This is great Grant, thanks. I also don't want to seem like I'm suggesting that what I'm writing is "the way it is," or anything like that. It's just that a lot of people have written about this topic, and so these are the things I resort to.
Regarding the idea that "it makes no sense to imagine a kind of deeply private experience that isn't translatable in some way to the social," that strikes me as a lazy assertion that avoids an honest admission of the utter weirdness of conscious experience, and if my half-assed knowledge of the history of philosophy serves me, I believe one of phenomenology's notable achievements was to show that there's more to conscious experience than the "dead end" view Wittgenstein proposed.
You may be right about phenomenology, it's not a methodology I'm well-versed in. Here I'm also betraying some of my analytical preferences, as I generally subscribe to anti-phenomenological views, like those of Jacques Derrida. I wouldn't call Wittgenstein an anti-phenomenologist per se, but I do think his emphasis on language signals a turning away from phenomenological interests. But his later writings were very interested in psychology and philosophy of mind, so there's probably some overlap.
I also may have done a poor job of conveying Wittgenstein's ideas. His isn't a dead-end view, as he doesn't think that language ever really fails. In fact, his interest in language is that it continues to work despite being imperfect. His Philosophical Investigations are really quite something to read, unlike any other philosophical text I've ever read. He argument is also specifically that of private language--not experience as a whole. I may have conflated the two. But what he would say, I think, is that if individual people do have deeply intimate personal experiences that exceed the possibilities of language, then these experiences can't really matter for anyone except the person who has them. If our institutions of social meaning can't get a handle on these intimate, "mystical" experiences, then there's no way to convey them. A piece of art (which Wittgenstein doesn't really write about) might be inspired by an artist's deeply personal experience, but that experience won't be a part of the work's social meaning.
There's a kind of argument from ignorance in the claim that "there's nothing to say" about deeply private experience, as if our primitive monkey brains are somehow perfectly equipped to describe reality as we perceive it. I mean, have you ever seen a review of progressive / avant-garde music that did anything but utterly fail to capture the essence of the listening experience, or a trip report that served as an adequate substitute for being on a psychedelic drug? What about the evidence of the limits of the mind Peter Watts lays out in that lecture "Reality: The Ultimate Mythology"?
A couple things here:
1. if there is something to say about a deeply personal experience, then it doesn't exceed language. Maybe you can talk around the experience, but this raises the question of where exactly the boundary between language and experience lies. This is a debate that still goes on in neuroscientific and cognitive philosophy circles, and I don't think anyone has provided a suitable answer. I tend to fall toward the end of the spectrum that thinks all experience is, although maybe extra-linguistic on some deep level, almost immediately absorbed into what Jacques Lacan called the "symbolic" as soon as we have the experience. In other words, we're so fundamentally conditioned into language as soon as we're born that, by the time we can form memories and reflect on our experiences, the line between them and language is so fine as to be virtually nonexistent.
2. I have seen reviews that fail to capture the music, but then I also usually think that I have the language to more accurately describe them. I'm also probably over-confident in my writing abilities.
I started this but ran out of time to finish, lol, so I'll come back later to address the rest of your comments.
EDIT
It seems quite obvious to me not only that the breadth of conscious experience far exceeds the capacity of language, but that the inexpressible part of conscious experience has a profound impact on our lives. That's pretty damn relevant to me, and reason enough for a broader definition of relevance than "that which meets the criteria for academic study."
There's a passage from Aldous Huxley's "Literature and Science" that characterizes the relationship between language and private experience in a way I think does the latter justice:
That's a great quote.
I agree completely that the inexpressible has an impact on our lives; I guess I'm just skeptical of how separate these things are (I say more about this in my reply to Dak below)
I'm fully on board with Huxley's notion of literature as a way to work through non-linguistic experience. But this also introduces the weirdness of language itself. It might be true that conscious experience is weird, but language is also weird! And experiments in language can be great for working through private experience; but then, isn't language expressing something about that experience? When I read James Joyce or William Faulkner, I certainly don't think to myself "this is how people talk." But there's still a linguistic/textual element to the expressionistic impulse. There's something experimental and strange going on with language in these kinds of writings, and they're framing private experience in a particular way. I'm not sure how to draw the line between extra-linguistic experience and the linguistic framing of experience. I'd venture that artistic expression is as much a construction of experience as it is a re-presentation of it.
Getting back to the conflict I alleged earlier between critical theory and creativity, I want to mention that although a level of (amateur) academic study has always been an important part of my creative life, I've grown to recognize that academic study isn't just a process of knowledge acquisition: it's also a process of perspective-shaping. There are times in my life that call for a degree of naive commitment to a certain perspective (i.e. that aesthetics and politics are separable), regardless of how sound the objections are, as long as I do it in a self-aware and undogmatic way. By committing to a perspective, I program my mind into a particular process or "track" that allows a kind of idea-generation unique to that perspective. Given my experience with that, I wonder how much awareness there is within academia of the possibility of losing the ability to see from a perspective after dissecting it under the critical lens.
I can respect that. I'm definitely less creative these days than I used to be. Not sure I miss it, though; it's a different way of producing knowledge.