Dakryn's Batshit Theory of the Week

I teach composition to incoming freshmen that are not literature majors. Most are engineering majors.

I have maybe two or three who appear bored/frustrated by the material. I have a middle majority who are attentive but often quiet, and a significant portion (6-8 kids) who are often vocal and engaged with the material.
 
Probably the best post from Land in a while:

http://www.xenosystems.net/capital-escapes/

The Left sees capital elude its clutches — and it sees something real when it does so. By far the most significant agent of Exit is capital itself (a fact which, once again, politically-excitable apes find hard to see straight).
.....

The escape of capital is thus an intrinsic component of split-future forecasts, in which squalid ruin and techno-intelligenic runaway accelerate in inversely-tangled tandem (Cyberpunk, Elysium). Try not to ask — if only for a moment — whether you like it. Ask first, with whatever intellectual integrity you can summon: What is the real process?

It is the contention of this blog that without a conception of economic autonomization (which means escape) modernity makes no sense. The basic vector of capital cannot be drawn in any other way. Furthermore, the distribution of ideological positions through their relation to this vector — as resistances to, or promotions of, the escape of capital — constructs the most historically-meaningful version of the Left-Right ‘political’ spectrum (since it then conforms to the social conflicts of greatest real consequence).

If capital is escaping, the emergence of the blockchain is an inevitable escalation of modernity, with consequences too profound for easy summary. If it isn’t, then macroeconomics might work.
 
That is a good post.

It is the contention of this blog that without a conception of economic autonomization (which means escape) modernity makes no sense. The basic vector of capital cannot be drawn in any other way. Furthermore, the distribution of ideological positions through their relation to this vector — as resistances to, or promotions of, the escape of capital — constructs the most historically-meaningful version of the Left-Right ‘political’ spectrum (since it then conforms to the social conflicts of greatest real consequence).

I completely agree with this. Modernity is only discernible in light of unprecedented market expansion and infiltration (my own words for autonomoization, which is probably the best word). All cultures obviously think of themselves as modern, but this isn't the same thing as what we mean by "modernity," and Land is touching upon one of the essential components of modernity. Of course, he's not the first to point this out; Deleuze and Guattari, Foucault, Jameson, lots of critics have identified this aspect of modernity.

Land's unique bent is the whole capital as escape approach; but escape from what exactly...? From what I can tell, escape from political ideology; but as Land has already vocalized, the market conditions the political response to it (i.e. the Left-Right spectrum). Material relations give rise to political relations. In other words, capital precedes modern political ideology, and then conditions political ideology to respond to it. Finally, capital provides the opportunity of escape from political ideology. Capital thus inaugurates that which it also escapes from; it's a self-fulfilling prophecy.

To use a metaphor, it's the classic problem from The Matrix. The characters have the decision to exit the matrix; but this decision can only be presented from within the matrix. The thing that oppresses and restricts them is thus also the thing that empowers them.
 
I'm interested in your response to this blunt, NRx (not from Land) take on non-westernized foreign policy. It is specifically referring to jihading Islamists in context, but I think it can be applied more broadly in contingent fashion:

The same assholes who are continually lecturing at us to think outside of European frameworks are the same assholes who are completely incapable of thinking outside the narrow framework of modern analysis.

It’s all really goddamned simplistic. They’re coming to kill all the unbelievers. You either kill them, you convert, or they kill you. It’s like trying to make football something that’s not about scoring more touchdowns than the other guy. You either kill them until there are no more of them, or until they stop fighting.
 
My response is that I find such arguments tedious.

If you reduce the situation to two individuals - one Muslim jihadist with a knife and the other a Western classical liberal - then it makes sense to defend oneself.

The mistake the above NRx argument makes is to interpret the liberal (for lack of a better word) argument on an individual level. Now, before you get all "But that is the only level that matters!" let me explain:

No liberal, or academic, is telling you to stand down or not defend yourself; it is more than likely that the current situation will continue to reduce to violence. But the rationale for thinking outside the European framework doesn't apply merely to the immediate situation; it derives from the hope that attempts at diplomatic discussions now will lead to diplomacy in the future and, eventually, perhaps even a means of negotiating and interacting that doesn't need to resort to absolutist positions.

It's completely asinine and truly ignorant to believe that attempts at discussion are illogical and worthless. I have no reason to entertain such arguments. Calling it "simplistic" is what perpetuates its apparent simplicity. Comparing it to a game implies that there are winners and losers. The whole thing is dumb as a box of rocks.
 
Well if that sort of position spins out/morphs into the "let's turn x place into a glass parking lot" then I would agree that it is tedious. But I think there is a much less tedious point that could be made.

There are winners and losers in various senses in war, at a bare minimum there are those who live and those who die. I think the point here is that when one tries to reason with someone who does not get their directives via reason (in the enlightment sense of the word), the reasoner is at quite the disadvantage.
 
That logic lies at the heart of one of the oldest conservative jokes in the book:

"An angry Muslim comes screaming toward two people, a liberal and a conservative.

The liberal says: 'Well, what's the history here? What's the context? Was this Muslim wronged in the past? Did this Muslim's family die at the hands of American soliders? Etc... etc...'

The conservative says: 'BANG! BANG, BANG-BANG! BANG! BANG! click...'"

I despise it because it misconstrues the liberal argument. No one is saying "don't fight back"; that's the reactionary, paranoid, impatient conservative interpretation of the liberal argument (again, I'm using liberal/conservative for simplicity's sake, but it does tend to fall along these lines). Part of the liberal initiative lies in reshaping Western attitudes so that in the future the auto-defensive mindset might not be necessary. I'll never agree with arguments that attempt to silence perspective.
 
Well the posted quote is specifically arguing that the problem with liberal perspective seeking is that rather than really attempting to see things from the other side, it merely attempts to see things as a liberal perspective seeker "on the other side", yielding not only hypocrisy in attempts to be "understanding" but potentially increasing the danger in the form of infinite hesitation.
 
If your argument winds down to the opportunistic tactics of most politicians, then I don't have anything to say. But this is an old and tired point that doesn't interest me, especially when it's assumed that politicians are the only ones who seek to reinforce their own perspective and suggest that others see it that way.

No Western liberal democrat, or academic, understands what it's like to be a Muslim jihadist. Arguments from these sources are not trying to impart wisdom of experience, but merely suggest that there is something to be gained from contextualizing and historicizing. I don't understand what it's like to be a Muslim jihadist, but I think there's something to be gained from trying to understand; that's the position being argued on the liberal side. Ultimately any agent in a debate must admit some degree of hypocrisy since, more often than not, those agents have an interest in swaying others to their point. Accusing a contender of hypocrisy in this way (i.e. having a vested interest in his or her point) is akin to accusing a food critic who gives a good review of being hungry. There's no such thing as an objective argument.

I am more sympathetic toward a political program that opts for diplomatic relations, as tenuous or fragile as they may be, rather than one that opts for the institutionalization of automatic defensive action (which quite easily turns into automatic offensive action).
 
I think the point is that there are those that you might could have diplomatic relations with, and those you cannot. Diplomacy requires a degree of common ground in regards to ends and values, and an end where one is alive (and preferably autonomous) and not worshiping Allah is completely opposed to the end sought by the jihadist. There is no common ground for diplomacy. That does assume though that the leadership is ideological rather than merely using it, or that even if they weren't sincere, they have no power to rein in the troops if it were suddenly beneficial to drop jihad.

I agree though that the problem with ceding that point quickly allows for the slippery slope route of never ending pre-emptive action.

I'm not talking about hypocrisy of having a vested interest (I don't think). I mean that the perspective seeker that won't take claims at face value, particularly when backed by action otherwise, isn't actually seeking perspective but projecting perspective. In this case that takes the form of handwaving jihadist ideology and taqiyya as something fixable or with-workable, while the latter really makes it difficult to even take a sudden turn at diplomacy seriously.

I think the biggest practical argument against "pre-emptivism" is that it serves only to feed jihad (or any other sort of extremism).
 
I see what you mean. It doesn't really change my position on the original quote. The speaker could be perfectly thoughtful and intellectual, but the comment doesn't convey this.
 
The more I think about it, the more I can't figure it out: what exactly is ownership? Who owns first, and by what act, or practice? Is ownership absolute; or is it conditional?
 
I don't understand what you are asking. Do you want a definition? A legal perspective? What do you mean when you say "absolute"?

"First ownership" questions are probably pointless, in the way that I would frame them. We simply cannot trace back far enough. In simple immediate terms, you own what you acquired via voluntary trade with someone else, what you discovered that was either unowned, unclaimed, or "incapably protected" (think Native American ranges. Discovery is pretty unlikely since the turn of the last century) or what you produced with other similarly acquired materials.

I could quote the old adage "possession is 9/10 of the law". Given that a super simple definition of "that which you have exclusive control over", possession seems pretty necessary. Once you lose possession, claims to a right to control something have much less weight, in practical terms.
 
Namely, I'm interested in the logic of ownership. If there is no first ownership, then it would seem to me that subsequent transactions are based on an illusion - an illusion of ownership (and if we cannot identify or locate first ownership, then I'm fine with saying that there is no first ownership - it strikes me as paradoxical anyway). If someone doesn't actually own an item, then that person has no authority to sell that item, which problematizes any subsequent claims of ownership even if the buyer had no knowledge that the item was illegitimately owned.

The whole prospect of legitimately owning something strikes me as a fiction - there is no logic to ownership, or no absolute right, but only a particularly convincing narrative. By "fiction" I don't mean that ownership isn't real, but rather that it isn't an absolute relation between a person and a thing; it is a constructed relationship based on accepted values and practices. Ownership is a matter of illusion. If there is no origin to ownership, then the logic of ownership falls apart; it rests entirely upon an individual's ability to convince others that her ownership of an object exists.

Also, does ownership extend to animals? If the first thing that every individual owns is her body, then it strikes me that animals should have ownership over their body; but then this raises questions over the ethics of farming and other uses of animals, since they cannot offer their consent. What constitutes ethical treatment thus falls to humans to determine, which seems specifically unethical.

A rejoinder to this might be that a subject must be able to confirm itself as a potentially owning subject. Since animals cannot acknowledge this, they fail as subjects that can own things. But if ownership only exists via its confirmation, then this fixes it once again in a pattern of discourse, thus draining it of any absolute existence and making its existence decidedly fictional.
 
Namely, I'm interested in the logic of ownership. If there is no first ownership, then it would seem to me that subsequent transactions are based on an illusion - an illusion of ownership (and if we cannot identify or locate first ownership, then I'm fine with saying that there is no first ownership - it strikes me as paradoxical anyway). If someone doesn't actually own an item, then that person has no authority to sell that item, which problematizes any subsequent claims of ownership even if the buyer had no knowledge that the item was illegitimately owned.

The whole prospect of legitimately owning something strikes me as a fiction - there is no logic to ownership, or no absolute right, but only a particularly convincing narrative. By "fiction" I don't mean that ownership isn't real, but rather that it isn't an absolute relation between a person and a thing; it is a constructed relationship based on accepted values and practices. Ownership is a matter of illusion. If there is no origin to ownership, then the logic of ownership falls apart; it rests entirely upon an individual's ability to convince others that her ownership of an object exists.

Has someone suggested that ownership is "absolute?" I don't know where such an idea would come from. You cannot observe something and deduce its owner (certainly inscriptions are possible, but ownership doesn't necessarily follow from that).

If you wanted a perfection of traced paths of ownership this is impossible. Even if it were possible, the chain of "rightful ownership" has been broken by war and other thefts a number of times probably beyond count. We don't have a clear tracing of descendants either.

Of course, we could theoretically somehow trace all that, and then what? Do you owe me an ox your grandfather^76 stole from my great uncle^77? But then I owe you in return for the half acre of prime mountain grazing stolen by some other relative from some other relative? If all ownership becomes illegitimate then none of it becomes illegitimate, as we are all simply new first owners. Back we come to possession.

Also, does ownership extend to animals? If the first thing that every individual owns is her body, then it strikes me that animals should have ownership over their body; but then this raises questions over the ethics of farming and other uses of animals, since they cannot offer their consent. What constitutes ethical treatment thus falls to humans to determine, which seems specifically unethical.

A rejoinder to this might be that a subject must be able to confirm itself as a potentially owning subject. Since animals cannot acknowledge this, they fail as subjects that can own things. But if ownership only exists via its confirmation, then this fixes it once again in a pattern of discourse, thus draining it of any absolute existence and making its existence decidedly fictional.

Does ownership extend to plants? To dirt? rock? planets? Solar systems?
 
Has someone suggested that ownership is "absolute?" I don't know where such an idea would come from. You cannot observe something and deduce its owner (certainly inscriptions are possible, but ownership doesn't necessarily follow from that).

This is from a text by historian Orlando Patterson, entitled Slavery and Social Death:

The prevailing view of ownership, which persists as a fundamental legal concept in continental civil law and is now universally employed as a social concept even in countries such as Britain and America in spite of its irrelevance to common law, is the Roman view that it is a set of absolute rights in rem - things, usually tangibles, sometimes also intangibles.

If you wanted a perfection of traced paths of ownership this is impossible. Even if it were possible, the chain of "rightful ownership" has been broken by war and other thefts a number of times probably beyond count. We don't have a clear tracing of descendants either.

Of course, we could theoretically somehow trace all that, and then what? Do you owe me an ox your grandfather^76 stole from my great uncle^77? But then I owe you in return for the half acre of prime mountain grazing stolen by some other relative from some other relative? If all ownership becomes illegitimate then none of it becomes illegitimate, as we are all simply new first owners. Back we come to possession.

Does ownership extend to plants? To dirt? rock? planets? Solar systems?

Lots to talk about here.

For starters, you seem to be saying that, theoretically, first ownership could be traced; but this raises some important questions. Who was the first owner; the first human? But who was the first human? You've insinuated that animals, plants, rocks, etc. cannot own things; but how do we distinguish exactly when human subjects capable of ownership evolved into existence? Did the first owning human need to say: "This is mine!" But if that's the case, then ownership is a fiction - in other words, it's something that must be discursively constructed.

You also say that if all ownership is illegitimate then this somehow legitimizes all ownership; but this doesn't add up either, or at least does nothing to underscore the existence of ownership. Arbitrarily deciding on a point to mark as the origin of ownership undermines the logic of ownership; ownership simply ceases to exist. There's nothing to substantiate any claim to own something. Anyone can swoop in and take what is "yours" and you have no rational argument to resist this, since the thief can now simply declare his possession to be the new origin of ownership.
 
First of all, my rhetorical question (and other discussions at other times) should make clear that I find talk of ownership, rights, etc., among the living and non-living forms on this planet other than humans to be ridiculous and a non-starter (not that this excuses wanton destruction, there are other reasons for not taking a slash and burn approach to the environment).

Ultimately ownership is going to boil down to an ability to hold. Whether we do that directly via walls and locks and weapons, or indirectly by mutual agreement in a legal and social system. The "justification" as it were is the means to settle disagreement over ownership where one or both parties would wish to avoid dying over it, etc. The idea of ownership (mine!) as well as the ability to recognize when one has been defrauded (theft) is seen in studies of children at an age where they either can't speak or barely can do so. The logic or rationality behind "just" or "rightful" ownership that extends beyond what I hold in my hand at any given time is illusory in the sense that I am said to possess it without holding it in my hand. But it's not "unsubstantiated", and isn't purely a social construct (obviously it is a human construct).
 
First of all, my rhetorical question (and other discussions at other times) should make clear that I find talk of ownership, rights, etc., among the living and non-living forms on this planet other than humans to be ridiculous and a non-starter (not that this excuses wanton destruction, there are other reasons for not taking a slash and burn approach to the environment).

Well, I'm not trying to argue that animals are property-holding subjects; I was merely pointing out that concepts of property and ownership (as described by Patterson) must either be admitted as fictions, or be capable of extension to nonhuman subjects. If the ownership of one's body is absolute, for instance, it would seem to me that an animal also has absolute ownership of its body. If the response to this claim is then that humans have the ability to conceive of themselves as owners, then we depart from any notion of inherent, or innate ownership, and enter into the realm of ownership as a set of discursive relations (i.e. fictional, or constructed).

Ultimately ownership is going to boil down to an ability to hold. Whether we do that directly via walls and locks and weapons, or indirectly by mutual agreement in a legal and social system. The "justification" as it were is the means to settle disagreement over ownership where one or both parties would wish to avoid dying over it, etc. The idea of ownership (mine!) as well as the ability to recognize when one has been defrauded (theft) is seen in studies of children at an age where they either can't speak or barely can do so. The logic or rationality behind "just" or "rightful" ownership that extends beyond what I hold in my hand at any given time is illusory in the sense that I am said to possess it without holding it in my hand. But it's not "unsubstantiated", and isn't purely a social construct (obviously it is a human construct).

I actually don't think we're on opposite sides here, I just think you expected us to be :cool:. Ownership is unsubstantiated if any individual, at any time, can take someone else's property and declare a new phase of ownership. In such a scenario, ownership ceases to be what it is, which is a right to something beyond one's immediate tactile possession of it (i.e. holding it in your hand).

I'm not trying to say that ownership doesn't exist and that it's a free-for-all. I'm saying that, just as we shouldn't need to justify economic success, or accumulation, by appealing to the free market, we also shouldn't need to justify ownership by appealing to abstract notions of absolute rights in a thing. Rather, we should acknowledge that all property and ownership is the result of necessary violence; but the current cultural mythology of property precludes this.

I'm not saying that you or anyone else is necessarily swayed by this cultural mythology, I'm simply calling attention to it because I wanted to parse it out. To be honest, your response was more rational than I'd expected (also, not implying that you're usually irrational).

I think it's pretty clear that if ownership does simply boil down to what someone can hold on to, then legal and social discourses don't go along with this (which is what Patterson is getting at, partially). Ideological conceptions of property invest a great deal of abstract, absolute rights in objects. "Things are mine because they're mine; yes, I bought them, or yes, I made them - but this has brought about an inherent right to these things that cannot be taken away..." etc. etc.

Ownership is definitely a human construct; but often the explanation for property, or ownership, makes contradictory appeals to something inherent and/or absolute that would automatically include other forms of life, and perhaps even things. So I'm just trying to tease out these complications.
 
Ownership is unsubstantiated if any individual, at any time, can take someone else's property and declare a new phase of ownership. In such a scenario, ownership ceases to be what it is, which is a right to something beyond one's immediate tactile possession of it (i.e. holding it in your hand).

Maybe we have different ideas of what "unsubstantiated" means. Of course a thief thinks of a stolen thing as "his", at a bare minimum in relation between himself and anyone other than the "real" owner.

On a similar note, Land recently had a couple of links on "steel anarchism" (essentially anarchocapitalism) and a response, in which the response suggested that anarchocapitalism should not lay claim to the anarchic label because hierarchies of a voluntary sort are still accepted, thereofore is is still "Archic" as it were. Instead the response suggested "Aristocratic Egalitarianism", which I think is way off the mark, but maybe the initial critique has a point of sorts
 
I think that calling it "aristocratic" at least exhibits a degree of self-awareness.

The instantly immediate problem is that of descriptivism versus prescriptivism; in other words, when hierarchies form organically (never really possible, in my opinion - those on top always have an interest in getting/staying there) they reflect certain material dynamics that are value-less (that is, they're descriptive of material elements). But once hierarchies are in place they are all too easily seen as being prescriptive of the way that things should be. There's no such thing as hierarchies that include the possibility of their dissolution as a constitutive component of their structure. All hierarchies are power structures that have an interest in maintaining that structure.