Dakryn's Batshit Theory of the Week

I have to apologize for, and rectify, some earlier statements I made about Marx and feudalism. My knowledge of Marx comes from the first volume of Capital and parts of his Grundrisse; but in my studies I recently came across this passage from The Communist Manifesto:

The bourgeosie, wherever it has got the upper hand, has put an end to all feudal, patriarchal, idyllic relations. It has pitilessly torn asunder the motley feudal ties that bound man to his 'natural superiors', and has left remaining no other nexus between man and man than naked self-interest, than callous 'cash-payment'. It has drowned most heavenly ecstasies of religious fervor, of chivalrous enthusiasm, of philistine sentimentalism, in the icy water of egotistical calculation. It has resolved personal worth into exchange value, and in place of the numberless indefeasible chartered freedoms, has set up that single, unconscionable freedom - Free Trade.

Even if the admiration of feudalism that he declares here is nothing more than nostalgic, it smacks of naive idealism. The quotation marks he puts around 'natural superiors' confuses me to no end, and I can only conclude that he acknowledges the artificial nature of feudal ties at the same time that he wishes they were real. This passage has really perplexed me. It doesn't change any of my own views on feudalism; but it seriously throws my understanding of Marx's views on feudalism into question.

It's statements like this that drive me away from Marx toward thinkers like Foucault or Habermas.
 
It is my understanding/experience that your average intellectual considers himself a "natural superior". How this manifested in Marx was anger at mechanisms that both equalized and measured, often completely aside from "intellectual acuity". It was no doubt a source of constant irritation for Marx that he did not have the "unlimited wealth" at his disposal that he imagined merely appeared through no legitimate process (read: because of inheritance/intellect) in the accounts of "capitalists", when obviously he was a 'natural superior'.

Free trade is merely a facet of free association. To say free association is unconscionable kind of undermines the entire Utopian side of communistic theory, and lends itself more to Sovietism.
 
Sanchez on Crusoe Economics

This isn't Rothbard's more concise and exhaustive version but is still a long read. I know you (Pat) had seemed to misunderstand what Crusoe indicated. Crusoe economics merely indicates that we are dealing with a single individual, isolated (to begin with). Once everything has been established regarding the actions and logic of the lone individual, we can introduce more factors in (other individuals).
 
Human action, not human psychology (thought). Praxeology is not concerned with the individual thought processes and individual subjective valuations.

The only kind of preference praxeology is concerned with is demonstrated preference: preferences demonstrated by action, not merely expressed in speech or considered in reflective thought.

For example, Crusoe might prefer not to be stranded on an island at all. He may prefer to be magically whisked back home. But as long as this preference has no bearing on action, it is not an object of praxeology.

Psychology would be concerned with what causes the specific valuations. This article really does a good job of covering all the basic bases like value scales, time preference, and psychic yield.

Profit, in a broader sense, is the gain derived from action; it is the increase in satisfaction (decrease in uneasiness) brought about; it is the difference between the higher value attached to the result attained and the lower value attached to the sacrifices made for its attainment; it, in other words, yield minus costs. To make profit is invariably the aim sought by any action. If an action fails to attain the ends sought, yield either does not exceed costs or lags behind costs. In the latter case the outcome means a loss, a decrease in satisfaction.

Profit and loss in this original sense are psychic phenomena and as such not open to measurement and a mode of expression which could convey to other people precise information concerning their intensity. A man can tell a fellow man that a suits him better than b; but he cannot communicate to another man, except in vague and indistinct terms, how much the satisfaction derived from a exceeds that derived from b.
 
Then praxeology discounts any psychic trauma that may result from human action, and this could very well be what China Miéville means when he says that capitalism results in repression.

Praxeology can say it only concerns itself with action; but by doing so, it amounts to claiming that "correct" human psychology should conform to the most efficient economic action. Any human psychic apparatus that does not do so is flawed; or diseased, upset, insane, etc. There must ultimately be a correlation between action and thought, otherwise human agents that pursue such action will suffer psychological consequences.
 
That would require making a value judgement re: "efficiency". There is of course a correlation between action and thought, and one who is insane may have an "odd" value scale (like axe-murdering as many people as possible bringing the greatest psychic value), or may be incapable to some degree of formulating a proper course of action to bring about desired future ends. These are not challenges at all.

Repression is too vague a word to be useful in this context, and I think you might need to expand on how psychic trauma is discounted (and whether you mean trauma for others or the actor). Either way, I don't see how this changes the underlying [truths] of subjective values and differences in time preference.
 
I just not convinced by this.

As soon as you introduce multiple agents into the field you have competing interests; physical and psychical. A lone "Crusoe" on an isolated island doesn't give us an apt framework that we can transpose into a populated society. It will never function.

Praxeology examines specific conditions and the actions that correspond to such conditions. Human thought is another matter, it claims. But if action must always correspond to condition, then this also demands that thought correspond, which is of course not the case. It demands a one-to-one direct relationship between thought and conditions. Essentially, it tells us that one must be mentally sound in order to operate efficiently under economic conditions; anyone who doesn't operate functionally is thus defined as aberrant.

An isolated individual who was sunburning his back on this hypothetical island but didn't turn over would be classified as mentally unsound. On the most basic level this seems radical and inconsequential; but if there are multiple actors in play, then the situation becomes infinitely more complicated. Praxeology/Crusoe economics can't really tell us anything useful about a complex economic society.

Repression isn't my term, Miéville used it. But it certainly seems that the economic system you're describing demands its practitioners to repress any thought that doesn't correspond to the proper economic action.
 
I'm not really sure what your contention is, at least as far as subjective value scales and differences in time preferences go. Are you saying that these things do not exist or are you saying something else?

Re: "complex economic society", starting from the ground up/square one is the only way to make meaningful sense of the phenomena we see around us. As we add in actors and factors, these will have an effect on the already constantly fluctuating (actionable) value scales and time preferences of the other actors.

As far as requiring people to exhibit certain behaviors and repress others for material success, this is not posited as an ideal but as fact. An example would be, all other things equal, exhibiting a lower time preference.
 
Crusoe might be annoyed by a splinter in his hand, and this uneasiness may inspire him to remove the splinter. Or he may enjoy the pain, and choose to leave it in his hand. This doesn't have much consequence for a single individual, other than Crusoe's death (which is his own problem).

In a society of multiples, Crusoe's choice to leave the splinter in his hand can affect his society in an infinite number of ways. If he chose to follow praxeological economic law and remove the splinter, then everything would work out fine; but human beings don't necessarily function that way.

It just seems to me that in praxeology human thought and consciousness is reducible to economic action, which I don't agree with.
 
Crusoe might be annoyed by a splinter in his hand, and this uneasiness may inspire him to remove the splinter. Or he may enjoy the pain, and choose to leave it in his hand. This doesn't have much consequence for a single individual, other than Crusoe's death (which is his own problem).

In a society of multiples, Crusoe's choice to leave the splinter in his hand can affect his society in an infinite number of ways. If he chose to follow praxeological economic law and remove the splinter, then everything would work out fine; but human beings don't necessarily function that way.

It just seems to me that in praxeology human thought and consciousness is reducible to economic action, which I don't agree with.

Ok, I think I see where the disconnect is. Whether or not Crusoe removes the splinter, he is merely demonstrating a subjective value scale. In one set of scales, removing the splinter is #1. In the second set, it is lower on the list if on it at all. Of course if Crusoe leaves it in and winds up dying from infection, this can either illustrate that he achieved the #1 end on his scale (death or merely the pain from the splinter), and that if death weren't his ultimate objective he made a miscalculation, which happens with imperfect beings/imperfect information.

Of course in a society, the ripple effects of violence and or death are far greater than a stranded man on an island (although the stranding itself would have similar effects, and were the body to eventually be recovered we are really talking about the same thing). To use current events for example:

The Chiefs linebacker that committed a murder suicide is an example of where achievement and prosperity took a lower position on his value scale than the death of his girlfriend and subsequently himself. The incident would have been bad enough, but they left a child behind. Regardless of the reasons for his selection of these #1/2 values , the action has now caused extensive ripples. The family has to now account for the care and well being of the child, and thusly their value scales must adjust. Chiefs players (and maybe others) are collecting money for a fund to provide for the orphan. The Chiefs organization must now fill a hole in the roster immediately and looking into the future. The child herself will most likely have lifelong impacts on her value scales due to orphan status + the manner in which she lost her parents.

The action undertaken by the linebacker was not "economic" in the sense where a purchase was made, but by eradicating the unease in violent manner has shifted value scales of all others left behind that will have both psychic and economic implications. Obviously for himself/the girlfriend, their monetary activity has objectively ceased. This economic theory recognizes that not everything is reducible to "dollars and cents", and that there is a psychic factor to consider, it just does not make value statements on them. While violence and destruction reduces productivity/wealth, it cannot say this is [bad]. It merely is what it is.
 
Oh. I'm sorry, then what exactly does it tell us? It doesn't seem to do much other than observe hypothetical action; in the case of Sanchez's article, it's a hypothetical argument very much in favor of the conclusions he wants to draw. But it just seems to me like a continual appeal to "common sense" action.

If it's simple observation of human action and theorizing on those actions, then it must apply to all individuals. Does this argument apply to a "wild" individual? Does it apply equally to someone who has not been socialized and to someone who has been exposed to culture and then isolated?
 
Oh. I'm sorry, then what exactly does it tell us? It doesn't seem to do much other than observe hypothetical action; in the case of Sanchez's article, it's a hypothetical argument very much in favor of the conclusions he wants to draw. But it just seems to me like a continual appeal to common sense action.

If it's simple observation of human action and theorizing on those actions, then it must apply to all individuals. Does this argument apply to a "wild" individual? Does it apply equally to someone who has not been socialized and to someone who has been exposed to culture and then isolated?

Socialization would have an effect on the value scale, it wouldn't create it. Dipping into the philosophical trash barrel for some amusement, let us utilize the "noble savage" for this example. Prior to contact with "civilization", the noble savage's value scale population was limited to only good and wholesome concerns like family time and sharing and maintaining peace. Upon "advancement" or contact, now the value scales have been sullied with the entrance of material desires, particularly if they take the top positions.

Establishing subjective value scales is tremendously important (and something, for example, Marx and Smith either did not consider or rejected). It does much to explain demand side of price calculation. It is intertwined with the scarcity principle, since not only are commodities limited in a finite world, so is our time and energy.

There are elements in Crusoe's environment that contribute to his welfare but which are not now scarce with regard to his ends. Nonscarcity is also called "superabundance."

For example, the air he breathes contributes to his welfare. But it is immediately available to him in such abundance that he does not need to take any action with regard to it.

However, this was not the case an hour ago, when, immediately after his shipwreck, he was drowning. At that time, air was not abundant. It was scarce. So he had to take action with regard to it. He had to purposefully swim to the surface of the water and take hold of a piece of flotsam in order to get air. At that time air was an object of action.

But now on the island, air is superabundant (nonscarce), and so it requires no action. Therefore, it is not a means (good). Superabundant things are "not the object of any action. They are general conditions of human welfare."[15]

However, Crusoe's personal energy and time are scarce, and therefore they are means (goods) and objects of human action.

Means are necessarily always limited, i.e., scarce with regard to the services for which man wants to use them. If this were not the case, there would not be any action with regard to them. Where man is not restrained by the insufficient quantity of things available, there is no need for any action.[16]

Is is also key in dispensing with the myth that for every transaction there must be a winner and a loser. In a voluntary trade (or sale/purchase), both participants are exhibiting different value scales. When you purchase a CD for $10, you are demonstrating a variety of scales, one of which is that to you, the CD is worth equal to or more than $10. To the seller, the CD is worth equal to or less than $10. By making the purchase you are also demonstrating at that moment it is the highest thing on your actionable value scale. Once the purchase is done, not only does it fall off the value scale, you would not consider purchasing a 2nd identical CD for the same price, even though objectively it is the same thing, for the same reason the seller does not mind parting with his or her stock. I forget the terminology for this but Rothbard goes into this extensively (as I'm sure others do, I just haven't gotten around to reading it).
 
I'm not completely comprehending your responses, but it's probably because I'm asking the wrong questions. This analysis of human action seems, at its most basic level, to be nothing more than an observational strategy. Absent any social value, action must be evaluated purely on what it loses or gains. This is basic survival-existence evaluation - the human as an animal, absent any value judgments.

I don't know how to make the leap from here. Sanchez handles the human animal's responses in a kind of "common-sense" manner, meaning that there appear to be a hierarchy of responses, those at the top being the most "normal." He's avoiding value judgments, but there is an implied sense that animals act in behaviorally predictable ways, and human animals will act in similar (if not the same) ways. That's making an implicit value judgment.

That's the faulty premise of Daniel Defoe's Robinson Crusoe (I know Crusoe economics isn't completely analogous, but I think the premise is). Defoe establishes a kind of "blank slate" situation; we called it a "reset button" today in class. He wants to try and build a successful, sturdy socio-economic system from the ground up, starting with one individual, prior to any societal system of evaluation. But Crusoe is already a social being; even Defoe's placement of his hero, his representation of the situation, is already evaluative. The same applies to Crusoe economics.
 
Is indicating that "normative" (respective to the situation), or survivalist responses will be most likely to occupy the upper tiers of a value scale making a value judgement, or merely a nod to reality?

My examples were an attempt to tie in subjective value scales to what you might more easily understand as economic situations.

You are correct regarding the specifics of Dafoe's Crusoe. Crusoe already possessed information and experience that affected his value scales which in turn had an effect on his actions, although relative to his ability to manipulative the island environment. Regardless of whether Crusoe washed up on the beach, or a Gen Y-er, the value scales will still exist, even if they look and manifest differently.
 
Is indicating that "normative" (respective to the situation), or survivalist responses will be most likely to occupy the upper tiers of a value scale making a value judgement, or merely a nod to reality?

It might appeal to a certain correlation between behavioral activity and material conditions; but it's also placing value in the correlation, since it's assuming a baseline normativity to such action. In order to assert that there is a common-sense form of behavior, and that this behavior more often than not corresponds to the conditions in which it occurs, is to make a value judgment. This goes all the way back to Hume; correlation does not imply causation. In order to pursue this line of thinking, we have to place a value upon correlation in order to assume causation. This is why I'm wary of this system that claims to circumvent psychic functions; it actually doesn't circumvent them, it implicitly establishes them.
 
It might appeal to a certain correlation between behavioral activity and material conditions; but it's also placing value in the correlation, since it's assuming a baseline normativity to such action. In order to assert that there is a common-sense form of behavior, and that this behavior more often than not corresponds to the conditions in which it occurs, is to make a value judgment. This goes all the way back to Hume; correlation does not imply causation. In order to pursue this line of thinking, we have to place a value upon correlation in order to assume causation. This is why I'm wary of this system that claims to circumvent psychic functions; it actually doesn't circumvent them, it implicitly establishes them.

I think you're placing too much emphasis on the specifics of an example meant to demonstrate generalities. Absolutely anything can fill the value scale. I could conjur numerous scenarios on the island involving slashers, zombies, and axe murderers to demonstrate the subjective value scale point. What would also be demonstrated is that while the time spent trying to kill each other or eat brains might bring the greatest psychic satisfaction to the inhabitants in this horror film, there will be little material progress on the island (in the sense of infrastructure, etc).