Dakryn's Batshit Theory of the Week

I was shocked to find that Land actually has a bit of a soft spot for the crazy Slovenian! This is, actually, a very interesting piece, and also achieves a great deal toward situating Žižek's work in relation to Derrida's (something that he has, as far I know, failed to do until now). I find his comparison of différance (one of Derrida's most important concepts) and parallax (one of Žižek's primary concepts, expanded in his book The Parallax View) to be very convincing, albeit overdue.

I'm not sure what Land's fascination with Žižek is, but I'm happy to see that he isn't entirely dismissive of the "radical Left" (a moniker and movement that it seems Žižek is becoming somewhat fed up with).

At any rate, as far as materialist philosophy goes, Žižek's work has much to offer; what he's explicating above is very closely related (as far as I can tell) to Land's own libidinal materialism/economy.

EDIT: and, just for clarity's sake, the psychoanalytic reading that he presents above has been his driving analysis for years now, at least since he published his first book in English. It's not anything new.
 
I actually commented on Outside In about this, but I do not correlate Žižek's work with Žižek the person. He's published so much fucking material, and he's such a repository of information, that it was only a matter of time before something left his desk that was plagiarized.

Furthermore, it doesn't really surprise me considering his history of admitted false reviews (of films he never actually watched) and pseudo-theory (basically making shit up). He's even published critical reviews of his own texts under pseudonyms! I do not consider the body of text that bears his name to have been produced by an atomic individual, since I do not associate him with only one theoretical form, nor do I even know if I should be taking what he writes seriously anymore.

Beyond The Sublime Object of Ideology, Less Than Nothing, and a few other disparate works (everyone disagrees on which Žižek texts are actually worth reading), I find many of his books to be excessive and superfluous.
 
I find many of his books to be excessive and superfluous.

keevec.jpg
 
http://bastiat.mises.org/2014/07/academic-fraud-and-the-peer-review-process/

This incident should not be surprising, however. Knowledge that the peer review process is gravely flawed and easily abused is well known. Richard Smith, the former editor of the respected British Medical Journal (BMJ), the Journal of the Royal Society of Medicine, characterized the “classic” peer review system as follows:

"The editor looks at the title of the paper and sends it to two friends whom the editor thinks know something about the subject. If both advise publication the editor sends it to the printers. If both advise against publication the editor rejects the paper. If the reviewers disagree the editor sends it to a third reviewer and does whatever he or she advises. This pastiche—which is not far from systems I have seen used—is little better than tossing a coin,"

But one would think that peer review would at least be useful for detecting fraud and major error. Not so, says Smith:

"Peer review might also be useful for detecting errors or fraud. At the BMJ we did several studies where we inserted major errors into papers that we then sent to many reviewers. Nobody ever spotted all of the errors. Some reviewers did not spot any, and most reviewers spotted only about a quarter. Peer review sometimes picks up fraud by chance, but generally it is not a reliable method for detecting fraud because it works on trust."

Now if this is the case in a “hard science” like medical research whose experimental results can, at least in principle be checked, imagine the situation in an social science like economics where controlled experiments are impossible and most “researchers” have strong ideological predispositions. Smith concludes that, despite its many defects, the peer review process

"is likely to remain central to science and journals because there is no obvious alternative, and scientists and editors have a continuing belief in peer review. How odd that science should be rooted in belief."

Certainly we should rethink the public funding of an institution that depends so heavily on such a defective process for discovering scientific truth.

Pat I know you have stood behind the PR process before, for the practical reason given at the end if for no other reason. I know "some are better than others", but BMJ isn't exactly PLoS, and if a former editor characterizes the general process that way....
 

I've always maintained that opinion.

Regarding peer review: Smith's argument doesn't call for the entire dismantling of the peer review system. It claims that the system is flawed, which of course is true; and I've never said otherwise.

The problem is that if we want to ensure a certain level of quality, peer review remains one of the best ways to do so. Only a panel of one's peers, familiar with a certain scholarly field, are able to adequately judge whether or not an essay engages successfully and capably with its fellow academic contributors.

Will we run into bureaucracy and politics? I'm certain. But I still believe, in general, that peer review works, and many scholars do continue to believe in it because - despite these occasional hiccups - it in fact does work.
 

Here's an interesting response to this:

http://www.rifters.com/crawl/?p=4987

I have other reservations. Prior to flipping the switch, Koubeissi et al got their patient to start repeating the word “house”, and to snap her fingers. They did this, we are told, to ensure that it really was consciousness that was being interrupted— that those milliamps hadn’t just induced some kind of motor paralysis that stilled the body even though the mind was active. K et al‘s reasoning was that paralysis would kick in instantly when the current hit; the fact that the speech and the finger-snaps trailed off gradually is supposed to take the paralysis confound off the table.

Yet there’s nothing in the paper to explain why this “off switch” couldn’t also activate instantaneously (once again, I cite my rock to the head). It seems a significant omission in the rationale, especially given that this “switch” has never been documented before. Besides, if the results had hailed from a conscious-but-paralyzed individual, wouldn’t she have been able to report as much after the fact?
 
Re: earlier points made on emergence, I have something that I've only recently come to formulate.

The back and forth on this thread, it appears to me, is over the possibility that an assemblage might amount to more than the sum of its parts versus the impossibility of this phenomenon. In the latter's view, the appearance of emergence (this perspective might even say "illusion") merely derives from our current inability to properly assess and understand all the working parts; but, provided that we could achieve such a complete understanding, all systems could be successfully reduced to their individual components.

I believe that the latter argument derives from a misinterpretation or misunderstanding of what exactly emergence entails. Emergence isn't some quasi-mystical argument for positing forces that exceed us or for paving a route to some ideological theory of communal society (i.e. there are no individuals, only aggregates, etc.). It is a theory that allows us to conceptualize and critique real social and natural processes; and we can see it at work all around us.

If all systems can be reduced to their individual components, then we very abruptly lose the ability to even apprehend interactive networks at higher/larger levels. Likewise, if we only take into consideration elements and interactions on the macro scale, we lose the partially constitutive presence of the pieces internal to these larger entities. I think emergence theory can become readily available to us by taking the example of the human body.

A human body is made up of cells. These cells engage in their own interactions and processes, and carry out functions very immediate to their scale. Without these cells, we would not have a human body; the cells comprise blood, skin, organs, tissue, muscles, bone, etc. They are fundamental to the composition of a human body.

Prior to emergence and other theories that fall under the category of complexity (which only began to appear in the last 150 years or so), the basis of human action, cognition, being, etc. had to be attributed to some kind of essential power or source within the human - Descartes's pineal gland, Kant's transcendental subjectivity, Bergsonian vitalism, or (prior to all) simply the infusion of the creative power of God. Beyond cells, tissue, bone and blood, there had to be a wellspring of being that bestowed consciousness and subjectivity onto the human.

Today, in the sciences and in theories of emergence, such essences are obsolete. Instead of positing a sacred or mystical force that regulates and transcends the bodily, we can theorize how complex systems such as consciousness arise from the basic material systems of the human body. This is how emergence theory can suggest that interactive components amount to "more than the sum of the parts." The human body, despite being comprised of cells, cannot be reduced to its cells because cells do not participate in market transactions; cells do not play sports or music; cells do not build houses or cities. The networks and processes that occur between what we call human agents cannot be reduced to the workings of cells.

In the same sense, the evolution of social/cultural fields - psychology, philosophy, engineering, physics, biology, etc. - cannot be reduced to human agents. As is the case with cells, we can posit that to take away the humans would be to take away any development whatsoever; but this is not to say that these developments are completely reducible to humans. Such complex phenomena can only be conceptualized via larger aggregates of human interaction and participation, which is why we organize humans into schools, institutions, private corporations, political bodies, etc.

Processes and functions take place on every level; cells carry oxygen through the body, corporations and private businesses feed money through a society, individual people use this money to trade with other people, thereby giving themselves energy, ensuring that they keep breathing and thus allowing their red blood cells to continue carrying oxygen. Just as it makes no sense to reduce a human to the cells that carry oxygen and fight off antigens (a reduction that precludes any interaction at higher levels), it makes no sense to reduce cultural development and change to human agents - cultural change takes place within an environment that includes people as well as machines, trees, animals, technologies, thunderstorms, etc.

Emergence does not insist upon science-fictional forces or mystical powers that subsist on their own, regardless of material environment. It attempts to provide a philosophical and scientific means of observing how different networks of symbiotic behavior take place on different levels of complexity, and offers ways to conceptualize these behaviors that adhere to the conditions of that level's environment. Emergence would never claim, absolutely, that technological development could have taken place without human intervention (although it may continue without human intervention, at some point); but this does not mean that technology can be understood purely as the intentional and purposeful cooperation between human agents. Neither of these positions makes sense. Rather, emergence allows us to perceive that technological developments such as - for instance - space travel or cybernetics takes place on a plane of complexity significantly beyond that of red blood cells.

EDIT: I have a new post on my SF blog, on the movie Snowpiercer.
 
While I think that was well and clearly written, I still disagree. Calling "emergence" mysticising might be hyperbole, but seeing it as obscurative would be relatively accurate.

Chemical reactions have the same sort of subjective appearance that "emergent phenomena" have, at a more basic level, but this does not cause some sort of radical philosophical shift. There is nothing specifically special about a catalyst in itself, but the arrangement has a specific "output" if you will. We can use "emergence" to refer to this output, but again, this isn't a truly new understanding of anything, just a new label.
 
Thank you.

If we don't call it "emergence," then what do we call it? I'm identifying emergence and complexity as part of a broader historical shift, as Foucault has already taught us to comprehend in The Order of Things. All emergence provides is a different way to conceptualize and ontologize networks of interacting parts, which in turn are comprised of networks of interacting parts. Criticizing emergence for simply slapping a new label on processes without altering their implications seems to miss the point, as far as I can tell.
 
Well it is only criticism if those who speak of emergence see it as more than that - which has been my impression. I see the exclamation about "more than the sum!" as much ado about nothing. If we take all the essential parts to an automobile, and assemble the entire thing, but leave out the oil and gas, it still sits there. When we add the fuel and lubricant.....it still just sits there. But once we start the car, and then proceed to drive - EMERGENCE!.....But this is merely an operation made possible by a particular arrangement of the same parts...and an arrangement is a part. This is why a soft drink could list all of its contents and still be impossible to exactly copy - because arrangement order and order of the arranging are all necessary parts.

I get a cake when I have the ingredients AND follow the entire process, to include order of mixing/adding, temp and time baked, etc. These things are all parts above and beyond a simple ingredient list (even if the list includes "the maker of the cake".

So I follow the recipe and voila: a cake emerges from the oven. So we eat and that is it. No radical shift emerges. :cool:

Contingency is actually what makes emergence a non-"issue".
 
If we take all the essential parts to an automobile, and assemble the entire thing, but leave out the oil and gas, it still sits there. When we add the fuel and lubricant.....it still just sits there. But once we start the car, and then proceed to drive - EMERGENCE!.....But this is merely an operation made possible by a particular arrangement of the same parts...and an arrangement is a part. This is why a soft drink could list all of its contents and still be impossible to exactly copy - because arrangement order and order of the arranging are all necessary parts.

You're really making this more convoluted than it is. Let me simply ask you: can a trade between a trapper and a medicine man be reduced to the cells that comprise their bodies?

Can the traffic fluctuations that cause gridlock on I-90 outside Boston be reduced to the parts of the automobiles?

All I'm saying is that there are networks whose behavior can't be explained purely through recourse to the combination of components at different (usually lower) levels. There are influential actors that possess a virtual status, meaning that they can effect material change in an assemblage purely through the possibility of their presence. This is about taking an environment into consideration, along with all its potential conditions.

This is the clearest I've ever explained it, and I'm just confused as to what exactly is undesirable about it. As far as I'm concerned, emergence is nothing more than a general term for how modern science understands its subject matter. The term "emergence" goes back to the nineteenth century. It's not some very recent speculative label. It's a practice of comprehending processes and networks as multivalent and multi-layered entities. There's such a thing as an automobile; but a traffic jam participates in larger social networks that fuel injectors do not. That's the point that emergence makes.
 
That explanation does make it look hyper-analytical rather than speculative. The traffic jam necessarily requires the participation of injectors to occur, as well as all the other parts at their various scales.
 
It requires fuel injectors, but the fuel injectors don't participate in the network of relations that involve a traffic jam; the amount of cars on a bridge affecting structural integrity, or the financial impact of people arriving late to work, or environmental politics focusing on climate change. Fuel injectors have an upward impact on such networks, but these networks operate on a level of complexity that transcends the function of fuel injectors, and this level in turn has a material, downward-causative effect on the manufacture of fuel injectors.

Fuel injectors have played an undeniable role in the development of these higher levels of complexity, but they can potentially be removed and these higher levels would still exist; cars may be manufactured differently, but traffic jams might still exist even if that's the case. The point of emergence isn't to paint some speculative magic ingredient, but to understand the relationship between part and whole, and how the whole participates in networks and processes that the part does not.

When we say that the whole is more than the sum of its parts, we are saying that the whole registers on a level of complexity that the part may have helped create but may not be necessary to perpetuate, and that organizes according to forces with which the part doesn't interact.
 
But they are participating when they participate, and in some cases even if they don't. That you might find ways to work that bypass fuel injectors doesn't mean they play no part when you do use them. In fact, cost/benefit relations in terms of things like legacy technology ensures that even if you and everyone in your neighborhood went electric, fuel injectors would still play a role affecting pricing and availability of all sorts of things. Segmenting off areas that a part plays no part, but only the whole, is simply short-sighted. It is always-already decreasing explanatory or revelatory power.
 
Going back to contingency, I want to explain what I see, based on your explanation of emergence, of the complete at-odds between contingency and emergence.

Contingency expands horizons, Emergence contracts them. Contingency increases the possibilities for explanation and exploration, Emergence decreases possibilities. Posited as explained, emergence merely fills an apologetic gap for arbitrary modelization which ignores whatever is wished as irrelevant for the purposes of questionable intent. It seizes the ideological position as reactionary against the disruptive force of contingency.
 
Oh man, you are completely misunderstanding something because emergence is all about contingency. As I have already said, fuel injectors have played an entirely contingent role in the effects of traffic! You've misinterpreted something along the way.

Yes, parts participate when they participate. No one is saying they don't, so I don't follow what you're saying. I'm not denying their participation, I'm saying that the appearance and existence of complex models can be discussed and studied without discussing the existence of parts on a smaller scale. We can talk about the damage caused by severe storms without discussing the autocatalytic feedback that occurs between gradients of temperature and pressure. We know they're their, we're not forgetting them or saying they do not exist. Fuel injectors can still affect pricing even if they're not in use, no one is saying that they become entirely non-influential. We're simply acknowledging something different about the processes at a higher complex level.

I don't see the point of your argument for short-sightedness. No one is ignoring certain smaller-scale parts, denying their existence, or claiming they play no role. Parts, emergence theory maintains, are real entities, and must be treated as such. It is not trying to downplay their importance or usefulness, and even admits that parts can play roles in multiple levels, moving in both directions (upward and downward) and across various dynamical relations.

I cannot see how emergence restricts explanation rather than expands it; emergence is a model for coexistent networks, symbiosis and feedback. It is all about inclusion and variation, interaction, and how systems participate in processes at varying levels of complexity. I don't understand why acknowledging the presence of fuel injectors while differentiating their functional quality from the functional quality of gridlock traffic that participates in social networks extending beyond automobiles into areas of psychic and biological health, environmental politics, and finance, to name only a few.

EDIT: and, regarding contingency, emergence doesn't maintain that there is some transcendental level of complexity that processes gravitate toward, or that represents the ultimate achievement of material networks. Even emergent phenomena can play the role of parts in larger complex phenomena. It's isn't restrictive, teleological, or causative in a deterministic sense; it is contingent in the strongest way possible, that is by emphasizing the accidental interactions between disparate parts that result in complex wholes, which in turn play the role of more parts along an open spectrum of variously complex levels.
 
Oh man, you are completely misunderstanding something because emergence is all about contingency. As I have already said, fuel injectors have played an entirely contingent role in the effects of traffic! You've misinterpreted something along the way.

Yes, parts participate when they participate. No one is saying they don't, so I don't follow what you're saying. I'm not denying their participation, I'm saying that the appearance and existence of complex models can be discussed and studied without discussing the existence of parts on a smaller scale. We can talk about the damage caused by severe storms without discussing the autocatalytic feedback that occurs between gradients of temperature and pressure. We know they're their, we're not forgetting them or saying they do not exist. Fuel injectors can still affect pricing even if they're not in use, no one is saying that they become entirely non-influential. We're simply acknowledging something different about the processes at a higher complex level.

I am sure you believe that, and the below and most of the rest I omitted would seem to indicate as much:

If all systems can be reduced to their individual components, then we very abruptly lose the ability to even apprehend interactive networks at higher/larger levels. Likewise, if we only take into consideration elements and interactions on the macro scale, we lose the partially constitutive presence of the pieces internal to these larger entities. I think emergence theory can become readily available to us by taking the example of the human body.

A human body is made up of cells. These cells engage in their own interactions and processes, and carry out functions very immediate to their scale. Without these cells, we would not have a human body; the cells comprise blood, skin, organs, tissue, muscles, bone, etc. They are fundamental to the composition of a human body.

However, after all of that, there is a "but":


Emergence..... attempts to provide a philosophical and scientific means of observing how different networks of symbiotic behavior take place on different levels of complexity, and offers ways to conceptualize these behaviors that adhere to the conditions of that level's environment. Emergence would never claim, absolutely, that technological development could have taken place without human intervention (although it may continue without human intervention, at some point); but this does not mean that technology can be understood purely as the intentional and purposeful cooperation between human agents. Neither of these positions makes sense. Rather, emergence allows us to perceive that technological developments such as - for instance - space travel or cybernetics takes place on a plane of complexity significantly beyond that of red blood cells.

On the surface this looks fine, but reading between the lines allows us to understand the impact of the "beyond" is to practically ignore. Emergence functions as a framework of understanding, and (again) merely situates itself as an excuse to discount X as "not on the correct plane". I think that "plane" is a problematic sorting mechanism, but emergence appears to rely on it via understanding limited to hierarchical formatting.

EDIT: and, regarding contingency, emergence doesn't maintain that there is some transcendental level of complexity that processes gravitate toward, or that represents the ultimate achievement of material networks. Even emergent phenomena can play the role of parts in larger complex phenomena. It's isn't restrictive, teleological, or causative in a deterministic sense; it is contingent in the strongest way possible, that is by emphasizing the accidental interactions between disparate parts that result in complex wholes, which in turn play the role of more parts along an open spectrum of variously complex levels.

This statement (particularly the emboldened part) functions as the highlight of the paradox of the two former quoted statements.

Maybe this will make things less clear than more so, but I see contingency making an evershifting Venn Diagram rather than a Tree/Pyramid, which is how I perceive your explanation of Emergence.