The Political & Philosophy Thread

1. Neocon war hawk except when it wasn't not immediately politically convenient
2. Got some random guy thrown under the bus over his wife's drug addiction
3. Pathetic military career propped up by having admirals as his father and grandfather
4. Attention whore that signed onto every new legal cause imaginable but generally failed at passing them through Congress
5. One of those was an act to amnesty over 10 million illegal immigrants
 
This could easily go in the Dak thread as well, but I figure it'd get more eyeballs here:

https://scholars-stage.blogspot.com/2018/08/tradition-is-smarter-than-you-are.html

The link name/title is misleading, and while providing some excellent selections of reasons why tradition shouldn't be so easily abandoned, the closing point is this:

Each stage in the model presents a different sort of society than that which came before it. Very basic social and economic questions—including subsistence strategy, family type, mechanisms for mate selection, and so forth—change substantially as societies move through one stage to the next. Customs and norms that are adaptive for individuals in stage two societies may not be adaptive for individuals in living in stage four societies.

If the transition between these stages was slow this would not matter much. But it is not. Once stage two begins, each stage is only two or three generations long. The children of Europeans, Japanese, Taiwanese, and South Koreans born today look forward to spending their teenage years in stage five societies. What traditions could their grandparents give them that might prepare them for this new world? By the time any new tradition might arise, the conditions that made it adaptive have already changed.

This may be why the rationalist impulse wrests so strong a hold on the modern mind. The traditions are gone; custom is dying. In the search for happiness, rationalism is the only tool we have left

I would like to tie in with Bakker's crash points here, that we may be rapidly approaching the limits of human capacity for broad successful adjustment to environmental changes outside our control; only this time it is of things of our own making rather than a meteor, volcano, etc. One way we have a crash episode is politically. Politics become erratic in history with crisis, but previously crises were often limited in scale/scope and politically generated as much as any other contributor. Now we have techonological advancement and information production and flows which are outstripping the ability of even the best and brightest to keep up with the whole thing.

What may survive are people who can either A. Adapt or B. Destroy it. The people who adapt to the environment would likely need to destroy the people who could destroy the environment, and the people who could destroy the environment would also need to destroy those who can adapt to it. The next 150 years are going to likely be an incredibly pivotal time in the timeline of the human civilizational progress.
 
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when people were saying "donald trump is going senile" was actually before he decided to run for president
so him looking kinda senile now shouldn't really be all that surprising to anyone
also, he's 72, so there's alot of people who are just assuming that his horrible public speaking is just "old age"
 
It's a tactic, thinking he's senile seems silly to me.
didn't necessarily say it wasn't "a tactic"
just pointing out that people were already accusing him of being senile before he decided to run for president
so now that he's become president, if he suddenly stopped looking senile, news reporters would be like "wtf?? crazy guy stopped being crazy??"
 
Was just watching Joe Rogan's episode with Tulsi Gabbard and they got onto the subject of super-delegates and how this impacted Bernie's chances (as a side-note; Rogan should absolutely have Bernie on his podcast sometime) and I realized I didn't actually know that the DNC and GOP have different rules regarding how their super-delegates can vote.

I don't know if it's accurate but here Tulsi says that unlike the GOP, the DNC have no rules in place that say super-delegates have to vote in a way that reflects their constituency (for example in Hawaii apparently 70% of voters wanted Bernie but the majority of super-delegates wanted Hillary, which I guess means Hillary won Hawaii) and also that super-delegates are allowed to get their votes in early before we even know which way the votes are swaying.



Does anybody know if any of this is accurate?
 
Well it may have been. I remember reading the DNC made a lot of delegate rule changes this past year because of the fiasco with Sanders/Clinton.
 
Tulsi mentions that actually, but I don't think said changes have come into effect yet based on what she laid out. The specific change she mentions is something to the effect of; super-delegates cannot cast their votes in the first ballot, which is a good start but that seems inconsequential when compared to the idea that they can vote against the majority of their constituencies.

She also says that many people opposing these changes and calls to get rid of super-delegates within the DNC are going with the rationale that super-delegates need to be able to overturn the will of the majority with their votes just in case the majority vote to do something beyond reason or violent. Basically setting themselves up as heroes standing between freedom and mob rule.

Laughable stuff.
 
"Unpledged delegates exist to make sure that party leaders and elected officials don't have to be in a position where they are running against grass roots activists..."

That sounds super dodgy to me. Especially when you consider that the Republican Party unpledged delegates are obliged to vote for their state's popular vote winner under the rules of the party branch to which they belong, according to Wiki.
 
https://forum.savingplaces.org/blog...5/lessons-from-psychology-and-health-sciences

Biophilic qualities that trigger an immediate visceral response include structures grouped in ways that people perceive as orderly and pleasing. Architect Christopher Alexander, in collaboration with other colleagues (including the authors of this post), identified the processes that generate “legible” patterns in the human environment, such as boundaries, alternating repetition, strong centers, and levels of scale. Alexander cataloged 15 of these geometric properties, which he called properties of natural “morphology”—a biological term meaning the form and structure of an organism considered as a whole. He then showed that these properties are copiously present in both natural structures and human structures up until the “modern” era. It seems that these characteristics help us feel at home in our environments, enabling us to make cognitive sense of our world—and to perceive it as beautiful—with very important implications for our health and well-being. In the short term, they foster a sense of “belonging to a place” and hence a state of reduced stress; in the long term, they correlate with improvements in overall health, which are now being measured in medical research.
 
That's an interesting article. I've read about how regularities in biology (heart rate, breathing, anatomical symmetry) map onto an appreciation for aesthetic regularities. I don't think it's too surprising that the things that constitute bodily comfort also constitute some form of visual comfort. We tend to look for patterns, and it's reasonable to assume that our attraction to certain visuals is as biologically conditioned as it is socially.

The authors present an interesting account of our evolutionary relationship to visual aesthetics; but I have to say, they appear to have a very limited knowledge of scholarship on modern art, and to lump all modern art into the category of the "almost century-old theory of visual modernity"--a term that homogenizes art that falls under the banner of "the modern," and reduces differences within the field to insubstantial accidents. For starters, the avant-garde was only one small portion of visual modernity. One of the most famous figures in modern architecture was Le Corbusier, whose buildings exhibited a variety of visual features--some of which feature strong centers and stable boundaries, some of which don't.

The authors don't mention brutalism--a prominent descendent of modernism in architecture--despite the fact that brutalism is all about strong centers (one could argue that brutalism itself constitutes a "strong center") and borders. They also don't mention recent research on the presence of fractal patterns in modern art, from the controversial examination of Jackson Pollock's paintings to the recent book The Fractal Dimension in Architecture. The authors of the latter text argue that fractal complexity in architectural structures reflects the demands of the structure; in other words, if the building needs to accommodate more people, it tends to exhibit more complex architectural patterns. This argument shines light on one factor that the authors of the Preservation Leadership Forum essay don't even consider: functionality.

I find that their argument gets a little murky at this point. For example, look at the photos they use contrasting a purportedly "modern" building with the Piazza di Spagna in Rome. They claim that the modern building betrays its wear and tear more than the older building does--a claim that I think is very true. The problem here is that the modern structure they've chosen is a purely functional structure and exhibits none of the qualities they attribute to visual modernity: namely, attention-grabbing, artistic packaging, and lack of correspondence to larger wholes. I also thought that phrase "Look at me, I'm a modern art object!" was adorably laughable; I know they're trying to be serious, but I don't think they've done all their research when it comes to visual modernity. Or perhaps more accurately, I think they've imposed certain specific qualities from avant-garde visual modernism onto an entire century's worth of architecture, but then haven't bothered to note disparities within architectural history or, for that matter, to be consistent in the kinds of buildings they focus on. In fact, I would argue against these authors that the majority of modern buildings (such as the one they included in a photograph) aren't constructed according to the modern traits they've specified, but according to the demands of functionality and affordability. If modern buildings don't correspond to their surroundings, it's not because of artistic credo but because of structural and environmental demands; but these don't always translate into visual pleasure.

Lastly (for now), I'd ask them why they're so insistent upon homogeneity in an architectural ecosystem. Or, if homogeneity is too harsh, at least complementarity. Urban architecture reflects history as much as it does an artist's ideals or the structural demands of city space. If you visit Copley Square in Boston, and stand in front of the public library, you'll probably be able to see no fewer than seven different styles of architecture, all reflecting different histories. Now, no one really lives in Copley Square, so this probably makes some difference; but it's quite magnificent to stroll through such a small space (relatively speaking) and see so many different architectural styles. If you go one block over to Newbury Street, you'll see far more architectural regularity. To me, this seems like a more democratic differentiation of architectural appearances--not the (as I see it) homogenization of architecture that these authors seem to be championing.