The Poona of Peshwa
Blood Glutton
Morality being an obsessive concern what consenting adults do with their genitals, as well as condemning disobedient children, audulterers, and any other manner of blasphemer to death.
The Intransigence of Religion
- Thread starter Norsemaiden
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That was the view held by Enlightenment philosophers but it has been abandoned by contemporary thinkers. The scientific method is concerned with the falsification of theories through experiments; philosophy is abstract thinking. There is a kind of knowledge separate from scientific knowledge; knowing what it is to belong to a nation, to feel something, to appreciate a work of art, etc. This is the Nietzschean Apollonian and Dionysian (?). But philosophy works in a very different way than science and I'm sure you know it, there's no point to elaborate.
Philosophy attempts to find answers. In so doing it formulates theories. These theories qualify as being philosophy although they are not properly evaluated. The evaluation requires a process of logical thought. The process of logical thought/evaluation is concerned with falsifying a theory. (Not every theory is possible to falsify and can still stand as a plausible idea). But why can't that be called scientific?
The difference with religion is that it insists that it provides answers and has no process of theory and attempted falsification.
Surely a scientific conclusion can often be reached purely by the process of induction and/or deduction (rationalism) and without having to be the sort of conclusion that requires empirical evidence from an experiment? We agree that mathematics is a science don't we?
Let's take a philosophical statement like: truth never clings to the arm of a man with convictions. (Nietzsche).
We have to decide whether that is something that sounds plausible or not. It means that if someone is closed-minded and intransigent then they will not find the truth in many matters. So why not? Because their refusal to consider ideas that do not comply with firmly held beliefs prevents them from seeing many facts that would make them more knowledgable. That idea makes logical sense. The process of coming to this conclusion is one that is scientific in essence surely? It doesn't require an experiment to conclude that the idea is valid, but it is clear that Nietzsche exaggerated. Philosophy has a poetic license that science is not allowed. It is likely that some truths are known to the man with convictions. (Eg. what day of the week it is).
Science isn't limited in its ability to apprehend truths because of having lack of poetry and metaphore. Even though some (and only some) philosophy uses such imagery, we then try to make sense of the statements in the same way that we make sense of the most straight-forward theories about life. Making sense of something means thinking logically = attempting to falsify = scientific.
Can't it be said that all existence and all forms of thought are in the scope of science? Even nonsense is in the scope of science since we have to know what nonsense is in order to differentiate it from what makes plausible sense.
What he's indirectly saying is that there is no Truth because to be convinced of any Truth, is to be mistaken. Nietzsche was himself a man of strong convictions. O_O
Ignoring all that.. "Natural Philosophy = Science" would work as you mentioned.
Nile577
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I think he means totally the opposite; truth should not get in the way of convictions. Nietzsche abhorred the pursuit of "truth" and the view of philosophy as the pursuit of knowledge. If the truth of life is that it would be better for man to never be, the impelling force of "Life" is more important than "truth." This impelling force is the will to power, which allows man to overcome man and become the superman.
In regards to the wider discussion, we might consult the first introduction to Heidegger's Being and Time. If we accept his definition there - "science in general can be defined as the totality of fundamentally coherent true propositions" - with the caveat that "this definition is not complete...," we can engage fruitfully with the following passage:
"The totality of beings can, with respect to its various domains, become the field where particular areas of knowledge are exposed and delimited. These areas - for example, history, nature, space, life, human being, language, and so on - can in turn become thematized as objects of scientific investigations. Scientific research demarcates and first establishes these areas of knowledge in a rough and ready fashion. The elaboration of the area in its fundamental structures is in a way already accomplished by pre-scientific experience and interpretation of the domain of being to which the area of knowledge is itself confined. The resulting 'fundamental concepts' comprise the guidelines for the first concrete disclosure of the area." - Being and Time, page 7. Translated by Joan Stambaugh.
For example, biology is 'opened' (made possible) by a demarcation of the being of beings as 'life.' Physics is made possible by an understanding of the being of beings as particles; History by the being of beings as encapsulated events; Realist painting by an understanding of the being of beings as aesthetic objects.
At the risk of over-simplification: in order for traditional subjects to be possible, a concept of what is meant by 'being' must leap ahead and disclose the region of enquiry.
Let us consider a tree. We might say: "a tree is." What exactly is commonly meant by the attributive "is"? It depends on the domain of the totality of beings in which it shows up. From biology a tree "is" a living, photosynthesising being. From physics it "is" a structure subject to the laws of gravity, casting a shadow in relation to the position of the sun. From Realist painting it "is" an object of aesthetic beauty to be 'captured' in paint, glorify the painter's ability and be broadly suggestive of the "countryside." From religion it "is" the tree from which Christ's cross was fashioned and, as a cross, a being of reverence and redemption.
My point is not at all that our understanding of beings is subjective, but that a pre-scientific, pre-subjective (in the sense of belonging to the province of a studied subject, e.g. math, physics, history) understanding of being leaps ahead and reveals the domains in which beings show up.
These leaps demonstrate a common-sense understanding of 'being' as that which can be given as the being of beings in different domains of enquiry. How is this common-sense understanding possible? Elucidating this forgotten, mediocre concept of what we mean by 'is' constitutes the project of Being and Time. We cannot answer this question meaningfully until we have understood that it demands a wider understanding of being than simply the being of beings. That is, we are not asking about ontic modes of the being of beings, but being in general.
This question is sovereign and by necessity before religion, science, history or any other demarcation of the totality of beings. Heidegger's words in Basic Questions of Philosophy resonate powerfully here
"Philosophy is completely different from 'world-view' and is fundamentally distinct from all "science." Philosophy cannot by itself replace either world-view or science; nor can it ever be appreciated by them. If we attempt to calculate whether philosophy has any immediate use and what that use might be, we will find that philosophy accomplishes nothing.
It belongs necessarily to the character of ordinary opinion and "practical" thinking always to misjudge philosophy, whether by overestimating or underestimating it. Philosophy is overestimated if one expects its thinking to have an immediately useful effect. Philsophy is underestimated if one finds its concepts merely abstract (remote and watered down) representations of things that have already been solidly secured in experience.
Genuine philosophical knowledge is never the mere addition of the most general representations, limping behind a being already known anyway. Philosophy is rather the reverse, a knowledge that leaps ahead, opening up new domains of questioning about the essence of things, an essence that constantly conceals itself anew. That is preceisely the reason this knowledge can never be made useful. We therefore say philosophy is the immediately useless, though sovereign, knowledge of the essence of things. Philosophy cannot at all be measured by anything else but only by its own now shining, now hidden, essence." - Basic Questions of Philosophy, pages 4-5. Translated by Richard Rojcewicz and Andre Schuwer.
Norsemaiden, I think we should have a clear definition of science. Not all rationalist thought is scientific. I like to think of science in the Popperian sense. It is the falsification of theories through experimentation. In quantum mechanics we have probability; but in some sort of a Newtonian alternative universe, one can say that if you know the position of all particles in a specific moment you can accurately predict the future at any given point. However, philosophy does not make prediction and it is not concerned with practical things. Often philosophers make psychological observations but that's something else. Can you call the concept of Schopenhauer's "will" scientific? It cannot be falsified in an experiment.
Another thing important to philosophy is that not all knowledge can be formalized, like Russel's logical atomism. There exists intuitive knowledge (I don't mean the difference between bookish knowledge and practical knowledge, like knowing history and knowing how to cook), a sense of being that its source is not abstract thinking or understanding but rather the fact we are part of the world, unlike in science when we are mere observers of phenomenon.
Another thing important to philosophy is that not all knowledge can be formalized, like Russel's logical atomism. There exists intuitive knowledge (I don't mean the difference between bookish knowledge and practical knowledge, like knowing history and knowing how to cook), a sense of being that its source is not abstract thinking or understanding but rather the fact we are part of the world, unlike in science when we are mere observers of phenomenon.
"Convictions are more dangerous enemies of truth than lies." from Nietzsche's "Human, all too Human". Nietzsche must mean that we should not have convictions. He doesn't wish to be an enemy of truth. What would be the point? What he would object to is a conviction that is presented as being truth.
Surely anyone who reads philosophy is in pursuit of knowledge?
Nile577
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Indeed, that is exactly what he wants to be: an enemy of truth. At least, objective, rational, scientific truth. Truth must be revalued (the "transvaluation of all values") so that what is "true," and what is "good," become what is powerful. For Nietzsche the "objective" truth of life was nihilistic: it was not worth living. Heroism is to be found in living in spite of and even because of this.
The pursuit of knowledge led to the destabilising of Christianity and, for Niezsche, the great tragedy of God's death. Part of Nietzsche's criticism of Christianity comes from the fact that it was unable to withstand seekers of knowledge and truth (whom he likens to sly nihilists). Wisdom should set contraints upon what we wish to know. It is better to strive for life than to keep digging for truths that may render it meaningless. Life is more important than truth.
(The foundation of truth, for Nietzsche, was the body. That is, "truth" is the result of neurones firing messages from the senses to the brain. For Heidegger, truth is pre-existent in being. Spivak writes excellently on these notions of truth in the preface to Derrida's Of Grammatology.)
Looking for truths has given meaning to my life - and looking at those who have the least meaning to their lives, you can see that they don't have the curiosity to find things out. They see no further than what is absorbed through outside influences and without independence of thought.
It is interesting that Nietzsche can be interpreted in such opposite ways.
What Truth is according to the great philosopher Norsemaiden (hubris is my strong point) is: that which is. We can't ever grasp all of it, and we can never be entirely sure that we have grasped any of it. But it exists independently of our apprehension of it. A man with a conviction is certain that he has found truth. He obviously values truth then. But he is less likely to have found it than someone open minded.
I haven't time to continue this post I have to go and see the great historian David Irving.
Nile577
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From "Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks"
3
Greek philosophy seems to begin with a preposterous idea, with the proposition that water is the origin and mother-womb of all things. Is it really necessary to stop there and become serious? Yes, and for three reasons: Firstly, because the proposition does enunciate something about the origin of things; secondly, because it does so without figure and fable; thirdly and lastly, because in it is contained, although only in the chrysalis state, the idea: Everything is one. The first mentioned reason leaves Thales still in the company of religious and superstitious people, the second however takes him out of this company and shows him to us as a natural philosopher, but by virtue of the third, Thales becomes the first Greek philosopher. If he had said: "Out of water earth is evolved," we should only have a scientific hypothesis; a false one, though nevertheless difficult to refute. But he went beyond the scientific. In his presentation of this concept of unity through the hypothesis of water, Thales has not surmounted the low level of the physical discernments of his time, but actually leapt over them. The deficient and unorganized observations of an empiric nature which Thales had made as to the occurrence and transformations of water, or to be more exact, of the Moist, would not in the least have made possible or even suggested such an immense generalization. That which drove him to this generalization was a metaphysical thought, which had its origin in mystic intuition and which together with the ever renewed endeavors to express it better, we find in all philosophies the proposition: "Everything is one."
How forcefully such a faith deals with all empiricism is worthy of note; with Thales especially one can learn how philosophy has behaved at all times, when she wanted to get beyond the hedges of experience to her magically attracting goal. On light supports she leaps in advance; hope and divination wing her feet. Calculating reason too, clumsily pants after her and seeks better supports in its attempt to reach that alluring goal, at which its divine companion has already arrived. One imagines two wanderers by a wild forest-stream which carries with it rolling stones; the one, light-footed, leaps over it using the stones and swinging upon them ever further and further, though they precipitously sink into the depths behind. The other stands helpless there most of the time; one has first to build a pathway which will bear a heavy, weary step; sometimes that cannot be done and then no god will help one across the stream. What therefore carries philosophical thinking so quickly to its goal? Does it distinguish itself from calculating and measuring thought only by its more rapid flight through large spaces? No, for a strange illogical power wings the foot of philosophical thinking; and this power is creative imagination. Lifted by the latter, philosophical thinking leaps from possibility to possibility, and these for the time being are taken as certainties; and now and then even whilst on the wing it gets hold of certainties. Creative premonition will show the place; imagination guesses from afar that here it will find a demonstrable resting place. Especially powerful is the strength of imagination in the lightning-like seizing and illuminating of similarities; afterwards reflection applies its measuring and models (templates) and seeks to substitute the similarities by equalities, that which was seen side by side by causalities. But though this should never be possible, even in the case of Thales the indemonstrable philosophizing has yet its value; although all supports are broken when logic and the rigidity of empiricism want to get across to the proposition: "Everything is water"; yet still there is always, after the demolition of the scientific edifice, a remainder, and in this very remainder lies a moving force and as it were the hope of future fertility.
3
Greek philosophy seems to begin with a preposterous idea, with the proposition that water is the origin and mother-womb of all things. Is it really necessary to stop there and become serious? Yes, and for three reasons: Firstly, because the proposition does enunciate something about the origin of things; secondly, because it does so without figure and fable; thirdly and lastly, because in it is contained, although only in the chrysalis state, the idea: Everything is one. The first mentioned reason leaves Thales still in the company of religious and superstitious people, the second however takes him out of this company and shows him to us as a natural philosopher, but by virtue of the third, Thales becomes the first Greek philosopher. If he had said: "Out of water earth is evolved," we should only have a scientific hypothesis; a false one, though nevertheless difficult to refute. But he went beyond the scientific. In his presentation of this concept of unity through the hypothesis of water, Thales has not surmounted the low level of the physical discernments of his time, but actually leapt over them. The deficient and unorganized observations of an empiric nature which Thales had made as to the occurrence and transformations of water, or to be more exact, of the Moist, would not in the least have made possible or even suggested such an immense generalization. That which drove him to this generalization was a metaphysical thought, which had its origin in mystic intuition and which together with the ever renewed endeavors to express it better, we find in all philosophies the proposition: "Everything is one."
How forcefully such a faith deals with all empiricism is worthy of note; with Thales especially one can learn how philosophy has behaved at all times, when she wanted to get beyond the hedges of experience to her magically attracting goal. On light supports she leaps in advance; hope and divination wing her feet. Calculating reason too, clumsily pants after her and seeks better supports in its attempt to reach that alluring goal, at which its divine companion has already arrived. One imagines two wanderers by a wild forest-stream which carries with it rolling stones; the one, light-footed, leaps over it using the stones and swinging upon them ever further and further, though they precipitously sink into the depths behind. The other stands helpless there most of the time; one has first to build a pathway which will bear a heavy, weary step; sometimes that cannot be done and then no god will help one across the stream. What therefore carries philosophical thinking so quickly to its goal? Does it distinguish itself from calculating and measuring thought only by its more rapid flight through large spaces? No, for a strange illogical power wings the foot of philosophical thinking; and this power is creative imagination. Lifted by the latter, philosophical thinking leaps from possibility to possibility, and these for the time being are taken as certainties; and now and then even whilst on the wing it gets hold of certainties. Creative premonition will show the place; imagination guesses from afar that here it will find a demonstrable resting place. Especially powerful is the strength of imagination in the lightning-like seizing and illuminating of similarities; afterwards reflection applies its measuring and models (templates) and seeks to substitute the similarities by equalities, that which was seen side by side by causalities. But though this should never be possible, even in the case of Thales the indemonstrable philosophizing has yet its value; although all supports are broken when logic and the rigidity of empiricism want to get across to the proposition: "Everything is water"; yet still there is always, after the demolition of the scientific edifice, a remainder, and in this very remainder lies a moving force and as it were the hope of future fertility.
Nile577
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Or, Nietzsche would argue, they have found out all too much: that life is meaningless. There is no heaven, no hell, no reason to strive. We can sit around and watch television and find eternal truth in momentary pleasures. Technology will save us. Enjoying yourself through instant gratification is all that matters in life. That's the truth. Hail hedonism.
Nietzsche asks us to weigh the value of truth. Can untruth ever be preferable to truth? I would suggest, knowing your beliefs, that if a religion arose that condemned fat, lazy, wilfully ignorant, selfish, interracially married people to hell, you would favour it, despite it being metaphysically untrue, for the values it would instill upon life.
I think she doesn't mean that (if I'm allowed). If a religion happens to have specific values one approves of and are "true", it is fine to accept its truths, but only after examining them. If the scriptures say that "the sun rises in the East" and "thou shalt not murder" and one did some scientific research and found out both are true, it does not mean he is genuinely religious, because religion means you take it all for granted. If religion is understood as a set of truths that can be scientifically falsified or proven true then it is indeed moronic, but this is simply not the case
I don't understand what is "metaphysically true" and what is the difference between a metaphysical and an actual truth.
Nile577
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I was referring to "hell" being a supernatural (and scientifically untrue) enforcer for those, in this instance supposedly scientific, values.
I meant in the sense that, as a proposition, 'hell exists' is not usually required to be proven empirically, and hence - in the traditional understanding of the word - is a metaphysical proposition.
I am on the rather dubious ground of trying to expound an argument I don't find engaging (though it is interesting). I think the Heidegger passages above are of much greater importance to this thread than my attempt to give an account of Nietzsche's thinking.
Nile577
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There is an attempt, currently, to found a culture around the new atheism of intellectuals such as Richard Dawkins, Daniel Dennett, Sam Harris and Christopher Hitchens. Dawkins in particular would see science as providing motivation for life in presenting the quest for knowledge and understanding as a motivational grail. The meaning of life is genetic reproduction, which happens on a gene-specific level. We are lucky to have been granted life and should marvel at the cosmos while we have the chance.
On a personal level I think Dennett is considered and deeply affable. Hitchens too, though I often disagree with him, has been something of a motivating influence to me in the, perhaps childish, sense of being the greatest conversationalist I know. I aspire towards his high standard of vocal delivery.
However, while I have much sympathy for the reasoned critique of Christianity, I am uncertain that scientism is preferable to the supernaturalism of theism.* Indeed, new atheism is really secular humanism. How are we to experience true wonder, even dread, if beings are understood as substantiality and nothing more?
Setting aside the problems of authenticity inherent to wilfully creating a culture, and the dangerous proposition that atheism and theism are mutually exclusive, these matters are still only superficially grounded. Again, what is being? To speak of being as beings of substantiality and nothing else, or to 'tell a story' of being in a chain of beings resolving in a supernatural first cause is to subvert and obscure the primal force of the question.
It sounds like an absurd thing to say, but essentially there is no difference between 'isms.' All 'isms' do violence to the question. When we speak of ideological preference we pick a grab bag of candy from a sweet shop; a pleasing hobby but wholly outside the province of careful thinking. [Later note: that's not to say, of course, there isn't a profound moral difference between ideologies]
* = certainly I would wish for and attempt to cultivate the emergence of an authentic non-theistic religion.
WeAreTheLastMen
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yeah, yeah yeah, blah blah blah, pretentious Nietzsche quoting, etc. Most people have found a way for religion and science to coexist without disregarding any aspect of science.
Funny how that pesky virus works. No matter what is thrown in its path, religion piles on the rationalizations.
WeAreTheLastMen
Metacom
Ok, the first thing I'd take issue with is the idea that there are tons of religious people are "spoonfed" ideas which they never question. These people do not exist. You've never met anyone whose never questioned they're religion, even if you think you have.
A few of my friends spent a long time thinking that I had never questioned my religion, but for three years, I pretty much rejected every aspect of it, and even now, I've only accepted a few of the broader concepts. Yet because I wasn't as loud about my faith as they were, they adopted the attitude you seem to have: that they were somehow superior philosophers, because they had the sense to question. Everyone questions. Every religious person above the age of 20 has, at some point, had a crisis of faith, and you're stupid and conceded to think that you're "above" anyone religious because of propensity toward questioning ideas: it's a basic tendency all humans posses.
The second thing I have a problem with is your contention that a religious person would not possess an "inquisitive mind that is searching for truth, facts and understanding by critically evaluating information."
Are you arrogant enough to believe that when someone accepts any particular religion they stop critically evaluating information? Why, then, are there Christians who are both pro-life and pro-choice? Maybe because they evaluated differently the information they received regarding these positions?
This is just one of my pet peeves. The idea that ANY philosophy could "trap" someone or limit their freedom is ridiculous. There's no padlock on anyone's mind. If I say I agree with everything Hume has written, does that limit my mind? And if religions trap people, how do you explain the large numbers of people moving to and from different religions? Could it possibly be because you're ridiculous, and they were never trapped in the first place?
Anytime anyone accepts any philosophy, they do so for one reason: they feel that embracing it satiates their drive for knowledge - in other words, it frees them.
WeAreTheLastMen
Metacom
And actually Norsemaiden, a huge survey on religion was just completed (took a damn long time to do) and it turns out 44% of the American public identifies as a different religion than the one they were brought up in.
So much for your bullshit "spoonfeeding" theory.
So much for your bullshit "spoonfeeding" theory.
Should we be 'trapped' into not being religious over concerns of 'being trapped'?
What is it about 'not believing' that is inherently more admirable and dignified than 'believing'? Both grant a level of power / value to the bearer. Suppose one is of a nature where they do not and cannot effectively determine a more useful version of 'truth' or 'reality' for themselves than that which a religion provides them with - could it not be more 'admirable' in such a case to accept ones limitations and take up the 'best tool for the job' as such? I guess, as with most (all?) things, eventually it comes down to what you think the point of it all is.
i think i disagree
religion (my observation of it) prevents thought
here's how i veiw the "science vs religion" thing
let's say person A has an immovable obect in her apartment (let's say bolted to the floor) then let's say person B want's to know what that object looks like
science
says that person B should travel to person A's apartment and see the object for herself
religion
says that person A should describe the object to person B so that the traveling is not neccassary
the problem here is that person A is lying when she describes the object
Christianity tells us that "homosexuality is a sin" despite science telling us that there is a bio component, and that whithout religion homophobia doesn't make sense, as long as nobody is getting raped, how could it be problem if the 2 people are the same gender?
Cristianity tells us that the creation of the universe is 6 days before the creation of "Adam" even though that puts the cration of the universe AFTER the extinction of the dinosaurs
this specific survey being mentioned, is, i believe, the survey where the different denominations of christianity are considered diferent religions for the purpouses of the survey, this obviously skews not only the specific numbers, but invalidates the whole thing IMO
in the USA, the vast majority of the people are still Jesus Christ worshippers
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