Regarding Dawkins, Hitchens, Harris: These guys seem out of their depth much of the time. Dawkins is really not philosophically adept and does not have the academic background to deal with the atheism/theism debate in a rigorous manner. I just would not go to that guy if I wanted an interesting treatment of the issue.
I am in basic agreement with the final sentence of your comment, but that's because (I think) I'm interested in theistic commentary that derives from a philosophical background, and philosophy is traditionally the arena of thought that has given us the most enlightening arguments for/against a metaphysical god.
I also agree that Dawkins doesn't have the complete academic background necessary for a theological debate. He's very intelligent, and in the arena of the natural/biological sciences he's definitely a powerhouse. I think he finds too much comfort and confidence in speaking about metaphysical matters with a purely empiricist/materialist scientific background. By this, I mean that he finds no evidence for a supreme god in his studies; everything in nature can be explained via natural and biological laws (which still isn't entirely true) and belief in god appears, to Dawkins, as a kind of unnecessary surplus belief, a leftover from pre-Enlightenment centuries. He doesn't really provide a logical argument about god's existence, he merely explains that there's really no place for such a belief in the secular pantheon of the natural and biological sciences.
I think this is a great case of the emerging influence of science in our modern Western culture, and the relationship between this emergence of empiricist/materialist sciences and the older, more originary pursuit of "philosophy". I've recently started a book by a guy named Quentin Meillassoux called
After Finitude that deals with the problem of studying the purported world before the emergence of human consciousness (or even life itself). Near the beginning there's a great little section where he says:
"Doubtless, where science is concerned, philosophers have become modest - and even prudent. Thus, a philosopher will generally begin with an assurance to the effect that her theories in no way interfere with the work of the scientist, and that the manner in which the latter understands her own research is perfectly legitimate. But she will immediately add (or say to herself): legitimate,
as far as it goes. What she means is that although it is normal, and even natural, for the scientist to adopt a spontaneously realist attitude, which she shares with the 'ordinary person', the philosopher possesses a specific type of knowledge which imposes a correction upon science's ancestral statements..."
By "ancestral statements" Meillassoux means statements about entities/events/things that are external or prior to the availability of human cognition (i.e. the Big Bang, the accretion of the earth, a supernatural god, etc.). I think this is a great explanation of the approach that Dawkins presumes to take (the "realist" attitude), and that which he ignores (the "specific knowledge" of the philosopher).