Free will?

[Nile577]

Heidegger's "On the Origin of the Work of Art" would be a good thing to read here.

 

[Øjeblikket]

Hmm, if you look, the whole section - from 'science' to 'measurment' - in my post, is in quote marks, with "To elucidate a subtlety in the Germanic language:" being used as an introduction to said long quote :\ May I gently suggest the problem lies with your comprehension?

In any case I shall edit the initial post to include source, which likely should have been done initially.

fine, smartass. You clearly haven't a clue on the proper use of quotation marks. Apparently, neither do you demonstrate having an education on proper sourcing.

 

[Øjeblikket]

No. In Heideggerian thought, 'ontical' being is the 'rational, scientific approach' and 'ontological' is the 'being-there' disclosed through the vector of 'care,' via which Dasein establishes its falleness as 'being-in-the-world.' 'Being-there' (in later Heidegger) is also revealed through artistic disclosure/poetic thought - again giving ontological meaning to things.

Interesting parallels between the Heideggerian ontic/ontological distinction and Sartre's "in-itself" and "for-itself" categories, no?

that's all very fine indeed, but my point was simply that designating a thing as either ontic or ontological demonstrates a capacity for comprehending or even understanding being since both of those terms relate to being and the study of being, and because the process of designation is linear.

I was considering the awkwardness of discussing being ontologicaly only to arrive at abandonment of principle, much as you did here:

"I believe reason, science and rational thought have no conception or understanding of 'being'." - Nile577

at least, I think that is your opinion.

 

[Nile577]

that's all very fine indeed, but my point was simply that designating a thing as either ontic or ontological demonstrates a capacity for comprehending or even understanding being since both of those terms relate to being and the study of being, and because the process of designation is linear.

I was considering the awkwardness of discussing being ontologicaly only to arrive at abandonment of principle, much as you did here:

"I believe reason, science and rational thought have no conception or understanding of 'being'." - Nile577

at least, I think that is your opinion.

There’s no need to get angry. I appreciate the discussion you provide.

You fail to demarcate between Being and being (I use the capital letter distinction here for clarity, much as it might rile some contemporary scholars. Another method, followed in the quote you give above, is to denote Being by placing quotation marks around the standard form of the word). If you look at the sentence quoted, the 'being' mentioned is the ontological type. Ontological Being is entirely different from ontical being. It is Heidegger's argument that scientific thought has no conception whatsoever of ontological Being. It is not that both forms are integral to the study of Being; it is, in fact, axiomatic that the entire history of western thought overlooks, misunderstands and entirely fails to engage with the question of Being when it is posed in this fashion.

Misappropriating this subtlety results in a lack of precision.

 

[Nile577]

Also: I don't think one 'designates' a thing as either ontical or ontological. A thing EXISTS (dasein ek-sists) ontologically. How do we determine a thing? A little syncretism: Sartre holds self to be distinguished by a realisation of what it is not through negation of the world in the nothingness of consciousness' founding nihiliation, and then an ability to highlight specific 'thises' through the malleability of this nihiliating consciousness. That is, precision (attention) in the nothingness of what consciousness is not, instils Being towards an object (a specific 'this'). This is the bridge between consciousness and the Heideggerian Earth, grounding Earth in World. Ontic thought takes no account of existence and has nothing to do with Being.

Not that I mind but this has wandered rather off topic and become quite technical. I apologise to those not familiar with Sartre or Heidegger for the rather obtuse terminology and obfuscating terms.

 

[Demiurge]

To be clear, free will in the sense the term is usually used is libertarian free will. I.e., in situation X, agent A had a genuine opportunity to act differently than he did. This is false. Agent A could have acted differently only if differently constituted. All agents have is the freedom to act as their constitutions dictate. This is basically a "compatibilist" view, but clearly, it runs contrary to absolute free will. The absolutely free will would be out of touch with the self: personality, cognitive ability, emotional state, etc. All of these things are causally conditioned. Libertarian free will is not individual choice, but being under the control of a random daemon.

 

[Nile577]

Interesting post Demiurge.

To be clear, free will in the sense the term is usually used is libertarian free will. I.e., in situation X, agent A had a genuine opportunity to act differently than he did. This is false. Agent A could have acted differently only if differently constituted. All agents have is the freedom to act as their constitutions dictate.

Some thoughts: I think libertarian free will is an insufficient paradigm.

Agent A 'exists' the manifold possibilities around situation X such that Agent A is not confronted by an objective situation X but rather maps its ontological horizons around it. That is, 'Situation X' is created by an investment of self's valuating consciousness. For example: in wandering along a narrow path by a cliff, self maps possibilities onto the 'situation' - e.g. falling to its death, crossing safely to the other side, something unexpected happening. There is no objective choice here, only a chosen ontological modification of self's future. Freewill operates not only at the level of response but at the positing of a 'situation' itself. Agent A determines all potentialities (even if some 'exist' as 'unexpected') and interacts with them in totality so that one not only chooses to 'be' in a certain fashion but also chooses not to 'be' in others. Self's being already exists in relation to (is coloured by) these created potentialities, so in some sense they have all already been 'chosen,' if we take that to mean they are given ontological meaning.

Freewill & determinism is a false dualism when it is realized that human ontology is comprised as much from what it is not as what it is and the locus of this ontology, in situation, is the plurality of all existed possibilities and our negative/positive relationship with them. Self exists possibilities; self exists 'situations'. Self is even 'free' to exist situations as (reductive) determinism.

Much as self picks out specific 'thises' following its primal negation that it is 'not' the entire universe, it also 'exists' specific situations from the infinity of absolute possibility (the universe). Situations, variables and choice are constituent parts of human Being.

I agree with your point regarding the impossibility of 'absolute free will' if we take that to be the idea that self could achieve whatever it wished regardless of context - this would make self divine and would cast 'freewill' as a qualitative attribute as opposed to a facet of being. However, I think the mechanism of this 'failure' would be freely chosen in that one would choose to be 'not-divine' in any given created 'situational' context. That is, freewill can only exist in context and is responsible for the creation of that context from the seat of Daseinc consciousness. We are not God, not can think like he might, and to graft freewill upon a divine being does rudeness to its tenets and is not a meaningful comparison.

 

[no country for old wainds]

To be clear, free will in the sense the term is usually used is libertarian free will. I.e., in situation X, agent A had a genuine opportunity to act differently than he did. This is false. Agent A could have acted differently only if differently constituted. All agents have is the freedom to act as their constitutions dictate. This is basically a "compatibilist" view, but clearly, it runs contrary to absolute free will. The absolutely free will would be out of touch with the self: personality, cognitive ability, emotional state, etc. All of these things are causally conditioned. Libertarian free will is not individual choice, but being under the control of a random daemon.

thank christ somebodys finally managed to put my argument in a way thats concise and makes sense

 

[Demiurge]

Interesting post Demiurge.

Right, thanks for the reply.

Agent A 'exists' the manifold possibilities around situation X such that Agent A is not confronted by an objective situation X but rather maps its ontological horizons around it. That is, 'Situation X' is created by an investment of self's valuating consciousness. For example: in wandering along a narrow path by a cliff, self maps possibilities onto the 'situation' - e.g. falling to its death, crossing safely to the other side, something unexpected happening. There is no objective choice here, only a chosen ontological modification of self's future. Freewill operates not only at the level of response but at the positing of a 'situation' itself. Agent A determines all potentialities (even if some 'exist' as 'unexpected') and interacts with them in totality so that one not only chooses to 'be' in a certain fashion but also chooses not to 'be' in others. Self's being already exists in relation to (is coloured by) these created potentialities, so in some sense they have all already been 'chosen,' if we take that to mean they are given ontological meaning.

For clarity’s sake, let us discuss a simple choice: my choice to respond to your post. This both excludes and generates possibilities. I could be doing many other things instead of posting and I realize that posting will probably lead to a response on your part, then another by me, etc. The question is, could I have decided not to post or not? I do not mean if I was differently disposed in some way, but as I was when I posted. I say that the answer is no.

I agree that an agent posits not only a discrete, “positive” choice, but also potentialities, including opportunity costs and further moves that will become possible after the action. With all due respect, though, I think it’s somewhat tangential to what I was saying. There is an action. I am posting, I am not sleeping or reading, although, the potential for me to undertake these other activities was present to my mind. The question is, could I have done one of the others were I not differently disposed or could I not.

 

[S4R]

I'm with Hume on this one.

 

[Nile577]

Right, thanks for the reply.



For clarity’s sake, let us discuss a simple choice: my choice to respond to your post. This both excludes and generates possibilities. I could be doing many other things instead of posting and I realize that posting will probably lead to a response on your part, then another by me, etc. The question is, could I have decided not to post or not? I do not mean if I was differently disposed in some way, but as I was when I posted. I say that the answer is no.

I agree that an agent posits not only a discrete, “positive” choice, but also potentialities, including opportunity costs and further moves that will become possible after the action. With all due respect, though, I think it’s somewhat tangential to what I was saying. There is an action. I am posting, I am not sleeping or reading, although, the potential for me to undertake these other activities was present to my mind. The question is, could I have done one of the others were I not differently disposed or could I not.

I think the mechanism of choice is miscast here. You responded to my post because you created a situation, investing value in its outcomes – ‘not posting’ (self saves effort but risks missing out on mental stimulation) or ‘posting’ (self gains mental reward but expends effort). This situation itself is created by the will, as it invests objects with contextual meaning. The outcomes/decision paths around a situation are constructed as possibilities, to be 'existed' (in the verb form) by self in hodological space, extending to a defined future point, towards which self will or will-not travel. This point corresponds to a realization of the hypothesized consequence the 'selection' of a particular behavior pattern will have. Now, as mentioned in my previous post, if it is allowed that self is able to 'exist' (again, as a verb) the potentiality of 'something unexpected happening,' we must conclude that self possesses unlimited potential for variety in terms of creating situations and bestowing value on them.

Now, 'choice,' I think, in the context it is employed in your definition, seems to imply an objective perspective in which agent A exhibits a propensity for choice A instead of B (or C or D), with these potential behavior paths being of universal validity, clear for all to recognize. I have argued above that choice is much more subjective, being created by the will. I also wish to suggest that, within this framework, because self chooses not to behave in a certain fashion does not mean that that the ontological constitution of self has selected against a particular possibility. Self IS. Self IS (ontologically) that which it chooses to select. Self IS (ontologically) that which it chooses NOT to select.

Example: 'I am NOT falling off that cliff,’ modifies the constitution of self and as such is selected and CHOSEN even in rejection. We CHOOSE to BE ‘not-falling-off-that-cliff’ We CHOOSE the nature of the NOT that our selves ARE. Consciousness is a malleable nothingness, defined as much by what self does NOT choose as by what it does.

Therefore, freewill exists at a deeper level than the definition given in your post. It creates not only all possibilities around a situation, selecting all of them (either in negation or affirmation) but it also establishes the very situation itself, instilling it with value and constructing the choice-paths in response to it that determinists falsely hold as being preeminent.

 

[Demiurge]

I must confess that I have an extremely difficult time trying to understand your posts. I fear that we may sometimes talk past one another because of this difficulty. I will read over your latest post and formulate a careful response.

 

[Nile577]

That's quite ok. Although I have tried to be as clear as possible, the fault may lie in poor communication on my part. I think it might help to have read Sartre's Being and Nothingness as I am quite influenced in my thoughts by his construction of consciousness. I appreciate the argument you provide in any case.

 

[Dominick_7]

Ok I'm late in comming to this discussion, but would like to give my two cents even though I could only read the first 3 pages and the last one..for some reason my computer couldn't bring the 4th page up. I'd like to try to keep it short because I just don't have time to do a long thread nowadays, where every point is debated and discussed like I used to be able to do..they can be sweet but I can't do that now. If you'd like to diaalogue on it, coool, but please just summarize your point/reply and try not to do a reply to each sentance. Though I would like to, I can't do that kind of thing currently.


I would contend that free will does actually exist.

I'm defining free will as the abillity to cause ones own actions, to be able to do or do otherwise. So it is libertarian but as I'm defining it..but please don't attach something to it it doesn't express.

I think much of what I've read confuses influences WITH what a determining cause is. Just because something can influence your choice, doesn't mean that that influence causes your action. When something is caused, what is happening is a potential (what can be) is actualized (what is) by an actuality ( for nothing cannot cause something..and non being isnt being so lets not confuse the two by saying a non thing has power to cause or produce something, when it has no power or even existance to be able to do something..what is different is not the same). When an action is caused, its being caused by a "self". If ones arm is hit by a falling rock and it hits a nerve which causes the arm to move, that is not what is meant by a conscious choice of the individual. If one picks up a rock to throw it against a wall (physical action causing the physical body to move), chooses between vanilla or chocolate (choice based on preference), or chooses to love and care for someone instead of murder them (moral choice), these are examples of what I mean by free will or ones conscious choice/action.

I'm not offering a defense of free will that is rationally/logically inescapable, because one can concieve of any contrary states of affairs in the mind (something exists, nothing exits, the universe exists, the universe doent exist, God exists, God doesnt exist, Zeus, pegasus exist etc). There are no purely rationally or logically airtight arguments. Rather I'm arguing that free will is actually undeniable. Undeniable doesn't mean one can't say "nah ah", or "that isn't true".. Undeniable means that something cannot be meaningfully denied, without implying its truth and reality in the very process of the denial. WHat I'm arguing is that the reality of free will is shown to be both self evident and actually undeniable in the very experiential process of thinking about it, questioning it, or denying it.

How do we know that free will is actually undeniable? We'll I must be in the actual process of causing my own statement, in order to deny that I can cause my own statements/actions. If I say "I have no free will" then I prove I have free will, for the only way I could produce the denial is if I had free will to do so. On the other hand, if it is true that "self" cannot make the denial, then I/self cannot deny free will exists. So it becomes self negating, self destructive, and contradictory (thus is shown to be demonstrably false) to deny one has free will. Hence, everytime I try to deny that I have free will, I actually and necessarily imply that I must have free will in order to do so. Every caused denial of free will implies the actuality of ones free will to be able to make the denial. If one can't cause their own denial, then one cannot meaningfully state they don't have free will. While saying free will doesn't exist is thinkable and statable, the thing is that its not meaningfully affirmable.


How do we know that free will is self evident, in that I can cause my own actions by my self? We'll in order to think about that, or ask about that, I must be in the actual experiential process of causing my own thought, statement, or question in order to ask whether I can cause my own thought or statement or action. I really catch myself using my free will while being in the actual process of thinking about if I do, or asking if I do. A actually produced thought or question implies an actual self that is really causing the thought or question.

If someone disagree with this position, my question to you would be "whose saying that"? If no one is saying it, then no one there needs to recieve a reply. Forces don't reason, talk, or deny..persons do. An existing person is required for a personal reply to be given. If youre not a person or self, then please don't reply..it will end up proving what I'm saying.

One other reply could be "if you can show me how you can deny free will exists WITHOUT causing your own thought, statement, or denial, then I'll change my mind".


PS:
One other supplimental argument is the following..A determinist believes one cannot cause ones own actions and do otherwise, thus would contend that ones actions are caused by another, not by ones own self. In a discussion with someone who believes in free will, a determinists believes that someone who believes in free will is wrong and ought to change their view to determinism. But "ought to change" implies they can change..So the question I have is why does a determinist discuss this or state their view trying to argue their point and see that someone who believes in free will changes their view to being a determinist IF it was really true/and that they really believed that a person who believes in free will believes it and cannot change their view? If the determinists believes actual dialogue or discussion is going on, and that the free willer should change their view, thus can, how can he/she maintain determinism is true when the very act of discussion and debate implies the truth that one can change their view, and thus can do otherwise, hence revealing that free will exists?

 

[Silver Incubus]

Ok I'm late in comming to this discussion, but would like to give my two cents even though I could only read the first 3 pages and the last one..for some reason my computer couldn't bring the 4th page up. I'd like to try to keep it short because I just don't have time to do a long thread nowadays, where every point is debated and discussed like I used to be able to do..they can be sweet but I can't do that now. If you'd like to diaalogue on it, coool, but please just summarize your point/reply and try not to do a reply to each sentance. Though I would like to, I can't do that kind of thing currently.


I would contend that free will does actually exist.

I'm defining free will as the abillity to cause ones own actions, to be able to do or do otherwise. So it is libertarian but as I'm defining it..but please don't attach something to it it doesn't express.

I think much of what I've read confuses influences WITH what a determining cause is. Just because something can influence your choice, doesn't mean that that influence causes your action. When something is caused, what is happening is a potential (what can be) is actualized (what is) by an actuality ( for nothing cannot cause something..and non being isnt being so lets not confuse the two by saying a non thing has power to cause or produce something, when it has no power or even existance to be able to do something..what is different is not the same). When an action is caused, its being caused by a "self". If ones arm is hit by a falling rock and it hits a nerve which causes the arm to move, that is not what is meant by a conscious choice of the individual. If one picks up a rock to throw it against a wall (physical action causing the physical body to move), chooses between vanilla or chocolate (choice based on preference), or chooses to love and care for someone instead of murder them (moral choice), these are examples of what I mean by free will or ones conscious choice/action.

I'm not offering a defense of free will that is rationally/logically inescapable, because one can concieve of any contrary states of affairs in the mind (something exists, nothing exits, the universe exists, the universe doent exist, God exists, God doesnt exist, Zeus, pegasus exist etc). There are no purely rationally or logically airtight arguments. Rather I'm arguing that free will is actually undeniable. Undeniable doesn't mean one can't say "nah ah", or "that isn't true".. Undeniable means that something cannot be meaningfully denied, without implying its truth and reality in the very process of the denial. WHat I'm arguing is that the reality of free will is shown to be both self evident and actually undeniable in the very experiential process of thinking about it, questioning it, or denying it.

How do we know that free will is actually undeniable? We'll I must be in the actual process of causing my own statement, in order to deny that I can cause my own statements/actions. If I say "I have no free will" then I prove I have free will, for the only way I could produce the denial is if I had free will to do so. On the other hand, if it is true that "self" cannot make the denial, then I/self cannot deny free will exists. So it becomes self negating, self destructive, and contradictory (thus is shown to be demonstrably false) to deny one has free will. Hence, everytime I try to deny that I have free will, I actually and necessarily imply that I must have free will in order to do so. Every caused denial of free will implies the actuality of ones free will to be able to make the denial. If one can't cause their own denial, then one cannot meaningfully state they don't have free will. While saying free will doesn't exist is thinkable and statable, the thing is that its not meaningfully affirmable.


How do we know that free will is self evident, in that I can cause my own actions by my self? We'll in order to think about that, or ask about that, I must be in the actual experiential process of causing my own thought, statement, or question in order to ask whether I can cause my own thought or statement or action. I really catch myself using my free will while being in the actual process of thinking about if I do, or asking if I do. A actually produced thought or question implies an actual self that is really causing the thought or question.

If someone disagree with this position, my question to you would be "whose saying that"? If no one is saying it, then no one there needs to recieve a reply. Forces don't reason, talk, or deny..persons do. An existing person is required for a personal reply to be given. If youre not a person or self, then please don't reply..it will end up proving what I'm saying.

One other reply could be "if you can show me how you can deny free will exists WITHOUT causing your own thought, statement, or denial, then I'll change my mind".


PS:
One other supplimental argument is the following..A determinist believes one cannot cause ones own actions and do otherwise, thus would contend that ones actions are caused by another, not by ones own self. In a discussion with someone who believes in free will, a determinists believes that someone who believes in free will is wrong and ought to change their view to determinism. But "ought to change" implies they can change..So the question I have is why does a determinist discuss this or state their view trying to argue their point and see that someone who believes in free will changes their view to being a determinist IF it was really true/and that they really believed that a person who believes in free will believes it and cannot change their view? If the determinists believes actual dialogue or discussion is going on, and that the free willer should change their view, thus can, how can he/she maintain determinism is true when the very act of discussion and debate implies the truth that one can change their view, and thus can do otherwise, hence revealing that free will exists?

I agree 100% and had said that in this thread, but of course not this elegantly

 

[no country for old wainds]

and i 100% disagree for exactly the same reasons as ever, virtually every pro free-will argument in this thread has boiled down to "a person can decide to do something over something else, and is thus free", but my argument is that whatever we decide is the only thing we could possibly have decided because no matter how many times we're hypothetically brought back to that moment, we would be the exact same person, and would thus make the exact same decision. taking an above example on board, a person will say "i have no free will" because at that exact time in that exact environment, that exact person will always react that same way.

ill put things another way: those in favour of free will claim that *we* are the cause of our actions. this, to me, is the same as saying a bullet causes itself to be fired, or keyboard causes itself to be played - i see humans as reactionary entities like everything else, whose so-called actions are merely reactions dictated by the intersection between how they're built at a particular time and their environment.

perhaps im missing something because this just seems so inherently logical to me, and i know im not communicating myself very well, but i'm still yet to read a single counter-argument that's actually seemed to understand my own argument let alone challenged it.

If the determinists believes actual dialogue or discussion is going on, and that the free willer should change their view, thus can, how can he/she maintain determinism is true when the very act of discussion and debate implies the truth that one can change their view, and thus can do otherwise, hence revealing that free will exists?

ill talk about this separately because i think it provides an opportunity for me to show how these sorts of arguments are congruent with my deterministic view.

of course a person's view may change, this is undeniable. what is deniable however is that they themselves are the causes of this change. when i argue with a person, i don't wish for them to change their own viewpoint, i myself am aiming to change their viewpoint. im unconvinced of the "fact that one can change their view or do otherwise", instead feeling that a certain intersection between a person at a particular time and their environment (say, as a simple example, you at the exact time youre reading this post) can result in a change to their viewpoint.

people do contribute to *causing their own actions* in the sense that what they are at a particular point determines how they will react to their environment, but i consider what a person is at a particular time to also be the product of accumulated reactions as described before, and thus we're perpetually reacting to environmental stimulus rather than ever actually causing our own actions or having the freedom to choose any number of paths.

i could not at this exact point in time as this exact person go into my mother's room and stab her in the head, or go downstairs and make a sandwich, not because i'm causing myself not to, but because the person i have become as a result of accumulated reactions down a linear causal path could not possibly be doing anything else in this exact environment but what i'm doing right now. at the point in which i do go downstairs and make a sandwich (probably not for a long time, i'm a lazy asshole), i will be a slightly different person in a slightly different environment and going to make a sandwich will be the result of that intersection.

am i making any sense yet?

 

[Nile577]

and i 100% disagree for exactly the same reasons as ever, virtually every pro free-will argument in this thread has boiled down to "a person can decide to do something over something else, and is thus free",

That's not true. I argue that a person's will first creates the situation around which a 'choice' is made and then 'selects' every single outcome around it simultaneously in selection or negation, with the negations of these 'choices' constituting the person's ontological makeup. That is, the nature of what I am is defined by what I AM not. In the simplest terms possible, in the act of crossing a chasm, there is a modification in the makeup of self in regards to the neglected choice of NOT falling off the cliff. One might say: ‘I AM (in the sense of: this is the nature of my self) not falling off the cliff.’

Your argument relies on the creation of an objective perspective in which we presuppose a situation (neglecting to consider that all situations are disclosed by the will) and then positing absolute behaviour choices around it, as if the selection of one negates the influence of the other in the realm of Being (ontology).

ill put things another way: those in favour of free will claim that *we* are the cause of our actions. this, to me, is the same as saying a bullet causes itself to be fired, or keyboard causes itself to be played - i see humans as reactionary entities like everything else, whose so-called actions are merely reactions dictated by the intersection between how they're built at a particular time and their environment."

people do contribute to *causing their own actions* in the sense that what they are at a particular point determines how they will react to their environment, but i consider what a person is at a particular time to also be the product of accumulated reactions as described before, and thus we're perpetually reacting to environmental stimulus rather than ever actually causing our own actions or having the freedom to choose any number of paths.

First, I think your opening sentence needs clarification. Do you identify the 'we' with our 'will?' That is, lets take the example of a security guard smoking a cigarette outside the warehouse he works at. He flicks the butt onto the floor, assuming it is extinguished. However, he discovers the following day that the warehouse has burned down in a fire caused by a discarded, still lit, cigarette end. The 'will' of the guard did not desire the outcome of his behaviour in context because it did not even occur to him. His Being is coloured by 'something unexpected happening.'

Secondly, Consciousness discloses the meaning of the world through its ontology (the Heideggerian 'Being-in-the-world'). The matter forming a glass can be disclosed as a 'beaker' if we are 'Being-towards-wanting-a-drink,' the same matter can be disclosed as a weapon if we are 'Being-towards-wanting-to-smash-someone-in-the-head.' These different disclosures are infinite in variety. Consciousness instills some part of the meaning of Being in ontic entities.

The 'I AM' of self is its past, present and future. If we look at the Sartresian construction of consciousness, the For-itself (consciousness) is connected with the In-itself (being) through facticity (a recognition of its own past). In his words, “It is what allows us to say that the For-itself IS or EXISTS. The facticity of freedom is the fact that freedom is not able not to be free.”

Within the context of a situation created by consciousness (freely and with infinite variety), the facticity of self is projected around the situation as hypothetical future points where the For-Itself and In-Itself are united - where 'I will be safe,' for example, corresponds to both. Of course, this is only possible in the future. The present, the moment, is simply the For-Itself's flight from the In-Itself towards the future. Consciousness (for-itself) does not exist in the instant and hence arguments centered around the creation of objective moments are not applicable to free will.

i could not at this exact point in time as this exact person go into my mother's room and stab her in the head, or go downstairs and make a sandwich, not because i'm causing myself not to, but because the person i have become as a result of accumulated reactions down a linear causal path could not possibly be doing anything else in this exact environment but what i'm doing right now.

This serves as a good example. The situational context of stabbing your mother in the head or making a sandwich is created itself by your will. The value and 'choices' around this situation are created in your consciousness. If you stab your mother you ARE 'not making a sandwich,' if you make a sandwich you ARE 'not killing your mother.' The linear causal path does not objectively exist as every facet of its construction is created, disclosed and selected by consciousness. Each choice in negation or selection colours your ontological makeup.

Hence we have definite free will and the usual Determinist/Free will paradigm is a false dualism.

 

[no country for old wainds]

First off, let me just say that I had you in mind as an exception when I put "virtually every". Your posts tend to intrigue me, but being pretty poorly versed in philosophy (including Sartre) in the grand scheme of things I also sometimes struggle in understanding your points, no doubt much moreso than Demiurge does. Nevertheless let me have a look.

 

[judas69]

Time is intimately tied to an understanding of free will and determinism and although I have not read all previous posts to know if this was discussed, it should at least be something to consider.

For example, what effect if any would there be to this discussion if time were bi-directional?

 

[Dominick_7]

Interesting post Demiurge.

Some thoughts: I think libertarian free will is an insufficient paradigm.

Agent A 'exists' the manifold possibilities around situation X such that Agent A is not confronted by an objective situation X but rather maps its ontological horizons around it. That is, 'Situation X' is created by an investment of self's valuating consciousness. For example: in wandering along a narrow path by a cliff, self maps possibilities onto the 'situation' - e.g. falling to its death, crossing safely to the other side, something unexpected happening. There is no objective choice here, only a chosen ontological modification of self's future. Freewill operates not only at the level of response but at the positing of a 'situation' itself. Agent A determines all potentialities (even if some 'exist' as 'unexpected') and interacts with them in totality so that one not only chooses to 'be' in a certain fashion but also chooses not to 'be' in others. Self's being already exists in relation to (is coloured by) these created potentialities, so in some sense they have all already been 'chosen,' if we take that to mean they are given ontological meaning.

Are you saying that those potentials aren't REAL potential choices? In other words are you saying that if a real person is infront of a real cliff, there isn't a REAL potential that he COULD fall off vs not fall off? What is a chosen ontological modification?? Why does him/her considering or conceptualizing the REAL potential outcomes MEAN that because he/she is thinking them in the abstract thoughts of the mind, that they don't have a REAL potential refferent in reality..I mean, if he/she thinks of falling off the cliff, the objective refferent is the cliff, and the thought is relative to the REAL potential that he/she could REALLY fall off. How is a real potential, or the recongnition of a real potential outcome=theres no REAL potential there to be discovered? EITHER he/she stays on the cliff, gets away from it, or falls off..what else is there? WHy do you speak about it as DETERMINING the potential outcomes and choices VS DISCOVERING realities that allow for that person to choose a REAL potential choice. While the externals are influences, it is HE/SHE that must determine their steps.

Freewill & determinism is a false dualism when it is realized that human ontology is comprised as much from what it is not as what it is and the locus of this ontology, in situation, is the plurality of all existed possibilities and our negative/positive relationship with them. Self exists possibilities; self exists 'situations'. Self is even 'free' to exist situations as (reductive) determinism.

I really don't understand what this means. Could you clarify it for me?

Much as self picks out specific 'thises' following its primal negation that it is 'not' the entire universe, it also 'exists' specific situations from the infinity of absolute possibility (the universe). Situations, variables and choice are constituent parts of human Being.

Why do you equate existing with a chosen action or cognative logical actions? I'm also curious to know why you speak of the ACTUAL universe as a potentiality, when the universe is actual and not purely potential..though its actual WITH real potentiality, and that the universe is not actually infinite, but rather is changing, finite, and limited therefore only potentially infinite (IE it can go on continuing to recieve more moments of existence?

I agree with your point regarding the impossibility of 'absolute free will' if we take that to be the idea that self could achieve whatever it wished regardless of context - this would make self divine and would cast 'freewill' as a qualitative attribute as opposed to a facet of being. However, I think the mechanism of this 'failure' would be freely chosen in that one would choose to be 'not-divine' in any given created 'situational' context. That is, freewill can only exist in context and is responsible for the creation of that context from the seat of Daseinc consciousness. We are not God, not can think like he might, and to graft freewill upon a divine being does rudeness to its tenets and is not a meaningful comparison.

Come again?