The Butt's Friendly Debate Hour: Is Music Just Sound? Or Is It Also Ideology?

There's nothing that's universal to all people, but I've yet to hear of a culture where it is uncommon to cry because of death. And even if such a culture does exist, it's the exception to the pattern that characterizes the vast majority of humans on this planet. The patterns that I mentioned are sufficiently common across diverse cultures-many of whom evolved separately- that an explanation is needed. You're zooming in so narrowly into culturally specific ideology that you are dismissing these patterns, which simply leaves your theory lacking in critical respects.

Good point; so, taking that into consideration:

I'm unwilling to say that there is no culture in which it is uncommon to cry because of death. I'm unwilling to say this regarding all cultures that currently exist on this planet; all that ever have, and all that ever will. That point aside, I agree that it is widespread and common to cry over deceased relatives.

But then we should ask why it is common to cry; is this because it is "natural," as you claim, or because our socio-historical conditions have introduced a climate/environment wherein such a relationship is fostered that in turn induces sadness over deceased loved ones? The institution of "love" itself is heavily ideological, not natural in any sense. Mammals certainly take care of their own in many cases; but is this not evolutionary? How do we distinguish between love and evolution? Perhaps it's nothing more than the frustration over an extinguished biological line that led to crying in the first place, which was then sublimated into love after a long period of time.

In this sense, crying over deceased relatives might not be a natural thing at all, but a heavily historically conditioned response.

This is where we disagree. People have certain natural capacities that also condition creation. This is why phenomena like art, music, etc. manifest in cultures that are totally separate from one another. Many of those conditions are inherent to the vast majority of humans (the exceptions being those with certain disabilities or injuries). By ignoring these inherent human (heck, in many cases inherent mammal) qualities you are engaging in a form of reductionism.

Yes, this is an extremely difficult concept to even talk about. I'm going to make a controversial point.

There are processes that pre-date ideology: metabolism, photosynthesis, gene mutation, evolution, erosion, hurricanes, etc. But we cannot claim that the human body, in its most basic non-cultural sense, isn't already ideological; that is, capable of knowing forms (or ideas) of the world. Conceiving of the human in this sense is already to impose ideological parameters upon it; that is, that something called "the human" actually exists. Not the body you inhabit or the bodies around you; but the concept called "the human."

We cannot separate "the human" from the artificial; humanity - indeed, much of life itself - is a technological being. What you want to call natural capacities are, in fact, already institutions that condition an ideological view of the world. Our very senses might be described as ideological; they form the perspective we have on the world. Our entire classification system (i.e. of plants/animals) is based on sight, on that which we can detect by seeing. The process of art - the making of music - reflects and reinforces, by its very creation, the ideological perspective that informs it.

People have certain natural capacities, and art is certainly a trans-cultural phenomenon; but art doesn't reflect pure natural capacity because the very form of art reflects views of the world, and these views are already ideological. You cannot separate the senses themselves from ideology; and these senses then give rise to more complex ideological institutions such as art, music, literature, etc.

In isolation, a body cannot realize the ideological capacity of its apparatus since it cannot realize itself as a thing among other things (other things like it, that is). Once this collective infusion begins - what we might call culture - then we witness the acknowledgement of the senses as instruments in the common effort to know that thing we call "the world." And this common effort produces all kinds various aesthetic and artistic institutions.

I don't think it's reductive to say that all artistic process boils down to ideology. I think it's important to realize that, in a paradoxical sense, ideology already exists prior to artistic creation. Art always presupposes a (purportedly) universal system, just as language cannot function without presupposing a network of words and meanings that precede it.
 
Good point; so, taking that into consideration:

I'm unwilling to say that there is no culture in which it is uncommon to cry because of death. I'm unwilling to say this regarding all cultures that currently exist on this planet; all that ever have, and all that ever will. That point aside, I agree that it is widespread and common to cry over deceased relatives.

But then we should ask why it is common to cry; is this because it is "natural," as you claim, or because our socio-historical conditions have introduced a climate/environment wherein such a relationship is fostered that in turn induces sadness over deceased loved ones?

The former is a much simpler explanation. I mean there's plenty of documentation of early anthropologists visiting tribes that had had little to no contact with Western culture and who engaged in mourning in their funeral rituals. If you're not willing to grant that these activities are inherent to humans--despite the fact that they're evidently rampant throughout humanity (we can also use literature to corroborate modern observations to at least assuage the historical dimension) then it begins to sound like you're saying it's some sort of cultural, borderline conspiratorial, energy is the source of humans crying when loved ones die. Which is really making something really simple overly complex.

The institution of "love" itself is heavily ideological, not natural in any sense. Mammals certainly take care of their own in many cases; but is this not evolutionary? How do we distinguish between love and evolution? Perhaps it's nothing more than the frustration over an extinguished biological line that led to crying in the first place, which was then sublimated into love after a long period of time.

Again, I disagree. First of all, I'm not clear on the evolutionary/ non-evolutionary divide that you're implying, since humans are as much the product of evolution as any other living organism. Second of all, I think stating that love is not natural in any sense is outrageous (although this might also be a good time for you to explain what you mean when you say natural, since I'm not sure we're using the term in the same way). Again, you're in the same bind you are in with regards to humans mourning at the death of a loved one--if love isn't in any way natural, how did it come to be that there are these corresponding ideologies across humanity. If you're not gonna grant that there's some inherent qualities to humans that lead the cluster of concepts known as "love" then it all seems quite magical.

I guess my counter would be that while a term like "love" might have different connotations in different cultures where it has been shaped by institutions and practices, it is still fundamentally grounded in essential characteristics, which are grounded in intrinsic aspects of human (and/or mammal) nature.

In this sense, crying over deceased relatives might not be a natural thing at all, but a heavily historically conditioned response.

Again, that just seems like an overly complex explanation that I don't think is substantiated by empirical evidence.

Yes, this is an extremely difficult concept to even talk about. I'm going to make a controversial point.

There are processes that pre-date ideology: metabolism, photosynthesis, gene mutation, evolution, erosion, hurricanes, etc. But we cannot claim that the human body, in its most basic non-cultural sense, isn't already ideological; that is, capable of knowing forms (or ideas) of the world. Conceiving of the human in this sense is already to impose ideological parameters upon it; that is, that something called "the human" actually exists. Not the body you inhabit or the bodies around you; but the concept called "the human."

We cannot separate "the human" from the artificial; humanity - indeed, much of life itself - is a technological being. What you want to call natural capacities are, in fact, already institutions that condition an ideological view of the world. Our very senses might be described as ideological; they form the perspective we have on the world. Our entire classification system (i.e. of plants/animals) is based on sight, on that which we can detect by seeing. The process of art - the making of music - reflects and reinforces, by its very creation, the ideological perspective that informs it.

People have certain natural capacities, and art is certainly a trans-cultural phenomenon; but art doesn't reflect pure natural capacity because the very form of art reflects views of the world, and these views are already ideological. You cannot separate the senses themselves from ideology; and these senses then give rise to more complex ideological institutions such as art, music, literature, etc.

The very fact that there's a distinction between sense and ideology two implies that there are two separate factors in play in perception. Your tendency is to reduce the role of senses and emphasize the way they are ideologically shaped. However, that just begs the question, because sense-the same senses that are present in nonhuman animals (albeit in different forms-is still present. To dismiss the natural dimension seems like a quick-fix way of reducing everything to your quality of choice--ideology. However, it doesn't seem very accurate or honest.

So I'm willing to go with you that sense and ideology are inherently intertwined in humans and this in turn leads to all other more complex human activities (i.e. music) as being ideological, but at the same time they are just as much grounded in that intrinsic sensual quality, which is also an irreducible element of the equation.

Hope that clarifies the ways in which I think your theory is reductive.

In isolation, a body cannot realize the ideological capacity of its apparatus since it cannot realize itself as a thing among other things (other things like it, that is). Once this collective infusion begins - what we might call culture - then we witness the acknowledgement of the senses as instruments in the common effort to know that thing we call "the world." And this common effort produces all kinds various aesthetic and artistic institutions.

I'm not sure about the first sentence, since there is strong evidence that there are nonhuman animals are able to identify themselves as things amongst things without having ideology.
 
I probably complicate emotions like "love" because I genuinely believe they're complicated. I don't think we can say love is just a sensual, emotional response that rises among all humans. That seems too simple, because not all humans love, not all humans have the "proper," "normal" emotional reactions.

My education has caused me to be skeptical of anything purporting to be "natural"; this isn't to say that nature doesn't exist, but that as soon as these things (love, music, emotion, consciousness, etc.) begin operating within a cultural context, we sublimate them into ideals. So nature becomes "Nature"; attraction between bodies becomes "Love." Saying that these things find root in natural causes may be true, but it also oversimplifies them.

I'm not saying the senses are ideologically formed. I'm saying that ideology itself is helplessly intertwined with sensory perception. We explore museums, institutions of sight, because we rely heavily on our eyes. We listen to music the way we do because we hear the way we do. Ideology can certainly be said to derive from some natural, basic ground of organisms in reality; but institutions such as Love, counterpoint, Nature, the major key, etc. cannot be explained by simply describing them as the result of sensual responses to environment.

Personally, I find that reductive.

EDIT: let me rephrase something that might clarify what I'm saying:

I think that the meaning of music can be explained ideologically because I don't think that meaning extends to sensation, or affective response. That is, meaning only emerges at a level which constitutes some form of conscious reflection on content or substance. We certainly experience physical stimuli in certain ways, but this doesn't translate into "meaning" until we reflect on these experiences at an ideological level.