If Mort Divine ruled the world

No one's saying there aren't measurable differences, and the author of that piece says as much.

By title alone, finding differences is sold as unethical. It specifically raised South Africa as an example of why such investigation is bad and confounded, and attacks Jewish scientists as being bigots. That's anti-Semitic! Clearly an unethical bias.

The bigger problem with the piece is the author is lying at worst or obfuscating/showing ignorance at best:

The problem was that most of his identical twins were adopted into the same kinds of middle-class families. So it was hardly surprising that they ended up with similar IQs. In the relatively few cases where twins were adopted into families of different social classes and education levels, there ended up being huge disparities in IQ – in one case a 20-point gap; in another, 29 points, or the difference between “dullness” and “superior intelligence” in the parlance of some IQ classifications. In other words, where the environments differed substantially, nurture seems to have been a far more powerful influence than nature on IQ.

A 30 point difference isn't enough to make this difference.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IQ_classification

The Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS) is pretty much the standard IQ test at this point, and has been for some years now. The scale runs as follows:

130 and above Very Superior
120–129 Superior
110–119 High Average
90–109 Average
80–89 Low Average
70–79 Borderline
69 and below Extremely Low

The biggest boost from "dullness" (whatever that is), which would be at best "Borderline", at 30pts would be "Average" (Even low average would only get to high average). I don't know if Bouchard was using an older version of the WAIS, but neither does the writer apparently, since there were no links (or he doesn't want to show them). Given that changes are supposed to be shown over time, I would assume relatively recent IQ comparisons would be using the WAIS-III or WAIS-IV.

He also lies about IQ tests testing a "sliver":

Yet people have not changed genetically since then. Instead, Flynn noted, they have become more exposed to abstract logic, which is the sliver of intelligence that IQ tests measure. Some populations are more exposed to abstraction than others, which is why their average IQ scores differ. Flynn found that the different averages between populations were therefore entirely environmental.

This finding has been reinforced by the changes in average IQ scores observed in some populations. The most rapid has been among Kenyan children – a rise of 26.3 points in the 14 years between 1984 and 1998, according to one study. The reason has nothing to do with genes. Instead, researchers found that, in the course of half a generation, nutrition, health and parental literacy had improved.

The only subtest on the WAIS to test verbal abstraction is the "Similarities" test.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wechsler_Adult_Intelligence_Scale

Information & Vocabulary are based on English/Western history canon (although not specifically history about western hist), but not abstract. The rest test either symbolic reasoning or numeric based memory. Separately, the Wechsler Memory Scale tests numeric, symobolic, and linguistic memory if one has trouble with numeric memory only.
 
https://www.realclearpolitics.com/a..._research_infects_us_legal_system_136423.html

A 2008 paper, in which he linked “undetected serial rapists” with a propensity to commit serial and “crossover” acts of violence such as interpersonal attacks unrelated to sex, was shown to have provided no basis for such a generalization. His assertions, allegedly supported by a study he co-authored in 2010, that false accusations of sexual assault are exceedingly rare, have been shown to violate basic math by counting as true cases that didn’t qualify as sexual assault, had insufficient evidence to make a determination, or were referred for prosecution but about which the outcome was unknown.


As for Lisak's vague statements about having interviewed "hundreds" of serial rapists (occasionally styled as “thousands” when others talk about him), in truth no evidence exists that Lisak has interviewed any “undetected rapists,” serial or otherwise, since his dissertation research 30 years ago.

His claimed years of research turned out to be a handful of actual research publications, reviews full of editorializing about others’ research, rehashing of the dissertation he completed in 1989, and a website that deceptively merges that dissertation’s 1980s-era research on 12 college students with unrelated data from the 2002 paper on repeat offenders.
 
By title alone, finding differences is sold as unethical. It specifically raised South Africa as an example of why such investigation is bad and confounded, and attacks Jewish scientists as being bigots. That's anti-Semitic! Clearly an unethical bias.

I'd encourage you to resist that assumption. The article is interested in the shortcomings of race science, specifically the science of genetics as it applies to racial differences. The author isn't denying that there are differences in average intelligence between races; he's simply saying that there is no empirical evidence that the root cause of those differences is genetic. A scientific perspective that privileges empiricism shouldn't jump to certain conclusions based on speculative connections between general racial homogeneity and statistical commonalities. The proper response should be that while genetics could explain these differences, there is no way to empirically verify such connections. Therefore, it's irresponsible to promote such a theory based on current studies/research.

The studies that have been cited as supporting race science have also been subject to mild, if not gross, misinterpretation. I think that's the point of the article.

I know you want to wave this away as "virtue signaling"; but my impression is that it's impossible to make an argument even comparable to this without you criticizing it as virtue-signaling, which is why I find your comments suspect.

A 30 point difference isn't enough to make this difference.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IQ_classification

The Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS) is pretty much the standard IQ test at this point, and has been for some years now. The scale runs as follows:

The biggest boost from "dullness" (whatever that is), which would be at best "Borderline", at 30pts would be "Average" (Even low average would only get to high average). I don't know if Bouchard was using an older version of the WAIS, but neither does the writer apparently, since there were no links (or he doesn't want to show them). Given that changes are supposed to be shown over time, I would assume relatively recent IQ comparisons would be using the WAIS-III or WAIS-IV.

"Dullness" would be low average. So he's not incorrect:

http://www.wilderdom.com/intelligence/IQWhatScoresMean.html

Lewis Terman (1916) developed the original notion of IQ and proposed this scale for classifying IQ scores:

  • Over 140 - Genius or near genius

  • 120 - 140 - Very superior intelligence

  • 110 - 119 - Superior intelligence

  • 90 - 109 - Normal or average intelligence

  • 80 - 89 - Dullness

  • 70 - 79 - Borderline deficiency

  • Under 70 - Definite feeble-mindedness

WAIS uses the same intervals as Terman.

He also lies about IQ tests testing a "sliver":

The only subtest on the WAIS to test verbal abstraction is the "Similarities" test.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wechsler_Adult_Intelligence_Scale

Information & Vocabulary are based on English/Western history canon (although not specifically history about western hist), but not abstract. The rest test either symbolic reasoning or numeric based memory. Separately, the Wechsler Memory Scale tests numeric, symobolic, and linguistic memory if one has trouble with numeric memory only.

Again, this is not true Dak.

The Similarities test assesses abstract verbal reasoning yes; but the comprehension portion assesses the "ability to express abstract social conventions," and matrix reasoning assesses "nonverbal abstract problem-solving." The verbal and perceptual categories both test for abstract logic. Memory and processing don't, but these also can only be tested via the application of abstractions. The test is very much invested in abstract thinking.
 
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I'd encourage you to resist that assumption. The article is interested in the shortcomings of race science, specifically the science of genetics as it applies to racial differences. The author isn't denying that there are differences in average intelligence between races; he's simply saying that there is no empirical evidence that the root cause of those differences is genetic. A scientific perspective that privileges empiricism shouldn't jump to certain conclusions based on speculative connections between general racial homogeneity and statistical commonalities. The proper response should be that while genetics could explain these differences, there is no way to empirically verify such connections. Therefore, it's irresponsible to promote such a theory based on current studies/research.

The studies that have been cited as supporting race science have also been subject to mild, if not gross, misinterpretation. I think that's the point of the article.

I know you want to wave this away as "virtue signaling"; but my impression is that it's impossible to make an argument even comparable to this without you criticizing it as virtue-signaling, which is why I find your comments suspect.

Well I'm not saying you are virtue signaling here, and there is certainly evidence for IQ gains from things like better nutrition, stable home environment, and quality education. But the author likely is signlaing(I mean, he is a "journalist" - his job is almost entirely signaling), especially considering he wrote a book on the topic. Since the sort of "Race science" he's probably familiar with from his book writing about is about 100 years out of date, the following is probably explained by that:

"Dullness" would be low average. So he's not incorrect:

http://www.wilderdom.com/intelligence/IQWhatScoresMean.html

WAIS uses the same intervals as Terman.

Terman helped develop the Stanford-Binet revision of the first IQ test back in 1916, and the use of "Dullness" is fairly obsolete. The current version of the S-B IQ test uses "Low Average" for 80-89.


Again, this is not true Dak.

The Similarities test assesses abstract verbal reasoning yes; but the comprehension portion assesses the "ability to express abstract social conventions," and matrix reasoning assesses "nonverbal abstract problem-solving." The verbal and perceptual categories both test for abstract logic. Memory and processing don't, but these also can only be tested via the application of abstractions. The test is very much invested in abstract thinking.

The memory test is literally just repeating series of numbers back to the testor, and the processing speed tests involve things like crossing out items the test says to, and these items are mixed in sporadically with other items. Vocabulary is testing memory of and/or exposure to words. Information tests the same thing but on random factoids in basic science, history, etc rather than words. Calling these "abstract" is fairly tortured imo. I don't have items from the Comprehension test memorized, but I obviously couldn't share them anyway if I did. However, Comprehension is not even a core test, but rather available as a substitute or for further testing if one is concerned about performance on certain other tests. Matrix Reasoning does test abstract reasoning, but doing poorly on that test can't be blamed on poor schooling or something. We don't have classes on shape series afaik. Still, we are talking about 2 tests out of a total of 10 if we include both verbal and symbol abstraction. 1/5 of the total test, not "all of it", which is what the author asserted:

abstract logic, which is the sliver of intelligence that IQ tests measure.
 
Most of this feels like interpretation to me. "Dullness" corresponds to the same interval as "low average," so I don't think that's an issue. As far as abstract thought in the test goes, it really boils down to how narrowly we choose to define "abstract." You seem to suggest that semantic knowledge doesn't rely on abstract thought; but I'm not sure I agree (meaning itself always involves abstraction, in my opinion, even if we associate such abstraction with practical application). Vocabulary is almost always abstract, especially when questions ignore/downplay context.

Seeing as intelligence tests measure our aptitude for solving problems that are largely symbolic of real-world, practical issues, I'd say the test is mostly abstract.
 
Most of this feels like interpretation to me. "Dullness" corresponds to the same interval as "low average," so I don't think that's an issue. As far as abstract thought in the test goes, it really boils down to how narrowly we choose to define "abstract." You seem to suggest that semantic knowledge doesn't rely on abstract thought; but I'm not sure I agree (meaning itself always involves abstraction, in my opinion, even if we associate such abstraction with practical application). Vocabulary is almost always abstract, especially when questions ignore/downplay context.

Seeing as intelligence tests measure our aptitude for solving problems that are largely symbolic of real-world, practical issues, I'd say the test is mostly abstract.

Well it is interpretation, but that doesn't resolve the issue. If everything we are doing involves "abstract thought", then the IQ tests still aren't testing a "sliver" of intelligence.
 
Everything we’re doing does involve abstract thought; but it involves abstract thought combined with the practicalities of daily life. An IQ test isolates the symbolic/conceptual abstractions that inform everyday thought.

That’s why the author suggests that the test measures the “sliver” of intelligence that involves abstract thought.
 
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Everything we’re doing does involve abstract thought; but it involves abstract thought combined with the practicalities of daily life. An IQ test isolates the symbolic/conceptual abstractions that inform everyday thought.

That’s why the author suggests that the test measures the “sliver” of intelligence that involves abstract thought.

Then what is this vast pie of total intelligence comprised of, minus the sliver of symbolic/conceptual abstract thought? I wouldn't dismiss the possibility that there's something important lying outside of g, but I'm not aware of anyone being able to consistently define it yet, much less isolate and test it.
 
Then what is this vast pie of total intelligence comprised of, minus the sliver of symbolic/conceptual abstract thought?

Intelligence is largely behavioral. Patterns are abstract, but pattern-matching involves practice. The practical application of abstract thought is different than thought, but it's still intelligence. IQ tests can't measure the application of conceptual thought to real situations in-context. Knowing the definition of "feed" doesn't mean one accurately comprehends the phrase "feed the meter," and understanding abstract social conventions doesn't mean one intelligently applies such understanding in context.
 
Intelligence is largely behavioral. Patterns are abstract, but pattern-matching involves practice. The practical application of abstract thought is different than thought, but it's still intelligence. IQ tests can't measure the application of conceptual thought to real situations in-context. Knowing the definition of "feed" doesn't mean one accurately comprehends the phrase "feed the meter," and understanding abstract social conventions doesn't mean one intelligently applies such understanding in context.

Sorry about the delay in responding, school is picking up after SB finished. If I understand you accurately, you're saying that IQ tests can't measure behavioral outcomes? That's true in a technical sense, but they correlate quite well.
 
https://samzdat.com/2018/03/07/everything-is-going-according-to-plan/

Either way, I don’t get Jung, so I judge by what I do know: for someone who lauds Nietzsche and Dostoyevsky, Peterson fails to see Spooky Postmodernism on his own terms. It isn’t “cultural relativism” or “anti-Christianity,” it’s the opposite. They care about truth and Platonic moralism all too much. Only if you cared about truth would it be a problem for it to be relative, only with the Christian moral backing would “truth is relative, but let’s go get the oppressor” make sense. Otherwise you’d shrug. “Weird, that path failed. Whelp, time to switch majors to Finance.”
 
Sorry about the delay in responding, school is picking up after SB finished. If I understand you accurately, you're saying that IQ tests can't measure behavioral outcomes? That's true in a technical sense, but they correlate quite well.

No need to apologize, but I'm kinda losing interest in this.


Damn, his posts are always so long.

I can bash Peterson without the attack on "postmodernism." The more things I read the less impressed I am with Peterson. Nathan Robinson just published a very entertaining critique on Current Affairs, in which he actually takes Peterson's writing to task (for which I'm grateful, since there's no way I'm slogging through that shit). Long story short, he basically accuses Peterson of either promoting vapid platitudes (e.g. "be yourself," "be honest," etc.), presenting obvious ideas as profound insights, or making no sense at all. He quotes a lot in this piece, and it merely confirms my suspicions.

https://www.currentaffairs.org/2018/03/the-intellectual-we-deserve

A few gems:

Peterson’s writing style constantly adds convolutions to disguise the simplicity of his mind; so he won’t say “the man’s cancer metastasized,” he will say the man “fell prey to the tendency of that dread condition to metastasize.” The harder people have to work to figure out what you’re saying, the more accomplished they’ll feel when they figure it out, and the more sophisticated you will appear. Everybody wins.

A few more Petersonisms:

  • There is no being without imperfection.” No shit.

  • “To share does not mean to give away something you value and get nothing back. That is instead what every child who refuses to share fears it means. To share means, properly, to initiate the process of trade.” Could mean anything, depending on interpretation: if I share my food with a hungry person, and ask for nothing in return, I may still have “gotten something.” But the maxim could also be interpreted as a defense of avarice. You can find a justification in it for whatever your worldview already is.

  • “You can’t make rules for the exceptional.” By definition.

  • “The future is the place of all potential monsters.” The future is the place for all potential everything.

  • “People do not care whether or not they succeed; they care about whether or not they fail.” Which is apparently different.

  • People aren’t after happiness, they’re after not hurting.” I’m actually after happiness, thanks.

  • “Life is suffering. That’s clear. There is no more basic, irrefutable truth.” Anything is “irrefutable” if it’s not clear what we mean by it.

  • “You cannot be protected from the things that frighten you and hurt you, but if you identify with the part of your being that is responsible for transformation, then you are always the equal, or more than the equal of the things that frighten you.” Unless you are frightened of leopards, and are subsequently eaten by leopards.
Peterson will vacillate between seeming to claim that nature implies a clear and virtuous hierarchical order of things and insisting that he is not precluding criticism of the existing order of things. When he seems to be saying something fallacious (e.g. hierarchies are okay because natural) he will qualify it with a caveat that means he is saying nothing at all (e.g. natural things are sometimes okay but not always). Sam Harris, who is sympathetic to Peterson’s political stances, has pointed out in exasperation that many of Peterson’s claims about the foundations of good conduct are either unsupported or do not make sense:

Has human evolution actually selected for males that closely conform to the heroism of St. George? And is this really the oldest story we know? Aren’t there other stories just as old, reflecting quite different values that might also have adaptive advantages? And in what sense do archetypes even exist? … sn’t it obvious that most of what we consider ethical—indeed, almost everything we value—now stands outside the logic of evolution? Caring for disabled children would most likely have been maladaptive for our ancestors during any conditions of scarcity—while cannibalism recommended itself from time to time in every corner of the globe. How much inspiration should we draw from the fact that killing and eating children is also an ancient “archetype”?

There’s no good reason for turning to evolution and the animal kingdom for moral advice, yet this is what Peterson recommends. Or doesn’t. I am dreading the inevitable emails insisting that I just don’t understand Peterson, containing copious quotes in which he insists he is saying the opposite of things he seems to be saying elsewhere. (By the way, an amusing aside: a few years ago my colleague Oren Nimni and I wrote a parody of nonsensical academic grand theory called Blueprints for a Sparkling Tomorrow, which literally happens to contain a passage recommending that human beings look to lobsters for moral advice: “We therefore propose a substitute outlet for humankind’s affections: the arthropod. Anyone who has attended a lobster wedding knows full well the kind of profundity and romanticism of which these divine creatures are capable. Yet the arthropod languishes in America’s batting-cages and seafood joints, stripped of its potential and dismissed in its attempts to make edifying contributions to civic life.” Peterson’s failure to credit us borders on academic malpractice.)

To the extent Peterson has any kind of response to the charges that he is making all of this up, it’s just that… imagination is real:

What’s common across all human experience across all time… there are moral, or metaphysical, or phenomenological realities that have the same nature. You can’t see them in your life by observing them with your senses, but you can imagine them with your imagination, and sometimes the things that you imagine with your imagination are more real than the things that you see…

And when an interviewer asked him why people should believe the myths he cites, Peterson’s response is that, well, you might as well take something seriously because life is serious, damn it, and a catastrophe awaits you:

INTERVIEWER: Because a lot of people just look at these stories like Tiamat and Marduk or the Christ story and the Bible stories and say, “Well, that’s just … Those are nice stories, but I’m not going to take it seriously.” What’s the case you make, because I know actually—

PETERSON: Well, what are you going to take seriously, then? You’re going to take nothing seriously. Well, good luck with that, because serious things are coming your way. If you’re not prepared for them by an equal metaphysical seriousness, they will flatten you. You can be dismissive with regards to wisdom, but that doesn’t protect you from the coming catastrophe.

(This is not a persuasive argument.)

:err:

Anyway, long quotes and I have nothing to add. At some point certain things just aren't worth thinking about anymore.
 
No need to apologize, but I'm kinda losing interest in this.

Np.

Damn, his posts are always so long.

Yeah, took two sittings bookending final thesis work to make it through to the end.

I can bash Peterson without the attack on "postmodernism." The more things I read the less impressed I am with Peterson. Nathan Robinson just published a very entertaining critique on Current Affairs, in which he actually takes Peterson's writing to task (for which I'm grateful, since there's no way I'm slogging through that shit). Long story short, he basically accuses Peterson of either promoting vapid platitudes (e.g. "be yourself," "be honest," etc.), presenting obvious ideas as profound insights, or making no sense at all. He quotes a lot in this piece, and it merely confirms my suspicions.

https://www.currentaffairs.org/2018/03/the-intellectual-we-deserve

A Harvard trained sociologist should be familiar with basic psychology/economic theories like https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Loss_aversion, which tells me he is either being intentionally misleading in misinterpreting those quotes, or ignorant. Neither are a good look. Peterson's writing in Maps of Meaning appears terrible, from the brief scan of a PDF version. That seems to be about the only defensible critique I have yet to see and it's rather irrelevant. I see two things in a lot of critiques of Peterson: Academics going after his non-academic writing style (rather than his writing in his peer-reviewed academic work), and people (mostly academic progressives or people who follow them on twitter) reacting to the subtle evisceration of their unsubstantiated ideals with petty mocking and weakmanning (Robinson makes no apologies for his brand of idealism in his blog magazine). He is doing both in that piece.

Incidentally the Samz[]dat piece was somewhat a takedown of the Robinsonian? type idealism which gets revealed in this snippet:

There’s no good reason for turning to evolution and the animal kingdom for moral advice

Now Robinson and Pinker aren't the same person but I dare say they are closer in ideals than not:

Let’s say that Pinker’s ideal world exists, it allows the most reasonable people to try and flourish. But what if “flourishing” requires things above level-2 irrationality? Even your elites won’t be worth anything, you’ll just have cut off a real human experience over a ridiculous and ancient ideal. Are people good? What if “the best human experience” requires a few unpleasant things in it? What about cruelty? Domination? Violence? Frivolousness? I’m not trying to be an edgelord here – you get that we’re animals, right? If you build a society for non-animal humans, then you have built an ideal society for ideally no one. “This is a nice world.” Yeah, a nice world where everyone is miserable. “But at least they aren’t hot-tempered.” What [in] the [world] would you be affirming besides your own egotism?
 
I don't want to appear brusque in neglecting the majority of your post, but we often get into the weeds and I have less time for that than usual these days. You say that Peterson's writing in the book "appears terrible," which is a comment on style; but can I just ask: what value do you find in the content, insofar as the content is comprehensible?
 
I don't want to appear brusque in neglecting the majority of your post, but we often get into the weeds and I have less time for that than usual these days. You say that Peterson's writing in the book "appears terrible," which is a comment on style; but can I just ask: what value do you find in the content, insofar as the content is comprehensible?

I have no clear idea; from a brief scanning I'm not guessing the slog would be worth it vs the other things I could spend my time I'm, since it seems unlikely there's going to be a bigger takeaway than "there are archetypes present in our mythologies", which is probably the least interesting stuff in his lectures afaiac. I'm more likely to give Jung a go at some point in the future if I wanted to get into that stuff. Although Peterson might disagree, I think his archetype stuff is more or less a red herring in terms of both the service he's providing outside of academia proper as well as what he gets criticized for. I hope he is getting to a lot of potential Nicholas Cruz's before they do something terrible, since law enforcement and academia are apparently impotent in that regard.
 
I hope he is getting to a lot of potential Nicholas Cruz's before they do something terrible, since law enforcement and academia are apparently impotent in that regard.

It's not academia's responsibility to provide misguided and potentially dangerous individuals with twelve-step self-help guides. It might be psychology's responsibility, and so if he manages to do that, then bravo.

The problem is a lot of his comments appear to achieve that goal by fomenting hostility between his listeners/readers and those whom they perceive to be against them. At best, you can say he's solving local problems at the expense of solutions for much larger conflicts.
 
It's not academia's responsibility to provide misguided and potentially dangerous individuals with twelve-step self-help guides. It might be psychology's responsibility, and so if he manages to do that, then bravo.

The problem is a lot of his comments appear to achieve that goal by fomenting hostility between his listeners/readers and those whom they perceive to be against them. At best, you can say he's solving local problems at the expense of solutions for much larger conflicts.

Well I do think it is psychology's responsibility to try, but we can't extricate psychology from academia either.

I think, and I believe Peterson has said or at least has intimated at such, that "those who they perceive to be against them" are in fact against them, and it's this same group that generally doesn't actually want these people helped (they being US liberals and these being mostly, but not entirely young straight white males). They want them "saved", which is another thing altogether. The conflict solutions they might have in mind are solutions the same way that Little Boy and Fat Boy were a conflict solution with Japan - or the solution offered when one comes to Jesus - nothing less than unconditional surrender. The resistance to this can take many forms, and Peterson is trying to channel it into more personally and socially productive forms. But it is still resistance, which is why he is treated as a heretic. Hell, Pinker is on the verge of being considered heretical and there may be no one more committed to the righteous cause.
 
Well I do think it is psychology's responsibility to try, but we can't extricate psychology from academia either.

Yes, true--and it is psychology's responsibility, I was being overly cautious. But it's definitely not Academia's responsibility, in any general sense. It's not literary studies' responsibility to avoid morally ambiguous texts (e.g. Lolita), or philosophy's responsibility to avoid pondering the value(s) of anti-natalism (even if most of us probably disagree with that position).

Understanding the ethical complexities and ambiguities of everyday life is essential to individual and social development. If certain individuals aren't capable of handling that material, then perhaps they should turn to psychology to prepare them. But that won't work if the psychologist they're turning to tells them that humanist academics are their enemies.

I think, and I believe Peterson has said or at least has intimated at such, that "those who they perceive to be against them" are in fact against them, and it's this same group that generally doesn't actually want these people helped (they being US liberals and these being mostly, but not entirely young straight white males). They want them "saved", which is another thing altogether. The conflict solutions they might have in mind are solutions the same way that Little Boy and Fat Boy were a conflict solution with Japan - or the solution offered when one comes to Jesus - nothing less than unconditional surrender. The resistance to this can take many forms, and Peterson is trying to channel it into more personally and socially productive forms. But it is still resistance, which is why he is treated as a heretic. Hell, Pinker is on the verge of being considered heretical and there may be no one more committed to the righteous cause.

The difference is that Pinker manages to be contrarian without being either obscure or an asshole. And look how popular he is! Peterson isn't even a poor man's Pinker. He's just a psychologist who couldn't find popularity through his actual work, so he turned to social media (i.e. YouTube).
 
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Yes, true--and it is psychology's responsibility, I was being overly cautious. But it's definitely not Academia's responsibility, in any general sense. It's not literary studies' responsibility to avoid morally ambiguous texts (e.g. Lolita), or philosophy's responsibility to avoid pondering the value(s) of anti-natalism (even if most of us probably disagree with that position).

Understanding the ethical complexities and ambiguities of everyday life is essential to individual and social development. If certain individuals aren't capable of handling that material, then perhaps they should turn to psychology to prepare them. But that won't work if the psychologist they're turning to tells them that humanist academics are their enemies.

I cannot recall my humanities classes besides philosophy classes doing much wrt helping understand ambiguity or complexity of every day life, and few people are taking many philosophy classes unless you want to count the neo-nunnery of Female Gender Studies departments. Peterson doesn't rip all humanist academics. Just the ones who probably like Foucault. Which just so happens to be a substantial portion. This portion can't continuously deride a portion of the population as inherently immoral and then wonder why there's a backlash, especially when one can't even "repent" for the sin of a straight white male.

The difference is that Pinker manages to be contrarian without being either obscure or an asshole. And look how popular he is! Peterson isn't even a poor man's Pinker. He's just a psychologist who couldn't find popularity through his actual work, so he turned to social media (i.e. YouTube).

Peterson isn't a poor man's Pinker, and I didn't mean to insinuate anything like that. They aren't even in the same fields of psychology, and Personality psychology isn't very hot outside of "Learn your MBTI Personality type on this Facebook Quiz!". Pinker is popular because he is still upholding enlightenment ideals, and works like the Blank Slate or his agreement with Haidt et al about liberal bias in academia is basically just an uncomfortable internal theological argument on the margins. Peterson isn't speaking to the saved in his non-academic work, he's speaking to the damned - and the damned can't make someone popular with the saved. Incidentally, Peterson seems to be publishing actual peer reviewed work at a far higher rate than any of his more notable academic detractors. I can't even find any publications by Nathan Robinson (of course he's still a graduate student - but still, not even one?) or others like Ira Wells, so it wouldn't even be fair to compare citation numbers when the competition is at a potentially collective zero. If he keeps publishing and teaching, it's pretty hard to claim his videos or the self-help book are reaching for popularity when failing otherwise. Pinker doesn't appear to have contributed original research in a peer reviewed journal in some time - is he then only interested in the popularity of being a public intellectual? I don't think so. Of course, Robin Hanson might disagree (can't wait to read his new book)!

All of that isn't to say I really want to get into an argument about Peterson's intent etc etc. I think Robinson's response to Peterson is understandable for two reasons: He's not one of the damned (not maligned by media etc (excluding FOX) and doesn't need therapy), and he is being disagreeable (to put it nicely) to a group Robinson feels a part of. It's really the former part I prefer to engage in defense of Peterson on, and it seems justified since the hate comes from precisely who he calls out (some reciprocal relationship maybe?). Robinson's attack on therapy related talk feels like punching down, to use a phrase he probably uses. Nothing in CBT is all that mindblowing. The problem for people in need of therapy is not that they can't do some complicated thing, it's that they need help functioning in routine tasks and situations. No surprise that a lot of therapy can have a "no duh" sound to those not in need of it.