But it seems like you want to subscribe to some kind of relativism where good is relativized to different cultures. But this is, in a significant sense, a kind of moral objectivism. I take it that the real contrast to relativism would be universalism, I guess (I am not sure what the best term is here.) If you want to deny that terms like "good," "bad," etc. latch onto any objective properties in the world, you might as well go the whole hog and deny the reality of moral facts entirely rather than stopping at relativism.
I haven't been explaining myself fully. I would say that if we adopt relativism, then we have to admit that it exposes the honest truth that moral facts do not exist. So I wouldn't stop at relativism; I would go all the way and say that moral facts are
ex post facto constructs and entirely contingent on the way we've been embedded in history.
This doesn't mean that I don't take there to be external forms, or even truths, that are objective. I just don't see any reason why the objectivity of such forms or truths should lead us to make value judgments on them. Concrete reality need not result in a system of morality that privileges certain cultures over others. My thoughts on this are similar to Toril Moi's, who writes in the realm of gender studies: "If we are serious about denying that biology can justify social norms, it follows that the question of how many sexes there are or ought to be has no necessary ideological or political consequences whatsoever. It does not follow, however, that the material structure of our bodies has no impact on our way of being in the world."
That's right, but I'm having trouble seeing how this example supports your view.
Following what I've been saying above, I won't even claim that the meaning of "good" is relative. Somehow, the word "good" suffices to
mean something, but I don't really claim to be able to point to a definition. What this demonstrates, in my opinion, is not that the word "good" is drawing on two entirely different meanings; it's that there aren't two different meanings at all. Rather, according to some preconceived rules of language, the word simply functions.
You're conflating two different things here, namely, (1) the question of whether there is something that is objectively good, and (2) the question of whether there is something that is always, without exception, good. You can answer in the affirmative to (1) while answering in the negative to (2). The question of objectivity concerns something like whether good is something mind-independent. This does not necessarily have anything to do with the concern over whether anything is always good. If I think there are some things that are objectively good, I need only believe, minimally, that some things are sometimes good and that their being good is independent of whether I take them to be good.
This is a good point, but I don't think it takes everything into consideration.
If something can be objectively good (i.e. good independent of our perceptive relationship to it), that means it must be capable of harboring a quality (temporarily or permanently) that makes it good. If we have nothing to measure it by except some obscure essential understanding of good (which can only be spiritual, theological, moral, etc.), then it stands to reason that even if the existence of this quality might be temporary, it is still always good in its potentiality. If something can be good independent of our perception of it, then the quality that makes it good must always make it good unless some other apparatus for measuring its quality or value comes into play.
Maybe there is a culture that doesn't. But what does that prove? It doesn't show that they're right not to; it just shows that they're different from us.
I agree, but perhaps that makes more sense if I abandon a belief in moral facts.
Somebody who denies moral relativism need not maintain that wresting somebody from the only culture they've ever known is the right thing to do all things considered.
I suppose it depends on what someone who denies moral relativism denies it
for.
But agreed; even if someone adopts a strong moral stance, of course there are other options open that are likely morally superior.
Even if our acting like moral universalists had bad consequences like what you describe above, that would not support relativism. It's entirely consistent with the claim that female genital mutilation is just flat out wrong. And anyway, at the purely conceptual level, relativism definitely does not buy you the tolerance you seem to prize so much.
If moral universalism and relativism were the only two options, then I would disagree. Relativism is far superior to moral universalism; but obviously, such a judgment is already conditioned by my amoral attitude.
Fortunately these aren't the only two options; one can dismiss moral facts outright, as we've been discussing, which might preclude moral debate but does not preclude ethical debate. I believe that it is entirely possible to discuss proper ethical action that can lead to the benefit and development of society without morality ever entering into the debate.
I'm sure I've criticised cultural relativism some time before on here. The last time I kind of got the same response, a definition of the concept with the implication that I didn't have an understanding of it.
I really don't see why cultural relativism is so widely accepted among people. It satiates people with insecure identities that relate to say, post-colonial nationalism or their religious identity. I don't think it does much in the way of good though, or at least other than that, if you regard that as being particularly important.
What kind of identities are you talking about? National identity is not the only kind of identity, but it seems to be the kind you're privileging.
I would not identify myself as an American by any criteria other than that I'm a citizen of this country; it's purely political. As far as my beliefs go, they are conditioned by my nationality, but they aren't dictated by it. I'm not insecure in my identity, I simply don't measure it by my nationality.
Now, I think I have brought some backing for at two proposals. First, that culture, popular opinion and political trends in a country are ultimately decided by an elite few. Whilst showing respect for those opinions and cultural trends (say the rise of Islamism after a few decades of flirting with secularism or something) might, on the surface, appear to be a benevolent decision, I would argue that it is most directly beneficial to the ruling elite in the country, both the official political elite and perhaps religious elite but also the more veiled sources of influence.
As the countries we call the West moved away from dogma, authoritarianism and made economic progress, the culture definitely changed. Witches are no longer killed by fire and women aren't dunked in lakes for gossiping. The Catholic Church has lost large amounts of its power and influence in various parts of the West and ultimately this is deemed to be good by progressives.
Now, view these changes from the point of view of an Islamist, they weren't truly positive changes. More to the point, they probably aren't from the point of view of someone living in Byzantium, if they could see the West today. There isn't a small reservation were nazis are allowed to kill a quota of Jews and Roma to satiate their fury and preserve their cultural integrity and Germanic pride.
I wouldn't deny that the West has made measurable and important developments that have significantly altered world history; but I don't find the need to elevate the status of the West in order to make myself feel better.
Assuming that a Muslim wouldn't find the changes inaugurated by the Western world to be positive is presumptuous. Now, I assume you mean fundamentalist; but these comprise a very small number of Islamic believers. The idea that Islam is a threat to the Western world is idiotic and is fueled by superstitious beliefs like you've just reiterated.
