Dakryn's Batshit Theory of the Week

[Einherjar86]

But IQ tests are measuring something, and in both cases, we are often coming to (at least what we think are) pretty good conclusions about what those somethings mean and are.

My criticism of IQ tests is that they prescribe what they classify as intelligence; not in the fact that they don't do anything. They simply reinforce a specific cultural definition of intelligence.

When we talk about measuring the electrical stimulation of neurons and what happens between them, we're talking about something very different. This kind of neuronal measurement is interested in activity, pure and simple; IQ tests seek to measure the quality of activity.

We don't really know much about the quality of activity taking place between neurons; but we know that if you add a hundred billion more you get something very different.

Ok, well that provides a little clarity, because I have been under the impression you were essentially supporting a "both" position, and responding as so. Well I would agree with the former, I just don't think it means what you think it means.

[IMG]http://www.docelticjewelry.com...at cannot be reduced back to that individual.

 

[Dak]

My criticism of IQ tests is that they prescribe what they classify as intelligence; not in the fact that they don't do anything. They simply reinforce a specific cultural definition of intelligence.

When we talk about measuring the electrical stimulation of neurons and what happens between them, we're talking about something very different. This kind of neuronal measurement is interested in activity, pure and simple; IQ tests seek to measure the quality of activity.

We don't really know much about the quality of activity taking place between neurons; but we know that if you add a hundred billion more you get something very different.

In terms of both IQ tests and neurological tests, we have already determined that what we are measuring provides useful information, and how that information is useful.

When we talk about society having an effect on an individual, we're talking about something to which an individual contributes but which feeds back and, in turn, has an effect on the individual that cannot be reduced back to that individual.

If you remove any given individual, the effect from as well as on the individual is removed. Of course, the entire system cannot be reduced to a single individual, but if all individuals are gone, the system goes as well.

 

[Einherjar86]

In terms of both IQ tests and neurological tests, we have already determined that what we are measuring provides useful information, and how that information is useful.

"Useful" doesn't mean they're similar in quality.

If you remove any given individual, the effect from as well as on the individual is removed. Of course, the entire system cannot be reduced to a single individual, but if all individuals are gone, the system goes as well.

This is not the point. You're being remarkably dense.

You've said several times how "if we remove the parts, the whole disappears." I've agreed with that already. A whole possesses the potential to act upon its components in ways that other actually-existing components do not. A knife possesses the potential to cut, and this marks one of its qualities - even if it's not actually cutting something.

 

[Dak]

"Useful" doesn't mean they're similar in quality.

Can you be more specific?

This is not the point. You're being remarkably dense.

You've said several times how "if we remove the parts, the whole disappears." I've agreed with that already. A whole possesses the potential to act upon its components in ways that other actually-existing components do not. A knife possesses the potential to cut, and this marks one of its qualities - even if it's not actually cutting something.

I understand and agree with that in a way(although I don't think that analogy was very good), but I don't find that it in any way supports something even approaching "substrate independence", or to negate praxeological theories, etc.

We can speak of wholes, or to use economic parlance, "aggregates", but these are of varyingly limited quality and utility.

 

[Einherjar86]

Can you be more specific?

I don't really care to be. It was a vague response to a vague criticism.

I understand and agree with that in a way(although I don't think that analogy was very good), but I don't find that it in any way supports something even approaching "substrate independence", or to negate praxeological theories, etc.

It's not my analogy. It's Manuel DeLanda's, and it's perfectly adequate.

As far as "substrate independence" goes, can an atom cut a piece of fruit? No, but a knife can; the whole knife, the combination of atoms that results in what we call a knife, possesses the capacity to cut - something the atom cannot do.

As far as praxeology goes, who the fuck even cares about this? Who says emergence is concerned with negating praxeology?

We can speak of wholes, or to use economic parlance, "aggregates", but these are of varyingly limited quality and utility.

Yes, it is limited; so are the component parts! What is so difficult about this?

 

[Jimmy... Dead.]

Should your robot driver kill you to save a child’s life?
Consider this thought experiment: you are travelling along a single-lane mountain road in an autonomous car that is fast approaching a narrow tunnel. Just before entering the tunnel a child attempts to run across the road but trips in the centre of the lane, effectively blocking the entrance to the tunnel. The car has but two options: hit and kill the child, or swerve into the wall on either side of the tunnel, thus killing you.
http://theconversation.com/should-your-robot-driver-kill-you-to-save-a-childs-life-29926



The universe according to Nietzsche: Modern cosmology and the theory of eternal recurrence
The philosopher's musings on the nature of reality could have scientific basis, according to a prominent physicist
http://www.salon.com/2014/07/13/the...smology_and_the_theory_of_eternal_recurrence/

 

[SentinelSlain]

You naggers should read Bounce by Matthew Syed. Talent is really overrated, especially by the "experts" in education.

 

[Jimmy... Dead.]

Can you provide an article on it or anything of substance?

 

[Dak]

It's not my analogy. It's Manuel DeLanda's, and it's perfectly adequate.

As far as "substrate independence" goes, can an atom cut a piece of fruit? No, but a knife can; the whole knife, the combination of atoms that results in what we call a knife, possesses the capacity to cut - something the atom cannot do.

As far as praxeology goes, who the fuck even cares about this? Who says emergence is concerned with negating praxeology?

The atomic atom (see what I did there) may not be able to cut, but it possesses the potential to cut when in the correct arrangement, and when in that correct arrangement presented with an arrangement with the potential to be cut.

I mentioned praxeology because unless I misunderstood, you have referenced emergent theory (implicitly if not explicitly) as an argument against an understanding of economics as rooted in human action.

Yes, it is limited; so are the component parts! What is so difficult about this?

The more complex the aggregate, the more limited it is in relative terms. Understanding aggregates as merely a whole of wholes, it is in fact merely a whole, and now relatively no more useful than looking at any other whole.

 

[Einherjar86]

The atomic atom (see what I did there) may not be able to cut, but it possesses the potential to cut when in the correct arrangement, and when in that correct arrangement presented with an arrangement with the potential to be cut.

Wow. I don't know what to say. You've achieved scientific stupidity.

I'm done arguing about this. It's useless to me.

 

[Dak]

Nothing about that statement is scientifically inaccurate. Everything is comprised of atoms in various arrangements, possessing all the potentialities of each arrangement. Of course the utility of all this is subjective.

 

[SentinelSlain]

Can you provide an article on it or anything of substance?

I'll just provide links to some of the cases the guy uses as evidence.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/László_Polgár

because that doesn't go into detail about his daughters:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Judit_Polgár

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Susan_Polgar

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sofia_Polgar


http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Violin_Concerto_(Tchaikovsky)

this piece was supposed to be unplayable, but as standards have risen, it now is often played by highly regarded people. If talent was simply inate genetics then presumably it would have been playable from the point of their being serious violin playing.

Also, pretty much all supposed child prodigies are people with ultra pushy parents.

 

[Einherjar86]

Sounds interesting. The myth about African long-distance runners is a good one, I think.

 

[Einherjar86]

As a literary critic, I've been thinking lately about the nature of my field; and I've come to the following conclusions.

Literary (and cultural) criticism isn't interested in hard philosophy (i.e. ontology, metaphysics) as it provides truth statements. For literary criticism, Truth is impotent and contradictory because literary critics are not interested in reality itself, but in how we represent reality to ourselves (e.g. texts, codes, images, language, etc.). The question of Truth is futile; not the pursuit of this question, but merely the naive belief that it can be answered.

Literary criticism is interested in models, forms, representations, etc. It is not interested in reality, ontology, truth. It is skeptical of anything that claims an access to the world unmediated by epistemological frames; it will challenge any claim to the truth about reality because the models we use to approach reality are always conditioned by prior cultural experience. Even if models approximate some degree of reality, they remain beholden to the institutions that gave rise to them.

In this sense, Truth is not only impossible; it is a retrospection of culture itself. Truth does not precede thought or knowledge; Truth only arises because of thought and knowledge, and all attempts to approach Truth only serve to dispel it further into the realms of unyielding materialism. Truth is a symptom of conscious minds, and it is real only in an imaginary sense. Literary criticism is interested in how we imagine truth to ourselves.

Truth, in its absolute sense (i.e. of an ultimate reality) does not exist. However, the processes and models of knowledge that we use to explore the world around us tell us vast amounts about the culture we inhabit; that is, these models, forms, and rules possess their own internal logic (which is often illogical in broader senses) that we can critique in order to come to applicable and effective conclusions about our perception of the world.

tl;dr - Literary studies is more interested in the model, not that which it purports to represent; in the map, not the terrain.

 

[Dak]

Probably why we bypass each other so often. While I w/could concede some sort of "Truth in itself" might be unknowable, for practical purposes it is not unapproximatable. Of course this view does necessitate that Truth exists, unknowable or not. Remaining beholden to institutions in some degree doesn't lessen the value of the lesson.

I've taken to looking at life/things from a heavily influenced Risk Management view, which is in line with the general tenets of statistical analysis, where perfect certainty is recognized as relatively impossible, but we can still get close enough. Insisting on perfect certainty for a judgement leaves one stricken with analysis paralysis, and life is too short for that. Increase favorable percentages as much as freely possible, and roll the bones.

 

[Einherjar86]

It is likely why we tend to disagree and/or misunderstand each other. Even when I talk about emergence I'm more interested in what it entails as a model rather than what it says about an ontological quality of reality.

Also, "analysis paralysis" could be a catchy title for an essay.

 

[Einherjar86]

Cary Wolfe, What is Posthumanism?:

[P]osthumanism can be defined quite specifically as the necessity for any discourse or critical procedure to take account of the constitutive (and constitutively paradoxical) nature of its own distinctions, forms, and procedures - and take account of them in ways that may be distinguished from the reflection and introspection associated with the critical subject of humanism. The "post-" of posthumanism thus marks the space in which the one using those distinctions and forms is not the one who can reflect on their latencies and blind spots while at the same time deploying them. That can only be done, as we have already seen, by another observer, using a different set of distinctions - and that observer, within the general economy of autopoesis and iterability, need not be human (indeed, from this vantage, never was "human"). It is only on the basis (which is not, strictly speaking, a "basis" at all, but a nonplace, a form of difference) that a first-order observer (the "subject" in humanist parlance) is opened, and unavoidably so, to the alterity of the other: not by "taking thought" or be benevolent reflection but by the very conditions of cognition and communication, conditions that, in their constitutive "blindness," generate the necessity of the other.

Parse that shit down, Jimmy.

 

[Dak]

Also, "analysis paralysis" could be a catchy title for an essay.

AP is a well known phrase/problem in the tabletop gaming community. Some people are extremely prone to it, and can really drag a game down. "It's Joe's turn? Guess I'll go to the bathroom/get something to eat/watch a movie and hopefully it will be my turn when I get back"

 

[Jimmy... Dead.]

Cary Wolfe, What is Posthumanism?:



Parse that shit down, Jimmy.

 

[Zephyrus]

Alterity of the other.