rms
Active Member
you're just flat out ignoring the domestic and regional market that existed prior to 1776.round half of the slaves brought to the US came before the Declaration of Independence.
you're just flat out ignoring the domestic and regional market that existed prior to 1776.round half of the slaves brought to the US came before the Declaration of Independence.
you're just flat out ignoring the domestic and regional market that existed prior to 1776.
I don't care about Deblanco since this is simply him quoting Foner. Foner is just a quasi-marxist with a specific axe to grind. I could pull plenty of contra pieces from the Mises Institute, for instance, but you wouldn't accept those for likely a similar reason I won't accept Foner (I'm not even saying that their pieces would necessarily be accurate either). As per his wiki, he has specifically engaged in historical revisionism (which is what made him somebody), which is also something you have previously spoken against at times.
The last shave ship to the US came in 1860. Around half of the slaves brought to the US came before the Declaration of Independence. If slavery itself in the South wasn't yet on the downward trend in terms of cotton production, the demand for slave import certainly was, and the US South had a tiny fraction of the total slave population in the Americas.
the mortality is what I'm referencing, the slave trade was about maintaining or replacing because of the harsh conditions for so long. So it's not a surge of slaves , rather a bring as many as we can because they lost so many.Yeah, slaves in the US had kids and those were traded around. The total numbers were still a fraction. Regional slave trading was negligible though, as slaves south of the US (Caribbean etc) had high mortality.
I've spoken against historical revisionism?
Being a Marxist doesn't disqualify someone as a scholar, although I'm sure it's a knock in your book. Again, this is about a community of scholars vetting another's work. I know you have a problem with a large portion of that community; but your personal grievances don't constitute a valid objection.
If you could pull pieces from a peer-reviewed journal, and not an anarcho-capitalist think-tank, that would be better.![]()
Slaves stopped being imported from Africa, but not because demand went down. The African slave trade was outlawed in the early nineteenth century, and slaves continued to be illegally transported to the U.S. until 1860. Increased numbers of slaves were traded from the upper to deep south in the wake of the prohibition. Demand wasn't on the downturn because of technology.
I could have sworn you have, but it would have been years ago when the subject even came up, so maybe things are different now, or I'm just misremembering.
If it weren't for personal grievances the marxist and marxist adjacent cults wouldn't have many adherents. I don't see much difference between working for the Mises Institute and declaring yourself a marxist, in terms of having a single hammer and declaring all problems nails in need of a-hammerin. At least the Mises Institute has a legitimate claim to their ideas never having been tried.
I already addressed both of these points. Demand wasn't down yet, but would have been as technology progressed. And again, yes slaves were transported to the US until right before the Civil War, but the number was minuscule (due primarily to the illegality, but still).
Paxton has argued influentially that fascism is as fascism does. But conspicuous features are recognizably shared, including: nostalgia for a purer, mythic, often rural past; cults of tradition and cultural regeneration; paramilitary groups; the delegitimizing of political opponents and demonization of critics; the universalizing of some groups as authentically national, while dehumanizing all other groups; hostility to intellectualism and attacks on a free press; anti-modernism; fetishized patriarchal masculinity; and a distressed sense of victimhood and collective grievance. Fascist mythologies often incorporate a notion of cleansing, an exclusionary defense against racial or cultural contamination, and related eugenicist preferences for certain “bloodlines” over others. Fascism weaponizes identity, validating the herrenvolk and invalidating all the other folk.
The Courier was one of many African-American papers that not only saw affinities between Nazi Germany and Jim Crow America, but also traced causal connections. “Hitler Learns from America,” the Courier had declared as early as 1933, reporting that German universities under the new regime of the Third Reich were explaining that they drew their ideas from “the American pathfinders Madison Grant and Lothrop Stoddard,” and that “racial insanities” in America provided Nazi Germany with “a model for oppressing and persecuting its own minorities.” The African-American New York Age similarly wondered if Hitler had studied “under the tutelage” of Klan leaders, perhaps as “a subordinate Kleagle or something of the sort.”
The Nazis themselves saw a clear kinship. Recent histories have demonstrated that Hitler systematically relied upon American race laws in designing the Nuremberg laws, while the Third Reich also actively sought supporters in the Jim Crow South, although the political leadership of the white South largely did not return the favor. But the correspondence between the two systems was perfectly evident at the time, on both sides of the Atlantic. A Nazi consul general in California even tried to purchase the Klan, with the idea of plotting an American putsch. His price was too low—the Klan was nothing if not mercenary—but, as journalists remarked after the story came to light in 1939, the Klan could not afford to seem foreign; “to be effective,” its nativist agenda had to be pursued “in the name of Americanism.”
Then, too, there was Father Coughlin. “I take the road of Fascism,” he said in 1936, before forming the Christian Front,” whose members referred to themselves as “brown shirts.” His virulently anti-Semitic radio program, regularly transmitting claims from the fabricated Protocols of the Elders of Zion, reached almost 30 million Americans at its height—the largest radio audience in the world at the time. Those listeners tuned in at the end of 1938 as Coughlin was justifying the violence of Kristallnacht, arguing that it was “reprisal” against Jews who had supposedly murdered more than twenty million Christians and stolen billions of dollars in “Christian property”; Nazism, he said, was a natural “defense mechanism” against the communism financed by Jewish bankers. Coughlin’s weekly newspaper, Social Justice, which had an estimated circulation of 200,000 at its height, was described by Life magazine at the time as probably the most widely read voice of “Nazi propaganda in America.”
But the American leader most often accused of fascist tendencies was Huey Long. As Louisiana governor (and senator), Long imposed local martial law, censored the newspapers, forbade public assemblies, packed the courts and legislatures with his cronies, and installed his twenty-four-year-old lover as secretary of state. Long was a racketeer, but his “Share Our Wealth” program did improve local conditions, building roads and bridges, investing in hospitals and schools, and abolishing the poll tax. His economic populism was also not predicated on furthering racial, ethnic, or religious divisions; he subordinated his white supremacism to his redistributionist political message. “We just lynch an occasional my pals,” he breezily declared when dismissing anti-lynching laws, though he also recognized “you can’t help poor white people without helping Negroes,” and so was prepared for his rising tide to lift all boats. When Long set his sights on the 1936 presidential election, Franklin D. Roosevelt was sufficiently alarmed to inform his ambassador to Germany: “Long plans to be a candidate of the Hitler type for the presidency,” predicting that by 1940 Long would try to install himself as a dictator.
American fascist energies today are different from 1930s European fascism, but that doesn’t mean they’re not fascist, it means they’re not European and it’s not the 1930s. They remain organized around classic fascist tropes of nostalgic regeneration, fantasies of racial purity, celebration of an authentic folk and nullification of others, scapegoating groups for economic instability or inequality, rejecting the legitimacy of political opponents, the demonization of critics, attacks on a free press, and claims that the will of the people justifies violent imposition of military force. Vestiges of interwar fascism have been dredged up, dressed up, and repurposed for modern times. Colored shirts might not sell anymore, but colored hats are doing great.
Reading about the inchoate American fascist movements of the 1930s during the Trump administration feels less prophetic than proleptic, a time-lapse montage of a para-fascist order slowly willing itself into existence over the course of nearly a century. It certainly seems less surprising that recognizably fascistic violence is erupting in the United States under Trump, as his attorney general sends troops to the national capital to act as a private army, armed paramilitary groups occupy state capitols, laws are passed to deny the citizenship and rights of specific groups, and birthright citizenship as guaranteed under the Fourteenth Amendment is attacked. When the president declares voting an “honor” rather than a right and “jokes” about becoming president for life, when the government makes efforts to add new categories of ethnic identity to the decennial census for the first time in the nation’s history, and when nationwide protests in response to racial injustice become the pretext for mooting martial law, we are watching an American fascist order pulling itself together.
Siskind says that HBD is either partly correct or can’t be shown to be false, linking to a Steve Sailer blog post. The unusually tortured, elliptical formulation of this confession suggests that he’s anxious to maintain plausible deniability. But then he immediately implores his correspondent to keep his opinion secret, even from his most trusted confidants, otherwise “I will probably leave the internet altogether or seek some sort of horrible revenge.” Just pause a moment to think about that. Now relate it the drama around Siskind shuttering Slate Star Codex. That was an episode in which he noisily left the Internet (though not quite “altogether”) and, in my opinion, clearly sought revenge against Metz and the Times. Does this not illuminate the reason he might do such a thing? Of course it does. It’s like shining an arc light in a closet. That was my point in linking to these emails. They are by far the strongest evidence available that my hypothesis about the entire affair is correct.
As a matter of logic, the fact that I once incorrectly maintained that there’s value in responding to Steve Sailer’s sealioning in a tolerant, liberal spirit of constructive intellectual exchange has no bearing whatsoever on the value of Siskind’s leaked email for establishing his mens rea in nuking his website. Of course, the idea behind this bit of Steve Sailer-related whataboutism is to distract from the fact that this email obviously does have substantial evidential value in support of my interpretation of the affair. Yarvin and Yang (great name for a racism-denial law firm!) act as though I’d linked to the email to build a case for Siskind’s cancellation. And what’s good for the goose is good for the gander, right?
But that’s not why I linked to the email, is it? I linked to the email to show that Siskind didhave views on race that he knew many people would find repugnant, that he was terrified that he would get cancelled if they came out, and that he was prepared to flee and/or fight if they did come out. I appreciate the opportunity to drive this point home.