Dominick_7
Member
It seems to me that this argument will only be plausible to one who actually thinks that the notion of necessary existence makes sense at all.
While logically incorrect implies a logical correct, actually crooked (that which is actually not straight) implies an actual straight, if (some or all)existence as you seem to imply is not necessary, then how does an actually non necessary being not (necessarily) imply an actual necessary existence by which to differentiate between the two?
If we're working with the notion that the existence of anything can only be proven a posteriori,
ONLY be proven a posteriori huh..How is that not being necessarily applied to existence/reality? In light of the fac that you must imply necessary knowlede about existence in that very statement, to say nothing can be known with necessity concerning existence...why accept that assumption?
If everything actual can only be known with gradtions of probabillity, and nothing actual can be known with actual necessity, unless its necessarily true that probability/probable degrees of knowledge can be known about reality why should we believe anything probable can be known about reality? Unless necessity does apply to reality we can know nothing about relaity. To say that probable known truth applies to reality, it can either apply probably (which has no ground) or applies necessarily. If it only applies probably you get an infinite regress of questionably known/less than necessarily certain "truths" where nothing is clear in itself, and must be made evident by another thing....ie nothing is known in itself...or you must finally arrive at self evident truth that is clear in itself, which needs not be made evident by another thing. If there is nothing self evident about actuality, nothing that is clear in itself, not needing to be made evident by something else, you canot known anything about reality in itself. To say "I know absolutely no thing in itself" implies knowledge of things in themselves to say that. So while one can state they know nothing, hey must imply that they know that. All denials of self evident truth imply the reality of self evident truth concerning reality.
and if we also identify the a posteriori with the contingent, then it seems that this argument would not even get off the ground. I think premise 5 can be restated as, "There cannot be anything whose existence is uncaused". That is a contingent proposition. That is, the supposition that everything has a cause is a claim supported by past experience, not by a deductive proof. So if we're identifying the a posteriori with the contingent, then premise 5 expresses a contingent fact. It is conceivable that there exists something such that it was uncaused. So it would seem that it is possible that something exists such that it was uncaused. If so, then premises 5, 6, and 7 go by the board.
Again, this was a quick response (I have to go to bed), so I apologize if it comes across as rather glib (and anyway, these are really complex issues).
I think you stated it well. The way you stated it shows the inescapabillity of the fact that necessity applies to actual existence/reality. To apply probabillity/sole a posteriori to existence must imply necessity in relation to relity, because either all knowledge about reality is ONLY probable (which indirectly implies necessity) or you must allow the possibility and actuaity of necessity applying to existence/reality. Either way you must affirm its possibility and or actuality.