the argument that it denies or at least restricts agency. It most certainly does.
Additionally, you've still done nothing to prove that not punishing a subject for committing a crime is somehow a denial of agency. From what I can tell, this stems from a very strict and sterile definition of "agency" on your part.
So agency is acknowledged. To take action is to display agency unless such action was completely or majorly forced by external forces.Even if i was, this in itself does not even grant any legal leniency. You haven't sufficiently argued that illegal immigration is either majorly or otherwise motivated.
To display agency is to take action, unless majorly forced by external factors or actors. Force must be clear, not merely conjecture. To contrast illegal immigration: Illegal immigration by Jews from the 3rd Reich ~1940 would be clear. Illegal immigration from Mexico? Also clear. Clearly different.
Denying agency is the very definition of judicial punishment/imprisonment is it not?
Clearly different. Also clearly motivated by external factors, just different external factors (although not entirely different; plenty of poorer Mexicans suffer the threat of violence from organized crime). It's tantamount to blissful ignorance to claim otherwise. To suggest that the motivation to emigrate to another country emerges entirely from within a subject, regardless of external conditions, falls back on a metaphysics of the subject that even you've questioned in the past.
But once again, none of this really pertains to my specific claim, which has to do with your accusation that by simply addressing systemic conditions I am somehow denying subjects their agency. It has nothing to do with the actual treatment of the subjects themselves by the judicial system or any social system - take your pick. I'm focusing specifically on your accusation that the argument itself is a denial of agency. This is what you've said: when you make an argument regarding the impact of social conditions, you deny/restrict agency. How am I restricting agency? How am I not trying to identify forces that restrict agency?
Yes, absolutely. It seems as though Dak is trying to say that imprisoning people admits and enhances their agency.
We can't say that anything emerges entirely from within the subject. That's setting the bar too high.
The topic was illegal immigration and deportation. cf was making a typical type of bleeding heart argument against carrying out the legal consequences/repercussions of actions because those consequences are unpleasant. To shelter people from the consequences of their actions requires some basis, usually some denial of their capability for agency (mentally ill, mentally handicapped, under external control, etc). cf and people like him like to treat everyone who does something wrong that isn't rich and/or white as falling within one of those categories, therefore denying them the capability of agency or maybe rather refusing to recognize it. Punishment recognizes agency in some cases by restricting it.
As I've already stated, I'm fine with the discussion being whether or not we should punish subjects for certain behaviors. I'm asking you to acknowledge that an argument addressing the conditions external to a subject as factors in that subject's behavior is not denying that subject any agency.
Obviously the law recognizes an individual choice at one particular moment: the moment of the criminal act. An objection might be that this choice was not individual at all, but in fact dictated by external conditions. In the case of immigration, this is probably the case to a significant degree (that's a premise of my position that I consider mostly accurate). Now, an argument that attempts to recognize these external factors is not denying criminals their agency, but is in fact acknowledging that said criminals may possess agency that they would otherwise use differently if the given external conditions were different. Agency need not be restricted to only the actual actions of an individual, but exists in the potential actions that a subject may make within the dynamics of social relations and conditions. This is not reducing it to an individual's capabilities, but to the range of acceptable possibilities that exist virtually in any given social context.
Now, set aside for a moment the argument over whether immigrants should be imprisoned. Let's say, in fact, for the sake of argument, that they should be. There is no need for the judicial system to appeal to individual agency in order to make this decision. That's simply how our current systems of discipline and punish choose to color the issue. We can make decisions of punishment based on assessments of social factors without appealing ultimately to a subject's agential power in committing a criminal act.
For what it's worth, Canada has a far better infrastructure for taking care of those... less fortunate, let's say, than Mexico does.
My claim, pure and simple, is that Crimson hasn't denied anyone agency, and his comments don't deny anyone agency, and even the judicial choice to not prosecute immigrants doesn't deny them their agency. They're already exercising agency, as you've said; and it's generating a social response, whether the judicial system acts or not. Agency is being acknowledged, even if there are no legal consequences.
This is entirely tangential to the argument of whether immigrants should or shouldn't be punished, or suffer consequences. I just don't like your characterization of agency because it strikes me as an attempt to turn racial accusations back on the accusers, and I don't think it works.