Dakryn's Batshit Theory of the Week

Lately Ive been beginning to rethink the praxelogical rejection of empiricism, especially in relation to the recently popular fields of behavioral economics, behavioral psychology, and neurobiology...

Does praxeology completely reject empiricism (I've read Human Action and some of Rothbard, and it would seem to me that it does, but I don't consider myself an expert)? I ask because it seems to me that a lot of behavioral studies have a lot to say for human action.
 
Lately Ive been beginning to rethink the praxelogical rejection of empiricism, especially in relation to the recently popular fields of behavioral economics, behavioral psychology, and neurobiology...

Does praxeology completely reject empiricism (I've read Human Action and some of Rothbard, and it would seem to me that it does, but I don't consider myself an expert)? I ask because it seems to me that a lot of behavioral studies have a lot to say for human action.

Can you be a little more specific?
 
they are ( the behavioral studies) empirical in their methodologies, and I don't feel like the insights they share are necessarily contrary to the Austrian school, in many ways, I see behavioral economics as an extension and evolution of the Austrian school (an evolution away from praxeology, but towards an understanding of human action and the decision making progress). In much the same way that recent discoveries in neurobiology and quantum theory have had implications for epistemology... is it perhaps time for praxeology to reassess its attitudes towards the empirical sciences?
 
Rothbard's praxeology differs from Mises's, and claims to be empirical from what I understand. He states:

Without delving too deeply into the murky waters of epistemology, I would deny, as an Aristotelian and neo-Thomist, any such alleged 'laws of logical structure' that the human mind necessarily imposes on the chaotic structure of reality. Instead, I would call all such laws 'laws of reality,' which the mind apprehends from investigating and collating the facts of the real world.

Rothbard seems to be trying to distance himself from Mises's Kantianism, which posits action as an a priori structure. Rothbard opts for a more empirical approach which denies the inherent nature of action in the logical structure of nature and instead claims that it is something empirically inferred from actual reality.

Rothbard's re-formulation is interesting to me, because it seems to drain the action axiom of any substantial meaning that posits it as an axiom. Axiom's must be self-evident (thus requiring no proof). Rothbard's concept of action might be better described as an inference, or idiom, making it more susceptible to debate in my opinion.
 
http://www.zerohedge.com/contributed/2012-07-08/it-aint-priced

Not only will Spain be on the hook for any investments made in Spanish banks by either the EFSF or ESM (via a state guarantee), but the actual guarantee has been structured such that the liability will not be recorded on Spain’s books as a debt.

The question of whether the Spanish bank bailout subordinates existing bond holders has now been answered. The bondholder are sitting in the back of the bus. And they wont like being there.

Do those technocrats think the markets are stupid, and won't notice this sham?

As it turns out, the much-touted Spanish bailout is more of the same crap we have been seeing from the EU leaders for the past two years. They are unable to realize a loss, their only response is to kick the same can a bit father down the road. I’m surprised that the change in terms for Spain's bank bailout has not gotten more attention in the press this weekend. I think it will be a topic of conversation next week.

If I’m right, the Europe story goes to Red Alert status for the balance of the month. Once again, I don’t think this is “priced in”.
 
Ein, not sure if you've read these articles. Thought you'd appreciate this..


The Violent Visions of Slavoj Žižek
John Gray

http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2012/jul/12/violent-visions-slavoj-zizek/?pagination=false

Not Less Than Nothing, But Simply Nothing
Slavoj Žižek

http://www.versobooks.com/blogs/1046-not-less-than-nothing-but-simply-nothing

Thanks Jimmy. I actually read these both yesterday, as I visit the Verso website frequently.

I think Žižek makes fair points about Gray's critique of his book. I find both of them interesting, but Žižek is the more rigorous thinker, I feel. I think Gray gets excessively passionate about his views. It's funny also, because Žižek quotes Gray a ton in First as Tragedy, Then as Farce.

I'm extremely interested in Žižek's new book, since it takes a look at current trends in science and quantum physics through a philosophical lens. Also, the discussion of violence is one that's deeply rooted in continental theory, and one that's explored by many prominent political theorists today, dating back to Walter Benjamin's "Critique of Violence".
 
I'm not sure what to make of it. I always felt Zizek aims to be misread, redefining terms to create more provocative sound bytes, defining violence in a way that he can say that Hitler was not violent enough. It reminds me of Lars von Trier's Nazi remarks. On the other hand I've found John Gray to be pretty insightful, so if Gray did make some grievous errors here, I'm disappointed that Zizek felt it would be too boring to respond to any of his actual points. It comes off as extremely childish.
 
I was talking to Pat about it, I agree Jimmy. I think this redefinition of violence is problematic, and most likely as you said, sensationalistic in intent. It's one thing to exaggerate to drive home a point, it's another thing to redefine words to their opposites to suit an agenda, and then whine when someone refers to the "textbook" definition.
 
I'm not sure what to make of it. I always felt Zizek aims to be misread, redefining terms to create more provocative sound bytes, defining violence in a way that he can say that Hitler was not violent enough. It reminds me of Lars von Trier's Nazi remarks. On the other hand I've found John Gray to be pretty insightful, so if Gray did make some grievous errors here, I'm disappointed that Zizek felt it would be too boring to respond to any of his actual points. It comes off as extremely childish.

I just finished Gray's book Straw Dogs, which I actually bought because Žižek quotes him in First as Tragedy, then as Farce. They have a complicated relationship, I think.

But I do feel that Žižek isn't entirely off-base with his "recategorization" of violence. He's trying to suggest a definition that challenges traditional conceptions, which he feels are more susceptible to state control. By defining violence as revolutionary action that behaves in such a way as to confound the state, I think he's exploring a definition that has more significance than traditional definitions, because he's taking intentionality into account. Granted, intentionality itself presents a whole other set of problems.
 

That quote should read: "It is amazing that people who think they cannot afford to pay for doctors, hospitals, and medication somehow think that we can afford to pay for doctors, hospitals, medication and a government bureaucracy to administer it."

Although suddenly it doesn't seem quite so "amazing" anymore.