Dakryn's Batshit Theory of the Week

[Addo_Of_Nex]

I'm talking more about the amusing little trick of language.

"This sentence is false."

What do you do with something like that? Is it false? well then it's true, so fuck. Maybe instead you want to say it's true? Well if it's true, then it's false, so also fuck.

I was actually talking to a graduate student a few months ago who was focusing on constructing a formal system of truth that tackled things like the liar/barber paradox and pretty much anything bearing resemblance to the infinite regress you find with the true-but-unprovable statements of the form "P is true, but the incompleteness of the system (read: necessity of introducing a new axiom into the system) renders it unprovable" that Godel's theorems tackle. He described a syntax that treats these as a special class of statements that are assigned some particular truth value in a different way than "standard" propositions. I have no idea of knowing how much he actually achieved, as it was the only time I've ever seen him and it was a conversation that took place after my beer count had reached double digits.

Come to think of it, this method sort of resembles Cesaro summation and other non-conventional methods of attacking infinite series in mathematics. For instance, Grandi's series diverges with respect to the typical definition of convergence found in real analysis, but the Cesaro sum is 1/2, as it is the "average" of the constituent terms, in some sense. Basically, it states that such a series doesn't actually converge, but that if it did, it should converge to this particular limit. Granted, the comparison is simply a non-rigorous analogous case that's probably only interesting on an armchair level. I'm out of my league with the metamathematical details of Godel's work, let alone its rigorous connection with non-standard methods of analysis.

 

[Einherjar86]

He described a syntax that treats these as a special class of statements that are assigned some particular truth value in a different way than "standard" propositions. I have no idea of knowing how much he actually achieved, as it was the only time I've ever seen him and it was a conversation that took place after my beer count had reached double digits.

Was it some kind of set-apparatus? I'm thinking if he designated previously distinguished categories of "True" or "False", and then placed certain statements under those categories, he might arrive at new possible syntactical interpretations. It's arbitrary to place these statements into categories like that, but for investigative purposes it might allow researchers to explore more possible meanings.

I have no idea if that's even close to what he was actually doing.

 

[Summerian]

I'm thinking about starting up a body armour business in USA.
For kids!

http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/BacktoSchool/story?id=3488420&page=1#.UM8d49nxaYE
"This is just another level of safety. We want our children to be safe and happy."

 

[Addo_Of_Nex]

Was it some kind of set-apparatus? I'm thinking if he designated previously distinguished categories of "True" or "False", and then placed certain statements under those categories, he might arrive at new possible syntactical interpretations. It's arbitrary to place these statements into categories like that, but for investigative purposes it might allow researchers to explore more possible meanings.

I have no idea if that's even close to what he was actually doing.

I think so. I recall telling him that it seemed like he was fooling around with the basic structure of second order predicate logic (which is necessary since it permits statements about countably infinite domains of discourse, that is, the set of natural numbers and any set of the same cardinality), and he said that the syntax was very similar and quite simple. I brought up Kripke's answer that such self-referential statements don't have a traditional truth value; and what he described seems to be an extension of this by canonizing such "weird" statements with a syntactical basis.

But yeah, your guess is as good as mine. I only remember very vague details since this was at a party where the majority of the conversations consisted of heavy metal and booze. Nevertheless, there are millions of metamathematical details that should be left to the experts; but such an approach seems to somewhat stifle the initial "what the fuck?" factor of such supposed paradoxes, at least.

 

[Einherjar86]

I had to do some Foucault reading for final papers; one of the most penetrating thinkers of the 20th century.

History has no "meaning," though this is not to say that it is absurd or incoherent. On the contrary, it is intelligible and should be susceptible of analysis down to the smallest detail - but this in accordance with the intelligibility of struggles, of strategies and tactics. Neither the dialectic, as the logic of contradictions, nor semiotics, as the structure of communication, can account for the intrinsic intelligibility of conflicts. "Dialectic" is a way of evading the always open and hazardous reality of conflict by reducing it to a Hegelian skeleton, and "semiology" is a way of evading its violent, bloody, and lethal character by reducing it to the calm Platonic form of language and dialogue.

 

[Dak]

I don't see how this is groundbreaking, except in comparison to long dead thinkers.

 

[Einherjar86]

Well, it isn't really groundbreaking now; but it was in the '60s when he wrote it. And, considering the fact that much of academia is still steeped in the tradition of the Hegelian dialectic and Platonic idealism, we have a lot to learn from Foucault's less-known writings. People still long to think that history has a meaning; and even if you might be free of that illusion, you can't deny that most people aren't.

And I mainly just posted that because I thought it was a fantastically succinct quote.

 

[Dak]

Well, it isn't really groundbreaking now; but it was in the '60s when he wrote it. And, considering the fact that much of academia is still steeped in the tradition of the Hegelian dialectic and Platonic idealism, we have a lot to learn from Foucault's less-known writings. People still long to think that history has a meaning; and even if you might be free of that illusion, you can't deny that most people aren't.

And I mainly just posted that because I thought it was a fantastically succinct quote.

Ah, I did not realize it was decades old. And obviously you are correct about the predicament of academia, and society in general. I think there's a possibility history has meaning, but not in that sense.

 

[Jimmy... Dead.]

So history has no meaning because of drastic changes and contrast in culture(s)?

 

[Einherjar86]

History has no "meaning" because this implies some teleological and (more importantly) anthropocentric view of the world. Religious systems impose meaning (eschatology), political systems (Fukuyama's "End of History"), and even philosophical systems (Hegel is the most famous, who believed that history was dialectical, embodying the movement of the World Spirit). Marxism is dialectical in that it posits the revolution of the proletariat as the ultimate meaning of historical human development.

Humans have a history, that's certain; but it's a history that we've created. I'm not even speaking of the old adage "history is written by the victors"; I simply mean that history is textual. It has to be written. Things have happened in the past, but "history" makes sense of these things, and that means rationalize them.

As humans, we have a tendency to hypostatize history as "History"; some abstract essence that has permeated the entire actual chronology of the universe. Even thinking of history in this sense is a heavily anthropocentric position to take, since it believes in some ultimate governing essence that controls the unfolding of events. This implies that history has a meaning, even if we can't detect it.

The popular phenomenon as of late, especially in movies and beach books, is to imagine that some meaning does exist, but humans simply aren't in the know. This is why we see the obsessions, especially in science fiction books/movies, over human origins and human apocalypse. This is the fantasy that Foucault seeks to demolish; that there is any rhyme or reason behind such notions (in Foucault, it remains questionable whether such things as "origins" and "ends" even exist in the first place).

 

[Addo_Of_Nex]

Forgive my utter ignorance (I've never read a page of Foucault), but how does he feel about Heidegger's thoughts on historicity and the fact that our ability to historicize is indebted to the sort of temporal being that we (humans) have? I rather like what you've outlined above.

 

[Einherjar86]

That's a really good question, and I'm not entirely sure I can answer it. Unfortunately, my Heidegger knowledge isn't very extensive, and that's primarily due to my own prejudice (I'm wary of a Nazi philosopher, which isn't really a good excuse). Foucault doesn't engage much with Heidegger, at least that I've read; but when he does mention him it always seems to be sympathetically. I think Foucault acknowledges a certain philosophical debt.

Politically, the two of them couldn't be further apart. Heidegger had his own "end of history" type belief with the Nazis, and Foucault was always vehemently opposed to fascism (totalitarianism in general). But Foucault does privilege history above the other human sciences, to an extent; essentially, Foucault uses history to expose its institutions and developments as the consequences of shifting power structures. So, like Heidegger, he places an enormous amount of importance on our ability to historicize; but I think he's critical of the ideological tendency that accompanies it. When we historicize, we also rationalize; Foucault was all about shattering our rationalizations.

I really do need to read more of Being and Time, I just don't know when I'll have the time.

EDIT: also, Foucault's thought evolved throughout his career, and in the '60s he really turned more toward structuralism and poststructuralism, which are often viewed as challenges to traditional phenomenological and existentialist philosophies like Heidegger's. That said, Foucault couldn't stand being called a "poststructuralist." He was very fond of Nietzsche, and identified with him more than any other philosopher; I suppose where Heidegger saw Nietzsche as a problem to be overcome, Foucault saw him as providing an opportunity.

 

[Jimmy... Dead.]

Shady fucking numbers

Do numbers EXIST? - Numberphile

http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=1EGDCh75SpQ

 

[Summerian]

AMMO against NRA.
Just post these. Don't argue with these tools.








So just get rid of the 2.nd already.

 

[Dak]

Interesting collection of strawmen and contextless statistics.

 

[Jimmy... Dead.]

Physicians in China treat addictions by destroying the brain’s pleasure center

http://io9.com/5971500/physicians-in-china-treat-addictions-by-destroying-the-brains-pleasure-center

 

[Dak]

Overreaction much?

 

[Dak]

TED Talk: We aren't all cyborgs.....yet

 

[Jimmy... Dead.]

I like to think I'm a cyborg every time I drive. Like it's my Exoskeleton.

 

[Dak]

Interesting conceptualization. So if I am driving and talking someone else on bluetooth while using GPS guidance (completely common scenario now), I'm an exocyborg.