Free will?

[Dominick_7]

and i 100% disagree for exactly the same reasons as ever, virtually every pro free-will argument in this thread has boiled down to "a person can decide to do something over something else, and is thus free", but my argument is that whatever we decide is the only thing we could possibly have decided because no matter how many times we're hypothetically brought back to that moment, we would be the exact same person, and would thus make the exact same decision. taking an above example on board, a person will say "i have no free will" because at that exact time in that exact environment, that exact person will always react that same way.

Thank you for the reply, but if you believe that that's what I was saying, then you didn't listen carefully at least to the particular argument I gave for free will. I didnt just STATE that a person can decide to do something over something else and THEREFORE is free...Simply put, the REASON why I say "a person can decide to do something over something else", or more specifically, let's go to what I actually said...that "a person can cause their own action, and can do otherwise" is because it is actually undeniable and self evident that they must cause their own action or statement INORDER to state they can't cause their own actions or statements. In other words, YOU ACTUALLY demonstrate you can cause your own actions, everytime YOU SAY/YOU PRODUCE a statement saying you can't cause your own actions.

ill put things another way: those in favour of free will claim that *we* are the cause of our actions. this, to me, is the same as saying a bullet causes itself to be fired, or keyboard causes itself to be played - i see humans as reactionary entities like everything else, whose so-called actions are merely reactions dictated by the intersection between how they're built at a particular time and their environment.

A bullet causing itself to be fired, implies it has an aspect of itself that exists beyond the physical that can act ON the physical aspect of itself. Since pretty much know that a bullet doesn't have an aspect of itself that is different from the phsyical aspect of itself by which to act ON its physical aspect, it is obviously nonsensical to speak of a bullet causing itself to be fired. The reason why it is NOT nonsense to say a self can cause its own actions is because we have an aspect of self that is disctinct from, transcendant over, and different from the physical aspect of self. For one thing an action is different from the center from which the action comes from. The reason why it makes sense for humans to say we can cause our own actions is because thats just how we are naturally. This isnt just statable, its defensable. I'd contend its obvious..but many things in this world that are, are made to appear not obvious for various reasons. If we could be made to think that the obvious things arent obvious, wouldnt it be easier to sell something to you you dont really need AS IF you couldnt live without it? Well thats for another time..but anyway..The obvious self evident truth is that ...We/I think. Bullets and keyboards dont. Bullets didnt create themselves, nor do bullets. Rather, WE create bullets and keyboards. SO were different from them in that respect. Also, the more general obvious truth is that we intuatively know we think, reason about things like matter, and make judgements about things like that. We know this and it is self evident. It is obvious that we think. We also know that we have an immaterial aspect of self that is different from our material aspect of self. How do we know these things to be true? Theyre self evident and undeniable. I can state that, as can anyone, BUT I will also attempt to defend that claim as well.

For one thing, how do I know I think? Its self evident that I must think in order to ask whether I think. I catch myself thinking WHILE in the experiential process of asking, or questioning whether I think. Everytime I ask whether I can think, I catch myself thinking inorder to do so.

Man, even if I said I'm 100% stupid, or know absolutely nothing, one can immediately know that that isnt true. How? We'll one MUST know enough about ones stupidity, to know that at very least theyre stupid..but if they KNOW theyre stupid, then they can't be 100% stupid for they at least DO know one thing. Youd HAVE to know SOMETHING to be able to claim you know or believe youre stupid. So youd have to be less than 100% stupid or ignorant to be able to KNOW you are that. This at very least means I'm not completely 100%stupid I guess? It means I know something, but don't know everything. Welcome to reality right? So its also undeniably true that I am a thinking rational being.

Its the same thing in saying "I know absolutely nothing". It CANNOT be true to say "I know absolutely nothing", for I'd have to know that I know absolutely nothing..but if I KNOW that I know nothing, then I know something. If I REALLY DID know nothing, then I couldnt think or state that. So while one can say that they know nothing at all all day long, it cannot be meaningfully affirmed WITHOUT implying the truth that I do know something..if one is making a meaningfull analysis that one has discovered they know absolutely nothing, they must meaningfully know that and must have knowledgably discovered that, to be able to say that...thus its actually inescapable that I am a thinking rational creature. Either way, whether one asks about it or denies the truth that one thinks as a rational creature, its shown to be actually inescapable that Im a rational thinking being. We know this via experience and intuition as it is immediately verifiable this way.

What can also be stated is that thoughts are immaterial and are produced by an immaterial self. Do an experiment with me for a moment. Think of something you like..a car, person, whatever..picture it in your mind. This can be used with anything really, but I'll use the example of a Red Fire engine. I don't care for them, but whatever. Ok. If we close our eyes and picture a red fire engine, we can see it in our mind right? Can you see it? Its red pigment because its painted red, its shininess, the different textures of the wheels in comparison to the metalic red metal frame? Picture that for a moment. Ok. Now what you experience is a mental image of A red fire engine right? When you did that, was another red fire engine added to the universe? No right? If someone cut your head open WHILE you are thinking of that mental image of the fire engine, will a red fire engine fly out of your brains? No right? If they did cut your head open, would the find red pigment, metal, rubber from any tires or any physical evidence of that mental image of the red fire engine? No right? But YET you could REALLY mentally percieve it somehow, correct? So while it wasnt an actual or physical, independantly existing red fire engine, it is a REAL abstract mental image of it. IE you experienced and conjured up a REAL mental image of a red fire engine, BUT YET that mental image doesnt have any physical properties to it. What is the conclusion from that experiment? Your have and experience REAL thoughts/mental images, BUT those mental images ARENT physical because they have no physical properties to them: IE your thoughts/mental images are immaterial.

While one can physically measure the physical brain processes or the activities of the physical brain which you use through which to think or conjure up that image, there are NO physical properties to the END RESULTING mental image in any case. What follows from this is that one causes their own thoughts, which are real thoughts/mental images, that are not material, but rather are immaterial or not physical. The thoughts are produced not by the brain, but with the brain BY the mind, which is itself immaterial from which the thoughts come from. So, because the thoughts that are produced by the self are immaterial, which points out that the self is immaterial, and both of which are different from the physical body, this is why it isnt nonsensical to talk about how and why we know we can cause our own actions, or act upon our body or act on other things. This is also an argument that leads to showing that the immaterial soul or aspect of self continues to exist after the physical death of the body, because for one thing, entrophy only applies to the physical universe, but thats for another time.


Philosophically its self evident and undeniable that because the main alternative is is to say everything is only matter. But to do that one must make a observation and judgment about all matter. The problem with this is that to make an observation or judgment implies an observed thing (the universe) and the observer of the thing (self). The only way one could make a judgment about all matter is if they had an observationally distinct vantage point beyond matter by which to observe and judge it. If ones self was identical to the matter that was being claimed to be observed, then one couldnt make the observation because the thing being observed would be identical to the observer..thus the observer observed thing distinction would be eliminated. If the observer and observed thing were identical, and not different, then there would be no point beyond matter by which to observe or judge it. If nothing was different from matter, then matter couldnt be observed or judged. If all was a thing, then there could be no thought about a thing (materialism). If all was thought, then there could be no thing to come to know (pantheism). Rather if one thinks, about things, then it implies a real difference in terms of the kinds of beings there are, where theres a real difference between thoughts and things, which makes rational thought possible and justifiable (theism). To reduce everything to matter, eliminates the observabillity of it, which makes all claims for materialism self negating..on the other hand, to reduce everything to thought, is to take away the meaningfullness of the claim, for unless knows someTHING, one cannot claim to know anyTHING. This would also be a denial that ones self exists, for its a claim that only thought exists, but no distinct minds by which to think. Yet how can thought occur without an actual mind/self to think it? Either course of action is self negating, self defeating and contradictory, thus false. The only view that doesnt contradict itself, and is also self evident and undeniable, is theism. Without this worldview, rational claims are not justifiable in any objective sense. I'm not here (at least today) to justify theism, but just to say that its the only view which allows for rational thoughts to be justifiable and objectively descriptive.

perhaps im missing something because this just seems so inherently logical to me, and i know im not communicating myself very well, but i'm still yet to read a single counter-argument that's actually seemed to understand my own argument let alone challenged it.

You may have correctly observed SOME of the "arguments" given in the forum about free will are not really arguments but just a dogmatic assertion rather than a defensible argument that not only SAYS its true but shows WHY it is true. Mayby that might be fair to say about how some have tried to repsond to challenges to their views of free will, but I think what I've done is not just state that free will exists, but gave a correct definition of it as well as a defense for it that is both actually necessary and sufficient...in other words its self evident and undeniable.

What Im saying isnt really a proof in the sense that something is being made more evident by another thing..rather all Im doing is unpacking terms, and showing how they connect to reality, because you cant make something self evident be made more evident by another thing..because its evident in itself. ALl triangles have three sides is self evident. You dont need to go beyond the statment to see if it is, because it has verything it needs to see if its true or not. It may not be self evident TO SOMEONE observing it..but if the terms are defined and unpacked it can be readily seen why it is said to be self evident because the description (predicate) is identical (that which has three sides) or redicible to its subject/refferent (triangle). A triangle when broken down, by definition, is that which has three sides, so it shows that that is identical or reducible to its description/predicate. This is what is means when its said that something is self evident or clear in itself.

As CS Lewis said, to see through everything is not the same things as seeing. If this was made evident by that, and that needed to be made evident by that other thing unto infinity, and you never got to anything that was evident or clear in itself, then nothing could be known in itself. ONLY if there is most basic, foundational knowledge that can be known in itself, know as First Principles, could knowledge be possible. All Im trying to do is unpack those for you. Some things that are self evident, obvious and undeniable are "I exist", "Im a rational creature", "I have free will", "God exists"..but the latter is for another time as well.

ill talk about this separately because i think it provides an opportunity for me to show how these sorts of arguments are congruent with my deterministic view.

of course a person's view may change, this is undeniable. what is deniable however is that they themselves are the causes of this change. when i argue with a person, i don't wish for them to change their own viewpoint, i myself am aiming to change their viewpoint. im unconvinced of the "fact that one can change their view or do otherwise", instead feeling that a certain intersection between a person at a particular time and their environment (say, as a simple example, you at the exact time youre reading this post) can result in a change to their viewpoint.

Did you say that YOU are..AIMING..to change/cause THEIR viewpoint?? How is it that you don't believe in free will again? What you just said is what ree will states. Either their acts are their own or not, because their someone or more correctly, something elses. Is it THEIR viewpoint, and YOUR viewpoint, or someone elses or someTHING elses? How is it you speak of YOU changing something, when according to determinism that isnt possible? I thought you said you cant cause or change things? It can be figuratively stated that your change someones viewpoint, but in reality what is going on is that you each have your own viewpoints that you developed on your own, based on either a correct view of first principles or an incorrect view of them/distortion of them, and you are attempting to make arguments that are persuasive NOT coersive, so that the other person changes their views because of your arguments for detreminism vs free will/acts caused by self.

Either way I dont see how you dont see youre not escaping the truth of free will when you talk about YOU changing something beyond yourself. YOU changing/causing something, is exactly how Im arguing for free will, in that it is you that causes what you do, whether to yourself or to someone else or on something or someone else.

Besides that how is it that you arent convinced that YOU can change your own view point, BUT yet are convinced that YOU can change someone elses? How does that escape the fact of free will when it means that you have the abillity to cause your own actions for what you said is YOU are AIMING to cause or change something..Again, specifically though, in the scenario you gave it was YOU doing changes towards a certain END in mind (I dont know much more theistic that gets), for you stated that YOU AIMED at it and YOU attempted to change or cause something to come about. If YOU can do it and thus have free will (by your own admission), why is it do you believe that no one else can? Im not trying to make you look like anything, or make you mad, or frustrated, or whatever..its just something to consider. Im not trying to make you do anything, or believe anything, for you have the free will to believe whatever you want and choose. I respect if you disagree, and think thats great because it shows you think. So all Im asking is that you consider what Im saying. Im not asking for anything more.You can reject it if you thi nk it makes no sense. If you have any challenges to what Im saying, questions, or whatever, Im open to that. Thats the very essence of discussion no? I just think the very way you, and pretty much everyone talks REEKS of free will...Im mean you guys are talking/typing/thinking or whichever it is no? I hope Im not taslking to highly developed bots or something

people do contribute to *causing their own actions* in the sense that what they are at a particular point determines how they will react to their environment, but i consider what a person is at a particular time to also be the product of accumulated reactions as described before, and thus we're perpetually reacting to environmental stimulus rather than ever actually causing our own actions or having the freedom to choose any number of paths.

Yes thats exactly what free will is. They determine how they will respond or react to certain things. Theyre knowledge is dependant on both their abillity to know someTHING, and that there are THINGS external to themselves to be able to come to know/discover. If there were no THINGs to know, or no capacity to be able to come to knoe a THING, then noTHING could be known. Both thought and thing(s) are required for knowledge to occur. When a thought matches or corresponds to reality/its refferent its a true thought. If a thought doesnt correspond to its refferent/reality (whether abstract or actual) it is not true, but rather is false. My question to you in looking at what you continud to say is how can there be a "they"/self or person that determine their responces to other things, AND simulaneously there be no distinct persons because theyre equated to being nothing but "accumulated reactions"? Im also curious to know what the difference is between "reacting to environmental stimulus" and "causing our own actions"? In both cases you are causing a rational response based on something/influence no?

I partially agree with you. I didnt define free will as choosing ANY possible paths. I think its ok to say that social determinism may be true, but even so, that doesnt mean moral determinism is. What I mean is in the 1950s you may have been able to choose between vanilla or chocolate ice cream, but could NOT have chosen between verizon DSL or comcast cable broadband right because they were not part of our culture at the time or place in history? So while those KINDS of choices are dependant on social changes or developments, MORAL choices are not. It may not be universal to be able to choose which flying car you can buy for an affordable price, but it is universal and absolute to say we should take care of children and not bash their skulls up against a wall till their heads burst open for no good reason. Its self evident morally and universal that we should treat people with respect and not mistreat them, to do good and shun evil. Its self evident universally that courage is a strength and cowardice is a weakness and is not good. So while choices based on preferences, in the realm of vanilla or chocolate, dsl and cable vs books or writting on leaves, are determined partially on social development, moral choices are not. YET even in the case of choices based on preference, you have a choice, because IF theyre avaliable and accessable, you either can choose vanilla or chocolate OR reject them both, or you can choose to find a way to write on better materials, leaves vs not yet discovered paper, or not. While what is avaliable may be limited, the abillity or fact of freedom is accessable by any consciously existing rational creature.

i could not at this exact point in time as this exact person go into my mother's room and stab her in the head, or go downstairs and make a sandwich, not because i'm causing myself not to, but because the person i have become as a result of accumulated reactions down a linear causal path could not possibly be doing anything else in this exact environment but what i'm doing right now. at the point in which i do go downstairs and make a sandwich (probably not for a long time, i'm a lazy asshole), i will be a slightly different person in a slightly different environment and going to make a sandwich will be the result of that intersection.

am i making any sense yet?

Hmm so you arent stabbing your mother in the head not because you dont choose to for good reasons based in a developed character from sustained beliefs about reality, but because you just happen to not be that kind of person based on unspecified circumstances where in that case going to make a sandwich could very well cause you to stab your mom in the head..because your reactions arent based in rational choices but emotional reactions that are caused directly by external determining factors that you cant avoid or reject...? Hmm ok..well..I guess..I hope you can fit that in a hallmark card for your mom on mothers day? JK.


I guess my question to you is is there a way you can prove/rationally justify how your actions arent rationally based..? Where theyre not really rationally based and can be just emotionally influenced, but are purely emotionally based?

My other question would be, if YOU can react (ie decide how to respond to external stimulii, or better yet, outward messages), how do you prove that you can move your will forward, and aim towards a specified end, BUT NOT NOT move it, or move it in the opposite direction especially considering that you can concieve of the opposite? BTW I wanted to just say I appreciate your openess to chat about this stuff and thoughtfullness in how you take time to think about what youre saying. Have a great day.

 

[Dominick_7]

I agree 100% and had said that in this thread, but of course not this elegantly

Thank you for your kind words How you doing Silver Incubus?

 

[Dominick_7]

Time is intimately tied to an understanding of free will and determinism and although I have not read all previous posts to know if this was discussed, it should at least be something to consider.

For example, what effect if any would there be to this discussion if time were bi-directional?

You mean like Bob Ross' fro?

 

[judas69]

Don't you dare bring Bob Ross into this ..

 

[Demiurge]

Dominick_7, hello and welcome to the forum. For a man lacking the time for lengthy debates, you've pounded out a lot of text. On to more substantive matters...

I would contend that free will does actually exist.

I'm defining free will as the abillity to cause ones own actions, to be able to do or do otherwise. So it is libertarian but as I'm defining it..but please don't attach something to it it doesn't express.

I think much of what I've read confuses influences WITH what a determining cause is. Just because something can influence your choice, doesn't mean that that influence causes your action. When something is caused, what is happening is a potential (what can be) is actualized (what is) by an actuality ( for nothing cannot cause something..and non being isnt being so lets not confuse the two by saying a non thing has power to cause or produce something, when it has no power or even existance to be able to do something..what is different is not the same). When an action is caused, its being caused by a "self". If ones arm is hit by a falling rock and it hits a nerve which causes the arm to move, that is not what is meant by a conscious choice of the individual. If one picks up a rock to throw it against a wall (physical action causing the physical body to move), chooses between vanilla or chocolate (choice based on preference), or chooses to love and care for someone instead of murder them (moral choice), these are examples of what I mean by free will or ones conscious choice/action.

I'm not offering a defense of free will that is rationally/logically inescapable, because one can concieve of any contrary states of affairs in the mind (something exists, nothing exits, the universe exists, the universe doent exist, God exists, God doesnt exist, Zeus, pegasus exist etc). There are no purely rationally or logically airtight arguments. Rather I'm arguing that free will is actually undeniable. Undeniable doesn't mean one can't say "nah ah", or "that isn't true".. Undeniable means that something cannot be meaningfully denied, without implying its truth and reality in the very process of the denial. WHat I'm arguing is that the reality of free will is shown to be both self evident and actually undeniable in the very experiential process of thinking about it, questioning it, or denying it.

How do we know that free will is actually undeniable? We'll I must be in the actual process of causing my own statement, in order to deny that I can cause my own statements/actions. If I say "I have no free will" then I prove I have free will, for the only way I could produce the denial is if I had free will to do so. On the other hand, if it is true that "self" cannot make the denial, then I/self cannot deny free will exists. So it becomes self negating, self destructive, and contradictory (thus is shown to be demonstrably false) to deny one has free will. Hence, everytime I try to deny that I have free will, I actually and necessarily imply that I must have free will in order to do so. Every caused denial of free will implies the actuality of ones free will to be able to make the denial. If one can't cause their own denial, then one cannot meaningfully state they don't have free will. While saying free will doesn't exist is thinkable and statable, the thing is that its not meaningfully affirmable.


How do we know that free will is self evident, in that I can cause my own actions by my self? We'll in order to think about that, or ask about that, I must be in the actual experiential process of causing my own thought, statement, or question in order to ask whether I can cause my own thought or statement or action. I really catch myself using my free will while being in the actual process of thinking about if I do, or asking if I do. A actually produced thought or question implies an actual self that is really causing the thought or question.

If someone disagree with this position, my question to you would be "whose saying that"? If no one is saying it, then no one there needs to recieve a reply. Forces don't reason, talk, or deny..persons do. An existing person is required for a personal reply to be given. If youre not a person or self, then please don't reply..it will end up proving what I'm saying.

I am a bit confused by this explanation. To deny libertarian free will is not to deny the existence of a self, in some sense. Rather, it is the defining of self as an aggregate of conditions. The determinist need not assert the will to be non-existent, but that it is causally constrained. There is human agency, but it is shaped by causal forces. A person makes a decision in situations based on his characteristics, which are the product of gene-environment interaction, and the specific situation. There is, therefore, no way for a person to act differently in situation X without altering that situation or the person's attributes. The self is the cause of an action, but the self is not causa sui. To deny libertarian free will is merely to deny that there is an aspect of the self that is free from causal constraint.

One other reply could be "if you can show me how you can deny free will exists WITHOUT causing your own thought, statement, or denial, then I'll change my mind".

I am causing it, but what am I? I am nothing more than an aggregate of causal conditions. The heavy lifting in this argument is to demonstrate that the element of the self responsible for decision is free from causality, and I don't see that anywhere in the thread.

PS:
One other supplimental argument is the following..A determinist believes one cannot cause ones own actions and do otherwise, thus would contend that ones actions are caused by another, not by ones own self. In a discussion with someone who believes in free will, a determinists believes that someone who believes in free will is wrong and ought to change their view to determinism. But "ought to change" implies they can change..So the question I have is why does a determinist discuss this or state their view trying to argue their point and see that someone who believes in free will changes their view to being a determinist IF it was really true/and that they really believed that a person who believes in free will believes it and cannot change their view? If the determinists believes actual dialogue or discussion is going on, and that the free willer should change their view, thus can, how can he/she maintain determinism is true when the very act of discussion and debate implies the truth that one can change their view, and thus can do otherwise, hence revealing that free will exists?

Changing your view is like learning something new. A determinist does not need to deny that you can learn, if you possess sufficient cognitive faculties. I am sure that there are many things that I do not know because I have not been exposed to them. However, if they were explained to me, taking for granted that I am smart enough, I would come to understand them. Similarly, if the right argument against free will is presented to you and you are properly disposed, you can become a determinist. It's just a matter of someone finding one that will appeal to your sensibilities.

 

[Demiurge]

Regarding the mind, if I remove the right part of your brain, you will no longer be able to see the color red, for example. Therefore, we have proven that, at the very least, your mind is dependent upon your brain for its actualization. That is, you might say that your immaterial mind retains the capacity to see the color, but it needs the brain to be in the right condition for it to do so. Why, though, posit two entities instead of one? The simpler explanation is that what we call mental properties emerge from the physical and when the latter is damaged, they can no longer emerge. Another example of emergence is that liquidity emerges from a hydrogen and oxygen molecules, although, the molecules are not liquid. Ultimately, substance dualism boils down to a more complex explanation which offers nothing explanatory, but merely preserves the afterlife. I do not view this as being a good enough reason to accept it.

 

[Demiurge]

Philosophically its self evident and undeniable that because the main alternative is is to say everything is only matter. But to do that one must make a observation and judgment about all matter.

All one can say is that matter is all that presents itself to us, and while there may be something irreducibly immaterial, in theory, there is no evidence of it, and it is beyond us to explain how it could interact with matter, anyway.

The problem with this is that to make an observation or judgment implies an observed thing (the universe) and the observer of the thing (self). The only way one could make a judgment about all matter is if they had an observationally distinct vantage point beyond matter by which to observe and judge it.

To make a judgement about all of being would require omniscience. Certainly, materialists do not assert that they have experienced all of the cosmos. Possibility is not equivalent to actuality.

If ones self was identical to the matter that was being claimed to be observed, then one couldnt make the observation because the thing being observed would be identical to the observer..thus the observer observed thing distinction would be eliminated. If the observer and observed thing were identical, and not different, then there would be no point beyond matter by which to observe or judge it. If nothing was different from matter, then matter couldnt be observed or judged. If all was a thing, then there could be no thought about a thing (materialism).

I contest this. An orange growing on a tree in Florida is not identical to my computer monitor, although, both are material things. There are predicates that can be applied to one but not the other, and vice versa. Certainly, I am not identical to the monitor, either. It is notably lacking certain neurobiological properties that I have. All things which are material are not alike, just as not all hypothetical minds can be alike, if your philosophy of mind is to maintain any credibility. My mind needs to be somehow distinct from yours, insofar as it can cause me to do something without causing you to do it. How this might work is inexplicable to me, and since I am no substance dualist, it isn't my problem, but as you can see, it's crazy to say that everything physical is the same as everything else that is physical, just as it would be to say that everything mental is the same as everything else that is mental.

If all was thought, then there could be no thing to come to know (pantheism).

Idealism, not pantheism.

Rather if one thinks, about things, then it implies a real difference in terms of the kinds of beings there are, where theres a real difference between thoughts and things, which makes rational thought possible and justifiable (theism). To reduce everything to matter, eliminates the observabillity of it, which makes all claims for materialism self negating..

As I stated above, I will not accept a more complex answer to the mind/body problem, which offers no explanatory benefits, over simpler explanations. There is no good reason to hypothesize two entities when one works just as well, even though there could theoretically be more. Theoretically, we could multiply the entities into absurdity, just as I could say that the laws of physics only hold because in each individual instance, God makes them work, but what would this offer over the mechanistic view? Nothing.

 

[Dominick_7]

Don't you dare bring Bob Ross into this ..

LOL. Oh my bad.

 

[Dominick_7]

Dominick_7, hello and welcome to the forum. For a man lacking the time for lengthy debates, you've pounded out a lot of text. On to more substantive matters...

Hehe. I was thinking the same thing when I was done. Sometimes I do have time sometimes I don't. This time I did aparently

I am a bit confused by this explanation. To deny libertarian free will is not to deny the existence of a self, in some sense. Rather, it is the defining of self as an aggregate of conditions. The determinist need not assert the will to be non-existent, but that it is causally constrained. There is human agency, but it is shaped by causal forces. A person makes a decision in situations based on his characteristics, which are the product of gene-environment interaction, and the specific situation. There is, therefore, no way for a person to act differently in situation X without altering that situation or the person's attributes. The self is the cause of an action, but the self is not causa sui. To deny libertarian free will is merely to deny that there is an aspect of the self that is free from causal constraint.

My question would be why define self as an aggregate of conditions as opposed to an immaterial center of consciousness or something to that effect? How do condition= persons or condition reply, respond, think, or the like? I find it confusing to define a self as a condition, when it seems much more accurate to define it as a center of consciousness, a personal ego, or mind...something more to that effect. How different would this kind of condition be from other conditions? Why is this condition personal, conscious, and able to think, judge, express, respond valitionally and others arent? Do you start your halmark cards "From one aggregate condition to another"? I hope not.

Why do you say that a person bases his decisions on his or her characteristic vs based on reasons? Are you saying that your reply is not based on rational reasons, but are based on arbitrary gene interactions, situational causes, and the flux and change of a contingent universe? It seems that to go that route eliminates any necessary, certain, or sure ground for your observations if they arent based on unchanging rational principles known by a selfs mind, not constraint by the flux of a changing physical universe.

I am causing it, but what am I? I am nothing more than an aggregate of causal conditions. The heavy lifting in this argument is to demonstrate that the element of the self responsible for decision is free from causality, and I don't see that anywhere in the thread.

IF you are nothing more than your brain, how is it youre able to observe and judge your brain to be such? Wouldnt observing and judging something imply that the source of observation and judgement is NOT the very thing being observed and/or judged? If you are identical to your brain, or the physically changing world that youre observing and judging, how could you have an observationally distinct vantage point beyond what youre observing if thres nothing beyond what is being obsevred..IE the physical world/brain etc. One must transcend the experiment inorder to observe it. It seems reasonable to say youre making an observation or judgement about the physical world, including your self as being identical with it or not distinct from it. If youre no different from or transcendant beyond it, how could you make an observation of your self if no observationally transcendant and distinct vantage point is required to make an observation or judgement? It seems to me that in allowing the self to be what it is, an immaterially distinct center of consciousness and valition, would allow observations and judgements to be able to make sense.

Changing your view is like learning something new. A determinist does not need to deny that you can learn, if you possess sufficient cognitive faculties. I am sure that there are many things that I do not know because I have not been exposed to them. However, if they were explained to me, taking for granted that I am smart enough, I would come to understand them. Similarly, if the right argument against free will is presented to you and you are properly disposed, you can become a determinist. It's just a matter of someone finding one that will appeal to your sensibilities.

Do senses come to know? Or does ones self come to know something THROUGH the senses? I think its a mistake to place the senses as athe faculty of consciouness and choice when that is the instrumental cause of knowledge and not the faculty with which one makes judgments with. Again, if all is only based in the changing physical universe, and there is nothing beyond that, doesnt it follow that your judgements about it could change from being true to false in the sam moment their uttered? If so, if the opposite of your view could be true, wouldnt that invalidate your view as false? On the other hand how could your judgments have any unchanging certainty, or necessary ground, if all is not necessary but rather is changing and in flux?

 

[Dominick_7]

Regarding the mind, if I remove the right part of your brain, you will no longer be able to see the color red, for example. Therefore, we have proven that, at the very least, your mind is dependent upon your brain for its actualization. That is, you might say that your immaterial mind retains the capacity to see the color, but it needs the brain to be in the right condition for it to do so. Why, though, posit two entities instead of one? The simpler explanation is that what we call mental properties emerge from the physical and when the latter is damaged, they can no longer emerge. Another example of emergence is that liquidity emerges from a hydrogen and oxygen molecules, although, the molecules are not liquid. Ultimately, substance dualism boils down to a more complex explanation which offers nothing explanatory, but merely preserves the afterlife. I do not view this as being a good enough reason to accept it.

Firstly, this doesnt refute what I argued about the ontological difference between the mind and brain.

Secondly, you must assume everything is material inorder to say that the mind is identical to the brain or dependant on the brain for actualization. Why could it not follow that because you cut the right side of your brain out you cant continue seeing red, that the mind just merely doesnt have access to observe certain physical properties, in that its abillities are limited to what it can percieve in the physical world, in terms of what it normally would have access to. In other words while it wouldnt follow that the mind is dependant on the brain ontologically, in that it is obtlogically distinct, it is nevetheless dependant on it for access to the physical universe. Isnt that what is being described? Limitation of what it can perceive? All that explains is its limitation of what it can discover and says nothing about its ontological status. How can one meaningfully concieve that a mental property is found where there is no mind IE in the red material thing being perceived? Only mind can have mental properties, where as that which is not mind does not have mental properties. Rather what happens inorder to keep catergoies not confused is to say that all being is knowable/discoverable. The mind is immaterial being, and is different from being which is material. And this distinction allows for observationally distinct vantage point to occur to allow for observations, knowledge, judgements, and decisions to occur.

ISnt what occurs in discovering something that a mind, being different from what it percieves through the senses, comes to know or discover the thing in itself, so its a matter of discovering instead of recieving and processing data rather than recieving mental properties? Unless Im misunderstanding you.

Thirdly if its true that all that exists is the changing material universe, the mind included (for you DEFINED it as an aggregation of conditions..) then that would eliminate the necessity or certainty of any statment made, for everything would be subject to change or flux, including yuor observation that all is part of the phsyical world..IF there is something OTHER than the physical changing world, like the immaterial self, God etc..THEN necessity and certainty is possible and can be demonstrated undeniably. To reject this view is to committ intellectual suicide with any statments regarded as certain or knowable. IF all is part of the changing universe, then the statement "the mind is just an aggregate of conditions" is subject to change from being true to false, thus this renders an impossibility to have any real knowledge or certainty about anything.

 

[Dominick_7]

All one can say is that matter is all that presents itself to us, and while there may be something irreducibly immaterial, in theory, there is no evidence of it, and it is beyond us to explain how it could interact with matter, anyway.



To make a judgement about all of being would require omniscience. Certainly, materialists do not assert that they have experienced all of the cosmos. Possibility is not equivalent to actuality.

If not all is matter, or one does not know if all is only matter, then it follows that the existence of immaterial things is possible firstly no? If so then one cannot be closed of the the possibility that there is something immaterial. Also not knowing HOW the immaterial soul or mind can interact with the material doesnt negate the fact that it happens, even in the very reply you made. For the reasons I gave it seems undeniable that the self is immaterial because

1) The properties of mental images are real YET are not material, thus are immaterial. WHen one thinks of something, that thought of a thing doesnt produce any physical properties of a thing nor does it add anymore actual things to the physical universe.

2) To reduce mind to matter is to eliminate the possibility for knowledge, judgments, decisions, or observations to occur or be meaningfull. Unless there is ssomething beyond the physically changing universe, specifically a mind or self that can come to know that which is different from itself, meaning the self is immaterial and the universe is material, knowledge decisions and observations could not occur. An observation requires an observationally distinct vantage point transcendant beyond that which being observed, for the observation to be able to occur. To reduce mind to matter is to elimate any certainty, unchangabillity or necessity regarding any statments, judgments or observations for all would be part of teh changing physical world, thus subject to change. If this is so, then the opposite of ones materialist can be true, meaning ones materialist views could change to being false. If so then the opposite of ones view (namely what Im arguing in this case) would be true, this would mean the materalists view would have to be false.

3) Reason is not material, thus not subject to change that is inherent in the material universe. Reason is based in what is unchanging and necessary. If all was part of the physically changing cosmos no rational judgments could be made about the physical universe, and no statment would be necessarily true or certain.

4) One must use an immaterial though to deny thoughts are immaterial.

I contest this. An orange growing on a tree in Florida is not identical to my computer monitor, although, both are material things. There are predicates that can be applied to one but not the other, and vice versa. Certainly, I am not identical to the monitor, either. It is notably lacking certain neurobiological properties that I have. All things which are material are not alike, just as not all hypothetical minds can be alike, if your philosophy of mind is to maintain any credibility. My mind needs to be somehow distinct from yours, insofar as it can cause me to do something without causing you to do it. How this might work is inexplicable to me, and since I am no substance dualist, it isn't my problem, but as you can see, it's crazy to say that everything physical is the same as everything else that is physical, just as it would be to say that everything mental is the same as everything else that is mental.

Youre right. While the monitor picture of an orange tree in florida is not identical to the actual florida tree, they both nevertheless would be physical in terms of having physical properties. What Im saying is that to say all is matter (which materialism states) requires having an observationally distinct vantage point beyond all matter to be able to make the observation and judgement. Without being able to have an transcendant observationally distinct vantage point beyond matter would not allow the possibility for a meaningfull observation or judgement to be made of the material universe. As you mentioned, stating that all is matter would imply omniscience which would again imply an immaterial agent..in this case, God. If youre not a materialist but rather say somethings are material others are immaterial, or youre agnostic who says you dont know, then the existence of something immaterial would be possible and be possibly demonstratable no? What is required isnt that there cant be different physical things, but that there must be something different in kind to allow for an observation of matter to be able to be made..IE there must be a distinct observational vantage point BEYOND matter to be able to observe and judge matter.

One other thing that could be noted is that if one states that ones thoughst are nothing but a stream of electrons, then thinking wouldnt be thinking it would be secreting.

Idealism, not pantheism.

Doesnt idealism hold that there are ideals or that there are ideals towards which one should act? Where as Pantheism states that all is one and one is all, there is no reality to distinctions, for all that appears to be distinct is maya or illusion. In their view all is not matter, rather all is mind/thought.

As I stated above, I will not accept a more complex answer to the mind/body problem, which offers no explanatory benefits, over simpler explanations. There is no good reason to hypothesize two entities when one works just as well, even though there could theoretically be more. Theoretically, we could multiply the entities into absurdity, just as I could say that the laws of physics only hold because in each individual instance, God makes them work, but what would this offer over the mechanistic view? Nothing.

ANy view can be stated either more simpler or more complex, so I dont see how one can use that as a tst for truth. If you want it more simply stated it can be done...Observations of the material universe require a distinct (in kind) observational vantage point beyond matter to allow for an observation to be made of it. There. Thats how it can be stated simply.

Just to recap, unless there was a real observationally distinct in kind vantage point for observations to take place, would make observations impossible and would mean that all observations and judgements are subject to change being that theyre part of the physically changing universe and are thus not distinct or beyond it. If that is true, then the view "the mind is matter and/or part of the changing physical universe" can change from being true to false wwhere the opposite of its statement, namely "the mind is not matter and is not part of the changing physical universe" is true. If its true, then its unchangably true thus in either case materialism is self invalidating and contradictory, thus false.

 

[Demiurge]

Firstly, this doesnt refute what I argued about the ontological difference between the mind and brain.

Indeed, but I did not say that it did. I basically stated that you have offered no reason to believe in your ontological distinction between mind and brain, so I won’t. It is possible, in principle, that you are right, but possibility is not actuality. It is also possible, in principle, that the occasionalist description of physics that I gave is correct, but I don’t give credence to that, either. It multiplies entities into absurdity without giving any benefits. It’s not a superior explanation, just a more complicated one.

Secondly, you must assume everything is material inorder to say that the mind is identical to the brain or dependant on the brain for actualization.

As I explained, I assume nothing. I state that only matter presents itself to us and while it is possible that something irreducibly immaterial exists, we have no reason to believe it to be so. Once again, that something is possible does not make it actual. I could give plenty of silly examples of things that are possible, but there is no evidence of their being so, and we do not believe in them.

Secondly, you must assume everything is material inorder to say that the mind is identical to the brain or dependant on the brain for actualization. Why could it not follow that because you cut the right side of your brain out you cant continue seeing red, that the mind just merely doesnt have access to observe certain physical properties, in that its abillities are limited to what it can percieve in the physical world, in terms of what it normally would have access to. In other words while it wouldnt follow that the mind is dependant on the brain ontologically, in that it is obtlogically distinct, it is nevetheless dependant on it for access to the physical universe. Isnt that what is being described? Limitation of what it can perceive? All that explains is its limitation of what it can discover and says nothing about its ontological status.

I offered the exact same formulation in an above post…. The thing is that you are explaining a phenomenon with multiple entities when one works just as well. Further, it merely opens up another problem: that of interaction.

How can one meaningfully concieve that a mental property is found where there is no mind IE in the red material thing being perceived? Only mind can have mental properties, where as that which is not mind does not have mental properties. Rather what happens inorder to keep catergoies not confused is to say that all being is knowable/discoverable. The mind is immaterial being, and is different from being which is material. And this distinction allows for observationally distinct vantage point to occur to allow for observations, knowledge, judgements, and decisions to occur.

No, what we refer to as mental properties emerge from the physical, just as liquidity emerges from hydrogen and oxygen molecules, although, the molecules are not themselves liquid. Nevertheless, the liquid is not different than the molecules. This is emergentism. It addresses the mind/body problem more parsimoniously than your substance dualism.

ISnt what occurs in discovering something that a mind, being different from what it percieves through the senses, comes to know or discover the thing in itself, so its a matter of discovering instead of recieving and processing data rather than recieving mental properties? Unless Im misunderstanding you.

The mind doesn’t come to know things in themselves. The mind has access to the phenomena that the senses give it access to, not noumena, if there are such things.

Thirdly if its true that all that exists is the changing material universe, the mind included (for you DEFINED it as an aggregation of conditions..) then that would eliminate the necessity or certainty of any statment made, for everything would be subject to change or flux, including yuor observation that all is part of the phsyical world..IF there is something OTHER than the physical changing world, like the immaterial self, God etc..THEN necessity and certainty is possible and can be demonstrated undeniably. To reject this view is to committ intellectual suicide with any statments regarded as certain or knowable. IF all is part of the changing universe, then the statement "the mind is just an aggregate of conditions" is subject to change from being true to false, thus this renders an impossibility to have any real knowledge or certainty about anything.

This inference is correct. I am a fallibilist through and through. My reading of epistemology, especially of the modern variety, has confirmed that there is no absolute knowledge. In fact, most modern epistemologists have given up on the idea of there being such a thing. Every statement which is not tautologous is a probable hypothesis, not a certain one. When I say that there is no immaterial mind, I mean that there is a dearth of evidence for such a thing. When I say that there is no aspect of the self that is free from causal constraint, I mean that there is no evidence of there being such a thing. If it is shown that there is good reason to believe that there is, I will change my position.

 

[Demiurge]

I decided to make another response, but I noticed this exchange is becoming very repetitive. At many different points, the same arguments are coming up. I'm torn as to how to respond, but what I'm planning on is responding only to arguments that I haven't addressed elsewhere and ignoring the ones I have. If I do this and you think I have ignored something I didn't touch on in one of my previous posts, you should call it to my attention.

 

[Demiurge]

Here is my reply to your first post. As I stated in my last one, I have truncated it to avoid responses that would lead to repetition. There is one more response to come.

My question would be why define self as an aggregate of conditions as opposed to an immaterial center of consciousness or something to that effect?

If you want to employ more entities in your explanation, it needs to explain the phenomenon in question better than the simpler explanation. That is the problem. I do not see that your explanation offers us any benefits in exchange for accepting its greater complexity, except that it preserves the afterlife. That it is comforting does not make it true.

How do condition= persons or condition reply, respond, think, or the like? I find it confusing to define a self as a condition, when it seems much more accurate to define it as a center of consciousness, a personal ego, or mind...something more to that effect. How different would this kind of condition be from other conditions? Why is this condition personal, conscious, and able to think, judge, express, respond valitionally and others arent? Do you start your halmark cards "From one aggregate condition to another"? I hope not.

I do not find it confusing. While I do not deny that a neuron cannot solve a mathematics problem, there is such a thing as an emergent property. Just because a constituent of a whole does not have a property does not entail that the whole doesn’t have it, either.

IF you are nothing more than your brain, how is it youre able to observe and judge your brain to be such? Wouldnt observing and judging something imply that the source of observation and judgement is NOT the very thing being observed and/or judged? If you are identical to your brain, or the physically changing world that youre observing and judging, how could you have an observationally distinct vantage point beyond what youre observing if thres nothing beyond what is being obsevred..IE the physical world/brain etc. One must transcend the experiment inorder to observe it. It seems reasonable to say youre making an observation or judgement about the physical world, including your self as being identical with it or not distinct from it. If youre no different from or transcendant beyond it, how could you make an observation of your self if no observationally transcendant and distinct vantage point is required to make an observation or judgement? It seems to me that in allowing the self to be what it is, an immaterially distinct center of consciousness and valition, would allow observations and judgements to be able to make sense.

First, my observations do not transcend my perspective. If view a dinner plate from above, it is a circle, from the side, a curved line. Far from being transcendent, my observations are from a highly limited perspective. Second, I am both seen and seer, subject and object. My hand is placed before my face and I observe it just as I would a mannequin’s. This is not limited to me…sentient things can sense themselves. This is in no sense contradictory. Further, I do not need to experiment on something other than myself to conduct an experiment. If, for example, I have a chemical substance and I want to determine its effects, I can take it myself: self-experimentation.

Do senses come to know? Or does ones self come to know something THROUGH the senses?

The senses give us data, the brain can turn it into inductive knowledge, which is probable, not certain.

 

[judas69]

Though it appears we are infact at the mercy of physics, that's not to say the physics/time puzzle is complete by any means, as far as current understanding goes, and that determinism is without its own problems (ie. the first uncaused cause).

 

[Dominick_7]

Demiurge: I hope to reply to the other posts you made but I have 2 questions for you for now..


You say that you can only know the phenomena (the feeling or thought of a thing as it is to you), not the noumena (the thing in itself), correct? Well my question to you is how is saying "you can't know a thing in itself" NOT a knowledgable statement about noumena/things in themselves?

If it is a knowledgable/informative statement about noumena/things in themselves (when you inform about what we cant know concerning noumena), how can you say you can't know/make knowledgable statements about noumena, when THAT IS a knowledgable statement ABOUT/IN REFFERNCE TO noumena?

To say "I know enough about noumena to know I cant know anything about noumena" is a contradiction, and is self negating, thus false, because it implies direct knowledge about things in themselves to be able to state that. So rather than show you cant know things in themselves, it necessarily implies you can and do know about things in themselves.

 

[Dominick_7]

Though it appears we are infact at the mercy of physics, that's not to say the physics/time puzzle is complete by any means, as far as current understanding goes, and that determinism is without its own problems (ie. the first uncaused cause).

While we are at the influence of physics, our minds are not reducible to physics nor is it identical to the physical. We can know what can influence us, and choose not to allow certain influences in our lives. To deny I can cause my own actions by my self, is to cause a statement by myself to be able to make the denial. Its actually undeniable that I can cause my own actions by myself, and think in order to do so. As I argued, because its undeniable that we can know things in themselves, as they really are (a spoon in a glass of water that appears bent ONLY makes sense if we know that we can know that the spoon really isnt bent in itself..but rather that looks like that or is made to appear that way), we can know the nature of our actions, and mental behaviors. We all intuatively know theres an aspect of ourselves that is immaterial. For we must use an immaterial thought to say that or to deny we have immaterial thoughts. We cant bump into, trip over, or literally weigh our thoughts (ex. in pds). We can think about secreions, but if our thinking is a mere passing of electrons, secretions, then we couldnt think about secretions or electrons. We would just be secreting, not thinking. To think about all matter or secretions implies a difference in the nature of our thinking/thoughts/mind to be able to make that distinct obsevation.


CS Lewis talks about this regarding the moral law, in that morals imply the immaterial because, and thus also mind, because morals are not purely descritive of what is, but rather are prescriptive of what ought to be. A thing that is may not be what it ought to be, so what ought to be must be beyond that which is, as a standard for what is to measure itself by. We can cause our own actions, and some actions are objectively moral by nature, right or wrong, for its contradictory to say "one ought never use ought or ought not", for that IS an ought type statement. Its also contradictory to say "there absolutely are no absolutes". Likewise its contradictory to say "one absolutely ought never speak of moral absolutes". Somethings are always wrong to choose cowardice over courage. Thus somethings are always right to choose..ex. be courageous vs being a coward. Since some actions are objectively moral, and what is morally right may not be how a thing is currently or ought to be, it follows that there must be something beyond what is currently occuring in time, space, and matter that exists by which we can unchangably measure our human decisions and behavior.

 

[Demiurge]

Dominick, once the noumena become determinate they cease to be noumena. The noumenal world is mind-independent, but if you say you know anything about it, you're rendering it determinate through mental understanding. It is, therefore, phenomena, not noumena, that you are discussing.

 

[Dominick_7]

Dominick, once the noumena become determinate they cease to be noumena. The noumenal world is mind-independent, but if you say you know anything about it, you're rendering it determinate through mental understanding. It is, therefore, phenomena, not noumena, that you are discussing.

Could you define what you mean by determinate and it in each part of your explanation concerning noumena?

I agree that the thought of a thing is different from the thing itself, ontologically,but epistemologically what Im saying is that that mental representation of the thing you percieve through the senses can match what youre percieving, and therefore render you to be able to know the thing in itself. Most certainly it does inescapably know things in themselves in the most general way relating to first principles regarding reality in general, its nature, the existence of God etc..

To go the route you suggest I dont see how you can avoid contradiction where you deem certain knowledge about noumena in that youre knowledably calling >NOUMENA< in itself unknowable, so youre identifying it informatively, THEN simulatenously describing what you know about noumena as unknowable in itself.

Do you not see that when you say ABOUT noumena "the nomenal world is mind independant (here is a statement your mind is producing concerning your knowledge of what the noumenal world is so while the noumena world is mind dependant, all statements regarding the noumenal world are mind/noumena dependant or correspondant of thought with thing dependant), but if you say you know about IT, youre rendering IT determinate...IT is therefore etc.." Each step of the way youre descriptively and knowledgably relaying info you have concerning noumena about it in itself and then simultaneously denouncing that you know anything about IT itself.

If you could show me exactly what you mean by "it" each step of the way, and define determinate I think will show how you cant escape what Im saying. I think what youre doing perhaps inadvertantly is youre equivocating on the term "it" switching meanings of it, to go from it meaning noumena in itself TO how noumena is merely and only how it appears to you.

I think you may also may be confusing what one comes to know in particular through inductive logic, which is not self evident but rather needs to be made evident by other things that are self evident, with what is self evident. If one skips self evident knowlege about reality in general, what is actually and necessarily true regarding actual reality, then I can see how you would say this because you would not be explicitly refferencing objective actually necessary general backdrop for all other interpretations regarding reality in its particulars, thus would explicitly lose the ground of certainty regarding all other things. Because you arent explicitly affirming actually necessary knowledge about reality I think that makes it so actually necessary knowledge about reality not obvious, when it really is, inescapably so...BUT if you are open to seeing what is self evident, and actually undeniable, IE actually necessary knowledge about reality in general, then I think it would show you how you can clearly and reliably know things in themselves, even when they are particulars regarding reality, with much higher certainty than your giving to your statments currently..though you are impling certainty everytime you make your statments of uncertainty concerning reality as well, yet may not see that.

 

[Dominick_7]

Dominick, once the noumena become determinate they cease to be noumena. The noumenal world is mind-independent, but if you say you know anything about it, you're rendering it determinate through mental understanding. It is, therefore, phenomena, not noumena, that you are discussing.

When you say THEY become determinate, are you saying that the noumena actually changes from being non determinate to determinate, OR that youre saying that because the noumenal world being being determined in the mind, and the determined thought isnt ontologically the same as the detemined noumenal world, that means the noumenal world isnt really being determined?? Why do you assume that just because the determinaton (itself) about the noumenal isnt ontologically identical with the noumenal world that it cant epistemologically cant be identical with the world, cant accurately correspond to the noumenal world, and cant match identically in content with what is in the noumenal world? What are you requiring in certain knowledge about noumena? That the noumenal world be shoved into your brains and squished together? Why does a thoughts correspondance with the noumenal equate to no correspondance or incapable of rendering matching contentful knowledge of the noumenal world in itself?