Dakryn's Batshit Theory of the Week

[Einherjar86]

For argumentative purposes, I think we can distinguish them.

In practical human existence, I don't think we can; certain critical methodologies like deconstruction maintain the distinction, but only so that they can expose the ephemeral nature of these concepts. Language is bound up with human organisms, so using examples of linguistic expressions doesn't make the point. In order for those statements to actually make your point, you would need to successfully separate them from any human participation or action whatsoever.

While it may be possible to separate such statements from human iteration, you're still presenting them as linguistic statements. That, in and of itself, constitutes an excess of value purely in their etymological structures and histories.

 

[Jimmy... Dead.]

I agree with a lot of what you said. There is a good amount of anthropocentrism of an almost teleological nature in his article. It's a dangerous middle ground he treads, in my opinion; I like to see more skepticism. In truth, consciousness isn't all that evolutionarily valuable. It's more convincing, in my opinion, that consciousness performs logical "cognitive tricks" in order to virtually appropriate the world to our senses. An extreme argument might even put forth that consciousness involves an intense form of fetishism of its own relation to the natural world (which, in turn, would partially explain concepts such as "god."

I think the author would agree with you. Now, consciousness as a form of fetishism... that's a REALLY interesting idea. Do you have any goodies you can share on that?

 

[Einherjar86]

Unfortunately, not really; it was just an idea that popped into my head while I was writing. But my first thoughts go, of course, to Marx and the notion of false consciousness, which is bound up with commodity fetishism. So there may be a possibility there.

But as far as regular consciousness involving a form of fetishism... I'll have to think about it more. I really wish people like Derrida wrote more about consciousness itself. Unfortunately it's absent in lots of the material I read. Daniel Dennett deals in consciousness, of course; but he never talks about fetishism. The only other person I can think of is Julian Jaynes. His book The Origins of Consciousness and the Bicameral Mind provides a kind of history of consciousness, and there might be something in there.

The most obvious examples (although I'd have no idea where to start in their works) are probably Freud and Lacan.

 

[Dak]

For argumentative purposes, I think we can distinguish them.

In practical human existence, I don't think we can; certain critical methodologies like deconstruction maintain the distinction, but only so that they can expose the ephemeral nature of these concepts. Language is bound up with human organisms, so using examples of linguistic expressions doesn't make the point. In order for those statements to actually make your point, you would need to successfully separate them from any human participation or action whatsoever.

While it may be possible to separate such statements from human iteration, you're still presenting them as linguistic statements. That, in and of itself, constitutes an excess of value purely in their etymological structures and histories.

I think we have a different definition of practical then. When I say practical, I mean what can be practiced. We cannot practice the binding together of these things in interaction (at least, not in English). We have nouns and then we have adjectives. Since we think in terms of our language, we might essentially think the noun and adjective simultaneously, but we have separated them by nature of the language.

Secondly, the very point of the analogy cannot be separated from humanity as economics, or human action, cannot be separated from humans. Otherwise it loses all meaning or relevance.

"Universal" does not have to mean it exists without humans, and it's not a copout to describe something as universal to humans; ie "in context". We specifically went over that in developmental psychology tonight.

I've come to understand that I believe in the empowerment of the individual, as the building block of everything. This is the nature of psychological counseling, and it's appeal is woven into my personal ethos (it struck me most obviously as I answered why I was applying to a home improvement store vs some other industry). This is also why the basic principles of Austrian economics (I could borrow from the non-Austrian Friedman and say "there is only good economics and bad economics").

Looking into this essentially ad hominem critique of "fetishism", I see a level of truth in the most vulgar sense but this is not essential or necessary, and denies the individual. In fact, I have yet to read quote or non-anti-Marx critique that indicates anything but a raging anti-humanist. Understanding "good economics" assists in the de-fetishization of both object and ideology, while both consumerism and anti-commodity ideologies/actons fetishize objects either in their present or lacking state. If anything, I have "fetishized" the individual, and I am quite comfortable with that. I consider anything that does not fetishize the individual, the human, as antihumanist. If someone is comfortable with that, then so be it.

Edit: This was intriguing:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Commodity_fetishism

In the 19th century, Karl Marx contradicted the artifice of Adam Smith's "naturalisation of the market's behaviour" as a politico-ideologic apology — by and for the capitalists — which allowed human economic choices and decisions to be misrepresented as fixed "facts of life", rather than as the human actions that resulted from the will of the producers, the buyers, and the sellers of the commodities traded at market. Such "immutable economic laws" are what Capital: Critique of Political Economy (1867) revealed about the functioning of the capitalist mode of production, how goods and services (commodities) are circulated among a society; and thus explain the psychological phenomenon of commodity fetishism, which ascribes an independent, objective value and reality to a thing that has no inherent value — other than the value given to it by the producer, the seller, and the buyer of the commodity.

It appears to me as though Marx and Mises (or Bohm Bawerk etc) had more in common from a proper understanding of the foundation of economics than you would think from their divergent conclusions, if this was actually the way Marx put it. As far as I know though, he still subscribed to the idea of an objective (as in labor input) value of things, he just didn't believe it to be the price.

 

[Einherjar86]

I think we have a different definition of practical then. When I say practical, I mean what can be practiced. We cannot practice the binding together of these things in interaction (at least, not in English). We have nouns and then we have adjectives. Since we think in terms of our language, we might essentially think the noun and adjective simultaneously, but we have separated them by nature of the language.

I mean practical as practicable as well; and I disagree with you that we "cannot practice the binding of these things in interaction."

It seems quite simple to me, and self-evident. Observing information involves the simultaneous act of evaluating it. I don't really see how you can separate the two.

Language doesn't prove your point. Yes, we have nouns and adjectives, but separate from human use these don't amount to much.

Secondly, the very point of the analogy cannot be separated from humanity as economics, or human action, cannot be separated from humans. Otherwise it loses all meaning or relevance.

"Universal" does not have to mean it exists without humans, and it's not a copout to describe something as universal to humans; ie "in context". We specifically went over that in developmental psychology tonight.

You're universalizing it to all humans. If it is not universal, then it isn't universal to all humans. This is the problem of drawing arbitrary lines.

I've come to understand that I believe in the empowerment of the individual, as the building block of everything. This is the nature of psychological counseling, and it's appeal is woven into my personal ethos (it struck me most obviously as I answered why I was applying to a home improvement store vs some other industry). This is also why the basic principles of Austrian economics (I could borrow from the non-Austrian Friedman and say "there is only good economics and bad economics").

Psychological counseling can approach the human from a variety of ways; not necessarily from the point of view of the central, whole self. This is merely the method perpetuated by our modern society, not the essence of psychological work in itself. Assuming the psychology is the study of the individual is misguided, in my opinion.

Looking into this essentially ad hominem critique of "fetishism", I see a level of truth in the most vulgar sense but this is not essential or necessary, and denies the individual. In fact, I have yet to read quote or non-anti-Marx critique that indicates anything but a raging anti-humanist. Understanding "good economics" assists in the de-fetishization of both object and ideology, while both consumerism and anti-commodity ideologies/actons fetishize objects either in their present or lacking state. If anything, I have "fetishized" the individual, and I am quite comfortable with that. I consider anything that does not fetishize the individual, the human, as antihumanist. If someone is comfortable with that, then so be it.

Well, I love anti-humanism and often find myself skeptical of anthropocentric thought.

It appears to me as though Marx and Mises (or Bohm Bawerk etc) had more in common from a proper understanding of the foundation of economics than you would think from their divergent conclusions, if this was actually the way Marx put it. As far as I know though, he still subscribed to the idea of an objective (as in labor input) value of things, he just didn't believe it to be the price.

Yesterday, I mentioned that Marx believed all human action was the source of all labor, to which you replied: "Of course, without human action there would be no labor."

I don't agree, and the reason that I mentioned this about Marx is that Marx was necessarily ignorant of future technologies.

Today, many jobs are performed by machines, but I don't think anyone would claim that no labor is being done. Most of the work that takes place today (telecommunications, cybernetics, computer programs/simulations, etc.) can't be traced back to human labor or action. Sure, we can say that these machines/technologies were invented by humans; but the amount of labor that they perform ultimately adds up to more than human actors could fulfill in their lifetimes. We need a new definition of labor than what Smith, Marx, or Mises worked with.

Marx's objective theory of value is not an actually-existing bubble of value. You need to understand Marx's objective value as an effect of culture itself. He uses it as a tool the same way that Derrida maintains metaphysics in order to critique metaphysics. You can't take Marx to mean that value floats up somewhere in the realm of ideal forms.

 

[Dak]

I mean practical as practicable as well; and I disagree with you that we "cannot practice the binding of these things in interaction."

It seems quite simple to me, and self-evident. Observing information involves the simultaneous act of evaluating it. I don't really see how you can separate the two.

Language doesn't prove your point. Yes, we have nouns and adjectives, but separate from human use these don't amount to much.

Meaning is a concept intertwined with humans. Separate from humans nothing means anything.

You're universalizing it to all humans. If it is not universal, then it isn't universal to all humans. This is the problem of drawing arbitrary lines.

It's not arbitrary. We are talking about something specific to humans, but universal regarding humans. "All NHL players use hockey sticks in games". This is a context specific universal. Hockey sticks are not universal without the existence of humans, or even outside of NHL games.

Psychological counseling can approach the human from a variety of ways; not necessarily from the point of view of the central, whole self. This is merely the method perpetuated by our modern society, not the essence of psychological work in itself. Assuming the psychology is the study of the individual is misguided, in my opinion.

The first definition for psychology is the study of the human mind, particularly that part that affects behavior. Of course I think this is too limited and want to expand this thinking holistically instead of concentrating on just the brain or the "ego". The problems of collectives are merely arbitrarily grouped problems of individuals. You have to get to the root of (human) problems, and they are rooted in individuals.

Well, I love anti-humanism and often find myself skeptical of anthropocentric thought.

I think antihumanism is an overreactive response to vulgar humanism (the "trash the planet/do whatever we want" extreme). Agent Smith has his appeal but it's suicide.

Yesterday, I mentioned that Marx believed all human action was the source of all labor, to which you replied: "Of course, without human action there would be no labor."

I don't agree, and the reason that I mentioned this about Marx is that Marx was necessarily ignorant of future technologies.

Today, many jobs are performed by machines, but I don't think anyone would claim that no labor is being done. Most of the work that takes place today (telecommunications, cybernetics, computer programs/simulations, etc.) can't be traced back to human labor or action. Sure, we can say that these machines/technologies were invented by humans; but the amount of labor that they perform ultimately adds up to more than human actors could fulfill in their lifetimes. We need a new definition of labor than what Smith, Marx, or Mises worked with.

Marx's objective theory of value is not an actually-existing bubble of value. You need to understand Marx's objective value as an effect of culture itself. He uses it as a tool the same way that Derrida maintains metaphysics in order to critique metaphysics. You can't take Marx to mean that value floats up somewhere in the realm of ideal forms.

Machines are human extensions, made to jobs for us or do things we couldn't do in a particular location. The various components of our computers, the transmission lines, the power lines, the various power producing stations, the maintenance crews and equipment, the computers and other hardware in various respective administrative offices, and so on, all exist so that we (or others obviously) can communicate without having to travel hundreds of miles. If all technology were to vanish, we wouldn't be able to communicate without relocation, as the most basic requirements for life would consume all our time. Something as basic as refrigeration or the washing machine has fundamentally changed our lives for the better, freeing up millions of man hours to apply elsewhere.

I'm not sure you can claim Marx didn't see the measurement of human labor, or the labor itself, as an ideal form. But you've read more of him than I have.

 

[Einherjar86]

Meaning is a concept intertwined with humans. Separate from humans nothing means anything.

Then... you agree?

It's not arbitrary. We are talking about something specific to humans, but universal regarding humans. "All NHL players use hockey sticks in games". This is a context specific universal. Hockey sticks are not universal without the existence of humans, or even outside of NHL games.

Sometimes their sticks break. Sometimes they drop them. Does this mean they're not playing hockey while they're not holding sticks?

I realize that's a bit ridiculous, but my point is that universalizing within a given context is idiosyncratic. We consistently rewrite and redefine our contexts, and this in turn determines what counts as the category we're discussing. It may, someday, be decided that hockey be played not with sticks, but with flexible rubber tubes. This does not mean we will stop calling it "hockey." Likewise, gold might someday be discovered to actually be made of different material, but we won't stop calling it gold.

Yet we somehow get by understanding that hockey players use sticks and that, should they pick up the puck and skate with it, they'll be penalized; but this by no means should give us the impression that the rules are universal, even in the given context, since the context isn't universal.

The first definition for psychology is the study of the human mind, particularly that part that affects behavior. Of course I think this is too limited and want to expand this thinking holistically instead of concentrating on just the brain or the "ego". The problems of collectives are merely arbitrarily grouped problems of individuals. You have to get to the root of (human) problems, and they are rooted in individuals.

Who are, in turn, comprised of a multiplicity of behaviors, mentalities, and sensibilities. You can't boil a single human individual down to a singular state of mind.

I think antihumanism is an overreactive response to vulgar humanism (the "trash the planet/do whatever we want" extreme). Agent Smith has his appeal but it's suicide.

Agent Smith is a vulgar example.

Even ecological activism and animal rights are a form of humanism. Anti-humanism is merely a critical position so we don't let our anthropocentrism run amok. The philosophers who expands this critical stance into a full-fledged theory are merely suggesting new ways to view the world. While they may not be practical to pursue, they are practical to keep in mind.

Machines are human extensions, made to jobs for us or do things we couldn't do in a particular location. The various components of our computers, the transmission lines, the power lines, the various power producing stations, the maintenance crews and equipment, the computers and other hardware in various respective administrative offices, and so on, all exist so that we (or others obviously) can communicate without having to travel hundreds of miles. If all technology were to vanish, we wouldn't be able to communicate without relocation, as the most basic requirements for life would consume all our time. Something as basic as refrigeration or the washing machine has fundamentally changed our lives for the better, freeing up millions of man hours to apply elsewhere.

I don't see how this responds to what I said. Yes, sure, I agree with all of it; and machines perform labor themselves, labor beyond what any human actor can do. Contemporary labor is not reducible to human action, since a great deal of labor takes place without human intervention. The fact that humans once intervened, or intervene intermittently, is of little consequence, since the labor itself goes on. The fact that these technologies serve our needs doesn't make any difference in the basic labor of the act either; our needs may be fulfilled by the action of machines, but the action is still being done on their part.

 

[Jimmy... Dead.]

Just random, not related to anything above.

 

[Einherjar86]

Louis C.K. is pretty funny. I don't really watch him that often, but he always makes me laugh.

Nice Heidegger quote, by the way; little existential for my taste... But then, Heidegger did inspire the most influential existentialist of them all, so I guess it makes sense.

Heidegger is still one gigantic, looming presence that I haven't succeeded in fully tapping into. I have three of his books: Being and Time, a collection of essays (of which I've read a few), and On the Way to Language. No matter how many times I try, and no matter where I jump into it (the sections on the jug and the boots tend to be the most important for humanities students), Being and Time always repels me. I've read what the successors have said about Heidegger, from Sartre to Badiou... but Heidegger himself still overcomes me, and terrifies me just a little bit. No philosopher has really gotten past him, although a case could be made for Lacan and Derrida. For me, his politics are still too confused and unsettling to make me spare the time to really dive into his work, although I have a friend in the doctoral program at UChicago that would shun me forever if he heard me say that.

Have you been reading his material?

 

[Jimmy... Dead.]

Heidegger helps to give me a jolt. The anxiety in the face of death really hits me hard. It reminds me of Schopenhauer's work on the sufferings of the world

I've been reading Being and Time. Lately I've been interested in the idea of the deconstruction of philosophy. What I like about Heidegger's investigation of the self is that it isn't some obsession with being right or wrong, but just Being(what he calls the Dasein)in a period of time and in the world. The complexity of being thrown into the world from the minute you learn to speak a language, a culture etc.

I'm the ultimate layman so I take what I can use I guess; like therapy. It's hard for me to see a right way to read and interpret. Which is probably why I'm into Existentialism.

 

[Einherjar86]

Awesome.

I think that's a fine way to read philosophy, especially someone like Heidegger, whom even other philosophers disagree ferociously about.

 

[viewerfromnihil]

I think you guys, Jimmy and Ein in particular, would really like Benjamin Boretz. He was a writer on new music and also a composer. One of his works, Language, as a Music, is an acknowledgement of just that. Outside of college library databases, it can be pretty hard to get a hold of. I'll upload the PDF and first two movements of it tomorrow for you two.

 

[Jimmy... Dead.]

Sounds good, thx brosef.

 

[viewerfromnihil]

Here's the link:

http://www.mediafire.com/download/xla03d6c73r0rv3/Language,_as_a_Music.zip

I ended up uploading the full 6 movements along with the pdf score. It's a long composition, so I typically only make it through the first few.

 

[Einherjar86]

Thanks mate.

I probably won't get to it for a couple weeks. I'm going to be out of commission very soon; arriving in Michigan tomorrow, tying the knot next Saturday, and then honeymooning in Mexico.

Once more unto the breach, dear friends.

 

[Jimmy... Dead.]

Congrats! Have a good one.

355: The Giant Pool of Money
May 9, 2008
A special program about the housing crisis produced in a special collaboration with NPR News. We explain it all to you. What does the housing crisis have to do with the turmoil on Wall Street? Why did banks make half-million dollar loans to people without jobs or income? And why is everyone talking so much about the 1930s


http://www.thisamericanlife.org/radio-archives/episode/355/the-giant-pool-of-money

 

[Dak]

Congrats broseph!

 

[Einherjar86]

Thanks dudes.

The fiancee is out for some pre-wedding appointments, so I had a few minutes and thought it would be pertinent to post yesterday's article from Aeon Magazine. This is a great little gem for considering mathematics and scientific laws, and how accurately they correspond to reality.

http://www.aeonmagazine.com/world-views/margaret-wertheim-the-limits-of-physics/

 

[Dak]

Good article.

 

[Dak]

People have suggested that PMs are not practical for every day use. While I think that digital transactions make this argument useless, new innovations in physical exchange are rendering it invalid there as well:

Now, I take issue with Schiff's "intrinsic-effort" value monologue, but the point on PMs vs inflation of paper stands.