A discovery

[Justin S.]

Dreyfus has tried to make sense of some of Heidegger's later writings on the basis of his intepretation of Division 1, but this doesn't always give a good account of Heidegger's later writings on art, technology and so on.

I agree, and think this is a fundamental problem. Division 1 is an analytic of Dasein that is structured in a disposive way. Trying to apply this structure to later Heidegger completely misses (I would even say "betrays", considering the way Dreyfus positions himself as an "authority" on Heidegger) what is attempted. I'm also critical of his appropriation of it in the service of things like AI projects, etc.

Most commentators just seem to speak (later) Heideggerese when they turn to topics of this sort and don't throw any light on these writings. It isn't clear anyone understood much about Heidegger's writings after 1930 or even that there is all that much to be understood there in the first place.

I believe you are displaying a much more condescending tone in your comments, and it hardly seems warranted.

It is absurdly condescending to dismiss the entire post-1930 continental "movement" in such a manner. I suppose we differ sharply on what it means to "bring to light" or to "understand".

The frustration in my tone (even if dull due to its constancy) is in response to this, especially attempts to scavenge pieces of Heidegger for the philosophical industry.

 

[derbeder]

I don't dismiss continental philosophy after 1930. I think all the following books are important, though I don't always find myself in sympathy with the style they are written in:
Merleau-Ponty (esp. Phenomenology of Perception)
Sartre (Transcendence of the Ego, Being and Nothingness - although some of Sartre's mistakes here result from not understanding Being and Time)
Gadamer (Truth and Method),
Habermas (On the Logic of the Social Sciences, A Theory of Communicative Action)
Derrida (Speech and Phenomena, Introduction to Husserl's "Origin of Geometry")
Foucault (Madness and Civilization, The Order of Things).

Many of these books are much more readable than Heidegger post-1930. I got into philosophy through some of these books as I got directed to them from a prior interest in literary theory. I always found Heidegger to be the most important continental philosopher. Yet despite all my attempts to make some sense of Heidegger after 1930, I couldn't succeed (I even did an independent study in college). Nor have I seen anybody succeed. This isn't quite what happens with any other philosopher. After a point, of course, one starts thinking that Heidegger really wasn't getting anywhere after the supposed "turn" in his thinking. Most if not all who take Heidegger's later writings to be important stick to throwing around Heideggerian phrases and imitating his prose but make no genuine effort to explain anything. At least part of "bringing to light" and "understanding" is being able to explain something in other (hopefully clearer) words. Fetishizing Heidegger's terminology and style leads to serious incomprehension. This is not a good way to do philosophy.

I don't know how much you know about AI research, but guessing from what you had said so far, it is not much. Maybe, it's not a good idea to be critical of any influence Dreyfus' interpretation of Heidegger may have had on AI research.

 

[Justin S.]

1. I don't dismiss continental philosophy after 1930.

2. Yet despite all my attempts to make some sense of Heidegger after 1930, I couldn't succeed (I even did an independent study in college). Nor have I seen anybody succeed... Most if not all who take Heidegger's later writings to be important stick to throwing around Heideggerian phrases and imitating his prose but make no genuine effort to explain anything. At least part of "bringing to light" and "understanding" is being able to explain something in other (hopefully clearer) words. Fetishizing Heidegger's terminology and style leads to serious incomprehension. This is not a good way to do philosophy.

A great deal of "continental philosophy" (especially Derrida and others concerned with "deconstruction") draws heavily from his later works (and according to you, are mostly charlatan failures, myself included). However, a good deal does not, so you are... correct in saying you don't dismiss it wholesale (which is not what I meant). Rather, as I understand it, you dismiss what is most important – it seems we have different notions of "continental philosophy" (indeed of the "meta" concerns in general), and I'm sure yours is more correct by volume, respectable influence, and other benchmarks of philosophical connoisseurship.

I don't know how much you know about AI research, but guessing from what you had said so far, it is not much. Maybe, it's not a good idea to be critical of any influence Dreyfus' interpretation of Heidegger may have had on AI research.

I am little concerned with the particular influence Dreyfus' interpretations have on AI research. I am concerned with and critical of the ideological framework supporting such an extraction and application. I see little questioning concerning technology and much embracing/aiding (however talked away) of the technological understanding of being. Dreyfus levels-off Heidegger's radicality.

 

[derbeder]

A philosophical connoisseur would not be doing philosophy at all. One finds something worth thinking about and tries one's best to understand the issues surrounding it. It does help to have some knowledge of what other people have thought about the subject. If what someone has written helps others deal with the issues it addresses (not necessarily because what it says is correct, but perhaps because it presents the problems in an illuminating way) then that writing is of philosophical value. That's all that matters as far as I'm concerned. And I have found Heidegger's early writings to be valuable in this regard. His later writings have not helped me in thinking about anything despite my honest attempts. I am making yet another attempt now, however - my interest in the later writings, especially those in the 30s, has been rekindled due to the translation I will be editing. So now I am reading the first two volumes of Heidegger's Nietzsche:

What did you make of these lectures, if you have read it?

 

[infoterror]

I greatly respect Heidegger's central ideas, but not his method or the way he presented his ideas (which I find repellent to the point of total hatred).

He writes like a coffeehouse full of hipsters accidentally accelerated into the g-160s.

 

[Justin S.]

A philosophical connoisseur would not be doing philosophy at all.

Exactly.

What did you make of these lectures, if you have read it?

I have not read them, but would like to at some point. I would need to re-read much of Nietzsche first, as it has been several years since I have read any of his work.

 

[derbeder]

In these lectures Heidegger almost exclusively focuses on Nietzsche's posthumously published The Will to Power. Nietzsche planned to write a book with that title in the second half of 1880s, but he seems to have abandoned the idea before his breakdown. Yet his sister published fragments from Nietzsche's notebooks as if they constituted a working draft of a magnum opus. Even though he is aware of the nature of these fragments, Heidegger still thought they presented Nietzsche's most significant thoughts - the will to power, its relation to art and to knowledge, eternal recurrence and the question of nihilism - in a unified way.
To make something of these lectures, it is good to have The Will to Power handy.

 

[speed]

In these lectures Heidegger almost exclusively focuses on Nietzsche's posthumously published The Will to Power. Nietzsche planned to write a book with that title in the second half of 1880s, but he seems to have abandoned the idea before his breakdown. Yet his sister published fragments from Nietzsche's notebooks as if they constituted a working draft of a magnum opus. Even though he is aware of the nature of these fragments, Heidegger still thought they presented Nietzsche's most significant thoughts - the will to power, its relation to art and to knowledge, eternal recurrence and the question of nihilism - in a unified way.
To make something of these lectures, it is good to have The Will to Power handy.

Perhaps I will have to check out these lectures, as they sound quite interesting. Will I need a pocket Heidegger Dictionary and Thesaurus handy? (kidding, kidding)

 

[Justin S.]

In these lectures Heidegger almost exclusively focuses on Nietzsche's posthumously published The Will to Power. Nietzsche planned to write a book with that title in the second half of 1880s, but he seems to have abandoned the idea before his breakdown. Yet his sister published fragments from Nietzsche's notebooks as if they constituted a working draft of a magnum opus. Even though he is aware of the nature of these fragments, Heidegger still thought they presented Nietzsche's most significant thoughts - the will to power, its relation to art and to knowledge, eternal recurrence and the question of nihilism - in a unified way.
To make something of these lectures, it is good to have The Will to Power handy.

Yes, I am aware of the focus on The Will to Power (and the work's origins). The themes of the lectures are highly influential to Heidegger's later works, so they are not unfamiliar. (and, continuing influence, I recently finished Derrida's The Post Card which drew heavily on the "eternal recurrence")

In fact, the prevalence of Nietzsche's views has, unfortunately, resulted in me neglecting a careful recent study of his work (as I said, I really should re-explore them, if not for this reason alone). I have an old prejudice: I don't understand, and certainly don't trust, a soul born in our era who picks up, say, The Genealogy of Morals, and finds its general thrust anything but intuitive.

 

[derbeder]

Perhaps I will have to check out these lectures, as they sound quite interesting. Will I need a pocket Heidegger Dictionary and Thesaurus handy? (kidding, kidding)

Heidegger's lectures are clearer than his writing. He takes his time explaining what he is up to and he discusses the text he quotes or addresses at length so we are not left wondering what his interpretation of it is. He also refrains from using too much terminology of his own (Thankfully, as his terminology around this time is close to incomprehensible to me right now. A short glance at Contributions to Philosophy: On Enowning confirms this.) There are four lecture courses on Nietzsche between 1936 and 1940 and I have yet finished only the text of first of these, The Will to Power as Art. I haven't really come across any idiosyncratic terminology in the 250 pages so far and skimming through the next 800, I couldn't find much either. This could be an interesting read, speed. But also a long one, I guess.