Dakryn's Batshit Theory of the Week

[Einherjar86]

I hope not. If I turned in a paper written in that style I don't think I'd come out higher than a B+. Which is doom in graduate study.

 

[Dak]

Not necessarily constructually but in content and flow.

 

[Jimmy... Dead.]

I just realized Pat's writing (not necessarily always in his responses to me though) looks a lot like ŽiŽek's.....

Are you saying he cloaks trivial ideas in obscure and inflated language to make them seem profound?

Fight, fight!

 

[Einherjar86]

When SS deletes posts I'm never sure if that means he thinks he's wrong, or he just doesn't want to get into it.

If any of my comments inhibit identity politics, they do so only so far as they challenge the metaphysical question of identity in the first place. Identity can't be construed on the basis of an individual's action and being, since neither is a constant quality and both are constantly changing. Identity is always a social construction, purely by nature of its form. I could make the controversial claim against identity altogether, but there are certainly elements of racial inherent in that kind of claim (there's something to be said for denying certain groups of people access to identity formation).

There's no reason why institutions such as the patriarchal family are necessary for identity formation or successful behavior in society; they might appear as necessary because our culture has become so functionally grounded in them (enter Deleuze and Guattari). Identity simply inscribes itself onto bodies and matter; no one is born with an identity.

Regarding Dak's earlier comment about tabula rasa theory: I believe that people are born blank slate, but I might be construing it differently than you do. For instance, it's obvious that some people are born black and others white; but it's logically incorrect to infer some kind of identity from these biological facts, primarily because sight and color are not necessarily universally privileged institutions. People may be born with variously minute tendencies toward certain biological behaviors, but none of this conditions an absolute identity or situates an individual's identity from the start.

The tabula rasa theory (as it stands today) doesn't deny the reality of biological differences; it merely acknowledges that none of these differences condition a necessary identity prior to the organism's cultural indoctrination as a subject. Only in this process does identity begin to form.

 

[Dak]

Can you explain exactly what you mean by "identity"?

 

[Einherjar86]

Anything, really; I don't know how to delimit it. Male, female, black, white, capitalist, Marxist, footballer, landscaper, hunter, tree-hugger, etc. etc. etc.

I'm opposed to identity as essential; not identity itself.

 

[Dak]

Ok. Well obviously that measure of "identity" is thrownness contingent: Can't be a NASCAR fan without NASCAR, etc.

However, our predispositions are not blank. Twin studies (identical/fraternal) have revealed a significant amount of biological "predetermination". While identity is dependent on encounter, selection (or at least preference unacted upon for whatever reason) upon the encounter is definitely not coming from a "blank slate".

 

[Einherjar86]

The problem I have with any kind of "slate" in general is that it presume some original surface on which preferences have, or have not, been inscribed. I believe in blank slate insofar as it pertains to identity; but if I'm being critical, I don't think there's a slate to begin with.

The claim that selections made upon encounters derive from some kind of biological predetermination assumes that prior to all encounters there is an objective slate, inscribed with whatever predeterminations, that will influence future behavior consciously or unconsciously. I don't think that's true because before the organism is even fully formed it's already being acted upon physically. There can be no separation of the formation of the organism from its inception as a potential "slate."

Does that make sense? I'm saying that any claim to biological determinism assumes a line that can be drawn between the organism in some pure, pristine state and the organism as it begins to be acted upon. But even in the womb during its formation it's being acted upon, potentially in ways that will monumentally affect its treatment in society.

Identity isn't something wholly formed from within subjectivity, which is another assumption that has to be switched; identity is impossible without interpollation and subjectivization by society. Basically, it requires a process of acculturation that even infiltrates the womb. Hence Althusser's claim that we are always-already subjects of interpollation (although he means it in a symbolic sense).

Of course, none of this is absolute or essential; that's what I'm trying to say. Identity, even if biological factors are involved, is never entirely the subject's choice, nor does it only begin to form after certain biological factors have been determined. The processes of biological formation and cultural interpollation are bound together.

 

[Dak]

I am necessarily distinguishing between the transmission/coalescence of a genetically unique human and then all subsequent "acting upon", from inutero nutrition to soundwaves, electromagnetic waves, etc. We still do not have any firm grasp on how influences pre-birth affect development. However, the significant sameness (in thought, action, preferences, etc)of identical twins even when separated from birth to different subregions (although granted still of the same overarching culture) has provided more than enough evidence to pursue more research to find the specific mechanism whereby this occurs via genetics/biology - as opposed to view that there is no such mechanism - a position from either ignorance or denial.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Minnesota_Twin_Family_Study

In 1979, Thomas Bouchard began to study twins who were separated at birth and reared in different families. He found that an identical twin reared away from his or her co-twin seems to have about an equal chance of being similar to the co-twin in terms of personality, interests, and attitudes as one who has been reared with his or her co-twin. This leads to the conclusion that the similarities between twins are due to genes, not environment, since the differences between twins reared apart must be due totally to the environment.

 

[Einherjar86]

Well, I've read about that study (I'm pretty sure you've posted it before) and it isn't universally accepted, nor has its methodology been vindicated. So I would resist your claim that denying any such mechanism exists is a position from ignorance; that individual may just find the MISTRA study unconvincing, as many others have.

I wouldn't say I disagree with Bouchard's conclusion; I just don't see its particular relevance. What uses does his study provide in determining behavior? I'm not sure how genes and social institutions/behaviors correlate. A gene doesn't understand what death metal is.

Ultimately, while I agree that there are biological factors that play a role, I don't think they're absolute. Put simply, genetic factors can never serve as useful or accurate measurements of future social behavior because the interaction of a genetic organism with an external culture actively alters that organism. The concept of the original genetic organism becomes illusory.

EDIT:

You know - technology wasn't invented by us humans. Rather the other way around. As anthropologists and biologists admit, even the simplest life forms, infusoria (tiny algae synthesized by light at the edges of tidepools a few million years ago) are already technical devices. Any material system is technological if it memorizes and processes that information and makes inferences based on the regulating effect of behaviour, that is, if it intervenes on and impacts its environment so as to assure its perpetuation at least. A human being isn't different in nature from an object of this type.

I would extend this claim (with which I agree) to include the assertion that an organism is never entirely only genetics, even from its earliest virtual conception. This shouldn't be read as an advocacy for "blank-slate" development. It can't be, because the slate doesn't exist.

 

[Dak]

Well, I've read about that study (I'm pretty sure you've posted it before) and it isn't universally accepted, nor has its methodology been vindicated. So I would resist your claim that denying any such mechanism exists is a position from ignorance; that individual may just find the MISTRA study unconvincing, as many others have.

I wouldn't say I disagree with Bouchard's conclusion; I just don't see its particular relevance. What uses does his study provide in determining behavior? I'm not sure how genes and social institutions/behaviors correlate.

I may have posted it before. I don't know enough about the details (or if the details detail enough) to say "Well this strand of DNA
means person X will be a socialist and like death metal". That's not the point (at this point). The point is that there are biologically set predispositions, and while they have a level of contingency, it's from some sort of set mean or median that we cannot yet measure. An understanding of statistical analysis and treatment would make this make more sense to you. Any variance from the mean or median doesn't totally/suddenly explode a hypothesis of relativity. In fact, r =/= 1.0, so there's always something missing. But, that doesn't mean there's no relativity.

Ultimately, while I agree that there are biological factors that play a role, I don't think they're absolute. Put simply, genetic factors can never serve as useful or accurate measurements of future social behavior because the interaction of a genetic organism with an external culture actively alters that organism. The concept of the original genetic organism becomes illusory.

It appears to me that this begs the question.

I would extend this claim (with which I agree) to include the assertion that an organism is never entirely only genetics, even from its earliest virtual conception. This shouldn't be read as an advocacy for "blank-slate" development. It can't be, because the slate doesn't exist.

Well at least you're comfortable abandoning empiricism. Granted, so am I, but I'm not ready to abandon both rationality and empiricism, which the "illusion" approach to any consciousness or perception appears to do. To abandon both is to do nothing but propagate the constant removing of the foundation for propagation. A sort of supercircular logic, if the philosophical illusionist believed in logic.

 

[Einherjar86]

I may have posted it before. I don't know enough about the details (or if the details detail enough) to say "Well this strand of DNA
means person X will be a socialist and like death metal". That's not the point (at this point). The point is that there are biologically set predispositions, and while they have a level of contingency, it's from some sort of set mean or median that we cannot yet measure. An understanding of statistical analysis and treatment would make this make more sense to you. Any variance from the mean or median doesn't totally/suddenly explode a hypothesis of relativity. In fact, r =/= 1.0, so there's always something missing. But, that doesn't mean there's no relativity.

I'm skeptical of the italicized portion. It seems as likely to me that we project the mean or median into reality; i.e., that it's nothing more than an ideal we construct.

EDIT: it's all italicized; I emboldened the part I'm referring to.

It appears to me that this begs the question.

I would agree.

Well at least you're comfortable abandoning empiricism. Granted, so am I, but I'm not ready to abandon both rationality and empiricism, which the "illusion" approach to any consciousness or perception appears to do. To abandon both is to do nothing but propagate the constant removing of the foundation for propagation. A sort of supercircular logic, if the philosophical illusionist believed in logic.

I am skeptical of empiricism because I don't fully trust the senses; furthermore, I'm entirely aware as to how our senses don't merely allow us to perceive reality, but they actively construct it.

The famous philosophical "test" question follows thus: If a tree falls in the forest, and no one is around to hear it, does it make a sound?

The realist (empiricist, logical positivist, etc.) answers: YES

The relativist answers: NO

The speculative realist/materialist answers: That depends; or: You've formed the question improperly (this is the position I maintain).

Asking the question above implies that we assume a hearing organism would be present or not; but there are organisms for whom sound doesn't exist. It is meaningless to ask such an organism if a falling tree makes any sound at all. This is not to deny that something is happening; of course, we merely interpret vibrations in the air as sound, but this may have an entirely different effect on another organism. We aren't denying that something material is taking place; but we are acknowledging that our senses are not always apt at observing/interrogating/explaining the world around us.

This doesn't mean it is irrational to claim that a falling tree doesn't make a sound. I would ask how you're using "rationality," because it appears to be in contrast to "logic"; it looks like you're saying that it's simply irrational to claim there's no original genetic template because common sense would suggest otherwise. To return to the falling-tree example, asking if something makes a sound falls into the anthropocentric trap whereby it assumes that an ontological truth can be stated via an appeal to human sensory perception. While our senses can tell us that something happens, they do not perfectly reflect what happens.

Now, the final twist in the argument is such: there is no single conscious, organic, material substance whose interpretation of reality perfectly molds to the shape of reality. We interpret vibrations in terms of sound; another organism might more intensely feel the vibrations; another organism might not pick up on them at all. There is no creature or thing that occupies the space from which it can perfectly adapt reality to its own interactive apparatuses. Because of this fact, reality as such - in-itself, ding an sich, noumenon, etc. - emerges as nothing more than a construction all around; every subjective position can do nothing more can construct a version of reality.

This construction likely appropriates reality to some degree of success; but it ultimately fails. Each organism's position varies slightly from every other, but there are groups whose perceptions overlap. This is not a relativist position, which claims that reality is only what each individual consciousness/organism perceives as such; rather, the speculative approach acknowledges that reality exists ontologically as an absence. There is something fundamental about reality itself that is actually not there.

Fictionally constructed ideals such as original slate organisms are one such example of where we can expose this absence, in my opinion.

 

[Dak]

I'm skeptical of the italicized portion. It seems as likely to me that we project the mean or median into reality; i.e., that it's nothing more than an ideal we construct.

I don't see how it's some sort of idealization that we can go through a battery of tests, rigorously constructed and performed (we assume), and get consistent results within certain parameters. (Things like intelligence and tendency to violence are highly inheritable.)

Identical twins share DNA. When reared separately, anything that still appears in both should be heavily genetically based. Of course, it's not 100%. This is explained by the concept of "switches", otherwise understood as predispositions - or potential. When spoken of in terms of disease we call this increased "risk". That this is accepted for physical health and not mental health is absurd.

I would agree.

So why do that?

I am skeptical of empiricism because I don't fully trust the senses; furthermore, I'm entirely aware as to how our senses don't merely allow us to perceive reality, but they actively construct it.

The famous philosophical "test" question follows thus: If a tree falls in the forest, and no one is around to hear it, does it make a sound?

The realist (empiricist, logical positivist, etc.) answers: YES

The relativist answers: NO

The speculative realist/materialist answers: That depends; or: You've formed the question improperly (this is the position I maintain).

Asking the question above implies that we assume a hearing organism would be present or not; but there are organisms for whom sound doesn't exist. It is meaningless to ask such an organism if a falling tree makes any sound at all. This is not to deny that something is happening; of course, we merely interpret vibrations in the air as sound, but this may have an entirely different effect on another organism. We aren't denying that something material is taking place; but we are acknowledging that our senses are not always apt at observing/interrogating/explaining the world around us.

This doesn't mean it is irrational to claim that a falling tree doesn't make a sound. I would ask how you're using "rationality," because it appears to be in contrast to "logic"; it looks like you're saying that it's simply irrational to claim there's no original genetic template because common sense would suggest otherwise. To return to the falling-tree example, asking if something makes a sound falls into the anthropocentric trap whereby it assumes that an ontological truth can be stated via an appeal to human sensory perception. While our senses can tell us that something happens, they do not perfectly reflect what happens.

Now, the final twist in the argument is such: there is no single conscious, organic, material substance whose interpretation of reality perfectly molds to the shape of reality. We interpret vibrations in terms of sound; another organism might more intensely feel the vibrations; another organism might not pick up on them at all. There is no creature or thing that occupies the space from which it can perfectly adapt reality to its own interactive apparatuses. Because of this fact, reality as such - in-itself, ding an sich, noumenon, etc. - emerges as nothing more than a construction all around; every subjective position can do nothing more can construct a version of reality.

This construction likely appropriates reality to some degree of success; but it ultimately fails. Each organism's position varies slightly from every other, but there are groups whose perceptions overlap. This is not a relativist position, which claims that reality is only what each individual consciousness/organism perceives as such; rather, the speculative approach acknowledges that reality exists ontologically as an absence. There is something fundamental about reality itself that is actually not there.

Fictionally constructed ideals such as original slate organisms are one such example of where we can expose this absence, in my opinion.

You're argument hinges on the same illusion of sound waves being projected by technological sensors.


On the subject of Land and the why of his political philosophy:

http://www.thedarkenlightenment.com/the-dark-enlightenment-by-nick-land/

For the hardcore neo-reactionaries, democracy is not merely doomed, it is doom itself. Fleeing it approaches an ultimate imperative. The subterranean current that propels such anti-politics is recognizably Hobbesian, a coherent dark enlightenment, devoid from its beginning of any Rousseauistic enthusiasm for popular expression. Predisposed, in any case, to perceive the politically awakened masses as a howling irrational mob, it conceives the dynamics of democratization as fundamentally degenerative: systematically consolidating and exacerbating private vices, resentments, and deficiencies until they reach the level of collective criminality and comprehensive social corruption. The democratic politician and the electorate are bound together by a circuit of reciprocal incitement, in which each side drives the other to ever more shameless extremities of hooting, prancing cannibalism, until the only alternative to shouting is being eaten.

Where the progressive enlightenment sees political ideals, the dark enlightenment sees appetites. It accepts that governments are made out of people, and that they will eat well. Setting its expectations as low as reasonably possible, it seeks only to spare civilization from frenzied, ruinous, gluttonous debauch. From Thomas Hobbes to Hans-Hermann Hoppe and beyond, it asks: How can the sovereign power be prevented – or at least dissuaded — from devouring society? It consistently finds democratic ‘solutions’ to this problem risible, at best.

................

Political agents invested with transient authority by multi-party democratic systems have an overwhelming (and demonstrably irresistible) incentive to plunder society with the greatest possible rapidity and comprehensiveness. Anything they neglect to steal – or ‘leave on the table’ – is likely to be inherited by political successors who are not only unconnected, but actually opposed, and who can therefore be expected to utilize all available resources to the detriment of their foes. Whatever is left behind becomes a weapon in your enemy’s hand. Best, then, to destroy what cannot be stolen. From the perspective of a democratic politician, any type of social good that is neither directly appropriable nor attributable to (their own) partisan policy is sheer waste, and counts for nothing, whilst even the most grievous social misfortune – so long as it can be assigned to a prior administration or postponed until a subsequent one – figures in rational calculations as an obvious blessing. The long-range techno-economic improvements and associated accumulation of cultural capital that constituted social progress in its old (Whig) sense are in nobody’s political interest. Once democracy flourishes, they face the immediate threat of extinction.

Civilization, as a process, is indistinguishable from diminishing time-preference (or declining concern for the present in comparison to the future). Democracy, which both in theory and evident historical fact accentuates time-preference to the point of convulsive feeding-frenzy, is thus as close to a precise negation of civilization as anything could be, short of instantaneous social collapse into murderous barbarism or zombie apocalypse (which it eventually leads to). As the democratic virus burns through society, painstakingly accumulated habits and attitudes of forward-thinking, prudential, human and industrial investment, are replaced by a sterile, orgiastic consumerism, financial incontinence, and a ‘reality television’ political circus. Tomorrow might belong to the other team, so it’s best to eat it all now.

Couldn't say it better.

 

[Einherjar86]

I don't see how it's some sort of idealization that we can go through a battery of tests, rigorously constructed and performed (we assume), and get consistent results within certain parameters. (Things like intelligence and tendency to violence are highly inheritable.)

That's how it's an idealization. We can't ascertain the miraculous thing itself; we can only witness evidence that seems to point toward an ideal measure of genetic prescription. Just because we can measure something with physical instruments doesn't mean those instruments aren't merely assisting us in our idealizations. In fact, they're reinforcing them.

Identical twins share DNA. When reared separately, anything that still appears in both should be heavily genetically based. Of course, it's not 100%. This is explained by the concept of "switches", otherwise understood as predispositions - or potential. When spoken of in terms of disease we call this increased "risk". That this is accepted for physical health and not mental health is absurd.

I'm not saying that people aren't "predisposed" in some way toward certain behavior before coming into contact with certain situations; I'm merely suggesting that the predispositions may not be as inherent (i.e. genetic) as we think. Even the twin studies haven't provided enough proof that their subjects were reared in substantially different environments. Just because they grew up in moderately different households with moderately different incomes doesn't mean they were exposed to radically ulterior value systems.

So why do that?

Sometimes logic just can't explain everything. In this case, the situation itself seems quite illogical.

You're argument hinges on the same illusion of sound waves being projected by technological sensors.

I don't understand what you mean. A technological sensor isn't an unbiased, objective instrument of measurement.

On the subject of Land and the why of his political philosophy:

http://www.thedarkenlightenment.com/the-dark-enlightenment-by-nick-land/

Couldn't say it better.

That makes sense (I'm not sure how I feel about his description of democracy). In fact, it seems to directly contradict the notion of planning for the long haul. Instead, Land suggests that we throw caution to the wind since we may not be here tomorrow. I am surprised that you agree with it though.

 

[Dak]

That's how it's an idealization. We can't ascertain the miraculous thing itself; we can only witness evidence that seems to point toward an ideal measure of genetic prescription. Just because we can measure something with physical instruments doesn't mean those instruments aren't merely assisting us in our idealizations. In fact, they're reinforcing them.

.......

I don't understand what you mean. A technological sensor isn't an unbiased, objective instrument of measurement.

To argue "Sound" itself doesn't exist is different from stating sound waves don't exist. The reception and interpretation is subjective. But I assume you are arguing that neither exist here, and that the we create sensors in a selfconfirming feedback loop. Except that this undermines your technology-using-us position.

I'm not saying that people aren't "predisposed" in some way toward certain behavior before coming into contact with certain situations; I'm merely suggesting that the predispositions may not be as inherent (i.e. genetic) as we think. Even the twin studies haven't provided enough proof that their subjects were reared in substantially different environments. Just because they grew up in moderately different households with moderately different incomes doesn't mean they were exposed to radically ulterior value systems.

This sort of goalpost moving allows for infinite deniability. We simply cannot take one identical twin and place him or her into a place with no contact with modernity of any sort. It's inherently impossible. But we can put them in different regions, subregions, etc, and obviously anyone troubled over district by district disparity in income and educational success shouldn't turn around and say people reared states away won't experience radically different environments, when even blocks away can be radically different. Even income itself does not necessarily indicate similar values, even when income is equivalent. I must (unfortunately I feel) ask what exactly you even mean by values, and how said values might influence things like preference for a particular sexual form or phenotypical presentation.

Sometimes logic just can't explain everything. In this case, the situation itself seems quite illogical.

Seems or is being posited. To divorce logic from rationality is to castrate the intelligence of rationality. We are reduced to bowing before totems which bring the rain. To be certain, this sort of behavior isn't in any way aligned with some sort of technofuturist development.

Or do you mean this specifically as a tautology? I don't see the tautology here though. Obviously I don't have a problem with tautologies in themselves if they can meet some rational empiricist standards. (Such as the tautology that there is no such thing as altruism as commonly understood).

That makes sense (I'm not sure how I feel about his description of democracy). In fact, it seems to directly contradict the notion of planning for the long haul. Instead, Land suggests that we throw caution to the wind since we may not be here tomorrow. I am surprised that you agree with it though.

What caution do you believe Land is suggesting we abandon, and what is it you think that I agree with that has you surprised? Of course we always labor under the assumption we will be here tomorrow, with the knowledge that it's not a certainty.

I agree almost completely (I leave almost since although I can't recall a disagreement, there's always room or possibility for one) with Land's critique of democracy, which certainly does not originate with Land. On the other hand, I'm not necessarily on board with "neoreaction", since neoreaction is still sort of a hash of diverse positions phoenixing out of the failure of progressive memetic propagation.

 

[Einherjar86]

To argue "Sound" itself doesn't exist is different from stating sound waves don't exist. The reception and interpretation is subjective. But I assume you are arguing that neither exist here, and that the we create sensors in a selfconfirming feedback loop. Except that this undermines your technology-using-us position.

Calling them "sound waves" still implies that you anticipate a hearing creature. Calling them "waves" implies that you anticipate creatures beholden to the understanding of Western physics; but something is still clearly happening. The reception is subjective, as is the interpretation; but all this tells us is that something engages us, which we receive, and something slips past us, which we lose or miss when we interpret this unnamed thing as "sound waves" and nothing more. "Sound waves" is never the entire picture.

I still don't understand how it undermines what I've said before. A sensor that measures sound waves is designed with specific anticipations in mind; i.e. that hearing creatures are going to be interpreting the results. The sensor itself is indifferent. Technology's manipulation of humanity occurs absent any subjective technological apparatus. Use doesn't necessitate intention; technology might use us just as you or I might use air, or our digestive system.

The point is: the sensor doesn't care about me or you, but this doesn't negate the fact that while it uses us, we can also use it. Technology gradually changes according to our gradually changing methods of measurements and perception, but its alteration also simultaneously feeds back and alters our methods of perception. There's no original apparatus. Organisms in the environment coexist in symbiosis all the time, but this doesn't mean a set standard had to exist prior to their coexistence. Why can't they emerge together?

Technology manipulates us in the very way that it reinforces our conceptualization of an imaginary "Paris metre" of genetics. Our asymptotic approach of some standard of measurement doesn't mean the measurement is there, which implies a universal. All it signals is a contingent occurrence of matter at a moment in cosmic time.

This sort of goalpost moving allows for infinite deniability. We simply cannot take one identical twin and place him or her into a place with no contact with modernity of any sort. It's inherently impossible. But we can put them in different regions, subregions, etc, and obviously anyone troubled over district by district disparity in income and educational success shouldn't turn around and say people reared states away won't experience radically different environments, when even blocks away can be radically different. Even income itself does not necessarily indicate similar values, even when income is equivalent. I must (unfortunately I feel) ask what exactly you even mean by values, and how said values might influence things like preference for a particular sexual form or phenotypical presentation.

Seems or is being posited. To divorce logic from rationality is to castrate the intelligence of rationality. We are reduced to bowing before totems which bring the rain. To be certain, this sort of behavior isn't in any way aligned with some sort of technofuturist development.

I'd ask that you forget logical fallacies for a moment and think about the paradoxical nature of the situation itself. What I'm suggesting isn't all that impractical; all I'm saying is that the possibility of multiple intervening factors can never be dismissed entirely. We can say that genetic dispositions exist, but they never exist originally. They never exist without fail, and we will likely never be able to reduce the behavior of organic creatures to their genetic codes.

Logic clearly doesn't inhere in nature since logic presupposes an originary point from which we can proceed in a deductive fashion. Adhering to that kind of doctrine is the most dangerous attitude of all. Instead, we should admit that logic can only ever proceed from a position that has always-already been determined to some extent by other mitigating factors. Logic is only pure in its ideal imagining.

What caution do you believe Land is suggesting we abandon, and what is it you think that I agree with that has you surprised? Of course we always labor under the assumption we will be here tomorrow, with the knowledge that it's not a certainty.

If our existence is ultimately so fragile, ephemeral, undetermined and inconsequential, then I don't see the purpose in abiding by an economic value system that privileges privacy and saving, for instance. I don't see why this cosmic history protects against the meaningless appropriation of all things from all people, for the sole purpose of immediate gratification.

 

[Dak]

Calling them "sound waves" still implies that you anticipate a hearing creature. Calling them "waves" implies that you anticipate creatures beholden to the understanding of Western physics; but something is still clearly happening. The reception is subjective, as is the interpretation; but all this tells us is that something engages us, which we receive, and something slips past us, which we lose or miss when we interpret this unnamed thing as "sound waves" and nothing more. "Sound waves" is never the entire picture.

I still don't understand how it undermines what I've said before. A sensor that measures sound waves is designed with specific anticipations in mind; i.e. that hearing creatures are going to be interpreting the results. The sensor itself is indifferent. Technology's manipulation of humanity occurs absent any subjective technological apparatus. Use doesn't necessitate intention; technology might use us just as you or I might use air, or our digestive system.

The point is: the sensor doesn't care about me or you, but this doesn't negate the fact that while it uses us, we can also use it. Technology gradually changes according to our gradually changing methods of measurements and perception, but its alteration also simultaneously feeds back and alters our methods of perception. There's no original apparatus. Organisms in the environment coexist in symbiosis all the time, but this doesn't mean a set standard had to exist prior to their coexistence. Why can't they emerge together?

Technology manipulates us in the very way that it reinforces our conceptualization of an imaginary "Paris metre" of genetics. Our asymptotic approach of some standard of measurement doesn't mean the measurement is there, which implies a universal. All it signals is a contingent occurrence of matter at a moment in cosmic time.

Why does sender absolutely necessitate a receiver? Only because we can only know that something was sent by receiving it? That falls flat theoretically.

I'd ask that you forget logical fallacies for a moment and think about the paradoxical nature of the situation itself. What I'm suggesting isn't all that impractical; all I'm saying is that the possibility of multiple intervening factors can never be dismissed entirely. We can say that genetic dispositions exist, but they never exist originally. They never exist without fail, and we will likely never be able to reduce the behavior of organic creatures to their genetic codes.

Logic clearly doesn't inhere in nature since logic presupposes an originary point from which we can proceed in a deductive fashion. Adhering to that kind of doctrine is the most dangerous attitude of all. Instead, we should admit that logic can only ever proceed from a position that has always-already been determined to some extent by other mitigating factors. Logic is only pure in its ideal imagining.

I would say logic gives us technology, you would say technology gives us logic - or that logic is a technology that gives more technology (the latter is less controversial). Of course we need an always already - but we get those from empirical sources. Rationality divorced from both empiricism and logic entirely is worse than totem worshipping. It doesn't even pretend to approximate reality, because it rejects reality, and thus neuters itself in any practical sense (which I've said before). I'm only now beginning to get a better understanding of the "how".

If our existence is ultimately so fragile, ephemeral, undetermined and inconsequential, then I don't see the purpose in abiding by an economic value system that privileges privacy and saving, for instance. I don't see why this cosmic history protects against the meaningless appropriation of all things from all people, for the sole purpose of immediate gratification.

I don't see where you elucidate the caution abandoned by Land, or where I surprisingly intersect with what views.

Attempting to reject anthropocentrism is not the same thing suggesting humans are "inconsequential" or "ephemeral".

Separately, technology requires longer time preferences (which is demonstrated concretely through saving), so I don't see why the intersection of [some-form-of-austrianism] and technofuturism is surprising.

 

[Einherjar86]

Why does sender absolutely necessitate a receiver? Only because we can only know that something was sent by receiving it? That falls flat theoretically.

Not sure I follow. I don't believe I've insinuated that a sender needs a receiver, or where I even used that language.

I would say logic gives us technology, you would say technology gives us logic - or that logic is a technology that gives more technology (the latter is less controversial). Of course we need an always already - but we get those from empirical sources. Rationality divorced from both empiricism and logic entirely is worse than totem worshipping. It doesn't even pretend to approximate reality, because it rejects reality, and thus neuters itself in any practical sense (which I've said before). I'm only now beginning to get a better understanding of the "how".

I'm perplexed as to why you think that way. I'm not rejecting reality at all. You're only privileging the studies that you find to be particularly relevant to your line of work. I'm just trying to maintain a speculative attitude in order to attempt the most rational approach. I don't know where you're getting all this divorcing of rationality from empiricism. Nowhere have I said that we should ignore our senses; merely that they something deeper about the unknowability of reality, and that we have to consider this lack. The moment we forget about it is the moment irrationality truly begins.

I don't see where you elucidate the caution abandoned by Land, or where I surprisingly intersect with what views.

Attempting to reject anthropocentrism is not the same thing suggesting humans are "inconsequential" or "ephemeral".

Separately, technology requires longer time preferences (which is demonstrated concretely through saving), so I don't see why the intersection of [some-form-of-austrianism] and technofuturism is surprising.

Maybe it isn't. I made an assumption. That last passage sounded like accelerationism, and I have trouble keeping accelerationism separate from conservative notions of capitalism.

 

[Dak]

Not sure I follow. I don't believe I've insinuated that a sender needs a receiver, or where I even used that language.

I'm sorry, that's how a interpreted

Calling them "sound waves" still implies that you anticipate a hearing creature

especially in light of previous discussions of language/communication.

I'm perplexed as to why you think that way. I'm not rejecting reality at all. You're only privileging the studies that you find to be particularly relevant to your line of work. I'm just trying to maintain a speculative attitude in order to attempt the most rational approach. I don't know where you're getting all this divorcing of rationality from empiricism. Nowhere have I said that we should ignore our senses; merely that they something deeper about the unknowability of reality, and that we have to consider this lack. The moment we forget about it is the moment irrationality truly begins.

Well of course we can keep it in the back of our minds "lolz we might just be in the Matrix", but it's not necessary to drag it up every time the empirical approach brings up something we don't like. Better first to attack any weakness in the particular studies than to resort to a Matrix-critique/defense.

Maybe it isn't. I made an assumption. That last passage sounded like accelerationism, and I have trouble keeping accelerationism separate from conservative notions of capitalism.

So the abandoning of caution you are referring to is accelerationism? If the D&G approach is correct, then "caution" concerning accelerationism is pointless anyway. We are merely the tools of tools.

A longer time preference means reducing the privilege of today over tomorrow, which is manifested by foregoing consumption now so that you may either have it to consume tomorrow, or if done enough, you will have saved enough to create higher order goods, or capital goods, etc. (those are not necessarily the same thing).

Material technology at this point are higher order goods and require capital goods - so Austrian (and probably classical in general) economics explains how humans enable the production of technology and accelerationism disagrees with the classical telos in favor of technologically directed end.

This sounds very similar to something along the lines of: "There's nothing wrong with taking something from someone. That's merely how it is."

Which doesn't strike me as something you'd say.

Pulling this over here: I don't see any similarity in subject matter.

 

[Addo_Of_Nex]

Not to derail anything, but Ein, could you recommend a few essential texts on speculative realism? The movement (if it can even be called that; I know Brassier despises the tag, haha) has interested me for a while, but I'd like to get around to exploring some primary texts and whatever commentary has been done on them.