The Democrat machine put its foot down, told its bitches how to vote, and— barring some late-breaking statistical miracle— relegated Sanders to footnote status. Further to the right, Trump’s ascension has pretty much sealed the deal. Suddenly the court jester is within a stone’s throw of the crown. Pundits on both ends of the spectrum have stopped laughing. Conventional wisdom is that no sane person has a choice any longer: unite behind Clinton, lest the country burn.
I agree with that math. Which is exactly why I so fervently hope that Trump becomes the next US president.
"I make the best conflagrations. Nobody makes better conflagrations than me."
I'm less concerned about Trump per se and more concerned about the people whom he's swindled - i.e. his constituency. And I can't entirely blame these people for their naivete either, since they belong to a demographic that has been economically and technologically cut off. I oscillate between amazement and indifference toward the attitude they regularly exhibit on topics such as immigration, terrorism, spirituality, and a plethora of social issues. If there's fodder for a diluted, media-friendly, socially palatable form of pseudo-academic/intellectual firebrand, it's the people that support Trump.
I'm convinced that Trump will back off on every issue if he's elected. He's a con artist, not an ideologue.
In other news, I attended a lecture a few weeks ago. The speaker was Cary Wolfe, author of What is Posthumanism?, and he gave a really dense (but very good) talk about the role of politics today. Interestingly enough, the topic of ethics came up only once during his talk, briefly, and associated with an entirely different theorist. Wolfe avoided the topic entirely, insinuating that politics and ethics are two separate practices...
I asked him about this in the Q&A, and he invoked Niklas Luhmann. He said that Luhmann rejected all applications of ethical praxis since they ultimately must fall back on a good/evil dichotomy, and he perceived those kinds of absolutes as dangerous (I agree, although I suppose I define ethics differently). Another scholar followed-up my question with a thinly veiled query as to how we attach responsibility in the aftermath of financial fraud (obviously alluding to the recent financial crisis). Wolfe admitted that for Luhmann, this kind of ethical prompting is untenable and that systems theory resists any "unnecessary structural coupling" (this was his exact phrase).
tl;dr - modern science and technology demand a theoretical reassessment of social/market relations that move beyond the latent humanism of Marxism, but that also reject the conservative humanism of the "free market."
I've identified this trend in Land's work for years; but in more recent posts he seems to oscillate between all-out market complexity and some weird residue of humanistic improvement.
I still believe this is a side effect of having kids. Easier to be disinterested with no "skin in the game".
http://www.theawl.com/2016/05/john-mcafee-libertarian-candidate-for-president
I wonder if McAfee winds up in a Trump administration.
I believe that. Not sure if Land has kids though...?
The issue here is not merely that of salvaging the ideality of truth from its materialist depredations—to characterize it as such is to invite the predictable charge of reactionary protectionism—but to rehabilitate truth’s critical potency with regard to a postmodern materialism whose reverence for what is oscillates between cynicism and inanity. It is to do so, moreover, in such a way as to subvert the facile opposition between critical materialism and conservative idealism. It is not news to observe the dialectical complicity between the materialization of the idea and the idealization of matter. What is new, however, is the revelation that a genuinely critical materialism requires acknowledging the way in which the non-being of the idea is entwined with the being of matter. This is an insight we owe to Plato. Sometimes, old ideas reveal their proper depth only when measured against the actual contours of their successors. What I wish to do here is underline the persistent critical salience of Plato’s discovery of non-being, in contrast with the pathologization of the negative promulgated in the name of a post-critical—both anti-Kantian and anti-Hegelian—metaphysics. The names most frequently associated with this post-critical metaphysics are Bergson, Whitehead, and Deleuze. Among the implications of the view I wish to propose is that it is precisely those who inscribe ideation within the immanence of material being who find themselves endorsing the substantive equivalence of thinking and being, whereas those who follow Plato in defending the transcendence of the idea substitute formal correlation for substantial equivalence, thereby preserving the autonomy of the real. So I agree with those who, like Badiou, think it is a mistake to reduce Plato’s dialectic of essence and appearance to a two-world metaphysics of phenomenon and noumenon. Plato’s is a formal dualism of eidos (idea) and soma (body), rather than a substantial dualism of mental and physical. And such formal dualism provides the necessary precondition for materialist monism. Conversely, it is in the varieties of metaphysical materialism, including dialectical materialism, rather than in Platonism, that the ostensibly idealist fusion of thought and being is consecrated. Thus, one of the most interesting consequences of Plato’s suspension of the Parmenidean axiom is the winnowing of substance from idea: concomitant with Plato’s metaphysics of negation is a certain negation of metaphysics understood as tautological iteration of the equivalence thinking: being. What does this negation entail? Simply that in acknowledging that what is not, somehow is, we are also bound to recognize that what is, somehow is not. Plato’s exposure of the entwinement of being and non-being in thinking about what is, remains the most authoritative rejoinder to those who would subordinate the autonomy of thought to the immanence of being. It is hardly surprising, then, that the overturning of Platonism remains the indispensable prerequisite for reinstating the unity of mind and nature. This unity is the ultimate figure of reconciliation and the desideratum of all metaphysical idealism. Yet dialectics, from its Platonic inception onwards, is a method of division and an antagonistic medium (antilogikon) within which every temporary resolution is haunted by its unreconciled remainder. This negative remainder is, of course, the phantom twin of every affirmation, and Plato’s invention of dialectic is the first and arguably most decisive step in honing the logos to the point where it can puncture the otherwise impenetrable opacity of phusis, or natural being.
His first book (which he admits was ultimately flawed) was an effort to do just that. He argues that Nietzsche's philosophy presents us with contradictions that shouldn't be abandoned, but should be pressed through beyond their (nihilistic) conclusions. I have no idea what that would look like, by the way. Brassier contends that nihilism is the greatest problem facing intellectual thought today, and that it doesn't deserve to be abandoned but needs to be thought through, basically. That's what I meant by a "drive through."
Brassier has a somewhat different take on Nietzsche than most contemporary philosophers, from what I understand, and that has segregated him from the contemporary school of Western affirmationist philosophy, and aligned him more with critical schools. But he really resists this association, and his writing partakes of a very traditional, rigorously precise analytical style. Unfortunately it's also very dense and presumptuous (i.e. it assumes that its readership is familiar with the nuances of philosophical tradition).
It's kind of a curiosity that the author conflates the New Left with Mencken.
I think the primary charge against Butler is that no one can be sure about their interpretation.
https://pjmedia.com/richardfernandez/2016/05/15/the-more-powerful-than-a-bomb/
A word on the practical aspects of Marxism (shared on XS).