Dakryn's Batshit Theory of the Week

[Dak]

Indeed, what it does instead is provide an account of failure—either you’re the victim of discrimination or you’re not a victim—so persuasive that even when it’s obviously not true, people believe it.

This is what the rebellion is against.

 

[Dak]

https://marginalrevolution.com/marginalrevolution/2019/10/beware-the-mediocre-robots.html

A super-robot replaces labor but has an immense productivity advantage which generates wealth and increases the demand for labor elsewhere. A mediocre-robot replaces the same labor but doesn’t have a huge productivity advantage. As a result, the mediocre robot is the true jobs killer because it replaces labor without greatly increasing wealth. Think about automated phone systems or chat bots.

Hadn't really considered this in these words.

 

[Dak]

https://americanmind.org/features/conservatism-in-the-bronze-age/the-deep-state-vs-the-deep-right/

Yarvin on cue.

The first step in getting to the 21st century is inventing it. The first step in inventing the 21st century is an aesthetic vision so strong, true and clear that it dominates and intimidates the stale old aesthetics of the 20th century.

Man invented art for one reason: to mog. The only reliable way to change a regime is to impress it into surrendering of its own free will. Persuasion is beta; only the uncertain persuade. The strong perform.

 

[Einherjar86]

On cue, or on point? He's one, but he's not the other.

But how can art become a weapon? Oh, art is extremely dangerous. Anything dangerous is a weapon.

 

[Dak]

On cue, or on point? He's one, but he's not the other.

One cue. I quoted the part I thought was the main point/takeaway. He didn't need to write the rest of it.

 

[Einherjar86]

It’s too bad he did. Some of it’s quite laughable.

I actually wouldn’t totally disagree with the part you quoted, although I imagine you and I have different reactions to the claim.

I do have a question though: what does “mog” mean?

 

[Dak]

It’s too bad he did. Some of it’s quite laughable.

I actually wouldn’t totally disagree with the part you quoted, although I imagine you and I have different reactions to the claim.

I do have a question though: what does “mog” mean?

I'm assuming he's using the urban dictionary definition rather than the other definitions out there, based on the context:

Verb; To assert ones dominance.

Adaptation of AMOG (Alpha Male of Group).

I don't per se even agree with the whole quote. I do agree with the part about persuasion being inferior to performance (in general). I think Yarvin is trying to ride along with BAP at the moment, but they serve very separate functions in the "deep right" , as he wants to call it, and I think Yarvin recognizes that his Moldbug moment can't hold a candle to what's happened post-Trump era. Smart guy, but there's never going to be a turtleneck revolution.

 

[Einherjar86]

I find it very difficult to qualify things like "persuasion" and "performance." I don't see how we can arrive at valid conclusions over their relative importance without falling back on value judgments about which parts of change are the most significant. This kind of qualification strikes me as similar to that which places "facts" above "framing/presentation." I have a hard time extricating these things from one another.

As far as Yarvin goes, he's not unintelligent, but I find so little worth taking away that it makes reading essays like this one a waste of time. And I find so much that's either blatantly wrong or poorly written that it makes me question the depth of his critical acumen.

 

[Dak]

I find it very difficult to qualify things like "persuasion" and "performance." I don't see how we can arrive at valid conclusions over their relative importance without falling back on value judgments about which parts of change are the most significant. This kind of qualification strikes me as similar to that which places "facts" above "framing/presentation." I have a hard time extricating these things from one another.

It's a little bit more clearly differentiated to me due to the difference in behavioral vs cognitive therapies (for a parallel example), although it's true that there's always a mix.

As far as Yarvin goes, he's not unintelligent, but I find so little worth taking away that it makes reading essays like this one a waste of time. And I find so much that's either blatantly wrong or poorly written that it makes me question the depth of his critical acumen.

His more recent writing seems to be a mix of assuming his audience knows his corpus and trying to graft it on to the current trends, which only works in certain cases, and the whole thing comes off poorly forced.

 

[Dak]

https://rsbakker.wordpress.com/2019/12/19/if-free-will-were-a-heuristic/

Bakker is showing his lack of followup on the relevant literature here:

So, let’s begin with a simple question: If free-will were a heuristic, a tool humans used to solve otherwise intractable problems, what would it’s breakdown look like?

But let’s take a step back for a second, and bite a very important, naturalistic bullet. Rather than consider ‘free-will’ as a heuristic, let’s consider something less overdetermined: ‘choice-talk.’ Choice-talk constitutes one of at least two ways for us humans to report selections between behaviours.

'Choice talk':

https://www.bmj.com/content/359/bmj.j4891 (From two years ago):

Many suggested refinements to the 2012 model and believed that improvements could be made to achieve a wider understanding of shared decision making. The terms “choice talk” and “option talk” were considered too similar. Others found it odd that the model did not mention risk communication or goal setting,232425 particularly as the idea of coproduction26 gains ground, and reported too little emphasis on exploring patient preferences and context. These critiques also reflected developments in the shared decision making literature. One study argued that illness brings a state of “uncertainty, vulnerability, and loss of power.”27 The researchers advocated shared decision making to enhance or restore a patient’s “autonomous capacity,” to pay more attention to the emotional and relational dimensions of care, and to emphasize the need to support the patient during a process of decision making, given that for most it may well be a novel experience. The 2012 model did not tackle these issues.

In the whole writeup, there's something of a sidestep of the interplay between biological predisposition, contingent environment input along the developmental path, and contingent immediate environmental and biological processing at the point of choice. "Free will" might not have the same meaning it had in the Cartesian sense, but it remains as individual as can be. Which is not as "disastrous" as Bakker wants it to be. The funny thing is that Bakker is correct about biocomplexity messing things up, just not in the way he would likely be happy to recognize.

 

[Dak]

https://royalsocietypublishing.org/doi/10.1098/rsif.2017.0792#d3e817

Very cool read.

Thus, any Markov blanketed system will embody recurrent processes of autopoietic self-generation, which—as long as the system exists—enforces a difference between a living system and everything else [33]. This means that these processes are fundamentally processes of identity constitution, given that they result in a functionally coherent unit [36]. Casting operational closure in terms of the presence of a Markov blanket gives the notion of operational closure a statistical formulation. One of the nice things about casting operational closure in terms of the presence of a Markov blanket is that it allows us to explain what Varela [36] called ‘the intriguing paradox’ of an autonomous identity: how a living system must both distinguish itself from its environment and, at the same time, maintain its energetic coupling to its environment to remain alive. According to Varela: ‘this linkage cannot be detached since it is against this very environment from which the organism arises, comes forth’ [36, p. 78].

The answer to this apparent paradox lies in the conditional independencies induced by the presence of a Markov blanket, which (as we know) separates internal states and external states, and can be further decomposed into active states and internal states. Crucially, active and sensory states are distinguished in the following sense: active states influence but cannot be influenced by external states, while sensory states influence but cannot be influenced by internal states. This constraint enforces conditional independence between internal and external states—from which an autonomous identity can be shown to emerge—while creating a coupling between organism and environment via sensory and active states.

 

[Einherjar86]

Really cool. Up my alley, but haven’t had time to read it all. Never heard of Markov blankets before.

 

[Einherjar86]

Moving this here:

I agree! Minus Carson, maaaaaaybe (I don't think he's a bad guy, but he's been misappointed out of his area of expertise). Fuck both Kushner (and Ivanka for that matter) and Bolton 3x over, but only Kushner is still in place (unfortunately). Most of Trump's notable appointments have been bad but shortlived. He even supposedly mocked Bolton the whole time he was in position which is almost worth the appointment. You have to consider the fact that many potential good appointees wouldn't consider accepting a position for fear of that Deep State/Cathedral reprisal that supposedly doesn't exist.

Short-lived yes, but they shouldn't have happened in the first place. It goes to show how inept he is--in my opinion, anyway.

I do see them bad because of EROEI. Renewable subsidies (specifically, wind/solar) are more or less a net loss every time I look at the data excepting maybe solar panels directly on houses. I'm against subsidies in a true ceteris paribus environment, but ceteris paribus in fact doesn't apply to international economics. The US has to contend with Saudi Arabia, Russia, etc. Hydro is less of an issue because of EROEI but creates other environmental issues (which solar/wind farms do as well).

Sorry, you gotta tell me what EROEI stands for...

As far as solar goes, you just said what it needs to be: solar on houses, on buildings! Universities are some of the most hypocritical institutions in this regard; they put panels on one or two buildings, all the while investing in pipelines out west.

I know people in Massachusetts who've installed panels on their houses; it's not an immediate return, but after a year they've said it more than pays off. Imagine if all buildings in an urban area installed them...

Obviously oil is the centerpiece of modern energy, but it's not going to last; in fact, at current rates of consumption, we might be out of oil by the end of the twenty-first century. There's only so much dead matter beneath our feet. The shift needs to be incentivized now--to solar, hydro, wind, nuclear, a combo.

Multinational capitalism is a problem in a variety of ways but the opposition is always misdiagnosing how/why and subsequently the cure is worse than the disease. Tucker Carlson isn't right about everything, but he's the closest to the mark these days when it comes to talking heads. My preferred policies: Indefinitely freeze immigration (including seasonal). Repatriate manufacturing through carrot/stick approach of tariffs and subsidies. End "green" subsidies. Subsidize 4thGen nuclear. Eradicate the entire welfare state payout/bureaucracy and replace it with a UBI pegged to some index which yields something like the Trumpbux that just went out. I have other ideas about the healthcare industry but I'm less settled on those issues than these issues listed here.

I wouldn't immediately object to any of this, with the exception of "freeze immigration."

I would say, good luck pushing nuclear subsidies. And I'd add removing oil subsidies. Again, it's a cornerstone; but we need to start thinking long-term, and nuclear/solar/hydro/wind are all regenerative. Oil is finite, and the end is near.

 

[Dak]

Moving this here:

Short-lived yes, but they shouldn't have happened in the first place. It goes to show how inept he is--in my opinion, anyway.

Reasonable enough to move here or the Mort thread. I agree they shouldn't have happened in the first place but, for example, Bolton was a grasp to find a warm body to fill the spot. Bolton was passed over repeatedly. The bottom line is competent people consider it career suicide to take positions in his administration. Whether it's because of worrying about being a "yes person" or because of the idiot media or deep state it doesn't matter. It affects who is even available to appoint. Bolton, as an example, is/was too stupid to TURN DOWN the appointment.

Sorry, you gotta tell me what EROEI stands for...

As far as solar goes, you just said what it needs to be: solar on houses, on buildings! Universities are some of the most hypocritical institutions in this regard; they put panels on one or two buildings, all the while investing in pipelines out west.

I know people in Massachusetts who've installed panels on their houses; it's not an immediate return, but after a year they've said it more than pays off. Imagine if all buildings in an urban area installed them...

Obviously oil is the centerpiece of modern energy, but it's not going to last; in fact, at current rates of consumption, we might be out of oil by the end of the twenty-first century. There's only so much dead matter beneath our feet. The shift needs to be incentivized now--to solar, hydro, wind, nuclear, a combo.

Energy Return On Energy Invested. It takes a fuck ton of energy to create a solar panel, a battery, a wind turbine, to put them where they are, to maintain (mining, manufacturing, transportation, installing, maintenance), and that doesn't even get into disposal costs. Michael Moore of all people I believe just put out a doc on the boondoggle of green energy (haven't watched it). At the individual consumer level solar panels may make sense to some degree, depending on usage and location. All buildings wouldn't see a return if they are roof based because of height/usage/density unless we somehow maybe make the glass of skyscrapers return that solar energy, and even then it's a big maybe because of shade caused by seasons/latitude/density/etc.

There is a nonbio theory of oil production but that's way outside of my knowledge area so I'll just go along with the theory that oil is "dead dinosaurs etc". We might be out of oil by the end of the 21st Cent. There's no sign that anything other than Nuclear has the ability to carry us on/off TerraFirma. Even assuming a place for solar panels, those require Rare Earth Minerals and those are rare/finite as well, and solar panels eventually have to be replaced (current lifespan is 20-30 years).

I wouldn't immediately object to any of this, with the exception of "freeze immigration."

I would say, good luck pushing nuclear subsidies. And I'd add removing oil subsidies. Again, it's a cornerstone; but we need to start thinking long-term, and nuclear/solar/hydro/wind are all regenerative. Oil is finite, and the end is near.

Who is helped in the US by immigration?

I'm all about longterm thinking. Wind is a bad bet period. Solar is a maybe. Hydro is regenerative but has some enviro issues. Oil is likely finite.

None of this even gets into farming scale issues. I'm as worried about food as I am about energy.

 

[Einherjar86]

Energy Return On Energy Invested. It takes a fuck ton of energy to create a solar panel, a battery, a wind turbine, to put them where they are, to maintain (mining, manufacturing, transportation, installing, maintenance), and that doesn't even get into disposal costs. Michael Moore of all people I believe just put out a doc on the boondoggle of green energy (haven't watched it). At the individual consumer level solar panels may make sense to some degree, depending on usage and location. All buildings wouldn't see a return if they are roof based because of height/usage/density unless we somehow maybe make the glass of skyscrapers return that solar energy, and even then it's a big maybe because of shade caused by seasons/latitude/density/etc.

I think that over time we would see an overall a return on solar; but at the outset you're right, we wouldn't. The obstacle lies in overcoming that initial delay. You're also right that it's not the case that every building's panels will cover that building's energy requirements. But I wasn't implying that a building's panels would belong only to that building; it's just a matter of utilizing as much surface area as possible. The distribution of energy is another conversation.

But solar alone won't do, as we've discussed. It would have to be combined with other sources.

There is a nonbio theory of oil production but that's way outside of my knowledge area so I'll just go along with the theory that oil is "dead dinosaurs etc". We might be out of oil by the end of the 21st Cent. There's no sign that anything other than Nuclear has the ability to carry us on/off TerraFirma. Even assuming a place for solar panels, those require Rare Earth Minerals and those are rare/finite as well, and solar panels eventually have to be replaced (current lifespan is 20-30 years).

I may be wrong, but I think dinosaurs make up a small portion of petroleum; it mostly comes from dead plant matter. I'm not familiar with any nonbio theory of its origin--I assume it's not widely accepted?

 

[Dak]

I may be wrong, but I think dinosaurs make up a small portion of petroleum; it mostly comes from dead plant matter. I'm not familiar with any nonbio theory of its origin--I assume it's not widely accepted?

Yeah decayed organic matter in general is the accepted theory.

The "Abiogenic" theory isn't widely accepted but it's another theory out there (I do notice in the wiki almost all quotes/citation go to one guy):

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abiogenic_petroleum_origin

 

[Dak]

Trade happened in pre-colonial Africa, just like slavery did; and slaves were traded in pre-colonial Africa, although not to the same degree they were between Africa and the Americas, or within the Americas for that matter. Capitalism was one of the major cultural developments in dismantling institutions like divine right, a general notion of which informed pre-colonial African societies (as far as we know); so accumulation wasn't done for accumulation's sake. Rather, accumulation reflected divine right. Royalty certainly accumulates in excess, but they don't weigh their accumulation against potentially greater value; they weigh it against their divinity. Under capitalism, by contrast, accumulation reflected success, and so more accumulation means more success. It has more to do with an alignment of values than it does with material needs.

By "economic infrastructure," I mean technologies by which excessive amounts of goods were able to be manufactured (namely, textile mills in England and cotton plantations in the American South, along with other plantations). The geopolitical structure of trade and the international manufacturing of goods created the demand for a workforce that far exceeded anything that was needed by any African kingdom. They engaged in trade and had markets, but nothing like the scale of production taking place between the Americas and Europe.

Again, I'm not trying to say there was no violence or oppression in pre-colonial Africa. I just think the South is the more likely cultural context that explains current socioeconomic trends.

Well under monarchies or comparable regimes certainly wealth flows mostly in the direction of the sovereign, but not exclusively. It's true that the scale was lower, but that had far less to do with people specifically and more to do with the multiplying of labor effort via technology. Slaves were only real multiplier previously, and eventually technology replaced them. The Intra-African and Arab-African slave trade was at least as large as the total TAST, and the US colonies comprised less than 10% of the TAST. While this is somewhat an aside to the overall original topic, I do think it's important to put the TAST in proper context both in relation to slave trade happening outside of the growing euro/anglo centric industrialization, and within it. Slavery was preindustrial technology, and industrial capitalism killed it as fast as it could innovate.

This is really interesting and I haven't read the Isenberg book, but it actually doesn't affect my point because African slaves wouldn't have come in contact with those isolated poorer white communities, outside of a few anomalies. They were purchased for work primarily on plantations, and poor whites couldn't afford more than one or two slaves, if any.

This would likely be a fair point until after the early 18th century. Poor whites would be unlikely to have a slave, but as they came in increasing contact with one another as the economy grew more interconnected, and then after emancipation, there would be more contact between blacks and poor whites. Interestingly enough Thomas Sowell has a book pushing the scotch/irish influence on post-slavery African American culture, but I've not read it, and I've read that it was criticized as being heavily based on one or a handful of sources. The interesting thing that frequently does not get discussed is the urban/rural divide and class. Poor whites and blacks in the US in urban areas have a lot in common, and poor whites and blacks in rural areas have even more in common. It's at the margins where the greater differences are in both directions.

 

[Einherjar86]

Well under monarchies or comparable regimes certainly wealth flows mostly in the direction of the sovereign, but not exclusively. It's true that the scale was lower, but that had far less to do with people specifically and more to do with the multiplying of labor effort via technology. Slaves were only real multiplier previously, and eventually technology replaced them. The Intra-African and Arab-African slave trade was at least as large as the total TAST, and the US colonies comprised less than 10% of the TAST. While this is somewhat an aside to the overall original topic, I do think it's important to put the TAST in proper context both in relation to slave trade happening outside of the growing euro/anglo centric industrialization, and within it. Slavery was preindustrial technology, and industrial capitalism killed it as fast as it could innovate.

I feel like it's giving industrial capitalism too much credit to say that it killed slavery... not sure that's a viable argument. If anything, industrial developments increased the demand for slave labor (as in the most famous case, the cotton gin).

I'm not sure why it matters that more slaves were sent to Central and South America. The tobacco plantations were as much a part of the colonial expansion of Euro-American capitalism as the cotton plantations were. I'd argue that the legacy of plantation capitalism in those regions had as detrimental of an effect on socioeconomic conditions for people of color today as it did in North America.

This would likely be a fair point until after the early 18th century. Poor whites would be unlikely to have a slave, but as they came in increasing contact with one another as the economy grew more interconnected, and then after emancipation, there would be more contact between blacks and poor whites. Interestingly enough Thomas Sowell has a book pushing the scotch/irish influence on post-slavery African American culture, but I've not read it, and I've read that it was criticized as being heavily based on one or a handful of sources. The interesting thing that frequently does not get discussed is the urban/rural divide and class. Poor whites and blacks in the US in urban areas have a lot in common, and poor whites and blacks in rural areas have even more in common. It's at the margins where the greater differences are in both directions.

After the early eighteenth century, we're in the thralls of Reconstruction and the country is witness to a whole new slew of violence and animosity.

I wouldn't disagree that poor whites and blacks have a lot in common--except for slavery, of course.

 

[Dak]

I feel like it's giving industrial capitalism too much credit to say that it killed slavery... not sure that's a viable argument. If anything, industrial developments increased the demand for slave labor (as in the most famous case, the cotton gin).

I'm not sure why it matters that more slaves were sent to Central and South America. The tobacco plantations were as much a part of the colonial expansion of Euro-American capitalism as the cotton plantations were. I'd argue that the legacy of plantation capitalism in those regions had as detrimental of an effect on socioeconomic conditions for people of color today as it did in North America.

Labor demand can be increased in the short run in a particular field, but over time the machine comes for everyone.

It matters that we have plenty of counter or comparable examples from other areas where many more slaves were taken, that have nothing to do with the cavaliers of the US south, and even less to do with the poor classes there.

After the early eighteenth century, we're in the thralls of Reconstruction and the country is witness to a whole new slew of violence and animosity.

I wouldn't disagree that poor whites and blacks have a lot in common--except for slavery, of course.

Implicit in this statement is a belief that "the country" is the north east coast, which itself is completely removed from experiences of violence and animosity. This ingrained perspective among those from the northeast coast is why people from the South have tended to dislike "Yankees".

 

[Einherjar86]

Labor demand can be increased in the short run in a particular field, but over time the machine comes for everyone.

The machine didn't come for everyone in U.S. slavery's case, though.

It matters that we have plenty of counter or comparable examples from other areas where many more slaves were taken, that have nothing to do with the cavaliers of the US south, and even less to do with the poor classes there.

Sorry, I still don't follow this reasoning.

Legacies of slavery have left socioeconomic wastelands all over Central and South America too. We just happened to be discussing the U.S. South. It's true that more slaves were sent to Central and South America, but 250k still went to North America; and when cotton production ramped up, nearly all of them were traded to Dixie.

Implicit in this statement is a belief that "the country" is the north east coast, which itself is completely removed from experiences of violence and animosity. This ingrained perspective among those from the northeast coast is why people from the South have tended to dislike "Yankees".

...if the implication includes the notion that a country should be "removed from experiences of violence and animosity," then I would agree; and I would say that I'd rather "the country" look like the Northeast than the Old South. To be honest, I don't see the point of this comment.