it would example either an inconsistancy with that desire of his (for her to be happy for herself) or perhaps just an ignorance on his part, like when someone gives 'tough love' thinking it will help someone but is really just hurting them. It doesn't necessarily example a lack of such desire---he could certainly still claim it's what he wants (as eating too many calories doesn't 'this person doesn't want to be thin', merely that they're presenting lacking the self-control to pursue that desire.).
Fair enough. Sure we can avoid an instance of falsification by adjusting assumptions elswhere as you've demonstrated, and we can do that with just about any theory. But for
you to make the specific moves you've just made here, it looks like you'd have to admit that Smith can genuinely have a psychological state of desiring for Wilma to be happy for her own sake. But of course that wouldn't be good for you, because then it would be plausible to maintain that there are ordinary cases in which a person can
act in accordance with that desire, just like people can act on their desires to, e.g. eat (by eating, that is).
such as? get specific here; give me a case that could actually provide some proof of it's existence.
I don't think this has necessarily been a matter of me proving my position. Rather, what I've taken issue with is that the theory you prefer (and the more general one that nobody ever does anything that is not ultimately in their own self-interest) seems to be framed in such a way that no conceivable behavior of any person could refute it. I already indicated that I felt that an instance of someone foregoing their own desires for the sake of someone else's (e.g. dying for somebody) at least constitutes some reason to doubt the idea that nobody ever does anything not in accordance with their own self-interest. I don't know why you keep going on about me proving my position as if you've already provided sufficient evidence for the truth of your own. What evidence have you mustered in your defense? You've merely reinterpreted a piece of data by making a bunch of claims about what really underlies such data. But I don't see that you've given any reason to think said reinterpretation is justified, so I don't understand why you think my position is lacking anything in the context of this debate.
If my theory suggests that possibly there is no counterexample (or maybe I'm just not that imaginative) I'm not sure what you want me to provide----a lack of counter example to the theory of gravitation or evolution isn't sufficient to say 'therefore it's a bad theory' because the truth of the theory suggests a lack of such.
You're misunderstanding me slightly. The point is not that your theory has never had any counterexamples. In fact, if a theory is constantly put to the test and no counterexamples to it have been found, then that is good for the theory. The issue is one about what a theory asserts. The theory of gravitation
rules certain observations out. That is, the theory of gravitation is only consistent with a subset of all possible observations. It is not consistent with everything we might possibly observe. A competent scientist (or possibly anybody that's scientifically literate) will be able to tell you what a counterexample to the theory of gravitation might be. This theory of yours (and the more general one I mentioned earlier) seem to be framed in such a way that said theory is consistent with all conceivable observations. Hence, it's not even testable. That's why I'd like to know what sort of observations
do you think the theory is incompatible with? What behavioral or psychological data would force abandonment of this theory? When I've seen this sort of idea propounded in the past, I've never been given an answer to this question.
Sufficient for now that you lack any example in support of the contradicting theory. Show me something which doesn't fit, show me something that suggests the only motive was 'for y's sake'---that would be a counterexample, obviously.
What do you want? A specific case from real life that would demonstrate the truth of my position or would you rather me sit in my chair and think really hard about how to construe some behavior type as being inextricably
for the sake of somebody else? I can't do the former and I refuse to do the latter because I don't even disagree with you in the sense that I think it is possible for there to be the appearance of X doing A for the sake of Y even when X is really not doing A for the sake of Y. What I disagree with is the idea that all such appearances are ultimately of this nature. How is that position justified? The argument you gave for it was merely you sitting in front of your computer and reading some certain psychological state into an agent in some hypothetical situation. How is that proof of your position?
