Addo_Of_Nex
Fuck of Death
My knowledge of the literature on free will and such is admittedly quite lacking, but I am committed to the necessity of considering findings in quantum mechanics in informing the discourse on the topic. I know that a lot of people will point to the superficial indeterminacy of the Copenhagen Interpretation and attempt to salvage the traditional notion of free will from it, but that seems to be a shifty move (because things at the quantum level are so inconceivably small; to extrapolate from a property of such small objects and non-rigorously apply it to our utterly human view of the world and the utterly human notion of free will is just intellectually dishonest, in my opinion).
Also worth noting is that this is simply one of the consistent interpretations of quantum mechanics. David Bohm constructed an explicitly non-local hidden variables theory of quantum mechanics that turns out to be perfectly consistent. However, Bell's Theorem confirmed that any local hidden variables interpretation of quantum mechanics must violate the principle of locality; but the principle of locality is an integral component of many fundamental notions in physics (Maxwell's equations, general relativity, etc.) From my intuitive view, the mathematics of a wave function and its various component quantum states seems to point in the direction of the wave-function collapse being an epiphenomenon of quantum decoherence: a view which posits that the wave-function collapse is merely an illusion created by a loss of information during a macroscopic (read: anything at the scale above elementary particles) observation. From this point, I think the logical movement toward a Many Worlds interpretation, and a quite interesting albeit philosophical companion to this can be found in Lewis's On the Plurality of Worlds, even though I'm vastly oversimplifying his philosophical thesis.
I do think that the traditional views of consciousness and free will are profoundly confused and hubristic. Especially given the advances we've made in neuroscience and particle physics, it seems a tad bit silly to think of consciousness as anything other than an emergent property of wholly physical processes between rudimentary particles that constitute everything around us, be them "organic" or "inorganic" (food for thought: Nietzsche was heavily skeptical about the distinction between the two, and rightfully so). However, I think that this is merely an indication of the sort of being we are, and to completely disregard the significance of our ontic modes of being is problematic as well (I saw that Ein was using some continental philosophy terminology, so why the fuck invoke some Heideggerian neologisms).
Overall, if we're to think of free will as something being relevant at all in this current human epoch, we have to radically reformulate the very notion of free will itself. Bergson has a really nice compatiblist position which posits that free will is not something we have, moreover it is something we experience. He demarcates between mundane things as determined, but profound things like coming to terms with true love for someone/something and assorted revelations as being done with the whole of one's soul (don't think of any theological connotations). It works pretty well in his system, though it itself is not without problems, as for him there's no way of an external agent "validating", so to speak, the sincerity of such a revelation of another agent since it's an act of intuition (a technical term, recall).
Fuck, I've pontificated long enough without really going anywhere. Hopefully there's something interesting to be found in the above miasma of disorganized thoughts.
Also worth noting is that this is simply one of the consistent interpretations of quantum mechanics. David Bohm constructed an explicitly non-local hidden variables theory of quantum mechanics that turns out to be perfectly consistent. However, Bell's Theorem confirmed that any local hidden variables interpretation of quantum mechanics must violate the principle of locality; but the principle of locality is an integral component of many fundamental notions in physics (Maxwell's equations, general relativity, etc.) From my intuitive view, the mathematics of a wave function and its various component quantum states seems to point in the direction of the wave-function collapse being an epiphenomenon of quantum decoherence: a view which posits that the wave-function collapse is merely an illusion created by a loss of information during a macroscopic (read: anything at the scale above elementary particles) observation. From this point, I think the logical movement toward a Many Worlds interpretation, and a quite interesting albeit philosophical companion to this can be found in Lewis's On the Plurality of Worlds, even though I'm vastly oversimplifying his philosophical thesis.
I do think that the traditional views of consciousness and free will are profoundly confused and hubristic. Especially given the advances we've made in neuroscience and particle physics, it seems a tad bit silly to think of consciousness as anything other than an emergent property of wholly physical processes between rudimentary particles that constitute everything around us, be them "organic" or "inorganic" (food for thought: Nietzsche was heavily skeptical about the distinction between the two, and rightfully so). However, I think that this is merely an indication of the sort of being we are, and to completely disregard the significance of our ontic modes of being is problematic as well (I saw that Ein was using some continental philosophy terminology, so why the fuck invoke some Heideggerian neologisms).
Overall, if we're to think of free will as something being relevant at all in this current human epoch, we have to radically reformulate the very notion of free will itself. Bergson has a really nice compatiblist position which posits that free will is not something we have, moreover it is something we experience. He demarcates between mundane things as determined, but profound things like coming to terms with true love for someone/something and assorted revelations as being done with the whole of one's soul (don't think of any theological connotations). It works pretty well in his system, though it itself is not without problems, as for him there's no way of an external agent "validating", so to speak, the sincerity of such a revelation of another agent since it's an act of intuition (a technical term, recall).
Fuck, I've pontificated long enough without really going anywhere. Hopefully there's something interesting to be found in the above miasma of disorganized thoughts.
