Dakryn's Batshit Theory of the Week

[Dak]

Both of those very good points still assume that the primary reason people go to work is to make the most money they can. Greif's hypothetical scenario is intended to liberate people from the concern over making the most money, and asks what people would do if they didn't have to worry about this. It's counterintuitive for us to extricate the amassing of wealth from the reason for working, and understandably so. We approach the notion of work/labor as something we would rather not do, but we do it anyway because we have to. We've built a system of values around the practice of hard work. I don't think Greif's proposal is practical or sound, but I do think it reveals how our standard way of viewing work isn't totally rational, but is a little bit pathological.

I think the apparent pathology is simply a mirage born of the complexity in the ever-lengthening process of production. In other words, we think we do not have to work to eat (or have anything else) because we didn't personally plant the seed, water it, weed it, harvest the produce, pack it, ship it, etc etc and maybe not even know anyone who did. The process becomes magical and why work for what can be magically produced. Modernity turns our understanding of productive processes into the myth of Gandalf's Sack (or a similar sack from any number of fables).

Secondly, and this has been said before, the primary reason people work is absolutely to make money. There is a seriously small minority of people who would continue to do what that do, or what dive headfirst into other meaningful work even absent some sort of directly connected compensation, but I will insist until proven wrong by such an actual application of work-reward decoupling that all economic, sociological, and psychological evidence points towards a further explosion of entertainment consumption, grievance movements, and general cognitive and social decline in response to such a decoupling.

One of the standard touchstones for contemporary Marxist intellectualism is that other forms of social existence and organization are possible, but that our cultural ideology makes it nearly impossible to imagine them (hence Jameson's famous line that it's easier to imagine the end of the world than it is to imagine the end of capitalism). I personally am not convinced that there are more effective alternatives to the general system that has developed over the past several centuries; but just because our current system is functional doesn't mean it isn't also slightly insane. We don't have to tolerate the bugs just because the operating system is still running.

So, to return to my original point, it depends on how we locate and organize our values.

Well, the more detachedly one views life, everything seems absurd and/or insane to a degree. I think the fact that the most heavily produced pieces of software require ceaseless updates to the updates suggests that there's a difference between recognizing that nothing is perfect and intolerance of bugs. Rather, we have to be able to provoke change while at the same time being tolerant of the problem.

Other grist:

https://www.wired.com/2017/04/the-myth-of-a-superhuman-ai/

 

[Einherjar86]

The process becomes magical and why work for what can be magically produced. Modernity turns our understanding of productive processes into the myth of Gandalf's Sack (or a similar sack from any number of fables).

Secondly, and this has been said before, the primary reason people work is absolutely to make money. There is a seriously small minority of people who would continue to do what that do, or what dive headfirst into other meaningful work even absent some sort of directly connected compensation, but I will insist until proven wrong by such an actual application of work-reward decoupling that all economic, sociological, and psychological evidence points towards a further explosion of entertainment consumption, grievance movements, and general cognitive and social decline in response to such a decoupling.

Your diagnosis of the myth is slightly misplaced, I think. It isn't "why work for what can be magically produced," because, as you say, people do still work. But as you also say, people don't work for food or some other direct object; they work to make money. So in this respect, yes--people do absolutely work to make money.

Because that's the system we've constructed for ourselves. Change the structure of distribution and accumulation, and you change people's motivations.

I'm still reading the piece on grievance moments from the Mort thread. It's long, but good.

Other grist:

https://www.wired.com/2017/04/the-myth-of-a-superhuman-ai/

This I'm on board with. Really nice critique of contemporary pop-culture perspectives on AI, which tend to shape intelligence around a human mold. I actually addressed this in my course this past spring. We kept discussing the difference in intelligence between human beings and nonhuman entities, and I eventually asked my students to think about the difference between human consciousness and intelligence, and whether the former implies the latter, or whether the latter necessitates the former. With regard to survival, I brought up things like ant hives and cockroaches and asked if those qualify as "intelligent."

All this said, the author's problem seems to be with the name "superhuman," rather than with anything that might be described as "superhuman." We tend to imagine superhuman intelligences in film (e.g. Terminator, The Matrix, Transcendence, etc.), but these are fictional fantasies of artificial intelligence--not scientifically informed possibilities.

Closer approximations would be films like Her, or the philosophical meditation on embodiment that we find in Ex Machina; but even these fall victim to anthropomorphism (although they're aware of it, I would say).

What the author seems to want to say is that we have an uncritical and inaccurate tendency to describe intelligences of expanded scales as "superhuman," which implies an amplification of human faculties and concerns (hence that superhuman intelligence could solve our problems). A more accurate description of these systems would be, simply put, different.

For my part, I've never used the term "superhuman." I prefer the phrase "complex system," or "complex intelligence." I definitely do think these kinds of intelligences are possible, and I don't think the author would deny this... I think he's saying that what we fantasize as "superhuman" is impossible, but complex intelligences are possible (and already exist, in fact).

 

[Dak]

http://slatestarcodex.com/2017/07/08/two-kinds-of-caution/

I worry there’s a general undersupply of meta-contrarianism. You have an obvious point (exciting technologies are exciting). You have a counternarrative that offers a subtle but useful correction (there are also some occasional exceptions where the supposedly-unexciting technologies can be more exciting than the supposedly-exciting ones). Sophisticated people jump onto the counternarrative to show their sophistication and prove that they understand the subtle points it makes. Then everyone gets so obsessed with the counternarrative that anyone who makes the obvious point gets shouted down (“What? Exciting technologies are exciting? Do you even read Financial Times? It’s the unexciting technologies that are truly exciting!”). And only rarely does anyone take a step back and remind everyone that the obviously-true thing is still true and the exceptions are still just exceptions.

 

[rms]

twitter and forums in 2017

 

[Einherjar86]

http://slatestarcodex.com/2017/07/08/two-kinds-of-caution/

Is this an argument for the potential risks of AI development, or a more abstract argument for adopting meta-contrarian positions in order to challenge popular belief?

Also, did you follow the link to the LessWrong piece? I read this paragraph with a raised eyebrow:

According to the survey, the average IQ on this site is around 145. People on this site differ from the mainstream in that they are more willing to say death is bad, more willing to say that science, capitalism, and the like are good, and less willing to say that there's some deep philosophical sense in which 1+1 = 3. That suggests people around that level of intelligence have reached the point where they no longer feel it necessary to differentiate themselves from the sort of people who aren't smart enough to understand that there might be side benefits to death. Instead, they are at the level where they want to differentiate themselves from the somewhat smarter people who think the side benefits to death are great. They are, basically, meta-contrarians, who counter-signal by holding opinions contrary to those of the contrarians' signals. And in the case of death, this cannot but be a good thing.

I'm not sure what this paragraph is suggesting. There are plenty of people with IQs of ~145 who would probably say that science and capitalism are bad (I wouldn't, but then my IQ is ~132).

Also, for the record, I wouldn't say that I'd argue for the philosophical value of "1+1=3" because it makes me look smarter, but because I'm fascinated by the philosophical arguments that promote such an equation. Actually, I wouldn't recommend any philosophical arguments on this matter, but Ted Chiang's awesome short story "Division by Zero."

The LessWrong author seems to be saying that people of about my IQ (~130) adopt counterintuitive arguments, and that these arguments don't fool the slightly smarter genius group (~140). I think this is pretty presumptuous. Let's say we have a group of people of equal intelligence (~135); those among this group won't treat each other's counterintuitive arguments as automatic signals that she or he is really smart. When I hear a counterintuitive argument from an intellectual peer, I might think to myself "that's interesting"--but I'd also treat the argument with suspicion and look into it myself. So, I think the LessWrong suggestion only works when a circa 135 argument is being offered to those of lower intelligence, let's say the average IQ of 100 (maybe the author said this, I didn't read the whole thing). Among a group of intellectual competitors though, circa 135, this simply doesn't happen. Counterintuitive arguments don't get free pass as clear signs of intelligence; they're subject to challenges and alternative possibilities.

Maybe I'm misunderstanding the general gist of both blogs.

 

[Dak]

Is this an argument for the potential risks of AI development, or a more abstract argument for adopting meta-contrarian positions in order to challenge popular belief?

Also, did you follow the link to the LessWrong piece? I read this paragraph with a raised eyebrow:


I'm not sure what this paragraph is suggesting. There are plenty of people with IQs of ~145 who would probably say that science and capitalism are bad (I wouldn't, but then my IQ is ~132).

Also, for the record, I wouldn't say that I'd argue for the philosophical value of "1+1=3" because it makes me look smarter, but because I'm fascinated by the philosophical arguments that promote such an equation. Actually, I wouldn't recommend any philosophical arguments on this matter, but Ted Chiang's awesome short story "Division by Zero."

The LessWrong author seems to be saying that people of about my IQ (~130) adopt counterintuitive arguments, and that these arguments don't fool the slightly smarter genius group (~140). I think this is pretty presumptuous. Let's say we have a group of people of equal intelligence (~135); those among this group won't treat each other's counterintuitive arguments as automatic signals that she or he is really smart. When I hear a counterintuitive argument from an intellectual peer, I might think to myself "that's interesting"--but I'd also treat the argument with suspicion and look into it myself. So, I think the LessWrong suggestion only works when a circa 135 argument is being offered to those of lower intelligence, let's say the average IQ of 100 (maybe the author said this, I didn't read the whole thing). Among a group of intellectual competitors though, circa 135, this simply doesn't happen. Counterintuitive arguments don't get free pass as clear signs of intelligence; they're subject to challenges and alternative possibilities.

Maybe I'm misunderstanding the general gist of both blogs.

I did not follow the link (irregular behavior from me!). I've never taken an actual IQ test but based on all other testing I have taken I'm guesstimating in the 125-135 range (IQs have confidence intervals), so on par with yours (both us of probably punch above our weight due to a heavy cognitive bias to the verbal over quantitative).

I think your point here is interesting. I would tentatively agree that the tendency to make a big deal out of "counterintuitive arguments" would be an attempt to signal intelligence (rather than virtue - unless intelligence is the virtue in question), which would ironically mean that this "meta-contrarianism" complaint winds up being the next level of one-ups-manship. Meta-meta-contrarianism?

Edit: I do appreciate that SA tends to be skeptic of the LW community tendency to pat itself on the back too much.

 

[Einherjar86]

The SSC piece was more nuanced than LW, I think.

The LW piece looks wobblier under closer scrutiny. For instance, from what I saw, it doesn't much consider the difference (if there is one) between intelligence and signaling intelligence. The author treats the two things as ostensibly distinct--i.e. circa 130 IQ people are smart, but their attempt to signal their intelligence is actually a kind of intellectual dishonesty; meanwhile, circa 145 IQ people see this as a form of unintelligence designed to deceive (crafty unintelligence?). None of this is explicit (again, from what I read), but the author's breezy use of these terms invites skepticism, I think.

I would want to ask the author whether signaling faux intelligence precludes being itself an act of intelligence--i.e. does signaling faux intelligence actually signal real intelligence? The only generous reading I can see of this argument is that people of moderate intelligence (~130) adopt counterintuitive positions so as to signal that they actually have a higher intelligence (~145); and that people of higher intelligence (~145) can spot these prevarications. My problem with this is that people of moderate intelligence (~130) don't need to communicate extra intelligence to those of lower intelligence (~100), since all they need to do to prove their intelligence to that group is act in accordance with their own level of intelligence. The only people it would make sense to signal extra intelligence to are those of higher intelligence (~145); but these are precisely the people who can spot the deception.

Sorry for that headache of a paragraph, but the whole LW premise just looks really shaky to me.

 

[Dak]

I haven't had the time to read the LW piece but I would assume signaling isn't inherently target-able unless one is only talking with one other person. Here's my off-the-cuff psychologizing on it: Paying attention to the obvious thing is what the average person would do naturally unless "enlightened" (maybe they grew up around lots of smarter people or whatever and overheard things). Paying attention to the exception is what the smarter group would do (using 130 as the line, that's 2 out of 100) as a way to distinguish itself from average. 2 out of 100 is good, but you're still mistakeable for 115s who vastly outnumber you (~12 out of 100). The top career choices for 115-135 heavily overlap due to supply/demand law, so differentiation requires more social nuances. Once you're at 145, so like, 1 in 1000 people or whatever, you don't give a shit about signaling your intelligence because it's probably pretty damn obvious in a myriad of other ways.

 

[Einherjar86]

That makes more sense, I think. I'm still suspicious of the social value of "signaling," but I can see how it would potentially serve a purpose in the more homogeneous pool of 115-135 applicants.

I guess as part of my education I wouldn't necessarily promote counterintuitive positions as my own (i.e. as those I believe are accurate), but I certainly enjoy discussing them. I'm not sure if that counts as signaling or not...

 

[Dak]

That makes more sense, I think. I'm still suspicious of the social value of "signaling," but I can see how it would potentially serve a purpose in the more homogeneous pool of 115-135 applicants.

People constantly signal things, consciously or unconsciously. Where we work/live, what/where we eat, what we drive or if we don't drive, what we wear/don't wear, what we talk about and where we talk what, etc etc. We're creating a social image or perceptions, and in some cases intentionally crafting it. Virtue signaling is as old as any other: How many times does one go to confessional or traveling to Mecca or Israel can have facsimiles in Fish logos or pro-LGBT/COEXIST car adornments.

I get the annoyance with it "virtue signaling!" charge being thrown out by people who probably didn't even actually read the signal, but from my position it does seem that almost every single article getting put out in any major or minor outlet (to include "conservative" outlets) are heeeeeavy on "virtue signaling" (which can also take the form of cringe-worthy NRA ads), which to me is a sign of serious socio-cultural dysfunction. It just so happens that the majority of sites are staffed heavily with people on the left, and anyone who might be on the right is going to have to hide or be at risk much in the way you would have difficulty having any job at FOXnews or Breitbart unless you were an agreeable token "opposition".

I guess as part of my education I wouldn't necessarily promote counterintuitive positions as my own (i.e. as those I believe are accurate), but I certainly enjoy discussing them. I'm not sure if that counts as signaling or not...

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Functional_contextualism

If one were to try and understand if one were engaging in intentional signaling, I think the question to ask is "What is/are the function(s) of this behavior in this context?". In relation to knowledge and dialogue, if the primary function is so you can learn something, that would probably be less likely to be signaling behavior. If the primary function is so others can learn something (separate from necessary pedagogy), probably more likely to be signaling.

 

[Einherjar86]

People constantly signal things, consciously or unconsciously. Where we work/live, what/where we eat, what we drive or if we don't drive, what we wear/don't wear, what we talk about and where we talk what, etc etc. We're creating a social image or perceptions, and in some cases intentionally crafting it. Virtue signaling is as old as any other: How many times does one go to confessional or traveling to Mecca or Israel can have facsimiles in Fish logos or pro-LGBT/COEXIST car adornments.

I get the annoyance with it "virtue signaling!" charge being thrown out by people who probably didn't even actually read the signal, but from my position it does seem that almost every single article getting put out in any major or minor outlet (to include "conservative" outlets) are heeeeeavy on "virtue signaling" (which can also take the form of cringe-worthy NRA ads), which to me is a sign of serious socio-cultural dysfunction. It just so happens that the majority of sites are staffed heavily with people on the left, and anyone who might be on the right is going to have to hide or be at risk much in the way you would have difficulty having any job at FOXnews or Breitbart unless you were an agreeable token "opposition".

I should have been more specific. I understand the social value of signaling in general, I'm just not sure about this particular phenomenon of "intelligence signaling," I suppose we could call it. Or I'm not sold on exactly how LW claims it happens.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Functional_contextualism

If one were to try and understand if one were engaging in intentional signaling, I think the question to ask is "What is/are the function(s) of this behavior in this context?". In relation to knowledge and dialogue, if the primary function is so you can learn something, that would probably be less likely to be signaling behavior. If the primary function is so others can learn something (separate from necessary pedagogy), probably more likely to be signaling.

Well, this is a good start. Although I'm not sure what category questions would fall into. A perceptive question can reflect a genuine desire to know more and simultaneously signal one's intelligence. I'm sure there are some cases in which signaling and non-signaling behavior are easily differentiated, but others in which they're not. And in those cases it might be that there is no meaningful difference.

 

[Dak]

https://www.city-journal.org/html/war-work-and-how-end-it-15250.html

Could easily go into the Mort thread or the Politics thread. Harvard economist laying out a long but reasonably concise review of how the interplay of economic downturns, industrial shifts, and an increasingly generous safety net have created layer after layer of a permanently unemployed class, with disastrous social effects.

The most important part, from a public health perspective:

Economists Andrew Clark and Andrew Oswald have documented the huge drop in happiness associated with unemployment—about ten times larger than that associated with a reduction in earnings from the $50,000–$75,000 range to the $35,000–$50,000 bracket. One recent study estimated that unemployment leads to 45,000 suicides worldwide annually. Jobless husbands have a 50 percent higher divorce rate than employed husbands. The impact of lower income on suicide and divorce is much smaller. The negative effects of unemployment are magnified because it so often becomes a semipermanent state.

Time-use studies help us understand why the unemployed are so miserable. Jobless men don’t do a lot more socializing; they don’t spend much more time with their kids. They do spend an extra 100 minutes daily watching television, and they sleep more. The jobless also are more likely to use illegal drugs. While fewer than 10 percent of full-time workers have used an illegal substance in any given week, 18 percent of the unemployed have done drugs in the last seven days, according to a 2013 study by Alejandro Badel and Brian Greaney.

Joblessness and disability are also particularly associated with America’s deadly opioid epidemic. David Cutler and I examined the rise in opioid deaths between 1992 and 2012. The strongest correlate of those deaths is the share of the population on disability. That connection suggests a combination of the direct influence of being disabled, which generates a demand for painkillers; the availability of the drugs through the health-care system; and the psychological misery of having no economic future.

Increasing the benefits received by nonemployed persons may make their lives easier in a material sense but won’t help reattach them to the labor force. It won’t give them the sense of pride that comes from economic independence. It won’t give them the reassuring social interactions that come from workplace relationships. When societies sacrifice employment for a notion of income equality, they make the wrong choice.

This is an underappreciated problem with UBI, and lends support to those like myself who assert that the "freedom" allowed is the freedom to be miserable for the average person.

While I don't share his optimism for retooling older workers, any Misesian would agree with this, at least in so far as it goes:

Along with up-skilling workers, we should lower the regulatory barriers to entrepreneurship. It’s a sad fact that America tends to regulate the entrepreneurship of the poor much more stringently than it does that of the rich. You can begin an Internet company in Silicon Valley with little regulatory oversight; you need more than ten permits to open a grocery store in the Bronx.

One-stop permitting would be a good step, especially in poorer areas. If new businesses had only a single regulatory office to satisfy, the obstacles to entrepreneurship would be less daunting. One-stop permitting would also make it easier to evaluate the regulator on its speed and the number of permits issued. Permitting shops could specialize in the languages and businesses most common in their areas.

He provides a mixed bag of other recommendations I won't go into, but I agree most with this assertion:

American entrepreneurs can solve our joblessness crisis only if the U.S. stops incentivizing joblessness.

 

[Einherjar86]

Social assistance programs need to be overhauled, that I think is correct. For the time being, all they do is perpetuate unemployment and general poverty. Most people living on welfare aren't going out and blowing it on X-boxes or flatscreens, they're using it to scrape by; but that doesn't mean they're actively going out and looking for work either (whether due to incapacity, complacency, or other mitigating factors like taking care of children or sick relatives).

Even self-proclaimed socialists champion small businesses, and I don't think you'll find a vast majority of democrats who are anti-entrepreneurship. But there's no reason why increased entrepreneurship and social assistance programs can't exist side by side. I'm wary of arguments that suggest that new businesses can "solve" the unemployment problem. I think they can help, but they can't solve it.

Honestly, I agree with Glaeser that what's needed is social reform, calculated educational interventions at local levels, and better financial management. I'm not for cutting anything in this regard. If anything, I think more money needs to be pumped into these programs, but they need to be revised and they need to allocate more funds toward educational outreach, not toward welfare checks. If empowering entrepreneurship would also help, then go for it.

 

[Dak]

Social assistance programs need to be overhauled, that I think is correct. For the time being, all they do is perpetuate unemployment and general poverty. Most people living on welfare aren't going out and blowing it on X-boxes or flatscreens, they're using it to scrape by; but that doesn't mean they're actively going out and looking for work either (whether due to incapacity, complacency, or other mitigating factors like taking care of children or sick relatives).

It would be interesting if a study would be funded (of course the left-outrage machine would howl ever so loudly at the racistness of the suggestion even though more whites in raw numbers are on govt assistance) to see what the overlap is in households on govt assistance and households with flatscreens and/or current or just previous gen consoles (and generally recent flagship smartphones). I would put money on the number being well over 50% - 80%+ wouldn't suprise me. There might be any number of explanations for those findings, but the overall point is that poor people typically have poor spending habits to compound all their other problems. There are limitations to some levels of poor living that prevent smarter spending in some ways, but what mentally traps people in that sort of vortex of unhappiness? No imagination or no hope?

Even self-proclaimed socialists champion small businesses, and I don't think you'll find a vast majority of democrats who are anti-entrepreneurship. But there's no reason why increased entrepreneurship and social assistance programs can't exist side by side. I'm wary of arguments that suggest that new businesses can "solve" the unemployment problem. I think they can help, but they can't solve it.

I would agree both with the fact that being comfortably unemployed is not amenable to entrepreneurship and that low to no social net is cruel next to a burdensome business regulatory apparatus.

Honestly, I agree with Glaeser that what's needed is social reform, calculated educational interventions at local levels, and better financial management. I'm not for cutting anything in this regard. If anything, I think more money needs to be pumped into these programs, but they need to be revised and they need to allocate more funds toward educational outreach, not toward welfare checks. If empowering entrepreneurship would also help, then go for it.

The one problem that I have with the increased educational opportunity angle is that prior research and current states of public education suggest that free to-near free education is not valued by those that need it most. People value what has been worked for more than what has not been.

 

[rms]

suggest that free to-near free education is not valued by those that need it most. People value what has been worked for more than what has not been.

this would coincide with the author's point though, right?

i think he should have gone into more detail about why Germany is the better place for education. From my understanding, it's a government directed and mandated system based on testing at far too young of an age, and I do not agree with their model even though it is successful (outside of needing Turkish and other middle eastern refugees for every other kind of labor)

 

[Einherjar86]

The one problem that I have with the increased educational opportunity angle is that prior research and current states of public education suggest that free to-near free education is not valued by those that need it most. People value what has been worked for more than what has not been.

Just to clarify, by "calculated educational interventions" I meant outreach programs designed to work with unemployed individuals on things like job hunting and planning, materials (letters, resumes, etc.), interviews, and possibly courses geared toward training, public speaking, financial planning, etc. This would be pitched as quite directly related to, and intended to assist, individuals on job searches. It needs to be understood as "You earn this retroactively, once you use what we give you to get a job."

I wasn't envisioning courses on nuclear chemistry, modernist fiction, or the Civil War (for example).

 

[CiG]

Most people living on welfare aren't going out and blowing it on X-boxes or flatscreens, they're using it to scrape by

You don't know too many welfare recipients do you?

 

[Einherjar86]

It would be interesting if a study would be funded (of course the left-outrage machine would howl ever so loudly at the racistness of the suggestion even though more whites in raw numbers are on govt assistance) to see what the overlap is in households on govt assistance and households with flatscreens and/or current or just previous gen consoles (and generally recent flagship smartphones). I would put money on the number being well over 50% - 80%+ wouldn't suprise me. There might be any number of explanations for those findings, but the overall point is that poor people typically have poor spending habits to compound all their other problems.

You don't know too many welfare recipients do you?

No, I don't.

http://www.slate.com/blogs/moneybox...d_their_money_it_s_not_steak_and_seafood.html

The point of these charts isn't that food stamp and welfare recipients never overspend, or make what might seem to be poor financial decisions. (Personally, I would love to see a distribution curve showing the range of spending patterns among families). Nor am I suggesting that these programs are 100 percent free of fraud; believe it or not, investigators found cases in California where welfare beneficiaries withdrew their benefits on cruise ships (the state later banned them from doing so). The point is, these are fringe cases, and they're used to demonize a group of people who are often working extremely hard just to get by.

 

[Dak]

How are they working hard to get by when working hard makes it harder to get by (at least initially)?

I tryed to find raw respondant numbers to that survey based on assistance and where from. Household selection methodology doesn't seem problematic at a glance but just a little more than half of total eligible households agreed to participate. Depending despersal, you wind up with a non-random sample due to self-selection effects. Additionally, reporting spending habits are definitely subject to demand characteristics (responses based on what the participant thinks the study is really about/responses based on what is socially acceptable).Both self-selection and demand characteristics are threats to external validity.

These are common threats to many survey studies and are an unfortunate fact of limits to study funding. However, due to these problems in a national survey with the additional problem of wildly fluctuating micro-economies, I'd take that graph with a large grain of salt. For instance: I'm sure $900 a month on housing would get you a premium cardboard box for 1 in San Francisco (outside of rentlocked housing). Conversely, one person can sublet for less than 400 a month all inclusive here in reasonable housing in parts of NC. To compare more closely to the average of 3.7 with my household of 5 atm, I don't pay 900 a month even in the summer all told for an apt.

Since crab was mentioned, I do have several locations within a couple of miles of me selling crab (and/or other non-necessities) with signs "EBT Accepted" prominently displayed.

 

[Einherjar86]

How are they working hard to get by when working hard makes it harder to get by (at least initially)?

That's a conundrum that no amount of hard work can fix.

I tryed to find raw respondant numbers to that survey based on assistance and where from. Household selection methodology doesn't seem problematic at a glance but just a little more than half of total eligible households agreed to participate. Depending despersal, you wind up with a non-random sample due to self-selection effects. Additionally, reporting spending habits are definitely subject to demand characteristics (responses based on what the participant thinks the study is really about/responses based on what is socially acceptable).Both self-selection and demand characteristics are threats to external validity.

Agreed--the observation has an effect on the observed, as we like to say. But if we're going to admit that kind of thinking now, at this point, then the entire enterprise becomes irrelevant. I doubt that all people are tweaking their spending numbers, and if some are I doubt they're doing it drastically. This doesn't give us a perfect model of welfare spending habits, but I'm inclined to think that it's vaguely accurate as opposed to wildly off-base.

These are common threats to many survey studies and are an unfortunate fact of limits to study funding. However, due to these problems in a national survey with the additional problem of wildly fluctuating micro-economies, I'd take that graph with a large grain of salt. For instance: I'm sure $900 a month on housing would get you a premium cardboard box for 1 in San Francisco (outside of rentlocked housing). Conversely, one person can sublet for less than 400 a month all inclusive here in reasonable housing in parts of NC. To compare more closely to the average of 3.7 with my household of 5 atm, I don't pay 900 a month even in the summer all told for an apt.

I do take it with a grain of salt, but I don't think a general suspicion toward the specificity of the numbers proves, or is strong evidence for the fact, that the majority of welfare recipients are taking advantage of the system. Even if some of them make frivolous purchases, and even if some are massaging the numbers, I don't think the takeaway should then be "they're mostly liars who spend their money on Fiji water and aged Japanese whiskey." No, they're spending their money on Wegmans water (or soda, which is a problem, but not a spending one) and Evan Williams.

Cost of living in general fluctuates from city to city, and income reflects that. Our rent doubled when my wife and I moved to Boston (for a smaller apartment than we were renting in Florida), but her income also went way up (for the same position). Things we spend money on might vary in cost, but so does the dispersal of spending money, why wouldn't welfare adjust accordingly?