Dakryn's Batshit Theory of the Week

[Einherjar86]

I definitely don't think I have ethics figured out, and my ethical positions are largely heuristic in nature. I don't think I've ever denied that.

Wittgenstein wrote in the Tractatus that ethics are transcendental. By this, Wittgenstein means something different than you do in your own comments on transcendence. He doesn't mean that ethics provide a set of absolute or unconditional directions for behavior, but rather that the very concept of an absolute ethics lies beyond the purview of language. We actually cannot talk about a transcendental ethics. It makes no sense within the structure of language. Like aesthetics and religion, ethics (if they exist) occupies a space beyond formally organized systems.

My take on Wittgenstein is that I think ethical conversations can be had, and ethical policies can be arrived at; but I don't think they'll ever be consistent or absolute. Ethics should always be up for debate.

 

[Dak]

My take on Wittgenstein is that I think ethical conversations can be had, and ethical policies can be arrived at; but I don't think they'll ever be consistent or absolute. Ethics should always be up for debate.

hitlermeme.jpg j/k

http://slatestarcodex.com/2017/04/17/learning-to-love-scientific-consensus/

Quite a few links to genetic/sex based psychological/cognitive differences included, but linking the final closing point:

I would rather have a world of people debating who agrees with scientific consensus or not, than a world of people debating whether scientific consensus is even valuable.

There is one caveat to the above: I think it’s dangerous to promote a normal of agreeing with scientific consensus, insofar as that helps encourage exactly the mistakes about the nature of consensus that I discussed above. When poorly-informed diet industry gurus support the Bad Old Paradigm, their rallying cry is usually “You’re a stupid crackpot, bow to the scientific consensus which agrees with me”. I gave three examples above of cases where I would have gotten the scientific consensus 100% wrong if I didn’t have access to a formal survey of scientific experts. In a world where these surveys had never been done – or some existing field without these surveys – or some field where these surveys have been done inaccurately or in a biased manner – people will often believe the consensus to be the opposite of what it really is. In those cases, demands that people respect consensus can be used to shut down people who are actually right – the field-wide equivalent of calling true facts you don’t like debunked and well-refuted. I see this happening all the time and I worry that waxing too poetically about the unreasonable effectiveness of scientific consensus will only serve to empower these people. Goodhart’s Law says that a measure which becomes a target ceases to be a useful measure, so we should be reluctant to target scientific consensus too strongly.

 

[Einherjar86]

hitlermeme.jpg j/k

But seriously, that's actually why ethics always needs to be up for debate, and why it needs to be democratized. If you tried to argue with Nazi Germany, you were sent to "Holocaust centers."

http://slatestarcodex.com/2017/04/17/learning-to-love-scientific-consensus/

Quite a few links to genetic/sex based psychological/cognitive differences included, but linking the final closing point:

Wow, good piece. I understand his wariness of blindly accepting scientific consensus. But the point isn't that people shouldn't be skeptical; it's that they should take the time and do their own fucking research (if they can), like SSC did; and lo and behold, look what you find?

My frustration is with people who are skeptical without having any reason to be beyond their own personal doubt.

I like this comment:

I feel a deep temptation to sympathize with global warming denialists who worry that the climatological consensus is biased politicized crap, because that is exactly the sort of thing which I would expect to come out of our biased politicized crappy society. Yet again and again I have seen examples of scientific fields that have maintained strong commitments to the truth in the face of pressure that would shatter any lesser institution. I’ve seen fields where people believe incredibly-bizarre sounding things that will get them mocked at cocktail parties just because those things seem to be backed by the majority of the evidence. I’ve even seen people change their minds, in spite of all the incentives to the contrary. I can’t explain this. The idea that scientific consensus is almost always an accurate reflection of the best knowledge we have at the time seems even more flabbergasting than any particular idea that scientists might or might not believe. But it seems to be true.

 

[Dak]

But seriously, that's actually why ethics always needs to be up for debate, and why it needs to be democratized. If you tried to argue with Nazi Germany, you were sent to "Holocaust centers."

Well, I'm not sure those to things go together. You're assuming the majority won't go for things like genocide etc. The more I learn the more I have a generally low opinion of the intelligence of the masses. Now, in what may seem a paradoxical position, I still think it's generally best to let people decide things about themselves for themselves, but this has more to do with data problems. However, letting people make their own decisions about themselves also requires intact feedback mechanisms. In other words, and for a sociopolitical example, a lack of systemic safety nets. No learning can occur without feedback. However, letting the majority deciding about everything what is best for everyone is prone to all sorts of problems, which the previous vox article sort of addressed.

Wow, good piece. I understand his wariness of blindly accepting scientific consensus. But the point isn't that people shouldn't be skeptical; it's that they should take the time and do their own fucking research (if they can), like SSC did; and lo and behold, look what you find?

My frustration is with people who are skeptical without having any reason to be beyond their own personal doubt.

I like this comment:

I would call myself a "true" climate skeptic but of course I'd run into problems there. My skepticism isn't with climate change though. It's with the ability to accurately construct a causal model. In social sciences, even predicting something like 30% of the variance is major achievement - but that still leaves 70% "error" (that is, shit we haven't figured out yet). Planetary climate would seem to be at least as complex as human behavior and cognition. Furthermore, value assessments of climate change are entirely outside of the scope of climate science, but do start involving the political realm. Statements like "climate change is happening" and "to some degree can be attributed to carbon levels in the atmosphere" have zero necessary connection to or indication for statements like "climate change is bad" or "climate change must be stopped" (or even "can be stopped").

Because of the lack of specific interest in or even simply ability to interpret and untangle these complex issues in the average person, my relatively self-interested model of human behavior and cognition says they are going to interpret through their values.

 

[rms]

But seriously, that's actually why ethics always needs to be up for debate, and why it needs to be democratized. If you tried to argue with Nazi Germany, you were sent to "Holocaust centers."

can we just have a laugh where "holocaust centers" is seen as a 'softer' term for concentration camps?

 

[Einherjar86]

Well, I'm not sure those to things go together. You're assuming the majority won't go for things like genocide etc. The more I learn the more I have a generally low opinion of the intelligence of the masses. Now, in what may seem a paradoxical position, I still think it's generally best to let people decide things about themselves for themselves, but this has more to do with data problems. However, letting people make their own decisions about themselves also requires intact feedback mechanisms. In other words, and for a sociopolitical example, a lack of systemic safety nets. No learning can occur without feedback. However, letting the majority deciding about everything what is best for everyone is prone to all sorts of problems, which the previous vox article sort of addressed.

I didn't really provide enough information to talk about implications. I'm not assuming that the masses won't choose death panels. I'm simply saying that it's safer to insist on democratic processes for ethical action. I'd prefer democratically discussing horrible practices than having moderate practices with no chance for discourse.

I would call myself a "true" climate skeptic but of course I'd run into problems there. My skepticism isn't with climate change though. It's with the ability to accurately construct a causal model. In social sciences, even predicting something like 30% of the variance is major achievement - but that still leaves 70% "error" (that is, shit we haven't figured out yet). Planetary climate would seem to be at least as complex as human behavior and cognition. Furthermore, value assessments of climate change are entirely outside of the scope of climate science, but do start involving the political realm. Statements like "climate change is happening" and "to some degree can be attributed to carbon levels in the atmosphere" have zero necessary connection to or indication for statements like "climate change is bad" or "climate change must be stopped" (or even "can be stopped").

Because of the lack of specific interest in or even simply ability to interpret and untangle these complex issues in the average person, my relatively self-interested model of human behavior and cognition says they are going to interpret through their values.

I'm sure they will. And I'll keep discounting those kinds of interpretations as uninformed.

 

[Dak]

http://nautil.us/issue/47/consciousness/the-kekul-problem

One hundred thousand years is pretty much an eyeblink. But two million years is not. This is, rather loosely, the length of time in which our unconscious has been organizing and directing our lives. And without language you will note. At least for all but that recent blink. How does it tell us where and when to scratch? We dont know. We just know that it’s good at it. But the fact that the unconscious prefers avoiding verbal instructions pretty much altogether—even where they would appear to be quite useful—suggests rather strongly that it doesnt much like language and even that it doesnt trust it. And why is that? How about for the good and sufficient reason that it has been getting along quite well without it for a couple of million years?

 

[rms]

McCarthy? Ein is about to bust a nut

 

[Einherjar86]

His next novel is going to be so fucking good.

Dude's a legit scientific mind as well as an amazing writer. His intelligence is enviable.

 

[Dak]

The McCarthy piece corresponded nicely with this quote:

http://www.reuters.com/article/us-musk-neuralink-idUSKBN17N0CU

"There are a bunch of concepts in your head that then your brain has to try to compress into this incredibly low data rate called speech or typing," Musk said in the latest interview.

 

[Einherjar86]

http://nautil.us/issue/47/consciousness/the-kekul-problem

This is a strange piece, and raises more questions than it answers (of course, I can't say I'm surprised). For me, McCarthy's distinction between the unconscious mind and language leaves the issue of consciousness quite ambiguous. I'm not sure if he sees consciousness as concomitant with language or not; and this is important, because for the hypothetical cave-dweller to suddenly realize that one thing can be another thing, does consciousness have to be in the picture? Or does the realization of language's potential lead to consciousness?

In effect, this sounds like a Watts-ian revisionist account of consciousness, but I'm not sure where consciousness falls in McCarthy's view.

Also, I hope he credited W.S. Burroughs with the whole "language is a virus" theme--because Burroughs was writing about that shit back in the 1960s.

 

[Dak]

http://www.nationalgeographic.com/m...ntelligence-neuroscience-creativity-einstein/

https://qz.com/956682/philosopher-a...ing-silicon-valley-executives-define-success/

 

[Einherjar86]

The Guardian scores. A great read, very informative, and several connections I wasn't previously aware of.

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2...ge-philosophy-predicted-the-future-we-live-in

The Warwick accelerationists saw themselves as participants, not traditional academic observers. They bought jungle records, went to clubs and organised DJs to play at eclectic public conferences, which they held at the university to publicise accelerationist ideas and attract like minds. Grant remembers these gatherings, staged in 1994, 1995 and 1996 under the name Virtual Futures, as attracting “every kind of nerd under the sun: science fiction fans, natural scientists, political scientists, philosophers from other universities”, but also cultural trend-spotters: “Someone from [the fashion magazine] the Face came to the first one.”

Like CCRU [Cybernetic Culture Research Unit] prose, the conferences could be challenging for non-initiates. Virtual Futures 96 was advertised as “an anti-disciplinary event” and “a conference in the post-humanities”. One session involved Nick Land “lying on the ground, croaking into a mic”, recalls Robin Mackay, while Mackay played jungle records in the background. “Some people were really appalled by it. They wanted a standard talk. One person in the audience stood up, and said, ‘Some of us are still Marxists, you know.’ And walked out.”

Fucking insanity.

 

[Einherjar86]

From Shaviro's No Speed Limit (cited in the above article):

Marxists denounce capitalism for being inhuman and destructive; traditional defenders of capitalism deny these charges outright. [Nick] Land, however, jams the circuits by rejecting both sides of the binary; he extols capitalism precisely for its inhuman, violent, destructive power.

Land's position has resonances with that of the early twentieth-century Austrian economist Joseph Schumpeter. Today, Schumpeter is famous for his theory of "creative destruction"--cited by [Lee] Konstantinou because it is so central to neoliberal ideology. But in fact, the very idea of "creative destruction" comes entirely from Marx. Schumpeter is the only significant right-wing, procapitalist economist who actually took the trouble to read Marx carefully and seriously. And Schumpeter closely follows the Communist Manifesto when he highlights the way that capitalism "incessantly revolutionizes the economic structure from within." Schumpeter--like a smarter version of Ayn Rand--celebrates the mythical figure of the heroic entrepreneur. Where Marx emphasizes capitalism's long-term tendency toward stagnation, Schumpeter hopes that the entrepreneur's vital innovations can rescue capitalism from its otherwise fatal entropic tendencies. Fifty years later, Land updates Schumpeter's myth in postmodern and posthuman terms with his vision "of a cyberpositively escalating technovirus, of the planetary technological singularity: a self-organizing insidious traumatism, virtually guiding the entire biological desiring-complex towards post-carbon replicator usurpation." Here the entrepreneur is replaced by an entirely nonhuman entity: Capital itself as a viral source of new vitality.

Fucking crazy shit, and there's no way Land's style could be construed (even by him) as anything close to institutionally viable (much less discursively accessible). His style is a rebellion against the parameters of academic writing. This is why I'm fascinated by Land not as a philosopher, but as a writer of theory-fiction, or what he calls "hyperstition" (although that may be giving him too much prophetic credit)--or, more generally speaking, a speculative hybrid of gnostic occultism and science fiction.

Land really hasn't changed all that much from his late essays, which aren't essays as much as works of short fiction. Many of his current political beliefs (as much as they can be identified/categorized) stem from his late-'90s and 2000s writings (i.e. his breakdown and post-breakdown writings). This isn't to say that his current politico-philosophical positions are a result of his breakdown; but whatever the case, it's a really interesting tale of academic discontent and rupture.

 

[Dak]

I would say Land resonates with Austrian economics in general, except when he diverges from any account of human action or at least human action as a tool of capital rather than capital the tool. Austrian economics does not have the same difficulty (as various neoliberal and neoclassical schools) in treating with marxist economics because it directly deals with faults in the critique (LToV) and the prescriptive theory rather than relying on models and history as a counter. Counter models can always be formulated, and marxists regularly discount historical failings (of communism, not other economic/political structures) in favor of hopeful tomorrows. Millions of directly starved is no comparison to the failure to get wasted food on one continent to the starving on another. The latter is the greater outrage, because it allows the ignorance of the difficulties of production in favor of the mental simplicity of armchair redistribution schemes.

 

[Einherjar86]

Austrian economics does not have the same difficulty (as various neoliberal and neoclassical schools) in treating with marxist economics because it directly deals with faults in the critique (LToV) and the prescriptive theory rather than relying on models and history as a counter.

Well, I don't think that Marxism is an economics, in which case it's pointless to critique Marxism tout court (if such a thing exists) as an economics. Marxism is a philosophy of history, with its various imperfections.

Louis Althusser points out that Marx doesn't adopt classical economics' labor-theory uncritically, and he doesn't reestablish it in his own writing. In fact, Marx criticized Smith and Hegel because they both proclaimed labor as the source of all wealth and the essence of humanity. They reduced human action to an abstract ideal of labor, which Marx saw as a symptom of industrial capitalism, not as an accurate reflection of value.

I feel like I've said this before. I know that you're more familiar with Marx through Austrian critiques, which usually mischaracterize Marxism as an economics because they don't actually take the time to read it, as Shaviro says.

But no one has time to read everything, hence discourse.

 

[Dak]

Well, I don't think that Marxism is an economics, in which case it's pointless to critique Marxism tout court (if such a thing exists) as an economics. Marxism is a philosophy of history, with its various imperfections.

Louis Althusser points out that Marx doesn't adopt classical economics' labor-theory uncritically, and he doesn't reestablish it in his own writing. In fact, Marx criticized Smith and Hegel because they both proclaimed labor as the source of all wealth and the essence of humanity. They reduced human action to an abstract ideal of labor, which Marx saw as a symptom of industrial capitalism, not as an accurate reflection of value.

I feel like I've said this before. I know that you're more familiar with Marx through Austrian critiques, which usually mischaracterize Marxism as an economics because they don't actually take the time to read it, as Shaviro says.

But no one has time to read everything, hence discourse.

Well that may or may not have been Marx's intent, but it's been interpreted as an economic theory by both economists and your average undergraduate "revolutionary". I would say also the the Bolsheviks etc but it's relatively clear that economics were an afterthought and Marx was more a justification for state power than a prescriptive plan per se.

 

[Einherjar86]

For most communist revolutionaries, economic sustainability is an afterthought. Initially, the goal is redistributing the relations of production. The excitement over solidarity in violent discontent is enough fuel for only so long.

Marx's utopianism is the weakest part of his philosophy, and can barely be described as an economics in any recognizable sense of the word. He foresaw collapse (which accelerationists pick up on) but dressed it up in optimistic clothes by imagining an egalitarian paradise afterward.

 

[Dak]

For most communist revolutionaries, economic sustainability is an afterthought. Initially, the goal is redistributing the relations of production. The excitement over solidarity in violent discontent is enough fuel for only so long.

I agree. Destruction and redistribution is easy, production is hard. There's the ol Thatcher quote about "socialism running out of other people's stuff". Quibbles about semantics aside, it rings true.

Marx's utopianism is the weakest part of his philosophy, and can barely be described as an economics in any recognizable sense of the word. He foresaw collapse (which accelerationists pick up on) but dressed it up in optimistic clothes by imagining an egalitarian paradise afterward.

It would be interesting to see what a marxist contingent would look like which vocally eschewed the economics.

 

[Einherjar86]

I think it basically ends up being a form of cultural critique. We've already had some: the Frankfurt School, the Situationists (and post-Situationists like Baudrillard), and even deconstruction (which isn't a Marxism but has plenty in common with Marx's critique of ideology and false consciousness).

None of these can offer viable economic alternatives to industrial and postindustrial capitalism. Their strategy is to draw our attention to where the gears are jamming, especially when most people would rather look the other way.

For my part, I still think systems theory can offer viable models for a post-cybernetic economics (which would include things like automation, hybridization, simulation, acceleration, as well as elements of hyper- and auto-critique, which stem originally from Marxist critique of ideology). The demands of production would have to outpace society's auto-critical aspects, but no element of society should be allowed to escape critique (not even critique itself--a very systems-theoretical tenet: we must always try and observe the unobserved spaces). This approach would likely mean a transformation in traditional (i.e. early-mid-20thc) social values, but I'm inclined to believe that as the emphasis shifts away from atomized labor (as it's already doing) this will be less of an issue.