Is "evolution" itself divine?

[SoundMaster]

Assuming the big bang occured in the manner that the scientific community generally posits, and assuming that what we know of evolution is accurate (which I accept based on the evidence), can it be said that something pushes or drives the "evolutionary spirit"? Let's scratch the word 'spirit' as that generally implies a supernatural view. let's instead say "evolutionary drive".

This is a tough question to phrase. I DO NOT intend to imply that an immortal super-being is in the driver seat. Rather, is evolution itself a consciousness?

What compels evolution to progress and move forward as it does? If anything.

WHY was there a big bang?

In my view, it's all chance, really. But does that sufficiently explain it? Does chance allow for cause and effect?

 

[entanglement]

The change brought about upon your own self to better suit the changed environment is called Evolution. The fight for Survival is what drives Evolution.

The survival of the fittest. The fittest is the one that could evolve.

 

[DctrFeelGood]

Evolution is simply a response to external factors that results in the best adapted (humans, cockroaches, and bacteria for instance) being able to breed which continues this cycle of birth, reproduction, and death. Asking the why is a religious question; science can only explain the how at this point in time.

 

[Silver Incubus]

science can only attempt to explain the how, meaning that we really don't know, and we,as a species, like to make eloborate guess based on what a few people think/percieve/experience.

 

[Krigloch the Furious]

is the big bang 100% true?

 

[Cythraul]

What compels evolution to progress and move forward as it does? If anything.

I think scientists just take it as a primitive fact about the world that living organisms are compelled to survive and propogate, in the same way that they take the concept of force to be primitive and fundamental. That is, I think they accept the following claim:

science can only attempt to explain the how

 

[entanglement]

I think scienctists just take it as a primitive fact about the world that ......

They prove...

 

[Cythraul]

They prove...

What?

 

[Europa Ascendent]

Science disproves, it doesn't prove, which is basically the distinction that Popper was driving at in his definition of science as falsifiable.

 

[Cythraul]

Popper's falsificationism is only marginally better than garden variety verificationism, because it's basically verificationism with a twist. I think holism is a more viable, albeit controversial, epistemology of science.

 

[Europa Ascendent]

Popper's falsificationism is only marginally better than garden variety verificationism, because it's basically verificationism with a twist. I think holism is a more viable, albeit controversial, epistemology of science.

The search for a comprehensive epistemology of science is, in my opinion, a waste of time. Functionally, the process works, so there's no real need to masturbate out a justification for it. Falsification is useful in that it allows us to easily distinguish science as a process from those activities which masquerade as science without being productive in any real sense.

 

[speed]

The search for a comprehensive epistemology of science is, in my opinion, a waste of time. Functionally, the process works, so there's no real need to masturbate out a justification for it. Falsification is useful in that it allows us to easily distinguish science as a process from those activities which masquerade as science without being productive in any real sense.

I agree. And I m glad theres another popper fan on the board.

 

[Cythraul]

The search for a comprehensive epistemology of science is, in my opinion, a waste of time. Functionally, the process works, so there's no real need to masturbate out a justification for it. Falsification is useful in that it allows us to easily distinguish science as a process from those activities which masquerade as science without being productive in any real sense.

I don't see how you can maintain the view that epistemology of science is a waste of time while at the same time holding that falsification is somehow useful. It's precisely the fact that falsification comes close to being an accurate epistemology of science that makes it useful in the first place. And falsification doesn't just aim to give an account of how scientists actually conduct inquiry (a goal it doesn't adequately achieve anyway) but aims to show how scientific inquiry can be at all reliable in the first place, namely because the process of theory rejection involves the logically certain principle of modus tollens. This is supposed to show why we're justified in accepting one theory over another, in addition to showing what kinds of statements are fruitless from a scientific perspective; it's not just a definition.

Any arbitrary hypothesis may "work", so saying that science is vindicated on account of the process working on a functional level and taking falsificationism as a way merely to make a distinction won't do. Indeed, one would think you're interested in something more than just empirical adequacy or the like if you're appealing to distinctions such as falsifiability/non-falsifiability. The principle of falsifiability is supposed to allow one to distinguish between two hypotheses which are potentially empirically equivalent. That's epistemology of science with a vengeance. To give a comprehensive epistemology of science is not necessarily to "masturbate out a justification for it." The only reason you would believe that is if you were taking a particular school of thought to be representative of the entire endeavor.

 

[Europa Ascendent]

I don't see how you can maintain the view that epistemology of science is a waste of time while at the same time holding that falsification is somehow useful. It's precisely the fact that falsification comes close to being an accurate epistemology of science that makes it useful in the first place. And falsification doesn't just aim to give an account of how scientists actually conduct inquiry (a goal it doesn't adequately achieve anyway) but aims to show how scientific inquiry can be at all reliable in the first place, namely because the process of theory rejection involves the logically certain principle of modus tollens. This is supposed to show why we're justified in accepting one theory over another, in addition to showing what kinds of statements are fruitless from a scientific perspective; it's not just a definition.

All falsification shows or attempts to show is the difference between scientific modes of inquiry and non-scientific inquiry. The question it asks - and answers - is "What is science?" not the epistemological question "How can science be shown to yield knowledge?"

Any arbitrary hypothesis may "work", so saying that science is vindicated on account of the process working on a functional level and taking falsificationism as a way merely to make a distinction won't do.

Sure it will, I don't need to have an epistemlogical justification for that which I can observe. I just need a compact means of explaining to Cheesus freaks why Intelligent Design is not and will never be science. Whether science produces 'absolute' knowledge is immaterial, because it produces the functional equivalent thereof. Airplanes fly and atoms split, and as long as science continues to reproduce those results, there are a lot more important questions for philosophers to turn their minds to than an epistemology of science.

 

[Cythraul]

All falsification shows or attempts to show is the difference between scientific modes of inquiry and non-scientific inquiry. The question it asks - and answers - is "What is science?" not the epistemological question "How can science be shown to yield knowledge?"

I already pointed out what falsificationism is in addition to being a distinction. I did not claim that falsificationism is a thesis which attempts to answer the question "How can science be shown to yield knowledge?" What I did point out is that it attempts to show why certain explanations don't count as good explanations, even if it is the case that falsificationism is merely deflationary. If empirical adequacy were sufficient for good science then there would be no need to recognize the principle of falsifiability. All you have to go on in science is empirical adequacy, falsificationism in addition divides empirically adequate explanations into legitimate and illegitimate. If all it's supposed to be is a distinction between science and non-science then it's inadequate, since it doesn't even accurately reflect the actual practice of science throughout history. But if it doesn't quite live up to the standard of being an adequate reflection of science or what scientists actually do, then of what use is it? It's an epistemological thesis distinguishing between good and bad explanations. To acknowledge the usefulness of the distinction is to admit that mere empirical adequacy is not sufficient to yield knowledge. In fact, it seems to suggest that you give a shit about some notion of knowledge not wholly borne out by the empirical results.

Sure it will, I don't need to have an epistemlogical justification for that which I can observe.

I never claimed that you did. And anyway my point was that it doesn't make much sense to claim that science is vindicated by its empirical results and then make use of the principle of falsifiability, because to do so would be to admit that empirical adequacy is not sufficient for good explanation. Why do you want to distinguish between so-called jesus freaks and true scientists anyway? The jesus freaks can make their crazy theories conform to whatever evidence may be presented. You see, you're ignoring the normative element inherent in the use of the falsifiability principle.

I just need a compact means of explaining to Cheesus freaks why Intelligent Design is not and will never be science. Whether science produces 'absolute' knowledge is immaterial, because it produces the functional equivalent thereof.

What? What is the functional equivalent of knowledge? I don't even know what that would be.

Airplanes fly and atoms split, and as long as science continues to reproduce those results, there are a lot more important questions for philosophers to turn their minds to than an epistemology of science.

Oh ok.

Anyway, you still seem to be holding to this view that epistemology of science = giving a comprehensive justification for science. I addressed that point at the end of my last post. Did you even read it?

edit: and anyway, the principle of falsifiability was the result of epistemological enquiries into science. Thus, if you find it useful, then I can't really see how you can reject epistemology of science wholesale. Furthermore, if your account of falsificationism is correct then your characterization of epistemology of science is incorrect.

 

[3200]

I think evolution IS divine.

How can some one believe there is a great and wonderous creator who set the design for the universe, and not believe that the creator would be smart enough to create creatures that could evolve and adapt to their environment in order to thrive?

it's common sense really.

 

[Europa Ascendent]

Cythraul,

Epistemology, by definition, is a comprehensive approach to sorting out the source and value of knowledge. Epistemologies of science deal with the question of whether or not science yields knowledge, how it yields knowledge and whether that knowledge is universally applicable. Falsification isn't an epistemology, and it doesn't try to be: it's just a means of seperating science from 'not science' with no regard to the truth values of the outcomes of those processes. Falsification is not an attempt to decide truth between 'empirically equivalent' hypotheses, it's an attempt to distinguish between scientific and non-scientific hypotheses.

My point about the larger question of epistemologies of science is that they are, at the present time, really a waste of effort. I could understand if the scientific process wasn't producing replicable results or useful products, but the fact remains that it does. The ultimate truth value of the 'knowledge' produced by science is, practically speaking, meaningless in the face of its present utility. There are, therefore, vastly more useful things which need the attention of thinkers first.

 

[Cythraul]

Epistemology, by definition, is a comprehensive approach to sorting out the source and value of knowledge. Epistemologies of science deal with the question of whether or not science yields knowledge, how it yields knowledge and whether that knowledge is universally applicable.

You keep overlooking the fact that just because epistemology inquires into the nature of knowledge it doesn't follow that epistemological inquiries into science = giving a comprehensive, prior justification for science. In fact, the prevailing view is that you simply can't achieve that. It's not the case that inquiring into the nature of knowledge is tantamount to asking the question "How can we vindicate such and such a mode of inquiry?" And one of the pieces of evidence for this is the falsifiability principle itself. Epistemology deals with not only knowledge but justification, belief, etc. You're taking a particular meta-epistemological stance to be representative of the entire endeavor, which is completely mistaken. It's a waste of time to throw definitions at me.

Falsification isn't an epistemology, and it doesn't try to be: it's just a means of seperating science from 'not science' with no regard to the truth values of the outcomes of those processes. Falsification is not an attempt to decide truth between 'empirically equivalent' hypotheses, it's an attempt to distinguish between scientific and non-scientific hypotheses.

First of all, it is epistemology in so far as it's an analysis of scientific-epistemic concepts. It says "this is the inferential structure implicit in scientific reasonings". What you're doing here is making the very mistake which I pointed out above. You need to understand the context in which falsificationism was formulated as well. It was a response to verificationism and the problem of induction. What it shows is how anything at all can be logically certain in scientific inquiries, namely via modus tollens. It's not just a way to distinguish between science and non-science. For what falsification shows is the logical structure of theory rejection (the only thing Popper thought was certain):

You have a hypothesis H, and a prediction P, so

H -> P
~P / ~H

If that's not a formal analysis of what we know and how we know it in science then I don't know what is.

Furthermore, you have not responded to my question of how useful it really is to appeal to the falsifiability principle if empirical adequacy is all you're concerned with. Exactly how useful is it to appeal to this as merely a distinction between science and non-science? You may as well appeal to the fact that scientists don't conduct experiments in churches, or the fact that they don't study 19th century Russian literature.

 

[Europa Ascendent]

You keep overlooking the fact that just because epistemology inquires into the nature of knowledge it doesn't follow that epistemological inquiries into science = giving a comprehensive, prior justification for science. In fact, the prevailing view is that you simply can't achieve that. It's not the case that inquiring into the nature of knowledge is tantamount to asking the question "How can we vindicate such and such a mode of inquiry?" And one of the pieces of evidence for this is the falsifiability principle itself. Epistemology deals with not only knowledge but justification, belief, etc.

This last is significant because moving beyond epistemological inquiry to constructing an epistemology requires accounting for all of the above. Falsification touches on epistemological modes of inquiry, but it cannot be in and of itself an epistemology of science, nor does it pretend to be such.

You need to understand the context in which falsificationism was formulated as well.

The context is irrelevant. Newton's Principia emerged out of, among other things, alchemical investigation. Does that make Newtonian mechanics a branch of alchemy?

It is important here to seperate what Popper hoped to achieve (a logical analysis for accepting or rejecting hypotheses) and what he actually achieved (a handy means for distinguishing between the practice of science as such and pseudoscientific theories that cannot be adequately addressed with the tools available to science as an institution).

Furthermore, you have not responded to my question of how useful it really is to appeal to the falsifiability principle if empirical adequacy is all you're concerned with.

They're two entirely seperate concerns. As I already mentioned, falsification is a handy tool for drawing the distinction between scientific endeavors and common forms of pseudoscience (like ID 'theory'). It is an argumentative device, not, in my view an important, comprehensive distinction.

More comprehensive investigations of the epistemology of science have been universally concerned either with defending science as an institution against attack, or in attacking science for (primarily) political purposes. My feeling is that from a practical perspective, success justifies success, so there is no real need to defend science, and any attack on science will collapse into a rhetorical exercise, regardless of the perfection of its internal logic.

 

[speed]

Now hold on, I thought falisification was one of many branches of epistemology that is concerned with justifying beliefs of a posteriori empirical knowledge? How is falsification not epistemoligical? (I think Europa stated this). And furthermore, if it is only concerned with a posteriori knowledge and not a priori, why need it be a total theory of knowledge?--when it is by nature, only a partial theory of epistemology. (I think this was a Cythraul statment)