Good and evil... do they exist?

[Seditious]

I personally believe wholeheartedly that the world is deterministic, but that does not exempt me from taking responsibility for my actions.

that's pretty much my point. even if we can't talk about 'morality' we're still going to treat people as responsible because we still feel in control (Even if that is just a great delusion of physics).

 

[Seditious]

His comments thus far have been primarily focused on belittling the thread and looking for ways to bicker. If I'm not mistaken, that's the definition of trolling. I don't doubt that he could introduce some good ideas into the discussion, but so far I've seen no indication that he's even looked at what we're talking about.

freedom of speech eh. you can always ignore something he says if it's not relevant, and if it is, then if you can't defend what's belittled maybe it deserves to be belittled (like Nietzsche pwning christianity's focus on an imaginary life during this one, that's not trolling, it's just a challenge, he believed their idea deserved to be belittled, and if it doesn't then it can be answered, and if it's irrelevant it doesn't deserve to be acknowledged as anything but a statement of ignorance).

 

[zabu of nΩd]

Oh, I think he has. And yes, hes combative, often trollish, but thats his style and we tolerate it because its more amusing than the bullshit most post here... and because he only respawns when banned

Ah yes, the regenerative capability of the troll... :zombie:

You know, I never even realized that connection between Internet trolls and 'real' trolls. What a noob I am...

 

[zabu of nΩd]

that's pretty much my point. even if we can't talk about 'morality' we're still going to treat people as responsible because we still feel in control (Even if that is just a great delusion of physics).

Okay then. I was under the impression that you were standing on the opposite side of determinism at first. I took Cythraul's references to "moral responsibility" to mean responsibility based on free will, not just responsibility period. It seems your interpretation of his terms was different.

 

[Cythraul]

The the government is evil for numerous reasons, including caging people as a means for protecting themselves. I'm happy to call that evil, but when even the most 'moral' acts are 'evil' there seems no more sense in using the word under that definition.

Nice point I guess. I don't really have the patience to respond to this adequately right now but maybe I will at a later time.

so why would we value a rapists act any less negatively because he was determined to do it?

I don't know what point you're trying to make here.

so if someone is determined to rape child after child anyone who believes in determinism is going to let him go because they believe in determinism? that doesn't sound true to me.

What are you talking about? I made no claim about what determinists would actually do. The issue is about whether claims making use of the notion of moral responsibility are justified if free will doesn't exist.

 

[Cythraul]

Determining whether abstract symbols 'exist' doesn't get us any closer to achiving any useful result, so why waste the fucking time?

Well...I'm pretty certain that symbols exist, but I do not know what an abstract symbol is.

 

[Cythraul]

that's pretty much my point. even if we can't talk about 'morality' we're still going to treat people as responsible because we still feel in control (Even if that is just a great delusion of physics).

That is not the real issue. Of course we're still in some sense responsible for our own actions if determinism is true, i.e. we cause them to happen, and of course it will still feel intuitive that we're in control. But if we suppose that determinism is true and if we suppose that determinism is incompatible with free will, then what becomes problematic is the normative notion of responsibility.

 

[Seditious]

That is not the real issue. Of course we're still in some sense responsible for our own actions if determinism is true, i.e. we cause them to happen, and of course it will still feel intuitive that we're in control. But if we suppose that determinism is true and if we suppose that determinism is incompatible with free will, then what becomes problematic is the normative notion of responsibility.

meaning what? you're not going to punish someone cos the jury is determined to reach a certain verdict after you having reacted in a determined way so as to take him to court? Determinism will never be proven in any way that will convince us to change our behavior regarding other people any more than we will let cancer spread if we find it's determined to do what it does--- so maybe we can't say a person is any more 'evil' than cancer is, but we don't need to do that to react in the same manner.

 

[Cythraul]

you're not going to punish someone cos the jury is determined to reach a certain verdict after you having reacted in a determined way so as to take him to court?

I do not understand the above sentence.

Determinism will never be proven in any way that will convince us to change our behavior regarding other people any more than we will let cancer spread if we find it's determined to do what it does--- so maybe we can't say a person is any more 'evil' than cancer is, but we don't need to do that to react in the same manner.

I don't know if you get what I'm saying. It seems like you don't. I don't care about what people would be inclined to do in the light of determinism being shown to be true!!! I am saying that it would not make sense to hold onto notions of moral responsibility and blameworthiness if there is no free will. It makes no sense to tell someone that they ought to act a certain way if they have no choice in the matter, and further, if acting such and such a way is not even a genuine possibility for them. Holding them morally responsible and punishing them wouldn't make sense. But of course people could just fail to be moved by the truth of determinism and just go about their business, but they'd be irrational in a certain sense.

 

[Seditious]

I don't know if you get what I'm saying. I am saying that it would not make sense to hold onto notions of moral responsibility and blameworthiness if there is no free will.

and I'm saying 'good, don't hold onto them.' it may be a problem to you because of your system, but in mine it's no problem at all.

again, you're not going to allow people to kill just because you can't hold them 'morally responsible' for killing. as I said not a week ago, ethics is rubbish.

 

[Cythraul]

as I said not a week ago, ethics is rubbish.

That sounds like bullshit to me. What is your reason for saying this?

 

[zabu of nΩd]

It makes no sense to tell someone that they ought to act a certain way if they have no choice in the matter, and further, if acting such and such a way is not even a genuine possibility for them. Holding them morally responsible and punishing them wouldn't make sense.

How did you reach this conclusion? You said earlier that choice is not a prerequisite for an action to be valued. Now you're saying that having no choice means we can't expect anything from people. Isn't the very reason we punish criminals because we value obeying the law?

Abandoning moral expectations for people just because they aren't in control of their actions isn't what determinism is about. I think it's this common misinterpretation which makes determinism so difficult for most people to understand and accept. Typically when people imagine a world where everything is determined, they start to think , "Oh, well that means we can just do whatever the hell we want in life, because it will end up the same regardless." That's not at all the case.

As I said before, your desires and your social expectations compete with each other throughout your life in determining most of your actions. This means you're going to act in accordance with these influences. Therefore it is possible for responsibility and 'lack of control' to coexist. You're causally forced to have responsibilities.

I'm probably not explaining this as well as I could, so if there's something about this which doesn't make sense to someone, just point it out to me.

 

[zabu of nΩd]

Determinism will never be proven in any way that will convince us to change our behavior regarding other people any more than we will let cancer spread if we find it's determined to do what it does--- so maybe we can't say a person is any more 'evil' than cancer is, but we don't need to do that to react in the same manner.

Going off what I just said to Cythraul: I don't think determinism is meant to radically change our moral expectations for people. What I see as valuable about determinism is that it fits into an empirical/scientific view of the universe - one in which we can look at people's actions as naturalistic phenomena which can be predicted just like all the other physical/cosmic/biological/etc. events we witness.

A determinist has the logical justification for believing that a person's actions are simply a function of their brain states, and can theoretically be 'reprogrammed' in much the same way as a computer. Someone who rejects determinism is essentially saying we can't do this, because the person's capacity for choice exists in some abstract spiritual entity (i.e. the soul) which is not bound to our world of physics and cause-effect relationships. This is, to me, what makes determinism so attractive.

 

[Cythraul]

How did you reach this conclusion? You said earlier that choice is not a prerequisite for an action to be valued. Now you're saying that having no choice means we can't expect anything from people. Isn't the very reason we punish criminals because we value obeying the law?

Suppose a man is possessed by a benevolent spirit and is caused against his own will to perform a bunch of acts which are generally beneficial to society. We'd all be inclined to value such actions since his actions caused things that we value, but why the hell would we praise him for such actions? He didn't even choose to perform such actions; he was made to perform them against his own will. We can even build into the case that the man actually wanted to go rape children instead. With that in mind, consider a quite different case. Suppose a malevolent spirit inhabits the body of a man and forces him to go around shitting in other peoples' mouths against their will. We don't value such actions in the sense that we don't like the outcome of those actions, but why would we blame the guy? It was completely out of his control. Now, of course we're going to want to lock the guy away because he's clearly a nuisance but not because we're holding him accountable for his actions. The notion of moral responsibility does not even play a role in this case.

Abandoning moral expectations for people just because they aren't in control of their actions isn't what determinism is about.

That's not even what I'm proposing. And what the heck is determinism supposed to be about anyway?

edit: I just realized that the above statement makes me appear inconsistent but I just pulled an all-nighter so I'm too tired to amend it properly. Either ignore it or wait until I'm in a better state of mind.

Typically when people imagine a world where everything is determined, they start to think , "Oh, well that means we can just do whatever the hell we want in life, because it will end up the same regardless." That's not at all the case.

Can do whatever the hell we want in what sense? In the sense that we're morally permitted to do whatever we want? Of course we're morally permitted to do whatever we happen to do if determinism is true, because it would make no sense to make normative claims at all if nobody has a choice in what they do. This does not mean that we would in fact do whatever we wanted to do or that it wouldn't be prudent to disallow people from doing whatever they want to do. Furthermore, there's a big difference between something's being morally permissible and something's being merely permitted.

As I said before, your desires and your social expectations compete with each other throughout your life in determining most of your actions. This means you're going to act in accordance with these influences. Therefore it is possible for responsibility and 'lack of control' to coexist. You're causally forced to have responsibilities.

None of that is inconsistent with what I've been saying.

 

[zabu of nΩd]

Suppose a man is possessed by a benevolent spirit and is caused against his own will to perform a bunch of acts which are generally beneficial to society. ... The notion of moral responsibility does not even play a role in this case.

It seems we pretty much agree with each other; we're just getting caught up on matters of word choice. When you said 'it makes no sense to tell someone to act a certain way if they have no choice', it sounded to me like you thought laws would be useless in a deterministic world. Now I see you don't actually think that.

Good analogy, by the way. I'll certainly remember it next time I have to make the case for determinism to someone.

Can do whatever the hell we want in what sense? In the sense that we're morally permitted to do whatever we want? Of course we're morally permitted to do whatever we happen to do if determinism is true, because it would make no sense to make normative claims at all if nobody has a choice in what they do. This does not mean that we would in fact do whatever we wanted to do or that it wouldn't be prudent to disallow people from doing whatever they want to do. Furthermore, there's a big difference between something's being morally permissible and something's being merely permitted.

I meant "whatever the hell we want" in the sense that, since we have no control over our actions, we need make no effort to 'try' to act a certain way. This seems to be how most people interpret determinism. They can't get their mind around the concept, so they simplify it to the point of absurdity.

In my experience, people often have a hard time distinguishing between free will and freedom. The analogy I like to make is that freedom is "being able to do what you desire" while free will is "being able to choose your desires". I think once you put it in those terms, it's pretty easy to see how bizarre the idea of free will really is. Who chooses their desires, after all?

 

[Norsemaiden]

Norsemaiden - We could classify any plant or animal as good because all their actions are directed towards advancing their gene pool, isn't that rather absurd? How can an action cannot be classified as either good or evil if the agent has no choice? I don't think we can't call an unintentional (instinctual) action morally "good" without good will, and not all actions would justify the benefit to the gene pool. Indeed, why are we able to think and reason at all?

Ok I will rephrase it. The ultimate good is that which is good for MY genepool, and the ultimate evil is that which harms MY genepool. But this is the point of view that can only appopriately held by members of my genepool.

Looking objectively at the genepools of other creatures - this is the only definition of good and evil that has any practical meaning.

This does not mean that damaging anyone or anything outside of my genepool is fine - because many things are interconnected in the web of life. Thus, killing all bees is bad for my genepool, and is evil.

 

[Seditious]

Ok I will rephrase it. The ultimate good is that which is good for MY genepool, and the ultimate evil is that which harms MY genepool. But this is the point of view that can only appopriately held by members of my genepool.

why would you genepool be the determinant of ultimate good? shouldn't I believe the same is true for my genepool if genepools have something to do with this?

Looking objectively at the genepools of other creatures - this is the only definition of good and evil that has any practical meaning.

so it's a fallacy to use the word ultimate isn't it?

This does not mean that damaging anyone or anything outside of my genepool is fine - because many things are interconnected in the web of life. Thus, killing all bees is bad for my genepool, and is evil.

why? if your genepool don't eat honey it's no worse than killing cancer instead of bees (ignoring the ecosystem repercussions for examplesake)

 

[Seditious]

Going off what I just said to Cythraul: I don't think determinism is meant to radically change our moral expectations for people. What I see as valuable about determinism is that it fits into an empirical/scientific view of the universe - one in which we can look at people's actions as naturalistic phenomena which can be predicted just like all the other physical/cosmic/biological/etc. events we witness.

A determinist has the logical justification for believing that a person's actions are simply a function of their brain states, and can theoretically be 'reprogrammed' in much the same way as a computer. Someone who rejects determinism is essentially saying we can't do this, because the person's capacity for choice exists in some abstract spiritual entity (i.e. the soul) which is not bound to our world of physics and cause-effect relationships. This is, to me, what makes determinism so attractive.

the reason we don't have determinism is essentially because our mathematical ability fails us.

sure, maybe a person can be reprogrammed from a destiny to rape by a butterfly being swatted instead of allowed to live, but if the butterfly isn't swat because it's determined so, then nothing can change that, no awareness of determinism changes anything, being aware of determinism would be a a predictable occurance, and the way people react in regards that idea would be predicted by determinism, and so on, there's no 'reprogramming', at best there is the delusion of reprogramming which is determined to be imagined by people in a society new to deterministic acceptance, but ya know, either things are determined or not. fuckit I'm too drunk to make my point lol I might try tomorrow

 

[hibernal_dream]

Ok I will rephrase it. The ultimate good is that which is good for MY genepool, and the ultimate evil is that which harms MY genepool. But this is the point of view that can only appopriately held by members of my genepool.

Looking objectively at the genepools of other creatures - this is the only definition of good and evil that has any practical meaning.

This does not mean that damaging anyone or anything outside of my genepool is fine - because many things are interconnected in the web of life. Thus, killing all bees is bad for my genepool, and is evil.

I understand. My main problem is that when a right motive (directed towards advancing my gene pool) leads to performing a wrong act (harming my gene pool), then you would define the act as evil. Simply knowing the end to which my behaviour is directed towards is probably not the best normative guide, since we cannot possibly know all the possible variables and consequences of each action we take - the intellectual effort required in deciphering whether one action alone will harm or benefit a gene pool is immense, let alone considering hundreds of actions per day and their cumulative effect. Outside a simplified form the theory, as you put it, hardly has 'practical meaning'.

 

[Cythraul]

Simply knowing the end to which my behaviour is directed towards is probably not the best normative guide, since we cannot possibly know all the possible variables and consequences of each action we take - the intellectual effort required in deciphering whether one action alone will harm or benefit a gene pool is immense, let alone considering hundreds of actions per day and their cumulative effect.

G.E. Moore makes almost the exact same points in Principia Ethica. I actually think his points are very important but they're in a chapter that nobody discusses that much. I strongly suggest you read Principia Ethica if you haven't yet.