Dakryn's Batshit Theory of the Week

Getting gut-punched is something friends can even do to each other for fun, or other games where you slap each other in the face as hard as possible, or just punching each other's arm and the first one to give in loses. Nobody does that with rape, even if the rapist thinks it's a joke to rape somebody, the victim isn't in on it and if the "victim" is in on it, it's not a rape it's just rape-play and doesn't come with the severe psychological damage an actual rape does.

I agree that there are differences between punching and rape; but just to be clear, friends punching each other for fun tend to have an agreement between them, either spoken or unspoken.

The difference between punching and rape shouldn't substantiate either as an ethically permissible act, though. Just because there are cases in which punching might be socially acceptable, and no imaginable cases in which rape is socially acceptable (obviously there are cultures in which it is, but it shouldn't be), that doesn't mean an unprovoked punching is okay.

Is it unethical to break into a stranger's home even though you don't steal anything, and just leave? Nothing is lost in the material sense, but much like a rape something is lost, or taken more accurately, psychologically. You're never the same again once your home has been violated, even if what was stolen does not measure up to the grief you feel over it. Many rape victims talk about how their consensual sexual relationships suffer dramatically due to being raped, and it's not that dissimilar to someone who has had their house broken into becoming paranoid about people walking by, or shutting all the windows and locking all the doors in a compulsive manner.

An unprovoked punch might register to someone as a loss in much the same way that rape does, albeit to a far lesser degree. I think this marking off in terms of degree just feels slippery and ultimately pretty arbitrary. And it appears to award "loss" to particular acts while denying it to others. I'm not sure what justifies these decisions beyond identifying some acts as quantitatively more harmful than others, and then arbitrarily deciding where to assign the category of loss.
 
Unlike material loss, abstract loss is subjective and entirely dependent on whether the person tells us or acts as if there is a loss. This is further complicated by the gains a traumatic or criminal event can give us, which is also subjective. The nature of experience is to measure losses up against gains in the wake of an event.
 
But rape strikes me as salient example wherein the victim doesn't lose anything in the same sense they would if all their possessions were blown up. If someone was presented with an ultimatum between getting gut-punched and losing all their possessions, it's like they would choose the former; but if the ultimatum was between getting raped and losing all their possessions, they might very well choose the latter.

Acts of physical violence toward a person's body might vary in degree, and the ethical value associated with such acts might also vary; but when you break it down, presenting someone with an ultimatum between getting punched and losing all their possessions is still an unethical proposition.

To put it another way, I see getting raped and getting punched as similar in kind but varying in degree. The difference in degree doesn't make one act ethical and the other unethical.

I'm not arguing at this point for what is or is not ethical behavior, or offering dichotomous ultimatums. I'm talking about where to start from in trying to figure what is or isn't ethical. You submitted pain (although this whole discussion is a large tangent from respect, but it's conceivable or allowable that respect is involved in ethics) as a starting point, referencing other philosophical ethics discussions. My point about receiving a punch vs losing all your possessions (by explosion no less) is that one is an experience of physical pain nearly all of us can directly empathize with, and the other involves no pain, and most of us at this point in the west can't empathize (vs sympathize) with such an event. Yet, I imagine that to a man (or woman), we would rather take the punch.

I struggle with putting rape and punch as different in degree vs in kind, but even allowing that, I think both still fit within a loss framework. It's just that loss is as subjective and as slippery as "pain" in instances of physical harm, whereas it has at least some concrete applications in other material conditions (as opposed trying to quantify the "pain" of loss, which psychology has been trying to do for a long time in the field of loss-aversion studies). You can even be raped and it theoretically not involve any pain at all (e.g., while drugged), yet there can be tremendous psychological loss.

Is it unethical to break into a stranger's home even though you don't steal anything, and just leave? Nothing is lost in the material sense, but much like a rape something is lost, or taken more accurately, psychologically. You're never the same again once your home has been violated, even if what was stolen does not measure up to the grief you feel over it. Many rape victims talk about how their consensual sexual relationships suffer dramatically due to being raped, and it's not that dissimilar to someone who has had their house broken into becoming paranoid about people walking by, or shutting all the windows and locking all the doors in a compulsive manner.

Defining ethics by loss, if you mean material loss, doesn't really get at pain related to the abstract.

I mean both material and psychological loss. There may be some outlier example I am not considering, but generally speaking, psychological pain is in response to loss, whether in terms of material goods/health or in beliefs about the world (i.e., that the world is a mostly good place, that you are secure, etc.). That's why I think loss is a more fundamental place to start.
 
Speaking of batshit theories...

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I'm not familiar with his later neoliberal stuff. I've read about it (in pieces like the one you link), but never actually read the source material, which I think is mostly lectures. I appreciate what the scholar interviewed here is doing, because it reveals the disparity and heterogeneity of postwar theorists. They all too often get lumped together as "postmodern Marxists," which Foucault clearly wasn't by the end of his life (and arguably even earlier, despite his relationship with the Althusserian school).

Personally, I view Foucault's neoliberal turn as a misguided attempt to theorize agency for the individual subject, which is lacking in his earlier work. Zamora rightly points out that Foucault saw the individual subject as "fairly passive, incapable of responding to power." He was interested in systems and structures of knowledge (knowledge here being something ideologically determined and organized, not a neutral concept), not in how subjects could withstand those structures. I suppose his fascination with neoliberalism derived from an urgency to theorize agency.
 
Personally, I view Foucault's neoliberal turn as a misguided attempt to theorize agency for the individual subject, which is lacking in his earlier work. Zamora rightly points out that Foucault saw the individual subject as "fairly passive, incapable of responding to power." He was interested in systems and structures of knowledge (knowledge here being something ideologically determined and organized, not a neutral concept), not in how subjects could withstand those structures. I suppose his fascination with neoliberalism derived from an urgency to theorize agency.

Misguided in which ways (not being familiar with source material either, and being mostly disdainful of Foucault on the motive level, I'm sure I would agree that it was misguided but maybe not in the same ways)?

In other news, Bakker drops a new piece:

https://rsbakker.wordpress.com/2019/09/27/exploding-the-manifest-and-scientific-images-of-man-2/

I'm not familiar with, or even all that interested in the piece that he is attempting to respond to (at least based on clips he responds to). I thought his Cognitive Ecologies section was reasonably accurate. Everything after that more or less went off the rails though. The hate on heuristics is simply a different type of blind bias to human cognitive diversity and the specific human-cognitive-limited-problemness, if you will, of problems for humans:

The contrast between shallow (source-insensitive) cognitive ecologies and deep information environments opens the question of the development of human self-understanding to the high-dimensional messiness of life.

The messiness of life increases as a response to the increasing access to deep information, which is provided by a decrease in reliance on heuristics in the accessors and the contact of the deep information problems for those without the neurobiological capability to handle it. In short, Bakker doesn't understand the problems of globalism + IQ, based on this blogpost. But that's typical of very smart people who don't understand IQ sufficiently, experientially. There's a truism, if not research (not sure), that a 40 IQ gap creates completely alien cognitive experience gap. I'll grant Bakker a higher IQ than myself. Given that, he couldn't fathom the cognitive ecology of 60-70+% of the planet. That's a pretty massive blindspot.
 
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Misguided in which ways (not being familiar with source material either, and being mostly disdainful of Foucault on the motive level, I'm sure I would agree that it was misguided but maybe not in the same ways)?

Just in the same way specified in that Jacobin piece--that he thought neoliberalism would be a way for individual citizens to discover and enact some kind of agency. As we now know from our privileged historical perspective, it hasn't done that.

Sounds like Moldbug and Bakker want analogous things--one says we should discard narratives, the other heuristics. At least, that's what a cursory glance tells me. I don't have time to dive into these.
 
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Just in the same way specified in that Jacobin piece--that he thought neoliberalism would be a way for individual citizens to discover and enact some kind of agency. As we now know from our privileged historical perspective, it hasn't done that.

Well I think that the agency issue is something that people who don't understand biological contributions to cognition will continuously trip over.

Sounds like Moldbug and Bakker want analogous things--one says we should discard narratives, the other heuristics. At least, that's what a cursory glance tells me. I don't have time to dive into these.

Interesting conflation - heuristics and narratives. I don't think you're necessarily absolutely right here but definitely not absolutely wrong. I also don't have time given where I am in the dissertation and internship app process but I'm also procrastinating lol.
 
https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2019/09/190930114732.htm

No-one knows what connects awareness -- the state of consciousness -- with its contents, i.e. thoughts and experiences. Now researchers propose an elegant solution: a literal, structural connection via 'L5p neurons'. The group offers evidence - and caveats. Their challenge to experimentalists: if consciousness requires L5p neurons, all brain activity without them must be unconscious.

I don't have any issue with this. There has to be some sort of "coordinating" or "attentional" process, if you will. *All* processes can't be "conscious". It's the coordination or attention that would be "consciousness".
 
This is from last year, but it's the kind of criticism of contemporary identitarian progressivism that I'm happy to engage with, namely because it's so logically and lucidly presented. I also find it hard to argue against because of its rigor.

I've discussed before that Marxists academics and identitarian academics often clash over how to redress marginalization in modern society. It's easy to lump both groups together, but they're hardly bedfellows (although Benn Michaels certainly perceives how they could be).

https://nonsite.org/article/the-political-economy-of-anti-racism

Redistributing skin colors has nothing to do with redistributing wealth; a world where every race was proportionately represented at every income level would be exactly as unequal as the one we have now. Arguably, however, it would have both ethical and economic advantages, or at least, that’s what its advocates believe. The problem with discrimination is that it generates what economists call “bad” inequalities. If a white male gets promoted over a Latina despite the fact that the Latina was doing a better job, that’s a bad inequality and it’s bad in two ways. It’s ethically bad because it’s unfair (the white man is being chosen for reasons that have nothing to do with merit) and it’s economically bad because it’s inefficient (since the white man wasn’t chosen for merit, the job is probably not being done as well as it could be). What anti-discrimination looks to do, then, is solve both the ethical and the economic problem—to make sure that all groups have equal opportunity to succeed and thus also to help make sure that the jobs are being done by the people who are best at doing them. Which has absolutely nothing to do with eliminating economic inequality.5 In fact, it’s just the opposite: the point of eliminating horizontal inequality is to justify individual inequality.

This is why some of us have been arguing that identity politics is not an alternative to class politics but a form of it: it’s the politics of an upper class that has no problem with seeing people left behind as long as they haven’t been left behind because of their race or sex. And (this is at least one of the things that Marx meant by ideology) it’s promulgated not only by people who understand themselves as advocates of capital but by many who don’t. Even the Marxist anti-racist David Roediger thinks that “anti-capitalists” shouldn’t “sneer at” the goal of “evenly distribut[ing]” “poverty and inequality…across racial lines.” From his perspective, the problem is that “corporate embraces” of diversity “mask desires for the surplus value” it produces6 and “shift the terms of struggles against racism”—as if real anti-racism would get the job done. But if the job is a redistribution of wealth that will produce something other than horizontal equality, real anti-racism, just like real anti-discrimination of all kinds, not only won’t get it done but doesn’t even try to do it. Indeed, what it does instead is provide an account of failure—either you’re the victim of discrimination or you’re not a victim—so persuasive that even when it’s obviously not true, people believe it.
 
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