Dakryn's Batshit Theory of the Week

My teaching advisor for the semester told me a few days ago that Stephenson actually went to BU. I had no idea. Apparently his first book is called The Big U, and is based on his time on campus.

Anyway, in other news:

https://aeon.co/ideas/you-thought-quantum-mechanics-was-weird-check-out-entangled-time

The problem is that entanglement violates how the world ought to work. Information can’t travel faster than the speed of light, for one. But in a 1935 paper, Einstein and his co-authors showed how entanglement leads to what’s now called quantum nonlocality, the eerie link that appears to exist between entangled particles. If two quantum systems meet and then separate, even across a distance of thousands of lightyears, it becomes impossible to measure the features of one system (such as its position, momentum and polarity) without instantly steering the other into a corresponding state.

Up to today, most experiments have tested entanglement over spatial gaps. The assumption is that the ‘nonlocal’ part of quantum nonlocality refers to the entanglement of properties across space. But what if entanglement also occurs across time? Is there such a thing as temporal nonlocality?

The answer, as it turns out, is yes. Just when you thought quantum mechanics couldn’t get any weirder, a team of physicists at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem reported in 2013 that they had successfully entangled photons that never coexisted. Previous experiments involving a technique called ‘entanglement swapping’ had already showed quantum correlations across time, by delaying the measurement of one of the coexisting entangled particles; but Eli Megidish and his collaborators were the first to show entanglement between photons whose lifespans did not overlap at all.

Seriously, what the fucking fuck.

And it gets weirder:

What on Earth can this mean? Prima facie, it seems as troubling as saying that the polarity of starlight in the far-distant past – say, greater than twice Earth’s lifetime – nevertheless influenced the polarity of starlight falling through your amateur telescope this winter. Even more bizarrely: maybe it implies that the measurements carried out by your eye upon starlight falling through your telescope this winter somehow dictated the polarity of photons more than 9 billion years old.

Lest this scenario strike you as too outlandish, Megidish and his colleagues can’t resist speculating on possible and rather spooky interpretations of their results. Perhaps the measurement of photon 1’s polarisation at step II somehow steers the future polarisation of 4, or the measurement of photon 4’s polarisation at step V somehow rewrites the past polarisation state of photon 1. In both forward and backward directions, quantum correlations span the causal void between the death of one photon and the birth of the other.
 
Would you like to parse practical application or meaning?

Edit: I've recently been arguing with my youngest brother he's been trying to reduce the hard problem of consciousness to irrelevance by saying "physics!", but I don't want to just say "quantum physics!" as a rebuttal.
 
I've recently been arguing with my youngest brother he's been trying to reduce the hard problem of consciousness to irrelevance by saying "physics!", but I don't want to just say "quantum physics!" as a rebuttal.

By appealing to physics, would he be trying to explain away the phenomenon of consciousness? That's my impression, but I don't want to presume.

I also still don't fully comprehend the quantum physics position on consciousness (I'm sure there's more than one). It's not as simple as reducing it to conscious observation, since "observation" in quantum physics means more than conscious perception.
 
By appealing to physics, would he be trying to explain away the phenomenon of consciousness? That's my impression, but I don't want to presume.

I also still don't fully comprehend the quantum physics position on consciousness (I'm sure there's more than one). It's not as simple as reducing it to conscious observation, since "observation" in quantum physics means more than conscious perception.

Yeah, he's being a material reductionist determinist and acting like no smart people have ever worked on this complicated problem. He's just about to turn 18 so ya know.....
 
http://reallifemag.com/model-citizens/

@Einherjar86 I imagine you will enjoy reading this. It was something to think about for me, because citysims are one of the game types I have enjoyed, although I always enjoy the earlier stages than the latter. At some point a city sprawls enough to stop being enjoyably manageable. This is probably one of the reasons why I liked "Banished" over larger sims like SimCity or Cities: Skylines (although I do really like Skylines).
 
Would you like to parse practical application or meaning?

Edit: I've recently been arguing with my youngest brother he's been trying to reduce the hard problem of consciousness to irrelevance by saying "physics!", but I don't want to just say "quantum physics!" as a rebuttal.

are you sam harris and your younger brother lawrence krauss? :lol:
 
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http://reallifemag.com/model-citizens/

@Einherjar86 I imagine you will enjoy reading this. It was something to think about for me, because citysims are one of the game types I have enjoyed, although I always enjoy the earlier stages than the latter. At some point a city sprawls enough to stop being enjoyably manageable. This is probably one of the reasons why I liked "Banished" over larger sims like SimCity or Cities: Skylines (although I do really like Skylines).

Interesting. I only read the first couple paragraphs, have to finish it later today or tomorrow. Opening lines and the emboldened passage look good though...
 
http://sciphijournal.org/why-the-culture-wins-an-appreciation-of-iain-m-banks/

This captures a lot of the issues I have with modernity, SJW topics, etc. etc.

Human beings have spent much of their lives lamenting “the curse of Adam,” and yet work provides most people with their primary sense of meaning and achievement in life. So what happens when work disappears, turning everything into a hobby? A hobby is fun. Many people spend a great deal of time trying to escape work, so they can spend more time on their hobbies. But while they may be fun, hobbies are also at some level always frivolous. They cannot give meaning to a life, precisely because they are optional. You could just stop doing it, and nothing would change, it would make no difference, which is to say, it wouldn’t matter.

Now consider the choices that people have in the Culture. You can be male or female, or anything in between (indeed, many Culture citizens alternate, and it’s considered slightly outré to be strongly gender-identified). You can live as long as you like. You can acquire any appearance, or any set of skills. You can alter your physiology or brain chemistry at will, learn anything you like.

Given all these options, how do you choose? More fundamentally, who are you? What is it that creates your identity, or that makes you distinctive? If we reflect upon our own lives, the significant choices we have made were all in important ways informed by the constraints we are subject to, the hand that we were dealt: our natural talents, our gender, the country that we were born in. Once the constraints are gone, what basis is there for choosing one path over another?

This is the problem that existentialist writers, like Albert Camus, grappled with. The paradox of freedom is that it deprives choice of all meaningfulness. The answer that Camus recommended was absurdism – simply embracing the paradox. Few have followed him on this path. Sociologically, there are generally two ways in which citizens of modern societies resolve the crisis of meaning. The first is by choosing to embrace a traditional identity – call this “neotraditionalism” – celebrating the supposed authenticity of an ascriptive category. Most religious fundamentalism has this structure, but it also takes more benign forms, such as the suburban American who rediscovers his Celtic heritage, names his child Cahal or Aidan, and takes up residence at the local Irish pub. The other option is moral affirmation of freedom itself, as the sole meaningful value. This is often accompanied by a proselytizing desire to bring freedom to others.17
 
http://sciphijournal.org/why-the-culture-wins-an-appreciation-of-iain-m-banks/

This captures a lot of the issues I have with modernity, SJW topics, etc. etc.

I haven't had time to go through this whole thing--it's long. But already I spot some suspicious claims.

Human beings have spent much of their lives lamenting “the curse of Adam,” and yet work provides most people with their primary sense of meaning and achievement in life.

Who says? I know plenty of people who would say that they feel more themselves when practicing their hobbies...

The Chinese, it may be recalled, undertook several major sea voyages to Africa in the 15th century. They left no lasting impact upon the continent, because upon arrival, having found nothing of interest to them, they simply turned around and went home. Europeans, by contrast, while primarily focused on navigating around the continent, brought along with them priests, who noticed millions of souls in need of salvation. And so they set up shop.

Europeans didn't set up shop in Africa because their priests noticed souls that needed saving. They set up shop (in South Africa, mind you) because it marked a strategic geographical position during the height of the spice trade. Religious conversion was mostly a smokescreen for geopolitical motivations.

Compared to the other “visionary” writers working at the time – William Gibson, Neal Stephenson – Banks is underappreciated. This is because Gibson and Stephenson in certain ways anticipated the evolution of technology, and considered what the world would look like as transformed by “cyberspace.” Both were crucial in helping us to understand that the real technological revolution occurring in our society was not mechanical, but involved the collection, transmission and processing of information.

Banks, by contrast, imagined a future transformed by the evolution of culture first and foremost, and by technology only secondarily.

What is culture without technology? This distinction makes no sense to me.

Also, Banks has said that

You can't escape the fact that humanity is a technological species, homo technophile or whatever the Latin is. Technology is neither good or bad, it's up to the user. We can't escape what we are, which is a technological species. There's no way back.

https://www.spikemagazine.com/0996bank.php
 
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Who says? I know plenty of people who would say that they feel more themselves when practicing their hobbies...

It's probably more accurate to say that work itself is the means with which people fund their attempt to find meaning and achievement. If your greatest achievement is in creating a family with a woman you love, you did that through work by earning money to use to build a house, feed your kids and so on. Same with hobbies, can't really enjoy your hobbies if you're broke, unemployed and/or homeless.

That said, the original claim said "most" and so in that sense, your counter claim of a few people who don't doesn't exactly debunk the claim.
 
It's probably more accurate to say that work itself is the means with which people fund their attempt to find meaning and achievement. If your greatest achievement is in creating a family with a woman you love, you did that through work by earning money to use to build a house, feed your kids and so on. Same with hobbies, can't really enjoy your hobbies if you're broke, unemployed and/or homeless.

What this reveals to me is that "work" is little more than a meaningless, functional operation that supports the more meaningful practices of life. It isn't work itself that's meaningful, but the truly enjoyable practices made possible by work.

Additionally, I'd say that if one were broke and unable to find work, then personal hobbies might be the most enjoyable thing one could do...

That said, the original claim said "most" and so in that sense, your counter claim of a few people who don't doesn't exactly debunk the claim.

That's totally fair, but the original piece offered no substantial evidence that most people find existential meaning in their primary source of income. It was offered as an axiomatic, and I'm questioning that axiomatic.
 
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What this reveals to me is that "work" is little more than a meaningless, functional operation that supports the more meaningful practices of life. It isn't work itself that's meaningful, but the truly enjoyable practices made possible by work.

I think that is definitely the case, except perhaps for the few lucky people out of the working population who were able to merge wage earning with their interests or specific hobbies. Increasingly I think that dream is coming true for a lot of people, due to the possibilities the Internet grants us.

Additionally, I'd say that if one were broke, then personal hobbies might be the most enjoyable thing one could do...

I've been that broke and homeless and trust me, you miss work because you feel so utterly useless and worthless. Spending money on something fun can often feel very bad when you can't afford to even do it. One of the worst feelings I've ever experienced.

That's totally fair, but the original piece offered no substantial evidence that most people find existential meaning in their primary source of income. It was offered as an axiomatic, and I'm questioning that axiomatic.

True, I wonder if there are any studies asking a question like that. Seems like a hard one to accurately word to me.
 
Who says? I know plenty of people who would say that they feel more themselves when practicing their hobbies...

"Meaning" and "feeling themselves" are not the same thing. I feel more "myself" when engaging in my hobbies. That doesn't mean that my hobbies provide the primary source of meaning in my life. But even that is irrelevant. The data on the relation between unemployment and depression, all-cause mortality, etc. overwhelmingly indicates that a workless existence is poor one, and it's not that people - in the west - anyway, are experiencing such poor outcomes due to a lack of basic necessities. Feeling useless is common factor in depression even when one is gainfully employed, so much more so for those who are not. Of course, you will find people happy to just by the proverbial river, and others who will be workaholics, working themselves into an early grave. We aren't talking about those outliers.

As a social creature, we evolved a need to contribute to the group in some fashion. Consuming without contributing is a recipe for poor mental health, to put it mildly.


Europeans didn't set up shop in Africa because their priests noticed souls that needed saving. They set up shop (in South Africa, mind you) because it marked a strategic geographical position during the height of the spice trade. Religious conversion was mostly a smokescreen for geopolitical motivations.

I think one can treat the imperialistic aims of European governments somewhat separately from the aims of the missionary monks. After all, they eventually withdrew and the clergy remained.

What is culture without technology? This distinction makes no sense to me.

Technology is not a simple determinant for culture is the point I think. The developed world and even many quasi-developed countries all have access to pretty much the same basic daily living technologies. Different countries still retain very distinct cultures. Just because McDonalds and Iphones are in China doesn't mean you are going to mistake Shanghai for Boston. However, the "Culture" as capitalized is working to iron out those differences, along with all the others which provide sources of meaning.
 
"Meaning" and "feeling themselves" are not the same thing. I feel more "myself" when engaging in my hobbies. That doesn't mean that my hobbies provide the primary source of meaning in my life. But even that is irrelevant. The data on the relation between unemployment and depression, all-cause mortality, etc. overwhelmingly indicates that a workless existence is poor one, and it's not that people - in the west - anyway, are experiencing such poor outcomes due to a lack of basic necessities. Feeling useless is common factor in depression even when one is gainfully employed, so much more so for those who are not. Of course, you will find people happy to just by the proverbial river, and others who will be workaholics, working themselves into an early grave. We aren't talking about those outliers.

As a social creature, we evolved a need to contribute to the group in some fashion. Consuming without contributing is a recipe for poor mental health, to put it mildly.

This is interesting to me, because it sounds like a discrepancy between meaning and identity--two things that usually find association in these kinds of discussions.

In other words, meaning as you're discussing it sounds like something effectively distinct from identity; meaning derives from the value one achieves in a social network, i.e. one's value as perceived by others. By contrast, identity would derive from one's individual interests and feeling oneself as oneself, so to speak. Yet the author of that article/post was interested in how individuals affirm their own identities, something that is inextricable from how they construct meaning.

I'd question your dissociation of meaning and identity if only because it's possible to contribute value to a society without taking any pleasure in doing so. We might point to extreme, totalitarian or utopian examples, but also to more plausible ones--i.e. someone who works a desk job in an office supplies store and does not enjoy themselves Monday through Friday, but feels alive on weekends going on bike rides or writing poetry, for example.

Now, as per my theoretical dispositions, I acknowledge that meaning exceeds an individual's perception of it (we've had this discussion before). But I also acknowledge that meaning arises from individuals' participation in the meaning-making process; there has to be some perceptive spark that resonates with an individual's subjective sense of selfhood.

So while I agree that "meaning" and "feeling oneself" aren't the same thing, I think the author of the piece you linked is interested in how they overlap.

I think one can treat the imperialistic aims of European governments somewhat separately from the aims of the missionary monks. After all, they eventually withdrew and the clergy remained.

Aims, yes--but now we're back to individual perceptions versus that unwieldy thing called "meaning." To say that England colonized Africa because they saw souls in need of saving is a vastly reductive and incomplete explanation. Comparing European perspectives on Africa to Asian perspectives and chalking it up to religious background ignores the (I think) far more important economic relationships between Asia and Europe at that time. Jesuit and Anglican missionaries were often lumped in with political and military campaigns to earn the support of the Churches.

Technology is not a simple determinant for culture is the point I think. The developed world and even many quasi-developed countries all have access to pretty much the same basic daily living technologies. Different countries still retain very distinct cultures. Just because McDonalds and Iphones are in China doesn't mean you are going to mistake Shanghai for Boston. However, the "Culture" as capitalized is working to iron out those differences, along with all the others which provide sources of meaning.

I haven't read Banks, so I can't speak to the series itself. In fact, it sounds like a structural functionalist (i.e. early systems theory) conception of advanced civilization.

A very preliminary explanation would be that the Culture, although it supplants/displaces distinctions that inform cultural meaning for us (e.g. gender, race, class, access to medicine, tech, etc.), also gives rise to new distinctions. The point of systems theory is that autopoietic evolution (i.e. the incessant rehabilitation/persistence of systems for their own sake, of expanding and maintaining their function) inevitably introduces new differences, many of which will be experienced by individuals at a visceral level. The neotraditional response is to reject change entirely for fear of giving up human identity--to concretize human identity as an experience closer to neolithic life than modern cybernetic life. Such resistance is incompatible with complex culture as it has developed to its current phase, which Banks extrapolates into a far-future scenario.

The apparent homogeneity of life under the Culture is misleading (as the author presents it), since the series is also constantly exploring how the Culture itself adapts when confronted with new life forms, star systems, energy and physical anomalies, etc (based on what I've read about it). Its point may be to reproduce itself, but this doesn't mean the Culture doesn't evolve.

Again, that's my impression based on the references to Talcott Parsons and the author's systems-theoretical perspective. I could be wrong about Banks's representation in the books.

In short, the fear of technological expansion and ubiquity seems to be that it would introduce the homogeneity of human life and experience, but there's no reason to assume this would be the case, especially in an adaptive and expanding civilization like the Culture.

I've been that broke and homeless and trust me, you miss work because you feel so utterly useless and worthless. Spending money on something fun can often feel very bad when you can't afford to even do it. One of the worst feelings I've ever experienced.

Point taken. Well put.

True, I wonder if there are any studies asking a question like that. Seems like a hard one to accurately word to me.

It also seems like a conceptually difficult thing to pinpoint in a study. Would be interesting to see, though.
 
This is interesting to me, because it sounds like a discrepancy between meaning and identity--two things that usually find association in these kinds of discussions.

In other words, meaning as you're discussing it sounds like something effectively distinct from identity; meaning derives from the value one achieves in a social network, i.e. one's value as perceived by others. By contrast, identity would derive from one's individual interests and feeling oneself as oneself, so to speak. Yet the author of that article/post was interested in how individuals affirm their own identities, something that is inextricable from how they construct meaning.

I'd question your dissociation of meaning and identity if only because it's possible to contribute value to a society without taking any pleasure in doing so. We might point to extreme, totalitarian or utopian examples, but also to more plausible ones--i.e. someone who works a desk job in an office supplies store and does not enjoy themselves Monday through Friday, but feels alive on weekends going on bike rides or writing poetry, for example.

Now, as per my theoretical dispositions, I acknowledge that meaning exceeds an individual's perception of it (we've had this discussion before). But I also acknowledge that meaning arises from individuals' participation in the meaning-making process; there has to be some perceptive spark that resonates with an individual's subjective sense of selfhood.

So while I agree that "meaning" and "feeling oneself" aren't the same thing, I think the author of the piece you linked is interested in how they overlap.

If I had to picture meaning and identity in geometric or physical terms I'm not sure how I'd go about doing so at this point, but certainly not in a Venn sense. I see identity being more complex as a person develops more fully, and not in an "intersectional" sense. If nothing else, I would say identity is a blend, with each added ingredient changing the emergent product, which is a different concept than the "layering" concept models tend to take (maybe if only for simplicities sake).

To distinguish meaning from identity: I feel like myself listening to metal songs I like. I wouldn't say that they "give my life meaning". They do improve my quality of life. What is mentioned in the segments I quoted, and what I would contend, is that hedonistic pleasures do not "give meaning", except in contrast to struggle - and it is struggle where we derive meaning either in itself and/or the rewards of the struggle - or this "meaning making process". Now, I completely agree that there has to be some connection between the struggle and the persons concept of self-hood, but it still doesn't have to be in the struggle itself - that's just a major bonus.


Aims, yes--but now we're back to individual perceptions versus that unwieldy thing called "meaning." To say that England colonized Africa because they saw souls in need of saving is a vastly reductive and incomplete explanation. Comparing European perspectives on Africa to Asian perspectives and chalking it up to religious background ignores the (I think) far more important economic relationships between Asia and Europe at that time. Jesuit and Anglican missionaries were often lumped in with political and military campaigns to earn the support of the Churches.

I haven't read Banks, so I can't speak to the series itself. In fact, it sounds like a structural functionalist (i.e. early systems theory) conception of advanced civilization.

A very preliminary explanation would be that the Culture, although it supplants/displaces distinctions that inform cultural meaning for us (e.g. gender, race, class, access to medicine, tech, etc.), also gives rise to new distinctions. The point of systems theory is that autopoietic evolution (i.e. the incessant rehabilitation/persistence of systems for their own sake, of expanding and maintaining their function) inevitably introduces new differences, many of which will be experienced by individuals at a visceral level. The neotraditional response is to reject change entirely for fear of giving up human identity--to concretize human identity as an experience closer to neolithic life than modern cybernetic life. Such resistance is incompatible with complex culture as it has developed to its current phase, which Banks extrapolates into a far-future scenario.

The apparent homogeneity of life under the Culture is misleading (as the author presents it), since the series is also constantly exploring how the Culture itself adapts when confronted with new life forms, star systems, energy and physical anomalies, etc (based on what I've read about it). Its point may be to reproduce itself, but this doesn't mean the Culture doesn't evolve.

Again, that's my impression based on the references to Talcott Parsons and the author's systems-theoretical perspective. I could be wrong about Banks's representation in the books.

In short, the fear of technological expansion and ubiquity seems to be that it would introduce the homogeneity of human life and experience, but there's no reason to assume this would be the case, especially in an adaptive and expanding civilization like the Culture.

Well I quoted the portion of the article that I thought was most important; I'm not all that interested in debating the interrelation between religion and imperialism. We could easily posit the RCC as a "soft imperialist power" that has never withdrawn from South and Central America. But that's rather beside the point I'm interested in.

I'm not familiar with Banks either, but I am interested in what how meaning relates the mental health, and how technological progress - even in so far as it enables hyper-hedonistic-consumption - is leading to poorer mental and physical health outcomes. I mean, in some sense I should be happy right? Because it's some degree of job security (for now anyway). I think a fear of homogeneity is not exactly the issue. It's not that there won't be differences, it's just that they will all be purely arbitrary and nonstatic, and therefore meaningless.

Furthermore, the degree to which everything is arbitrary erases the ability to conceptualize self, whether past, present, or future. There's a very hamfisted version of this critique in the meme about "Economics? I can't even figure out what gender I am!". Consciously and subconsciously, we need a high degree of predictability in our internal and external environments, which allows us to filter those things out so we can selectively pay attention. One of the problems in autism is that autists lack this filter to differing degrees, which causes them to shut down in what would be, for most people, relatively low stimulation environments (because we filter out). Endless flux is, imo, already beginning to have that effect in the west, and we aren't anywhere close to where we will probably end up in a technological sense. So we have a double whammy of overstimulation with no meaning, rendering us both depressed and anxious. No surprise, depression and anxiety rates are on the rise.
 
If I had to picture meaning and identity in geometric or physical terms I'm not sure how I'd go about doing so at this point, but certainly not in a Venn sense. I see identity being more complex as a person develops more fully, and not in an "intersectional" sense. If nothing else, I would say identity is a blend, with each added ingredient changing the emergent product, which is a different concept than the "layering" concept models tend to take (maybe if only for simplicities sake).

To distinguish meaning from identity: I feel like myself listening to metal songs I like. I wouldn't say that they "give my life meaning". They do improve my quality of life. What is mentioned in the segments I quoted, and what I would contend, is that hedonistic pleasures do not "give meaning", except in contrast to struggle - and it is struggle where we derive meaning either in itself and/or the rewards of the struggle - or this "meaning making process". Now, I completely agree that there has to be some connection between the struggle and the persons concept of self-hood, but it still doesn't have to be in the struggle itself - that's just a major bonus.

Hm. I'm still not sure I follow. I'm not even sure I know enough to say it's just disagreement; I simply don't know how to extricate one's identity from the prospect of living a meaningful life.

If meaningful lives and identity don't overlap, then we can hypothetically propose a life that is meaningful but in which said individual has no sense of identity. Alternatively, we could imagine an individual with a sense of identity and no sense of meaning in her life. I don't really fathom how either of these outcomes is possible.

I'm not familiar with Banks either, but I am interested in what how meaning relates the mental health, and how technological progress - even in so far as it enables hyper-hedonistic-consumption - is leading to poorer mental and physical health outcomes. I mean, in some sense I should be happy right? Because it's some degree of job security (for now anyway). I think a fear of homogeneity is not exactly the issue. It's not that there won't be differences, it's just that they will all be purely arbitrary and nonstatic, and therefore meaningless.

You would say that more people today have mental health problems than did people in the nineteenth century, for instance? Or earlier? First, how do you measure that; and second, is this just because there's a tendency to over-diagnose mental health issues today?

One possible response to this fear of arbitrary and nonstatic differences is that we simply lack the faculty (individually and culturally) to imagine what the meaning of such differences might be.
 
Hm. I'm still not sure I follow. I'm not even sure I know enough to say it's just disagreement; I simply don't know how to extricate one's identity from the prospect of living a meaningful life.

If meaningful lives and identity don't overlap, then we can hypothetically propose a life that is meaningful but in which said individual has no sense of identity. Alternatively, we could imagine an individual with a sense of identity and no sense of meaning in her life. I don't really fathom how either of these outcomes is possible.

Overlap is a conceptualization using physical space. I'm saying there are relations, but "overlap" is too simplistic. Now, I will say that we are now seeing people with "identities" that are grasping for meaning, and conversely we can see in various collectivist atmospheres people with little identity but plenty of meaning.

You would say that more people today have mental health problems than did people in the nineteenth century, for instance? Or earlier? First, how do you measure that; and second, is this just because there's a tendency to over-diagnose mental health issues today?

One possible response to this fear of arbitrary and nonstatic differences is that we simply lack the faculty (individually and culturally) to imagine what the meaning of such differences might be.

My (at this point admittedly limited) experience is that we under-diagnose for practical reasons. The over-diagnosis critique is related to the explosion of "disorders" in the DSM, and I'm not talking about that. I'm talking about the main diagnoses of depressive and anxiety disorders and related sequelae. There's also the issue of "clinical criteria" versus someone with like 3 out of 4 criteria, nevermind the somewhat arbitrary linedrawing of criteria cutoffs (in this case for practical reasons related to insurance reimbursement).
 
Overlap is a conceptualization using physical space. I'm saying there are relations, but "overlap" is too simplistic. Now, I will say that we are now seeing people with "identities" that are grasping for meaning, and conversely we can see in various collectivist atmospheres people with little identity but plenty of meaning.

I wasn't thinking of "overlap" in all that specific of a sense. I guess I would say I understand that there are relations, and that those relations mean that meaning and identity overlap. This feels like semantics, so it may not be worth debating.

As far as current identities grasping for meaning, I still think that presumes a distinction between current identities and older (let's say "traditional") forms of identity. Identity has always relied on the metaphysical guarantee of meaning, from the four personal virtues of Ancient Rome, to the spiritual salvation of the Middle Ages, to the politically motivated forms of identity that we have today. All of these rely upon the construction of meaning, and in some way "overlap" with it (in other words, identity wouldn't be possible without meaning).

My (at this point admittedly limited) experience is that we under-diagnose for practical reasons. The over-diagnosis critique is related to the explosion of "disorders" in the DSM, and I'm not talking about that. I'm talking about the main diagnoses of depressive and anxiety disorders and related sequelae. There's also the issue of "clinical criteria" versus someone with like 3 out of 4 criteria, nevermind the somewhat arbitrary linedrawing of criteria cutoffs (in this case for practical reasons related to insurance reimbursement).

I see. So even despite the fact that studies show depression and anxiety to be on the rise, you'd say they're still under-diagnosed?