Einherjar86
Active Member
This is from the middle, it's too long to be quoting the whole thing. I can't believe I'm reading it in a CFR publication.
Ah, thanks.
Reading about its history, it seems like it's entertained a host of right-wing contributors, including Fukuyama. It is kind of ironic though to find this position being promoted by the Council on Foreign Relations.
I'm afraid I don't understand the significance here, you might need to parse it a bit for me.
There are a few things, some more significant than others.
First, most Western philosophy criticized Derrida when he first came onto the scene. He was famously criticized by American philosophers in the 1960s when he delivered a now-canonical lecture titled "Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences." At that time, American philosophy was dominated by pragmatism, and they saw Derrida's remarks as unnecessarily obscurantist (a fair criticism), but also as not really saying anything new or revealing. As Bakker suggests, to pragmatists Derrida's point was "obvious": "Nothing is given, least of all meaning and experience." And this is true, Wittgenstein already made basically the same argument far more convincingly in his Investigations, if not in a roundabout way in the conclusion of the Tractatus (from 1922).
Bakker's point, and what I appreciate his post for, is his perceptiveness regarding the language in which Derrida makes his argument. As Bakker says, Derrida makes his point "within the phenomenological idiom" - he's "reproducing" the phenomenological argument in order to expose its internal contradictions from within. At the time Derrida was coming onto the scene, phenomenology was still a ragingly popular philosophical model, namely because Martin Heidegger was still alive and had published the monumental Being and Time in the 1920s. There are still plenty of phenomenologists today, albeit mostly across the Channel; but phenomenology also manifests in disciplines beyond philosophy - even in the rudiments of thought itself. Bakker has a problem with the phenomenological method, so Derrida's work has value for him.
For Bakker, phenomenology embodies something very literal about what he's calling the "horizons" of thought, or the methodological oversight of "keyhole neglect." These are material issues for current neuro-scientific inquiries (neuropsychology, neurophysiology, neurophenomenology, etc.), and Bakker is suggesting that Derrida's theory of "the trace" and other deconstructionist concepts can help us identify and understand these issues when they crop up.
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