Material conditions as our percepts? Explain material conditions? I'm just a bit confused.
Are you saying reality isn't cognitively knowable?
I'm not saying anything; rather, I'm offering some well-established views into the mix.
Even Hegel believed that reality was ultimately knowable; this was the Absolute, the Great Notion, which, through innumerable processes of dialectical synthesis, humanity could one day arrive at.
Hegel believed that to know the world, one began with ideas; ideas constitute material reality. Marx and Engels said that Hegel had the right idea (pun intended?), but he was standing on his head. Ideas don't beget reality; the material conditions of reality, rather, shape and inform our ways of knowing the world. In
The German Ideology they write:
"In direct contrast to German philosophy which descends from heaven to earth, here we ascend from earth to heaven. This is to say, we do not set out from what mean say, imagine, conceive, nor from men as narrated, thought of, imagined, conceived, in order to arrive at men in the flesh. We set out from real, active men, and on the basis of their life-processes we demonstrate the development of the ideological reflexes and echoes of this life process... Life is not determined by consciousness, but consciousness by life."
Marx believed the world could be known as well; if Hegel was an idealist, meaning he believed the world could be known through cognition and concepts, then Marx was a materialist, meaning he believed the world could only be known through material conditions and real, active men doing active work; but if materiality conditions the way in which we perceive and think about the world, then any critique of absolutely any topic is immediately encompassed by those material conditions.
I'll quote Eagleton again to better illuminate the issue at stake:
"When Marx and Engels speak of setting out from 'real, active men' rather than from what these 'men' say, imagine and conceive, they sail perilously close to a naive sensuous empiricism which fails to grasp that there is no 'real life-process' without interpretation. To attempt to 'suspend' this realm of meaning in order to better examine 'real' conditions would be like killing a patient to examine more conveniently the circulation of her blood. As Raymond Williams has commented, this 'objectivist fantasy' presumes that real life conditions 'can be known independently of language and of historical records' [the insinuation being that language and historical records are material conditions/products that are pregnant with ideological suggestion]."
Both Hegel and Marx deploy a temporal, chronological method that aims to begin with either ideas/concepts or material conditions and arrive at the other; but each approach has its inherent problems:
1. By beginning with ideas, as Hegel does, one must concede that there is some ultimate, absolute, ideal truth, similar to a Kantian categorical imperative; but it cannot be true that ideas came before humankind could think them, so there are not universal truths, merely truths as established by their respective historical epistemes, or paradigms, or what have you.
2. By beginning with material conditions, as Marx does, one must concede that material conditions are that which give rise to all thought; but if this is the case, then the very act of critiquing them or understanding is itself dictated by those very same material conditions. Essentially, by critiquing them, one must logically undermine one's own argument.