Dakryn's Batshit Theory of the Week

[Einherjar86]

That misses the point. Regardless of the source of a critique, whether it be from an oppressed group or not, it simply will not arise/be allowed, much less be given any credence during the part of history, in the place, in which such oppression in is firmly entrenched. This also does not in anyway assume that particular critiques are necessarily legitimate even after the case, but merely that if there is any truth, the critique is late.

I'm entirely confused. Is this some kind of logical argument? If so, I don't see the logic in it. That a critique of social relations can only arise after those relations have improved, or at least changed, strikes me as:

a) untrue; after all, Frederick Douglass wrote about the dehumanizing effects of slavery well before it was outlawed. His complaints were "allowed" to "arise."

b) hopelessly deterministic; you're basically saying that no one can say anything critical about any social relations except in retrospect. I don't see why that is the case.

A significant problem regarding "representation/advocacy" of the allegedly oppressed by someone completely outside of the sphere of the oppressed is that such an advocate will be presented with the difficulty of having not only an accurate historical frame of reference of specific values and challenges for the allegedly oppressed, but also issues any change will bring about. It may be that the specific alleviation an outsider advocate may champion is no real issue for the target group, despite admitted oppression in some form, and/or that the alleviation may cause more problems than it purports to fix, if it even fixes anything. This problem is less likely when the advocacy is internal rather than external. However, as I said already in bringing this up, the liklihood of allowance of such critique/advocacy is unlikely until the system has already made room for it (regardless).

I'm still confused. Why is "having an accurate historical frame of reference" a bad thing? I would of course agree that any accurate view is impossible, but I don't think this means that an intelligent observer cannot say anything productively critical about a social situation. You seem to be suggesting that because an external observer doesn't occupy the space of the oppressed, she can say nothing substantive about it. There are historical examples to invalidate this.

 

[Dak]

I'm entirely confused. Is this some kind of logical argument? If so, I don't see the logic in it. That a critique of social relations can only arise after those relations have improved, or at least changed, strikes me as:

a) untrue; after all, Frederick Douglass wrote about the dehumanizing effects of slavery well before it was outlawed. His complaints were "allowed" to "arise."

b) hopelessly deterministic; you're basically saying that no one can say anything critical about any social relations except in retrospect. I don't see why that is the case.

a) Your counter example is an escaped slave shortly before the US Civil War? Rather a point for me. He escaped in 1838 and his writings were published in 1845 and 1855 in the anti-slave North. Abolition had been going on in the entire West since the late 1700s. By 1833 Britain had banned slavery, and the Atlantic slave trade had already been banned by the US and other countries (and the British were enforcing the ban with the Royal Navy). He was the rearguard, not the vanguard.

I haven't done any sort of exhaustive cataloguing of timelines to offer some sort of airtight defense of this assertion. But I've noticed this trend in all the reading I do on history, philosophy etc., and I expect that nearly if not every time we zoom in on similar types of situations, we will find that the explosion in public advocacy (or whatever you want to call it) is a rearguard action.

b) I didn't say no one can say anything. Obviously people will have things to say. It's about who is saying them, how loudly, and the respect afforded the perspective. Douglass wouldn't have had the space to escape and write without sympathetic Northerners etc.

I'm still confused. Why is "having an accurate historical frame of reference" a bad thing? I would of course agree that any accurate view is impossible, but I don't think this means that an intelligent observer cannot say anything productively critical about a social situation. You seem to be suggesting that because an external observer doesn't occupy the space of the oppressed, she can say nothing substantive about it. There are historical examples to invalidate this.

I meant "not only *not having an accurate historical frame of reference". My mistake. It has less to do with substance than accurate assessment. For example: Jews in the prison camps probably needed better blankets. Someone championing the need for better blankets for Jews, while they were starving and/or marching to the ovens, and still being rounded up, and being hated by the regime, etc etc., is how I see most advocacy. This is an imperfect example of course, since many issues for a group have as many if not more internal causes as external.

 

[Einherjar86]

a) Your counter example is an escaped slave shortly before the US Civil War? Rather a point for me. He escaped in 1838 and his writings were published in 1845 and 1855 in the anti-slave North. Abolition had been going on in the entire West since the late 1700s. By 1833 Britain had banned slavery, and the Atlantic slave trade had already been banned by the US and other countries (and the British were enforcing the ban with the Royal Navy). He was the rearguard, not the vanguard.

I haven't done any sort of exhaustive cataloguing of timelines to offer some sort of airtight defense of this assertion. But I've noticed this trend in all the reading I do on history, philosophy etc., and I expect that nearly if not every time we zoom in on similar types of situations, we will find that the explosion in public advocacy (or whatever you want to call it) is a rearguard action.

I'm seeing contradictions abound here. First of all, yes - his narrative was published in 1845, shortly before the Civil War. But slavery was still widespread and in full force. There's no way you can argue that slavery was somehow lessened or unstructured at this point in time. It was absolutely a fully-blown social institution, and Douglass was "allowed" to write about it.

The second major contradiction has to do with this point:

Douglass wouldn't have had the space to escape and write without sympathetic Northerners etc.

But sympathetic Northerners have an "inaccurate historical frame of reference," so how could they possibly come to sympathize with a black slave? If their perspective is irrelevant, then it shouldn't make any difference whether he had their support or not.

Finally, let me just ask - what makes you think that issues of gender identity, inequality, marginalization, etc. are so absolutely neutralized so as to render any and all critiques of them historically irrelevant? If Douglass was writing at the tale end of slavery that doesn't make his critique somehow less important. It was an enormously important text for the eventual abolition of slavery. Critical writings of various social relations may come near the end of their widespread existence, but why does this render them unnecessary?

I'm confused as to what you're ultimately arguing. First, I don't think it's all that controversial to claim that historical circumstances make certain critiques cognitively possible. That strikes me as a somewhat self-obvious (i.e. tautological) claim: "I can only make this argument at the time that I can think it." This doesn't mean, however, that compelling critical arguments can't arise prior to the destabilization of the social relations they target. Second, I don't think this makes such arguments historically less important. So overall, I'm just confused as to what your issue is with critical theory in general. This seems like, to quote you, kicking up dust and complaining about not being able to see.

 

[Dak]

I'm seeing contradictions abound here. First of all, yes - his narrative was published in 1845, shortly before the Civil War. But slavery was still widespread and in full force. There's no way you can argue that slavery was somehow lessened or unstructured at this point in time. It was absolutely a fully-blown social institution, and Douglass was "allowed" to write about it.

I already provided the dates to disprove your assertion about the standing of slavery. I don't know what measure you are using. The US South was pretty much a final holdout in West.

But sympathetic Northerners have an "inaccurate historical frame of reference," so how could they possibly come to sympathize with a black slave? If their perspective is irrelevant, then it shouldn't make any difference whether he had their support or not.

Finally, let me just ask - what makes you think that issues of gender identity, inequality, marginalization, etc. are so absolutely neutralized so as to render any and all critiques of them historically irrelevant? If Douglass was writing at the tale end of slavery that doesn't make his critique somehow less important. It was an enormously important text for the eventual abolition of slavery. Critical writings of various social relations may come near the end of their widespread existence, but why does this render them unnecessary?

I didn't say they were unnecessary. But when is the tone limited to "hey, this was bad, probably shouldn't go back to that in the future" or "hey, things were pretty bad, but it's much improved now even though we have some holdouts, let's keep things moving as they are"? It's always "TOTAL SOCIAL OPPRESSION NOW!!1!", although with word choice of course stands in for actual exclamation points and all caps. It makes sense to me that one could argue in defense of such rhetoric that it's necessary (as per Alinsky). But that doesn't make it true.

I'm confused as to what you're ultimately arguing. First, I don't think it's all that controversial to claim that historical circumstances make certain critiques cognitively possible. That strikes me as a somewhat self-obvious (i.e. tautological) claim: "I can only make this argument at the time that I can think it." This doesn't mean, however, that compelling critical arguments can't arise prior to the destabilization of the social relations they target. Second, I don't think this makes such arguments historically less important. So overall, I'm just confused as to what your issue is with critical theory in general. This seems like, to quote you, kicking up dust and complaining about not being able to see.

You may be confused here because you are rolling two separate things together (which is probably my fault in presentation), and really three now that I think about it.

1. Social/economic factors almost always have to have already changed significantly enough to allow space for the respected airing of grievance/critique of the status quo, that such airing winds up being a rearguard action to the movement of change.

2. Critiques from the margins cannot be expected to have but so much descriptive power over the non-marginal.

3. """"Advocacy"""" from the non-marginal for the marginal is likely to misidentify key needs and challenges.

I don't have some lengthy, quote infused defense for these observations. But I have yet to be presented with anything I've seen or read that has suggested otherwise.

 

[Einherjar86]

I already provided the dates to disprove your assertion about the standing of slavery. I don't know what measure you are using. The US South was pretty much a final holdout in West.

You're right, abolition had been going on since the late 1700s - Ben Franklin wrote his own argument against slavery in 1790 or something like that. This seems to me, once again, as an example in favor of what I'm suggesting: that is, that anti-slavery arguments appeared well before slavery was finally made illegal.

I didn't say they were unnecessary. But when is the tone limited to "hey, this was bad, probably shouldn't go back to that in the future" or "hey, things were pretty bad, but it's much improved now even though we have some holdouts, let's keep things moving as they are"? It's always "TOTAL SOCIAL OPPRESSION NOW!!1!", although with word choice of course stands in for actual exclamation points and all caps. It makes sense to me that one could argue in defense of such rhetoric that it's necessary (as per Alinsky). But that doesn't make it true.

Alinsky is near worthless for most of the social critics I'm talking about. Foucault, Butler, Althusser... none of them mention Alinsky. That's because none of them wrote critiques of social relations that can be summarized as "TOTAL SOCIAL OPPRESSION NOW!!!" You should be more familiar with those critiques and what exactly it is they're critiquing if you want to characterize them so reductively. Butler's critique of gender in Gender Trouble has less to do with inequality (which, as you suggest, was already a hot-button topic) than it has to do with what gender means, how it functions.

You tend to have a very sharp reaction to these critiques as political firestarters, when that's not really what they are. They may have political consequences or concerns, but Butler isn't a political theorist.

You may be confused here because you are rolling two separate things together (which is probably my fault in presentation), and really three now that I think about it.

1. Social/economic factors almost always have to have already changed significantly enough to allow space for the respected airing of grievance/critique of the status quo, that such airing winds up being a rearguard action to the movement of change.

2. Critiques from the margins cannot be expected to have but so much descriptive power over the non-marginal.

3. """"Advocacy"""" from the non-marginal for the marginal is likely to misidentify key needs and challenges.

I don't have some lengthy, quote infused defense for these observations. But I have yet to be presented with anything I've seen or read that has suggested otherwise.

From my perspective, everything I'm presenting suggests otherwise. I either think you're blatantly wrong (about critiques of slavery, for instance, before the decline of slavery), or that you misinterpret what these more recent social critiques actually are.

 

[Dak]

You're right, abolition had been going on since the late 1700s - Ben Franklin wrote his own argument against slavery in 1790 or something like that. This seems to me, once again, as an example in favor of what I'm suggesting: that is, that anti-slavery arguments appeared well before slavery was finally made illegal.

Ben Franklin is the perfect example of the vanguard of the movement: Powerful and broadly accomplished (in this case maybe more so than his peers). Ben Franklin did and said a great many things, it would be more notable were he totally silent on the matter. Slavery was just part of the plethora of issues for him to consider and/or deal with. He gained or maintained no fame for this issue, it wasn't his primary concern, etc.

Contra social activists and academia decades and decades later, the rearguard. Their sole claim to fame, their sole source of income, etc. is in this one arena (or maybe a couple of related ones as well).

Alinsky is near worthless for most of the social critics I'm talking about. Foucault, Butler, Althusser... none of them mention Alinsky. That's because none of them wrote critiques of social relations that can be summarized as "TOTAL SOCIAL OPPRESSION NOW!!!" You should be more familiar with those critiques and what exactly it is they're critiquing if you want to characterize them so reductively. Butler's critique of gender in Gender Trouble has less to do with inequality (which, as you suggest, was already a hot-button topic) than it has to do with what gender means, how it functions.

You tend to have a very sharp reaction to these critiques as political firestarters, when that's not really what they are. They may have political consequences or concerns, but Butler isn't a political theorist.

Alinsky understood how to put theory into action. How to get people moving. He is a middleman to the ignorant man. Of course theorists aren't writing for his targets. They write for the Alinsky's or their peers.

I checked the SEoP:

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/feminism-gender/

This view assumes that women and men, qua women and men, are bearers of various essential and accidental attributes where the former secure gendered persons' persistence through time as so gendered. But according to Butler this view is false: (i) there are no such essential properties, and (ii) gender is an illusion maintained by prevalent power structures.

Looks like "total social oppression now" to me. It's standard marxist/post-marxist shtick.

From my perspective, everything I'm presenting suggests otherwise. I either think you're blatantly wrong (about critiques of slavery, for instance, before the decline of slavery), or that you misinterpret what these more recent social critiques actually are.

You misunderstand me on the first thing, and I could be misinterpreting social critiques but if so I'm not some outlier.

 

[Einherjar86]

Ben Franklin is the perfect example of the vanguard of the movement: Powerful and broadly accomplished (in this case maybe more so than his peers). Ben Franklin did and said a great many things, it would be more notable were he totally silent on the matter. Slavery was just part of the plethora of issues for him to consider and/or deal with. He gained or maintained no fame for this issue, it wasn't his primary concern, etc.

But he made the complaint, the critique was "allowed" to be made. Your rhetoric is obscuring your original claim, which was that critiques of major social issues can only appear when those issues are waning. I do not see at all how Franklin supports your point when it proves the exact opposite of what you suggested.

Contra social activists and academia decades and decades later, the rearguard. Their sole claim to fame, their sole source of income, etc. is in this one arena (or maybe a couple of related ones as well).

The argument we're having is not about what "kind" of people they are, or what their careers are, or what role they play in the social arena. The argument has to do with what kinds of critiques can be made, or are "allowed" (to use your word) to be made. It doesn't matter that Franklin was not a social theorist of the kind that emerges in the later-twentieth century.

I've already admitted that when, for example, Franz Fanon published The Wretched of the Earth there wasn't a widespread belief that slavery wasn't all that bad. People knew it was bad, and colonial practices had already been significantly downscaled. But Fanon wasn't just arguing "colonialism is a bad thing" or "slavery is a bad thing."

Alinsky understood how to put theory into action. How to get people moving. He is a middleman to the ignorant man. Of course theorists aren't writing for his targets. They write for the Alinsky's or their peers.

Right, which means that politics is not their primary concern. Theory is - identity, the forces that shape social relations, what these relations or identities tell us about ourselves, etc. The most significant aspect of Butler's argument has nothing to do with gender oppression, but with the articulation of traditional heterosexual gender roles as an identity that is as equally artificial (or constructed) as homosexual, queer, transgender, etc. That's not to say they are wholly artificial, but they are all equally precarious.

So when she claims that drag is a demonstration of the performativity of gender, she's not arguing that only drag, trans, queer, etc. are making gender into a performance. She's arguing that all gender is performative. And that is not a centrally political claim, although it has political consequences.

You misunderstand me on the first thing, and I could be misinterpreting social critiques but if so I'm not some outlier.

If I'm misunderstanding you, then I'm not an outlier either.

 

[rms]

Ben Franklin is the perfect example of the vanguard of the movement: Powerful and broadly accomplished (in this case maybe more so than his peers). Ben Franklin did and said a great many things, it would be more notable were he totally silent on the matter. Slavery was just part of the plethora of issues for him to consider and/or deal with. He gained or maintained no fame for this issue, it wasn't his primary concern, etc.

You are being too nice to Mr. Franklin

 

[Dak]

But he made the complaint, the critique was "allowed" to be made. Your rhetoric is obscuring your original claim, which was that critiques of major social issues can only appear when those issues are waning. I do not see at all how Franklin supports your point when it proves the exact opposite of what you suggested.



The argument we're having is not about what "kind" of people they are, or what their careers are, or what role they play in the social arena. The argument has to do with what kinds of critiques can be made, or are "allowed" (to use your word) to be made. It doesn't matter that Franklin was not a social theorist of the kind that emerges in the later-twentieth century.

I've already admitted that when, for example, Franz Fanon published The Wretched of the Earth there wasn't a widespread belief that slavery wasn't all that bad. People knew it was bad, and colonial practices had already been significantly downscaled. But Fanon wasn't just arguing "colonialism is a bad thing" or "slavery is a bad thing."

You're right. What I was thinking of is more accurately the critique as coming from a professional class of such, and/or from the oppressed class. Not critiques in general. So I amend my statement.

Right, which means that politics is not their primary concern. Theory is - identity, the forces that shape social relations, what these relations or identities tell us about ourselves, etc. The most significant aspect of Butler's argument has nothing to do with gender oppression, but with the articulation of traditional heterosexual gender roles as an identity that is as equally artificial (or constructed) as homosexual, queer, transgender, etc. That's not to say they are wholly artificial, but they are all equally precarious.

So when she claims that drag is a demonstration of the performativity of gender, she's not arguing that only drag, trans, queer, etc. are making gender into a performance. She's arguing that all gender is performative. And that is not a centrally political claim, although it has political consequences.

Plausible deniability is certainly present, but as soon as we start talking about power structures, politics is involved, whether or not the theorist wants to whip up the common man and lead them in the streets. The claims of Butler were split into two general parts in that SEoP writeup, and you're ignoring the latter. As far as the former goes, it is possible to describe gender as performative since we can only see the actions. It's basically tautological. But the "equally precarious" characterization completely disagrees with the available science, and again, is standard shtick for marginal theorists in approach #2 that I listed before ("there is no margin").

You are being too nice to Mr. Franklin

I'm not a fan of the guy per se, but one can't deny his accomplishments and company.

 

[Dak]

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Capitalism,_Socialism_and_Democracy

Schumpeter's theory is that the success of capitalism will lead to a form of corporatism and a fostering of values hostile to capitalism, especially among intellectuals. The intellectual and social climate needed to allow entrepreneurship to thrive will not exist in advanced capitalism; it will be replaced by socialism in some form. There will not be a revolution, but merely a trend for social democratic parties to be elected to parliaments as part of the democratic process. He argued that capitalism's collapse from within will come about as majorities vote for the creation of a welfare state and place restrictions upon entrepreneurship that will burden and eventually destroy the capitalist structure. Schumpeter emphasizes throughout this book that he is analyzing trends, not engaging in political advocacy.

In his vision, the intellectual class will play an important role in capitalism's demise. The term "intellectuals" denotes a class of persons in a position to develop critiques of societal matters for which they are not directly responsible and able to stand up for the interests of strata to which they themselves do not belong. One of the great advantages of capitalism, he argues, is that as compared with pre-capitalist periods, when education was a privilege of the few, more and more people acquire (higher) education. The availability of fulfilling work is however limited and this, coupled with the experience of unemployment, produces discontent. The intellectual class is then able to organise protest and develop critical ideas against free markets and private property, even though these institutions are necessary for their existence.[7] This analysis is similar to that of the philosopher Robert Nozick, who argued that intellectuals were bitter that the skills so rewarded in school were less rewarded in the job market, and so turned against capitalism, even though they enjoyed vastly more enjoyable lives under it than under alternative systems.

I would say I need to read this, but it seems like I've probably already figured the same stuff out/would simply agree. Preaching to the proverbial choir from the 40s.

 

[Einherjar86]

You're right. What I was thinking of is more accurately the critique as coming from a professional class of such, and/or from the oppressed class. Not critiques in general. So I amend my statement.

Okay. Well, in this case it's certainly accurate to suggest that the professional class of social/cultural theorists emerged only recently in history, and that this emergence only appeared after the targets of their theoretical critiques had been brought to widespread attention if not already begun to dissipate.

I'm not sure how I feel about this being necessary, however - i.e. that such a professional class could only arise at this point in time. It does make a lot of sense, yes.

But then, I would also repeat my suggestion that these critiques shouldn't be read primarily as political treatises on, or condemnations of, inequality.

Plausible deniability is certainly present, but as soon as we start talking about power structures, politics is involved, whether or not the theorist wants to whip up the common man and lead them in the streets. The claims of Butler were split into two general parts in that SEoP writeup, and you're ignoring the latter. As far as the former goes, it is possible to describe gender as performative since we can only see the actions. It's basically tautological. But the "equally precarious" characterization completely disagrees with the available science, and again, is standard shtick for marginal theorists in approach #2 that I listed before ("there is no margin").

This is true, although Butler's claim, while perhaps somewhat tautological (I don't think we've appropriately handled it here, but I don't think that necessary), is attempting to correct what she perceives as misguided definitions of gender, and that includes definitions from feminists! Her argument is somewhat tautological (A = A), but then she's trying to disillusion people from the belief that gender somehow corresponds to a metaphysics of presence within the body, or some other variation on this theme (i.e. A = X, Y, Z, etc.). You can accuse her argument of being tautological, but then of course the targets of her critique are actually illogical.

As far as her claim goes about gender being a factor pertaining to the organization of power structures, you're absolutely right that we cannot really dissociate such a claim from politics. But we can dissociate it from Butler's politics, as difficult as that sounds. In other words, this claim could just as plausibly come from a libertarian economist who happens to be tuned in to the social dynamics of gender relations - someone whose politics are, in all likelihood, very different from Butler's.

I think you're right to make the connection between social/cultural theory and political agendas, but I'm only suggesting that the theoretical texts we're discussing are very different from the kinds that appeared during, say, the heyday of abolitionism or the suffrage movement, or some other major social activist movement when the literature actually took the form of "TOTAL SOCIAL OPPRESSION NOW." Butler's books aren't calls-for-action, they're theoretical assessments of how gender dynamics continue to display themselves in nuanced yet significant ways, and how this continuance derives from a widespread misinterpretation of what gender is/how it functions.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Capitalism,_Socialism_and_Democracy

I would say I need to read this, but it seems like I've probably already figured the same stuff out/would simply agree. Preaching to the proverbial choir from the 40s.

This sounds interesting, although I really think it perpetuates a certain notion of post-Marxist cultural theory that is a bit... incorrect, I'll go ahead and say.

Briefly, I think that a LOT of theory since World War Two, the vast majority of French theory and everything derived from it, in fact, doesn't advocate for widespread revolution or political action - or rather, for a specific kind of political action. In fact, I'm of the opinion that it's far less incendiary than most people want to believe. In other words, I don't believe at all that the texts published by figures such as Foucault, Butler, Baudrillard, Derrida, et al are somehow championing revolutionary action or political overthrow, or anything so radical. I think they're very interested in how elements of social marginalization, disenfranchisement, etc. etc. continue to surface within the social field and how possibly we can interpret these appearances and possibly counteract them - but none of this amounts to a call for a full-blown social revolution.

I am of the strong belief that critics of (generally speaking) left-wing academia perceive all its members as closet Marxists who yearn for political rebellion. This is not the case at all. Market relations have afforded them, as you say, the space to function within society. Their goal isn't to destroy or even radically restructure those relations, but to provide a field model, or road map, for how we can operate more consciously within them.

 

[rms]

I'm not a fan of the guy per se, but one can't deny his accomplishments and company.

No doubt, but to say he had nothing to gain by freeing his slave only after his death and writing pro-abolition only in the final years of his life is being too nice to the man who likely knew he'd be the embodiment of the American persona both during the war and after

 

[Dak]

https://www.ted.com/talks/jonathan_haidt_on_the_moral_mind?language=en

edit: I still "identify" as preferentially (or "utopianish") "right-libertarian". However, after much experience and education, in terms of what I think is actually "necessary" in terms of "public policy" I lean very "conservative".

Pretty interesting that those charts Haidt shows keeps showing conservatives as the most balanced group. Maybe charges of ideological myopia towards the left aren't far off at all.

 

[Einherjar86]

I think the charge is correct that there is significant moral myopia on the left. Overall, Haidt's speech sounds a bit reactionary in that he's combating the elevated ethical elitism of the left (i.e. his talk is clearly a bit more hostile to liberals than to conservatives). But I don't think that's any reason to say that his research is wrong.

To be honest, I think the general argument is well-made: that left and right should strike a balance, despite the fanaticism on both sides that attempts to extinguish the other. It's too bad that most conservatives today don't have the presence of mind of an Edmund Burke - or a Hume, or a Kant, or a Hegel... all conservative by today's standards despite their elevation in Humanities departments. What most conservatives fail to acknowledge is that conservatism is a process of change, a constantly adapting set of values. In the nineteenth century, conservatism took the form of legitimism, which advocated a return to feudal aristocracy and despised industrialism. In the twentieth century, conservatism lauded industrialism as the signifier of progress and the ideals of capitalism. Conservatism is always undergoing revision, but often fails to realize this.

Liberalism (and I'm using that term specifically to refer to contemporary leftism) often urges change and evolution as a break with the status quo, without realizing how revolutionary ideas are rooted in the contemporary moment (and, by extension, in the past).

Coincidentally, Luhmannian systems theory is just such a model that attempts to get "outside the moral matrix," as Haidt suggests. Luhmann dismisses appeals to morality and ethics as exclusionary policies that fail to take into account the systematic complexity of the incomplete totality - my working phrase for a systemic entity that is what it is at any given moment, but can never be described as "total" or "whole" since it is always distinguishing itself from something else (i.e. its environment) and adapting to this environment, which is in turn always changing.

 

[rms]

https://www.ted.com/talks/jonathan_haidt_on_the_moral_mind?language=en

edit: I still "identify" as preferentially (or "utopianish") "right-libertarian". However, after much experience and education, in terms of what I think is actually "necessary" in terms of "public policy" I lean very "conservative".

Pretty interesting that those charts Haidt shows keeps showing conservatives as the most balanced group. Maybe charges of ideological myopia towards the left aren't far off at all.

I like Haidt. Seen a few things from him now.

 

[Dak]

I think the charge is correct that there is significant moral myopia on the left. Overall, Haidt's speech sounds a bit reactionary in that he's combating the elevated ethical elitism of the left (i.e. his talk is clearly a bit more hostile to liberals than to conservatives). But I don't think that's any reason to say that his research is wrong.

Well that's because of the audience of the TED talk. I bought his book "The Righteous Mind", but I need to sit down with it.

To be honest, I think the general argument is well-made: that left and right should strike a balance, despite the fanaticism on both sides that attempts to extinguish the other. It's too bad that most conservatives today don't have the presence of mind of an Edmund Burke - or a Hume, or a Kant, or a Hegel... all conservative by today's standards despite their elevation in Humanities departments. What most conservatives fail to acknowledge is that conservatism is a process of change, a constantly adapting set of values. In the nineteenth century, conservatism took the form of legitimism, which advocated a return to feudal aristocracy and despised industrialism. In the twentieth century, conservatism lauded industrialism as the signifier of progress and the ideals of capitalism. Conservatism is always undergoing revision, but often fails to realize this.

Liberalism (and I'm using that term specifically to refer to contemporary leftism) often urges change and evolution as a break with the status quo, without realizing how revolutionary ideas are rooted in the contemporary moment (and, by extension, in the past).

Well there's revision and then there is what looks like a runaway train - which is something many more conservative writers warned about, especially in regards to democracy. "Freedom and Equality" don't have the same ring to them when the city is on fire and everyone is starving.

Coincidentally, Luhmannian systems theory is just such a model that attempts to get "outside the moral matrix," as Haidt suggests. Luhmann dismisses appeals to morality and ethics as exclusionary policies that fail to take into account the systematic complexity of the incomplete totality - my working phrase for a systemic entity that is what it is at any given moment, but can never be described as "total" or "whole" since it is always distinguishing itself from something else (i.e. its environment) and adapting to this environment, which is in turn always changing.

This sounds quite Theseusian.

 

[Einherjar86]

Well there's revision and then there is what looks like a runaway train - which is something many more conservative writers warned about, especially in regards to democracy. "Freedom and Equality" don't have the same ring to them when the city is on fire and everyone is starving.

So, an argument would be that any/all "runaway train" liberal policies or values are unnecessary, because conservatism will undergo revision anyway, regardless of liberal opposition. This is an appeal to social determinism, however - that social conditions will change and inevitably bring about changes in cultural values. The truth is that there's a back-and-forth, right? Cultural thought and material conditions exist symbiotically, if we're attempting to understand something about historical development.

Runaway train attitudes are necessary because they channel energies typically repressed by more conservative attitudes. As backwards as it sounds, "progress" is a highly reactionary ideal: it elevates what we've always done as the path toward progress. It conjures its own paradox from within by actually advocating its exact opposite, i.e. not-progress, resistance to progress. Liberal thought blows open these contradictions, albeit sometimes dangerously.

This sounds quite Theseusian.

It is, but then that's not really a problem. We typically date the fall of the Roman Empire (in the West) as 476 CE, but the people living in the imperial regions during that time didn't notice any significant change. They simply continued living their lives. Distinctions are useful for categorizing and understanding processes and systemic adaptations, but they don't necessarily partake of reality itself.

In other words, the ship of Theseus is still seaworthy even if it's comprised of new parts.

 

[Dak]

So, an argument would be that any/all "runaway train" liberal policies or values are unnecessary, because conservatism will undergo revision anyway, regardless of liberal opposition. This is an appeal to social determinism, however - that social conditions will change and inevitably bring about changes in cultural values. The truth is that there's a back-and-forth, right? Cultural thought and material conditions exist symbiotically, if we're attempting to understand something about historical development.

Runaway train attitudes are necessary because they channel energies typically repressed by more conservative attitudes. As backwards as it sounds, "progress" is a highly reactionary ideal: it elevates what we've always done as the path toward progress. It conjures its own paradox from within by actually advocating its exact opposite, i.e. not-progress, resistance to progress. Liberal thought blows open these contradictions, albeit sometimes dangerously.

I disagree with the broad characterization of change as progress. Liberals simply want change, they justify it by calling it progress. It's not much of a mischaracterization to paint a conservative mindset as someone always crying out "Danger!" in regards to change, but it's also not much of a mischaracterization of a liberal to paint them as the ones who do not listen. In give and take terms, let us just assume either is right half the time. The conservative is much more concerned about missing out on danger than missing out on progress and of course liberals don't seem to believe there is any danger except in not changing.

In other words, the ship of Theseus is still seaworthy even if it's comprised of new parts.

I don't think the paradox was concerned with seaworthiness Of course that would actually be my primary concern.

 

[Einherjar86]

It's mine too! This is why I get confused sometimes when we're having these discussions. You brought up the paradox here, not me; and if certain critics whom I've frequently cited have seemed concerned with paradoxes (including Luhmann) it's only because they argue that the comprehension of social phenomena necessitate a grappling with the paradoxes that emerge through them (the phenomena, that is).

I disagree with the broad characterization of change as progress. Liberals simply want change, they justify it by calling it progress. It's not much of a mischaracterization to paint a conservative mindset as someone always crying out "Danger!" in regards to change, but it's also not much of a mischaracterization of a liberal to paint them as the ones who do not listen. In give and take terms, let us just assume either is right half the time. The conservative is much more concerned about missing out on danger than missing out on progress and of course liberals don't seem to believe there is any danger except in not changing.

I disagree with the characterization of change as progress too! I'm sorry if my writing is vague on this - I didn't think it was.

If anything, academic leftism is adamantly resistant to the notion of progress, even as it relates to social activism. The entirety of Adorno and Horkheimer's Dialectic of Enlightenment is structured on this premise - i.e. that change shouldn't be thought of progressively. If you're insinuating that the core theoretical texts of contemporary liberal thought advocate a blind progressivism, then I'm sorry but that's just inaccurate.

I can't emphasize how long I've been trying to communicate this idea to you. Most leftist theory, if we can call it that (many would not classify Niklas Luhmann as a leftist), does not advocate "progress" because they see progress as a dangerous and contradictory value. The point is not to propose we change for the sake of change, but that we acknowledge how change already inheres within the contradictory premises of contemporary society, many of which (i.e. the premises) constitute the fundamentals of conservative thought. Conservatism is by its very nature contradictory because it refuses to acknowledge its own adaptive quality.

I'm sure I've said this before, but Jürgen Habermas and Terry Eagleton (the latter of whom is definitely a radical academic) have accused theorists such as Derrida of being conservative! These categories are filled with contradictions, and it's been the primary effort of the academic theorists (whom I often refer to) to illuminate these contradictions. This doesn't amount to a rationalization of putting the train on autopilot and pointing it toward the edge of a cliff.

 

[Dak]

I disagree with the characterization of change as progress too! I'm sorry if my writing is vague on this - I didn't think it was.

If anything, academic leftism is adamantly resistant to the notion of progress, even as it relates to social activism. The entirety of Adorno and Horkheimer's Dialectic of Enlightenment is structured on this premise - i.e. that change shouldn't be thought of progressively. If you're insinuating that the core theoretical texts of contemporary liberal thought advocate a blind progressivism, then I'm sorry but that's just inaccurate.

I can't emphasize how long I've been trying to communicate this idea to you. Most leftist theory, if we can call it that (many would not classify Niklas Luhmann as a leftist), does not advocate "progress" because they see progress as a dangerous and contradictory value. The point is not to propose we change for the sake of change, but that we acknowledge how change already inheres within the contradictory premises of contemporary society, many of which (i.e. the premises) constitute the fundamentals of conservative thought. Conservatism is by its very nature contradictory because it refuses to acknowledge its own adaptive quality.

I'm sure I've said this before, but Jürgen Habermas and Terry Eagleton (the latter of whom is definitely a radical academic) have accused theorists such as Derrida of being conservative! These categories are filled with contradictions, and it's been the primary effort of the academic theorists (whom I often refer to) to illuminate these contradictions. This doesn't amount to a rationalization of putting the train on autopilot and pointing it toward the edge of a cliff.

Well I'm responding to you as much as I am the "meta" cultural environment. You and I are significant outliers, and carry along significant baggage in political or moral language at our disposal. I am also probably not as concise as I should be. When I said liberals and conservatives I did mean across the population, not merely academia.

I was just remembering that at one point we argued about meaning, and you were adamant (or so I interpreted) about the legitimacy of the interpretation of the reader, possibly at the expense at what was possibly or presumably meant by the writer. If that is the case, that would suggest that if only a select few "accurately" interpret core theoretical texts of contemporary liberal thought, then maybe there is a problem. Conservative writers do not seem to have nearly the same problem (the only issue would be cries from leftists of "fascist" or some form of "soulless". Not the same thing as being misunderstood by your own group). Maybe there's a problem in prose, rhetoric, or explicit or implicit content. Or maybe I'm way off base.

By the way I put off my other plans for today and cracked The Righteous Mind, and I'm about 2/3s of the way through it. The TED talk was a super brief summary. I'm only mildly surprised to see a few NRx shibboleths present in very watered down and careful presentation - those relating to genetic evolution as it relates to behavior, and some mentions of things that appear in polemics on "The Cathedral"/western liberals. There's definitely a significant theme of "emergence", although that word specifically is not used much.