Moved: Recent Heidegger discussion

[Nile577]

Really it's been beyond discussion that thoughts arise from brain cells firing in patterns for quite some time. Among cognitive scientists anyways.

Well it ought not to be "beyond discussion."

That thoughts "arise" causally from brain cells does not reveal how they are en-owned (crudely: invested) with thoughtly character, as thoughts. We have accounted for how thinking happens mechanistically, but not what thinking IS.

Thinking IS in-the-world. The "in" of in-the-world ought not to suggest location - as in: this drink is in contained within this bottle - but a dwelling. We might almost write "inn," with all the connotations of a public house or a lodging.

What does this mean?

Thinking is bound up with Human Being (Dasein). Dasein is inn the world more primally than the subject/object distinction upon which cognitive scientism is founded. When we open a door, for example, the handle does not show up for us as a wooden baton eight inches in length, hard, combustible and connected to a steel hinge; we barely register it analytically at all. Yet a disconnected entity of material properties is exactly the kind of being we would expect to encounter if scientific analysis were to provide primal insight into the phenomenon of the world.

Conversely, and fascinatingly, it is only when Dasein is shaken in its dwelling that such subject/object contemplation arises. It is only when the door handle breaks that it shows up for us as an entity (we might stop, stare at it, try it again, examine it, become aware of it) - though even then it is not revealed in isolated scientific detachment, as it still shows up in its worldly context.

A further example: ever been out driving and thought suddenly "wow I don't remember how I drove that last mile. I was thinking about something else entirely."? One is inn the car as a mode of Being, founded upon dasein's being-inn-the-world. The steering wheel shows up in its “steering” character. The indicators become extensions of the hands. You do not encounter them as objects, from the cognitivist perspective of a detached observer, but towards them you dwell in-the-world. They become invisible, or forgotten – like the lenses in your glasses when you look at a painting. It is only when the indicator goes wrong that your dwelling-inn-the-world is impoverished to the point of merely-being-towards-contemplating it. It's only this contemplation that can reveal the item as "occurent," and can abstract from its situational circumstance general notions of occurentness to formulate scientific models. (Perhaps if dasein is not skilled scientifically (e.g. dasein enjoys jane austen novels ) one might only reveal "pure occurentness," which would be an empty staring at the broken indicator bulb with very little other involvement )

Cognitive scientists obscure from their research the phenomenon of the World. I can only hint at this here. This obscuring prevents an understanding that thinking is bound up in what Dreyfus terms the "equipmental nexus" of the ready-to-hand (the kind of beings of “equipment&#8221. That is, the equipmental character of a "hammer" only makes sense against the background nexus of a towards-which (nails to be hammered)in a workshop, for-the-sake of dasein. Thinking IS in-the-world. This nexus brings forth the worldly character of the world. Nothing in-the-world IS in isolation.

In essence then, the cognitivist account of thinking is impoverished, and detached from the primal everyday being of dasein. That cognitive science is empirically verifiable, skilful and productive does not excuse its failure to recognize that thinking is already inn-the-world. Science is powerfully successful, breath-taking and demonstrable, but it is not primal, and its ignorance towards the question of Being belies the muddle-headed claims of Scientism.

 

[kmik]

Brilliant post. Correct me if I'm wrong but are the " - " 's in "in-the-world" to contrast against "IN 'the-world'"?

 

[Nile577]

Brilliant post. Correct me if I'm wrong but are the " - " 's in "in-the-world" to contrast against "IN 'the-world'"?

"In-the-world" is hyphenated to draw attention to the nature of the dwelling. That is, dasein is not a subject located inside a world; human BEING IS being-in-the-world. (I lean towards writing "inn" as a signification of dwelling-amdist, rather than being located at a coordinate within).

 

[kmik]

OK, I understand. But what is the difference between "IS being-in-the-world" to "IS in-the-world"? (You say thinking IS in-the-world but human BEING IS being-in-the-world)

 

[Nile577]

OK, I understand. But what is the difference between "IS being-in-the-world" to "IS in-the-world"? (You say thinking IS in-the-world but human BEING IS being-in-the-world)

Thinking is founded upon (and equi-primordially bound up with) human Being (dasein) as being-in-the-world. Hence thinking IS in-the-world as an existential mode of dasein's being-in-the-world. "Thinking" as an analytic cognitive act might be thought of as an existentiell mode of dasein.

In writing "human Being IS being-in-the-world" one draws attention to the often overlooked word "being" in "human being," and situates that being as dwelling "in-the-world." One tries to emphasise the "flavour" of human being as distinct from and disclosive of present-to-hand being or ready-to-hand being.

(That's not very clear I realise. Perhaps Justin might do better than I can).

 

[Justin S.]

Thinking is founded upon (and equi-primordially bound up with) human Being (dasein) as being-in-the-world. Hence thinking IS in-the-world as an existential mode of dasein's being-in-the-world. "Thinking" as an analytic cognitive act might be thought of as an existentiell mode of dasein.

In writing "human Being IS being-in-the-world" one draws attention to the often overlooked word "being" in "human being," and situates that being as dwelling "in-the-world." One tries to emphasise the "flavour" of human being as distinct from and disclosive of present-to-hand being or ready-to-hand being.

(That's not very clear I realise. Perhaps Justin might do better than I can).

This is very difficult ground.

First, a quick "formal" matter. I am uneasy with the capitalization of "being". Heidegger says being is always the being of a being. When, in English, we render "Sein" as "Being" I think we run the risk of substantivizing it, of "being" becoming cloaked in an aura of the "meta" (especially through repetition), of something abstract and unusual (in an inappropriate sense). Sein does not have these connotations in German, partly because all nouns are capitalized in the language.

When Heidegger "hyphenates" an expression or word, it is usually to either call attention to some important aspect of it (that is often overlooked in our day to day usage), or to attempt to reflect its unification in the very act of signification. Sometimes, it is the work of the editor/translator, another reason to be very careful with translations (one example I have run across is "be-ing" for "Seyn", which is very makeshift, to say the least).

In Being and Time, H. has this to say about being-in-the-world, the "fundamental constitution of Da-sein":
"The compound expression "being-in-the-world" indicates, in the very way we have coined it, that it stands for a unified phenomenon. This primary datum must be seen as a whole...'In' stems from innan-, to live, habitare, to dwell."

As we can see, Nile577's account here is basically right. Dwelling, amidst, inn, all "capture" elements of the relation spoken of in In-der-Welt-sein.

As far as "thought" or thinking goes, I'm not convinced we know just what this is. In any case, science (and especially scientism) is of no use for this task. I won't attempt to "justify" this here as, if our speech humiliates our thoughts, they are utterly raped on UM.

 

[Nile577]

This is very difficult ground.

First, a quick "formal" matter. I am uneasy with the capitalization of "being". Heidegger says being is always the being of a being. When, in English, we render "Sein" as "Being" I think we run the risk of substantivizing it, of "being" becoming cloaked in an aura of the "meta" (especially through repetition), of something abstract and unusual (in an inappropriate sense). Sein does not have these connotations in German, partly because all nouns are capitalized in the language.

I think you raise an important point. Maybe I'm wrong. The only reason I capitalised "human Being" was to draw attention to the "Being" (i.e. "human being" as suggestive of a way of being as opposed to an empirical subject). Perhaps I would not otherwise capitalise it here.

"Heidegger says being is always the being of a being." - This is interesting though. I think in Being and Time Heidegger argues that whereas traditional ontological enquiries are conducted into the being of entities, he will attempt an enquiry into the being of Being itself.

"Being cannot indeed be conceived as an entity; nor can it acquire such a character as to have the term "entity" applied to it. "Being" cannot be derived from higher concepts by definition, nor can it be presented through lower ones. But does this imply that Being no longer offers a problem? Not at all. We can infer only that "Being" cannot have the character of an entity. Thus we cannot apply to Being the concept of 'definition' as presented in traditional logic, which itself has its foundations in ancient ontology and which, within certain limits, provides a quite justifiable way of defining 'entities.' The indefinability of Being does not eliminate the question of its meaning; it demands that we look that question in the face." - Page 23 of the Macquarrie translation, page 4 of Being and Time.

(Do you have the Stambaugh translation? How does it render this passage?)

Isn't Heidegger's "method" of enquiry (outlined in the very difficult second introduction) essentially a reformulation of phenomenology? That is, rather than have phenomena arise within an Husserlian transcendental consciousness, Heidegger proposes that "consciousness" is already in-the-world (and itself a misunderstood abstraction from Dasein). Hence our enquiry too must begin in-the-world and the ontological status (dwelling) of the enquirer should not be overlooked. He proposes that as the enquiry into Being has Dasein as its enquirer - that is, the enquiry in itself is in-the-world - we might proceed with a hermeneutic method, whereby the status of the enquirer is bound up with, influenced by and an influence to the enquiry.

My understanding of the methodology is that the enquiry seeks to reveal the phenomenon of phenomena. That is: to understand how phenomena show themselves as phenomena. This would provide access to Being (ontological understanding) distinct from the being of entities (ontic understanding).

I quite empathize with the dangers of "Being" becoming a 'meta' term. I think later Heidegger came to see this problem too. He would write Being with a line drawn through it (Derrida would call this "writing under erasure") to draw attention to the fact that Being was not some kind of situational oasis of being, or solid present-to-hand thing.

another reason to be very careful with translations (one example I have run across is "be-ing" for "Seyn", which is very makeshift, to say the least).

I think this arose from the controversial Emad and Maly translation of Contributions to Philosophy. I'm not quite so hostile to it though. "be-ing" is supposed to suggest a non-metaphysical understanding of "being," grasped by the "turn" in Heidegger's thinking which leads us from hermeneutic phenomenology to be-ing-historical thinking.

(In noticing the confusion with capitalisations of "Being" I think there ought to be convention that one allow Heidegger to dictate capitalisation ahead of standard grammatical usage. That is a new sentence should begin with the desired non-capitalisation of "being," rather than use "Being" erroneously).

In Being and Time, H. has this to say about being-in-the-world, the "fundamental constitution of Da-sein":
"The compound expression "being-in-the-world" indicates, in the very way we have coined it, that it stands for a unified phenomenon. This primary datum must be seen as a whole...'In' stems from innan-, to live, habitare, to dwell."

As we can see, Nile577's account here is basically right. Dwelling, amidst, inn, all "capture" elements of the relation spoken of in In-der-Welt-Sein.

The Macquarrie translation uses "alongside-the-world," which I think is a terrible translation. It is suggestive of a completely misleading subject/object divide.

 

[kmik]

hehe, you two I will try to ask it another way: is it correct to say that thinking IS being-in-the-world or that human being is in-the-world?

"human Being" would be the ontological Being of man. If the ontological Being of a hammer is disclosed through care - for example being-towards-hammering-a-nail (?) then it is not clear how human Being is disclosed, but in any event, it is technically akin to the "meaning of life", isn't it? Because something cannot disclose itself.

You say that Being is not entity (thus it can't be alongside-the-world because then we have relations between the world and Being like between two regular entities) and it's also not a property so it's not a property of the world, and yet you somehow suggest a relation between the world and Being which I simply cannot understand. I mean I can understand the "IS" of in-the-world (at least I think I can do in the same sense than I think I can understand death ontologically and not merely as the decay of an organism), but some entity can also be-in-the-world. i.e my computer is in-the-world (because all entities are in-the-world). So even though Being is not an entity, it still has a relation to the world that is similar to that of an entity and I don't understand that.

 

[kmik]

"being is always the being of a being" - so all beings are the beings of an entity? Does this go on indefinitely? i.e the being of the being of being of some being (the meaning of the meaning of life)?

 

[Justin S.]

Firstly, I apologize to speed for using his thread to discuss matters concerning Heidegger. Blame Nile577, who I'm sure initiated it out of sheer spite (apparently, he somehow didn't absorb his homeland's famous etiquette).

Secondly, I may have, humorously enough, introduced confusion through some sloppy capitalization! Quickly, I will attempt to clarify this. "sein" is the German verb that functions like "to be". When it takes the form of a noun (as in "Being" and Time) it is capitalized (as all German nouns) often with an article as "Das Sein". However, translating this as "Being" is, strictly speaking, not appropriate for the reasons I listed above. Capitalization in German does not have the connotations that it has in English. Furthermore, the way "sein" is conjugated allows immediate recognition of the different terms. For example, the English translation, "being means the being of a being" is awkward, abstract, and likely to cause confusion due to repetition of the same signifier, but with radically different referents. In German, "a being" is "Seiende", "Seiendes", and so on. Thus, the meaning of the sentence, "Sein von Seiendem" is quite clear, in terms of the formal structure.

"Being cannot indeed be conceived as an entity; nor can it acquire such a character as to have the term "entity" applied to it. "Being" cannot be derived from higher concepts by definition, nor can it be presented through lower ones. But does this imply that Being no longer offers a problem? Not at all. We can infer only that "Being" cannot have the character of an entity. Thus we cannot apply to Being the concept of 'definition' as presented in traditional logic, which itself has its foundations in ancient ontology and which, within certain limits, provides a quite justifiable way of defining 'entities.' The indefinability of Being does not eliminate the question of its meaning; it demands that we look that question in the face." - Page 23 of the Macquarrie translation, page 4 of Being and Time.

(Do you have the Stambaugh translation? How does it render this passage?)

I think there are many problems with that translation. An example is the introduction of "entity" as a translation of "a being". This is done to aid "readability" but it is far too formal, imports the very ontological concept under question (i.e., beings are not mere "entities"), and obscures the important (and fluid) connection of sein and Seiende. Below are excerpts of that passage from Stambaugh's translation, followed by excerpts from the 6th ed. German:
"Indeed, 'being' cannot be understood as a being...'Being' cannot be defined by attributing beings to it. Being cannot be derived from higher concepts by way of definition and cannot be represented by lower ones. But does it follow from this that "being" can no longer constitute a problem? Not at all. We can conclude only that "being" is not something like a being."

"Sein" kann in der Tat nicht als Seiendes begriffen werden...Aber folgt hieraus, dass "Sein" kein Problem mehr bieten kann? Mitnichten; gefolgert kann nur werden: "Sein" ist nicht so etwas wie Seiendes."

"Heidegger says being is always the being of a being." - This is interesting though. I think in Being and Time Heidegger argues that whereas traditional ontological enquiries are conducted into the being of entities, he will attempt an enquiry into the being of Being itself.

From the Stambaugh translation (p6-7 Sein und Zeit):
"What is asked about in the question to be elaborated is being, that which determines beings as beings, that in terms of which beings have always been understood no matter how they are discussed. The being of beings "is" itself not a being...Insofar as being constitutes what is asked about, and insofar as being means the being of beings, beings themselves turn out to be what is interrogated in the question of being. Beings are, so to speak, interrogated with regard to their being." (bold emphasis added)

The above second to last line in the German:
"Sofern das Sein das Gefragte ausmacht, und Sein besagt Sein von Seiendem, ergibt sich als das Befragte der Seinsfrage das Seiende selbst." (bold emphasis added)

Only beings can "be". "Being" (Sein) cannot be spoken of as a "being" (Seiende) so, to be precise, I disagree that his enquiry is into the "being of Being". Rather, he is interrogating beings with respect to their being in order to gain access to the Sinn von Sein ("sense of being") that remains unasked and obscure in our everyday understanding. The being that is to be interrogated in the pursuit of the Seinsfrage ("question of being") is the very being that is interrogating--Dasein.

 

[Nile577]

I would like to second the apology to speed.

Justin,

Thanks for providing the Stambaugh translations (and originals too!)

...he will attempt an enquiry into the being of Being itself.

This was a fantastically ill-considered phrase on my part. It is entirely confused and unhelpful. I think you were quite justified to disagree with it. I don't know what I can have been thinking to have written such dreck! I admire the thoughtful and revealing "terminology" of your reply.

That said, I disagree about the merits of writing "Being" with a capital 'B.' I think there are several places in Heidegger's writings where he hints (albeit inconsistently) at a bound-up-difference between Being and being. This most notably occurs in his discussion of Rilke's "Globe of Being" (the image of a globe or disc having a light, visible side (world) and a dark, veiled side (earth))and in "On the Question of Being"

The B/being divide only comes to mindful fruition in his later writings. If we wish to understand Heidegger fully we must understand the turn in his thinking and yet stress continuity between Being and Time and these later works. This task necessitates thoughtful and painstaking enquiry into the ambiguities of B/being.

Julian Young's book is good for the above. He says Being should be capitalised; other critics do not capitalise it.

 

[Nile577]

Perhaps unwisely I feel the need to add a disclaimer to the above. I am very aware that the previous post will appear farcical and even openly risible to many people here. I would not claim a full understanding of Heidegger myself, and to explain the “fourfold” and his later thinking in depth would require a book. . It seems quite absurd to toss around such phraseology in the wake of my disastrous confusion so adeptly exposed above by Justin.

If anyone wishes to approach such difficult ground I cannot recommend Julian Young’s “Heidegger’s Later Philosophy” enough. It provides a very manageable (120 page) “introduction” to some key concerns.


(Later note: Reading this back, years later, I'm glad I did study it academically as it allowed me to gain some much needed distance and come to understand that there are serious problems with areas of Heidegger's thinking, including very dubious political resonances that I missed at first (not to mention outright skin-crawling passages in some of his seminars, which I had not yet read). It was a worthwhile undertaking because back when I posted here I sounded more like a discipline of Heidegger than anything else (hence the insufferable tone). Heidegger's Nazism is too much sidestepped by Dreyfus. These days I agree with Critchley: that we should be 'with Heidegger; against Heidegger.')

 

[kmik]

Look. I understand you have deep feelings towards the philosophy of Heidegger and that questions from "non-Heideggerians" piss you off even more than, say, a creationist would piss me off. I for one can tell you that I try to read those posts about Heidegger almost religiously and that I am very interested in the subject. I'm of course no philosophy student and much younger than you, but I tried to read Being and Time (understood nothing) and I'm slowly going through Dreyfus' lectures. The little I did understand about that has to me been fascinating. Now if someone's questions are too board, stupid, have already been answered, or whatever you can say that but ignoring others like that is simply annoying. You do not have to share your knowledge with anyone, especially not on an internet forum, but at the very least you can give some sort of response, even "I don't feel like answering". Thanks

 

[Nile577]

Oi! I wasn't ignoring you, and no, questions don't annoy me at all, though it is strange indeed to be placed in a position of authority when still a beginner There are a limited number of minutes a day I can spend here! I must shelve books, serve people, wash dishes, man gas stations, circulate quadrupeds and pursue similar continentual-philosophy-friendly activities.

Also: i'm not really a philosophy student and have no qualifications in "Philosophy."

Your question is very broad and I don't have the time right now - or perhaps the desire - to try and summarize "On what is called thinking" (which I would direct you to). In any case I am no expert and probably lack the ability to answer you fully.

"Thinking" as detached, rational, subject/object cognition is an ontic mode of dasein's being-in-the-world and as such (tentatively and imo) should not be equated with being-in-the-world. Detatched "thinking" is founded upon being-in-the-world, although only comes to pass when the worldhood of the world falls away - i.e. the doorknob doesn't work and dasein is merely-being-towards-contemplating the doorknob as occurent). "Thinking" IS still in-the-world, but dasein's dwelling is impoverished as the worldhood of the world is obscured. When dasein is most "unravelled" from the "equipmental nexus" of the world, cognitive-analytic thoughts emerge.

To speak of mindful thinking is a very difficult undertaking and, unless someone else will venture an offering, I will need considerable reading time to formulate a careful response.

 

[Nile577]

I tried to read Being and Time (understood nothing)

I am reading it carefully for the second time at present. I am about 150 pages through the Macquarrie translation. I think I shall start a thread and share my notes/thoughts (however imperfect and confused they are) with a view to deepening my own understanding in the undertaking.

(This should also prevent outbreaks of "Heidegger jargon" in other threads).

Again, far from being an expert, I am very much in the process of discovering Heidegger. Those with deeper understanding will speak with more authority and probably find my musings naive.

 

[Justin S.]

kmik,

I certainly wasn't ignoring your questions, and in fact fashioned my posts in a way that (I hoped) would address both you and Nile577. I believe that my last somewhat lengthy post can help bring some clarity to the issue of ontological difference (the difference between "being" and beings; see the brief analysis of the German above).

Being and Time is a difficult work, one that assumes a background in philosophy. However, much can be learned without such an acquaintance. I would not necessarily recommend this work for those beginning to read Heidegger and who lack such a background in philosophy, as it is his most "systematic" and, in many ways, most "abstract" text. However, if one were determined to read it in English, I highly recommend the Stambaugh translation as it is much easier to read as a consequence of its faithfulness to the German language (the Macquarrie translation is much more rigid, "over-handled", confusing, and liberal in its rendering).

 

[Murphy]

Both of the english versions of Being and Time as well as the original and ten other books on Heidegger are availiable in pdf-format for download from different torrent sites under the name: Heidegger A Starting - Survival Kit.

If anyone wants I can send it to them as well.

 

[Justin S.]

That said, I disagree about the merits of writing "Being" with a capital 'B.' I think there are several places in Heidegger's writings where he hints (albeit inconsistently) at a bound-up-difference between Being and being. This most notably occurs in his discussion of Rilke's "Globe of Being" (the image of a globe or disc having a light, visible side (world) and a dark, veiled side (earth))and in "On the Question of Being"

The B/being divide only comes to mindful fruition in his later writings. If we wish to understand Heidegger fully we must understand the turn in his thinking and yet stress continuity between Being and Time and these later works. This task necessitates thoughtful and painstaking enquiry into the ambiguities of B/being.

Your concerns are well taken, but it seems a part of this issue is, at heart, one of specifically English translation. Not to ankle-bite you further, but Heidegger was not dealing with any "b"s whatsoever, so I would need to consult the German to witness the development and transformation of "Sein". That said, I think you have successfully intimated many important matters at stake in later Heidegger. However, I cannot comment on them at this time. I have postponed my reading of much of his later works until I can truly engage them, rather than interpretations produced through the mediation of a "translator".

 

[kmik]

OK, that was good to know. I sensed some vague Heideggerian snobbery but I guess that only has to do with being completely incomprehensible! Well, good luck with your thesis (I guess in it's literature, then). Still unable to understand anything you said there (it's very surprising to learn it's related to my questions ), but I'm tired now so I'll try again tomorrow. The other question however which seems to me more concrete - at least a yes/no would suffice - is Dasein technically the "meaning of life"? Thanks

 

[kmik]

Oh and Murphy if you upload that thing I'd be very glad cuz I have the other translation (also stolen)